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Core Lightning

Modular C implementation of the Lightning Network protocol and node stack.

BitcoinLightning NetworkActive incident
Repository coverage

2330 commits in the local evidence base

Every captured commit receives deterministic security triage and a separate communication-quality score. Security candidates and broader second-pass signals receive full-patch Ollama analysis.

228security candidates319second-pass queue1977AI analyses
99commits · 30 days
229commits · 60 days
709commits · 180 days
1578commits · 365 days
Backfill bands
Aug 5 → Feb 61049 seen37 candidatesComplete
Feb 6 → Jun 6579 seen10 candidatesComplete
Jun 6 → Jul 678 seen1 candidatesComplete
Jul 6 → Aug 5147 seen16 candidatesComplete
Commit communication

Does the history explain itself?

Message quality measures whether a commit identifies its scope, purpose, rationale, testing, and supporting references. It does not change the security-severity score.

71/100 average clarity
628Strong · 80–100
1399Adequate · 60–79
272Thin · 40–59
31Opaque · 0–39
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Developer activity

Who is changing the project?

Public Git author strings; identities are not independently verified.

DeveloperCommitsCandidatesAnalyzedHigh riskMessage avg.
cdecker331217581
daywalker9019315113471
Níckolas Goline961252376
Amperstrand322278
Rusty Russell96977961173
Sangbida Chaudhuri18537157167
Vincenzo Palazzo19714185
Lagrang3115679170
dovgopoly18016165
Dusty Daemon821378066
ShahanaFarooqui931093063
Peter Neuroth1469110074
Analysis record

Published AI watches

Last scanned 25 minutes ago

Informational 15 AI analysisMessage 85 · Strong
EP Elements ProjectCore Lightning BitcoinLightning Network

doc: bring lightning-downgrade's version list up to v26.12.

This commit only updates documentation. It adds new version entries to the manual page for the lightning-downgrade tool and mentions the tool in the upgrade guide. No code, database logic, or security behavior is changed.

2e7a9f5aby Ken Sedgwick+9−12 files
No security note in commit
Informational 23 AI analysisMessage 66 · Adequate
EP Elements ProjectCore Lightning BitcoinLightning Network

Makefile: install lightning-downgrade.

This is a packaging/build fix, not a security vulnerability. The `lightning-downgrade` utility was being compiled but accidentally left out of the list of programs installed by `make install`. As a result, official release archives contain…

06ea9ba0by Ken Sedgwick+1−01 file
No security note in commit
Low 27 AI analysisMessage 83 · Strong
EP Elements ProjectCore Lightning BitcoinLightning Network

wallet: create bwatch tables before backfilling them

This commit fixes a database upgrade bug in Core Lightning. Wallets created with version v26.06.10 were missing two new tables (our_outputs and our_txs) because they skipped the migrations that create them. When users later upgraded, a fol…

Database migration failure could prevent node startup after upgradeFixes missing table creation before data backfillAdds regression test for upgrade path from v26.06.10
ce2a6836by daywalker90+105−02 files
No security note in commit
Informational 15 AI analysisMessage 5 · Opaque
EP Elements ProjectCore Lightning BitcoinLightning Network

v26.12rc1

This commit is a routine version bump from v26.06.10 to v26.12rc1 for Core Lightning. It only updates version strings in packaging files, a changelog, and a lockfile. There are no code changes that introduce, fix, or modify any security-se…

4002c4e9by Níckolas Goline+164−1110 files
No security note in commit
Low 30 AI analysisMessage 68 · Adequate
EP Elements ProjectCore Lightning BitcoinLightning Network

wallet: store payment failure details per groupid

This commit fixes a database bug in Core Lightning where failure details for a payment attempt were being overwritten by later retry attempts that shared the same payment identifier fragment. The fix makes the failure record match on an ad…

Data integrity bug causing incorrect error reporting across payment retry groupsNo memory safety, authentication, authorization, or cryptographic issues presentNo external input is trusted or validated differently
24082c6dby daywalker90+6−34 files
No security note in commit
Low 43 AI analysisMessage 83 · Strong
EP Elements ProjectCore Lightning BitcoinLightning Network

cln-plugin: do not panic when the log writer task is gone

This commit fixes a bug in Core Lightning's Rust plugin library where a plugin could crash with a panic if it tried to log a message after the internal log-writing task had already stopped, such as during shutdown. The fix makes the plugin…

panic on send failure replaced with stderr fallbacklog message no longer silently dropped on writer task exitunit test added for dropped-receiver scenario
8661ffabby cdecker+29−11 file
No security note in commit
Informational 15 AI analysisMessage 90 · Strong
EP Elements ProjectCore Lightning BitcoinLightning Network

docs: explain hsmtool HTLC recovery

This commit only adds documentation to the manual page for an existing command-line tool (hsmtool). It explains how to recover funds from old Lightning payment commitments (HTLCs) after losing channel state. There are no code changes, no n…

f90c140dby Sangbida Chaudhuri+85−01 file
No security note in commit
Informational 15 AI analysisMessage 68 · Adequate
EP Elements ProjectCore Lightning BitcoinLightning Network

tests: make test_delpay_works deterministic

This commit only changes a test file to make a flaky test more reliable. It does not modify any production code, so it has no security impact on real users.

a224ca81by daywalker90+16−161 file
No security note in commit
Informational 20 AI analysisMessage 73 · Adequate
EP Elements ProjectCore Lightning BitcoinLightning Network

doc: say that listtransactions gives blockheight 0 for a tx not in a block

This commit only updates documentation to explain that the `listtransactions` command reports a block height and transaction index of 0 when a transaction is not currently in a block (for example, because it hasn't been mined yet or was re…

bc281be3by Peter Neuroth+4−42 files
No security note in commit
Informational 20 AI analysisMessage 50 · Thin
EP Elements ProjectCore Lightning BitcoinLightning Network

fixup! pyln-client: don't crash Millisatoshi.to_approx_str() on zero

This is a small bug fix in a Python helper library used by Core Lightning. The Millisatoshi.to_approx_str() method previously crashed with a math error when converting a zero amount to a human-readable string. The patch makes zero return "…

No security-relevant signals presentFix is a routine correctness/robustness improvement
02612ed5by Amartya Singh+4−31 file
No security note in commit
Moderate 62 AI analysisMessage 73 · Adequate
EP Elements ProjectCore Lightning BitcoinLightning Network

wallet: reject unmodifiable PSBTs in addpsbtoutput/addpsbtinput

This update fixes a crash in two wallet commands, addpsbtoutput and addpsbtinput. These commands let users add extra transaction outputs or inputs to a PSBT (a Bitcoin transaction planning file). If a user supplied a PSBT whose version 2 '…

Daemon crash (assertion failure) on crafted/strict PSBT inputMissing validation of PSBT v2 modifiable flags before mutationUser-controlled input directly passed to libwally without precondition check
42472816by daywalker90+14−12 files
Vendor flagged security relevance
Moderate 59 AI analysisMessage 83 · Strong
EP Elements ProjectCore Lightning BitcoinLightning Network

tests: show addpsbtoutput/addpsbtinput crash on an unmodifiable v2 PSBT

This commit only adds a new test case that demonstrates two Core Lightning commands, addpsbtoutput and addpsbtinput, crash with an internal assertion when given a v2 PSBT that does not allow adding inputs or outputs. The test is marked as …

Daemon abort due to failed assertion in PSBT helper functionsRPC commands addpsbtoutput and addpsbtinput lack validation of PSBT modifiability flags before calling libwallyPotential denial-of-service vector: any caller able to submit a crafted v2 PSBT can crash lightningd
42e268abby daywalker90+60−01 file
No security note in commit
Informational 20 AI analysisMessage 73 · Adequate
EP Elements ProjectCore Lightning BitcoinLightning Network

pyln-client: don't crash Millisatoshi.to_approx_str() on zero

This commit fixes a minor bug in Core Lightning's Python client library where calling a pretty-printing method on a zero-amount payment would crash with a ValueError. It is a routine correctness fix, not a security vulnerability. There is …

5ebe365dby Amartya Singh+3−12 files
No security note in commit
Moderate 59 AI analysisMessage 83 · Strong
EP Elements ProjectCore Lightning BitcoinLightning Network

dualopen and splicing: add minimal verification of tx_signatures

This commit adds missing safety checks in Core Lightning when a peer sends signatures for opening or splicing a dual-funded Lightning channel. Before the patch, the software accepted peer-provided transaction witnesses without verifying th…

Missing input validation on peer-provided witness dataBOLT-2 compliance fix for tx_signaturesRejection of empty witness stacks
c6be4f71by Lagrang3+633−97 files
Vendor flagged security relevance
Moderate 54 AI analysisMessage 85 · Strong
EP Elements ProjectCore Lightning BitcoinLightning Network

channeld: abort_channels no longer fails a channel with a signed splice

This fix prevents a user-issued 'abort channels' command from incorrectly failing a Lightning channel when a splice transaction has already been signed. Previously, the code would pass the latest in-flight splice to a routine that aborts i…

Denial-of-service/availability impact: user-initiated abort could inadvertently fail a funded channelProtocol compliance fix: avoids sending tx_abort after tx_signatures, which BOLT 2 forbidsState-handling bug in splice negotiation lifecycle
c87f5573by Andezion+22−11 file
No security note in commit
Moderate 51 AI analysisMessage 73 · Adequate
EP Elements ProjectCore Lightning BitcoinLightning Network

lightningd: fix crash on mutual close of an unconfirmed dual-funded channel

This update fixes a bug where a specific type of Lightning channel close could crash the node. It only happens when both parties cooperatively close a dual-funded channel that has not yet been confirmed and has gone through a funding bump …

NULL pointer dereference leading to daemon crash (denial of service)Crash occurs in cooperative-close path for unconfirmed dual-funded/RBF channelsFix uses canonical channel funding key instead of splice-only field
555143beby Sangbida Chaudhuri+9−31 file
Vendor flagged security relevance
High 74 AI analysisMessage 73 · Adequate
EP Elements ProjectCore Lightning BitcoinLightning Network

cln-grpc: reject malformed request values instead of panicking

This commit fixes a security bug in Core Lightning's gRPC plugin (cln-grpc). Previously, a malformed request from a gRPC client could crash the plugin: bad public keys, hashes, secrets, channel IDs, or enum values triggered Rust 'unwrap()'…

Denial-of-service via malformed gRPC request causing tonic worker task panicDenial-of-service via std::process::exit(1) in ProofField conversion on missing oneofSilent integer truncation of u16/u8 fields via 'as' casts
b2703436by daywalker90+1558−12135 files
Vendor flagged security relevance
Informational 15 AI analysisMessage 51 · Thin
EP Elements ProjectCore Lightning BitcoinLightning Network

nix: drop protobuf again

This commit removes the protobuf package from the Nix build environment because it is no longer needed. A previous change made the cln-grpc component use its own bundled protoc compiler instead of relying on the system one. The Python bind…

a0459eeeby Peter Neuroth+0−11 file
No security note in commit
Informational 15 AI analysisMessage 73 · Adequate
EP Elements ProjectCore Lightning BitcoinLightning Network

make: check gRPC protos for breaking changes against the last release

This commit adds a new automated check to the project's build process that compares gRPC protocol definitions against the last release to catch accidental breaking changes early. It does not change any runtime code, fix a bug, or introduce…

db5fea70by daywalker90+43−84 files
No security note in commit
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Security candidateglobal: replace randombytes_buf() with randbytes() wrapper.by Rusty Russell · f8fd97fb · Nov 13, 2025 · 69 filesMessage 65 · AdequateInformational 19Details
Commit message · Rusty Russell

global: replace randombytes_buf() with randbytes() wrapper.

This allows us to override it for deterministic results.

Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>

65/100 · AdequateMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides an explanatory body
Why it was queued
cryptography-sensitive pathsigning or wallet pathparser or protocol path
AI analysis · Informational 19/100

This change is a straightforward internal cleanup: it replaces direct calls to the cryptographic library's random-byte function (randombytes_buf from libsodium) with a project-specific wrapper called randbytes(). The wrapper currently does the same thing, but having it in one place makes it easier to swap in a deterministic (predictable) random source for testing in the future. There is no direct security bug introduced by this commit itself, and no evidence it weakens real-world randomness.

Security candidatelightningd: introduce some changes for dual open id randomness even with CLN_DEV_ENTROPY_SEED.by Rusty Russell · 633fd21e · Nov 13, 2025 · 1 fileMessage 70 · AdequateInformational 23Details
Commit message · Rusty Russell

lightningd: introduce some changes for dual open id randomness even with CLN_DEV_ENTROPY_SEED.

Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>

70/100 · AdequateMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides an explanatory body✓ Names security-relevant behavior explicitly
Why it was queued
entropy or randomness
AI analysis · Informational 23/100

This commit fixes a developer-only edge case. When running Core Lightning with a special developer mode flag (CLN_DEV_ENTROPY_SEED) that forces the same randomness seed for testing, multiple channel-opening sub-processes could accidentally pick the same internal IDs. That could cause a PSBT (transaction-building data structure) collision when combining contributions. The fix tweaks the seed slightly for each new sub-process so IDs differ, then restores the original seed afterward. It is not a normal user security bug and does not expose funds or keys.

Security candidatesplice: Update splice_info tlv to use odd versionby Dusty Daemon · c29db245 · Nov 13, 2025 · 2 filesMessage 80 · StrongLow 29Details
Commit message · Dusty Daemon

splice: Update splice_info tlv to use odd version

Update the tlv to use the type referenced in the spec, which also makes marks the tlv as optional.

Changelog-EXPERIMENTAL: --experimental-splicing: if you have splicing enabled on a channel both nodes must upgrade in unison due to updating commitment_signeds splice_info tlv's type.

80/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Explains rationale or failure mode
Why it was queued
boot or update path
AI analysis · Low 29/100

This commit changes an experimental splicing feature's internal message numbering from 0 to 1 so it matches the official Lightning spec and becomes optional. It is a compatibility/standards-alignment fix, not a direct security patch. Both channel peers must upgrade together or they may fail to understand each other's splice-related messages.

Security candidatefuzz-tests: get rid of magic numbers in `fuzz-hsm_encryption.c`by Chandra Pratap · 9be3eeea · Nov 10, 2025 · 1 fileMessage 83 · StrongInformational 15Details
Commit message · Chandra Pratap

fuzz-tests: get rid of magic numbers in `fuzz-hsm_encryption.c`

Changelog-None: `fuzz-hsm_encryption.c` hard codes the lengths
sizeof(struct secret) as 32 and crypto_pwhash_argon2id_PASSWD_MAX
as 4294967295. Replace the latter with the former to improve
readability and maintainability.

While at it, replace the `tal_free()` call on our secret key with
`discard_key()`. This has the benefit of testing `discard_key()`.

[ Changed from fuzz-hsm_encryption to fuzz-hsm_secret --RR ]

83/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Mentions testing or verification
Why it was queued
secret or key materialfuzzing or regression evidence
AI analysis · Informational 15/100

This is a minor cleanup change to a fuzz test file. It replaces hard-coded numbers with named constants and swaps a generic memory-free call for a dedicated key-discard function. There is no security vulnerability here.

Security candidatepytest: test for bcli crash with huge PSBTs.by Rusty Russell · 5d64eb9a · Nov 3, 2025 · 1 fileMessage 70 · AdequateLow 34Details
Commit message · Rusty Russell

pytest: test for bcli crash with huge PSBTs.

Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>

70/100 · AdequateMessage clarity
✓ Descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides an explanatory body✓ Mentions testing or verification
Why it was queued
signing boundary
AI analysis · Low 34/100

This commit adds a test that checks whether Core Lightning's bitcoin backend plugin (bcli) crashes when handling very large transactions. The test is marked as expected to fail for now, meaning the underlying crash bug is known but not yet fixed. It does not itself change production code.

Security candidatecommon: remove tal_check() call on libwally allocations.by Rusty Russell · 48c3df91 · Nov 3, 2025 · 1 fileMessage 83 · StrongInformational 19Details
Commit message · Rusty Russell

common: remove tal_check() call on libwally allocations.

We call it once at the end, but calling on each allocation is
excessive, and it shows when dealing with large PSBTS. Testing a
700-input PSBT was unusably slow without this: after this the entire
test ran in 9 seconds.

Changelog-Fixed: JSON-RPC: Dealing with giant PSBTs (700 inputs!) is now much faster.
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>

83/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Mentions testing or verification
Why it was queued
signing boundary
AI analysis · Informational 19/100

This change removes a repeated internal sanity check that was making very large Bitcoin transaction templates (PSBTs with hundreds of inputs) extremely slow to process. It is a performance fix, not a security fix. The remaining single check at the end still catches the same class of problems, just less frequently.

Security candidatewallet: update wallet address generation logic to use unified BIP86/BIP32 approachby Sangbida Chaudhuri · 620eb080 · Oct 26, 2025 · 6 filesMessage 73 · AdequateLow 33Details
Commit message · Sangbida Chaudhuri

wallet: update wallet address generation logic to use unified BIP86/BIP32 approach

Simplify wallet address generation by using a unified approach where
the derivation method (BIP86 vs BIP32) is determined by the wallet's
HSM secret type rather than having separate address types.

73/100 · AdequateMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context
Why it was queued
secret or key materialsigning or wallet path
AI analysis · Low 33/100

This commit refactors how Core Lightning generates wallet addresses. Instead of keeping two separate address types (legacy BIP32 and mnemonic-based BIP86), it now picks the derivation method based on the wallet's HSM secret type. The change removes the special 'bip86' address type from RPCs and unifies address generation. It also fixes a memory leak by freeing a temporary TLV structure. There is no direct evidence in the commit of a security vulnerability being patched, but the change touches key-derivation logic and could affect fund recoverability if implemented incorrectly.

Security candidatelightningd: store base and derive pubkeys locallyby Sangbida Chaudhuri · 16656652 · Oct 26, 2025 · 7 filesMessage 80 · StrongInformational 11Details
Commit message · Sangbida Chaudhuri

lightningd: store base and derive pubkeys locally

RIP to this commit there's a good chance a lot of this code doesn't even make this into the final PR. Pour one out for the fallen lines of code.

This commit is doing the rest of the derivation. There was a significant overlap between the bip32_pubkey derivation and the bip86_pubkey derivation so that has been refactored in one place.

80/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Explains rationale or failure mode
Why it was queued
secret or key materialsigning or wallet path
AI analysis · Informational 11/100

This commit adds experimental support for deriving Bitcoin public keys using the BIP86 standard inside Core Lightning. It stores a new base key locally in the main daemon and adds a command-line option to turn the feature on. The change also removes a dedicated HSM permission flag for BIP86 derivation, folding it into existing capability checks. There is no clear security bug in the diff, but the commit message says much of the code may not survive review, so it looks like unfinished work-in-progress.

Security candidatecommon: refactor hsm_secret to {secret_data,len,type}by Sangbida Chaudhuri · 0192b82e · Oct 26, 2025 · 2 filesMessage 73 · AdequateInformational 12Details
Commit message · Sangbida Chaudhuri

common: refactor hsm_secret to {secret_data,len,type}

BIP86 derivation requires the full 64-byte seed that comes from the BIP39 mnemonic. The first 32 bytes goes towards to master seed material and the nest 32 bytes go towards the chaincode, so we need the entire 64 bytes for deterministic derivations. I've kept the old secret struct in for now for backwards compatibility and also added some accessors which will eventually die in this branch's git multiverse but that's a spoiler, they're on the ride for the next few commits at least to help us migrate to this length aware API throughout the rest of the code without making a lot of breaking changes.

73/100 · AdequateMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context
Why it was queued
secret or key material
AI analysis · Informational 12/100

This commit is a code refactor in Core Lightning's wallet secret handling. It changes how the HSM (Hardware Security Module-like) secret is stored internally so it can hold either the traditional 32-byte secret or a full 64-byte seed derived from a BIP39 mnemonic. It keeps the old 32-byte field for backward compatibility and adds helper functions to read the secret. There is no security fix or vulnerability being patched here.

Security candidatehsmd: use the new mnemonic-compatible hsm_secret routines.by Sangbida Chaudhuri · 218dc2fe · Oct 26, 2025 · 11 filesMessage 73 · AdequateLow 33Details
Commit message · Sangbida Chaudhuri

hsmd: use the new mnemonic-compatible hsm_secret routines.

Changelog-Changed: hsmd: New nodes will now be created with a BIP-39 12-word phrase as their root secret.
Changelog-Deprecated: config: `encrypted-hsm` to require a passphrase (use `hsm-passphrase`).
Changelog-Added: config: `hsm-passphrase` indicates we should use a manual passphrase with the hsm secret.

73/100 · AdequateMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context
Why it was queued
access controlsigning or wallet path
AI analysis · Low 33/100

This commit changes how Core Lightning's Hardware Security Module daemon (hsmd) creates and stores the master secret for new nodes. Instead of a raw 32-byte random secret (optionally encrypted with a password-derived key), new nodes now get a 12-word BIP-39 mnemonic phrase as their root secret, with an optional passphrase. The old --encrypted-hsm option is deprecated in favor of --hsm-passphrase. The change is a feature redesign of key storage, not a fix for a known exploitable bug, but it touches critical cryptographic material and removes legacy encrypted-secret handling.

Security candidatelightningd: scan outputs for BIP86 addressesby Sangbida Chaudhuri · 249fa036 · Oct 26, 2025 · 4 filesMessage 80 · StrongLow 42Details
Commit message · Sangbida Chaudhuri

lightningd: scan outputs for BIP86 addresses

This commit fixes an issue where BIP86 addresses were not being
discovered during wallet recovery/rescan operations.

The root cause was that init_txfilter() only populated the transaction
filter with BIP32-derived keys, preventing lightningd from recognizing
BIP86 UTXOs during blockchain scans. Now both BIP32 and BIP86 derived
scripts are included in the filter when BIP86 derivation is enabled.

This ensures that wallets restored from BIP39 mnemonics can properly
discover and display previously funded BIP86 addresses without requiring
manual address generation first.

[ We also move the slightly-lost comment about libbacktrace so it is
where we actually include <backtrace.h> --RR ]

80/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Explains rationale or failure mode
Why it was queued
secret or key materialsigning or wallet path
AI analysis · Low 42/100

This commit fixes a wallet-recovery bug in Core Lightning. When a user restored a wallet that used BIP86 (a modern Bitcoin address type), the node failed to scan the blockchain for those addresses, so previously received funds would appear missing until the user manually generated an address. The patch makes the rescan process look for both BIP32 and BIP86 addresses.

Security candidatecommon: add unified HSM secret handling moduleby Sangbida Chaudhuri · 9977b72e · Oct 26, 2025 · 3 filesMessage 68 · AdequateInformational 11Details
Commit message · Sangbida Chaudhuri

common: add unified HSM secret handling module

This is a newer API to replace hsm_encryption.c and hsm_encryption.c, this tidies up the API to be used and also cleans things up to support our new formats. Our hsm_secret formats now include:
- Legacy 32-byte plain format
- Legacy 73-byte encrypted format
- New mnemonic format without passphrase (32 zero bytes + mnemonic)
- New mnemonic format with passphrase (32-byte hash + mnemonic)

This commit includes support to detect the format based on the file size and content structure. The hsm will store mnemonics in the hsm_secret file as:

`passphraseHash`mnemonic`

68/100 · AdequateMessage clarity
✓ Descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context
Why it was queued
access control
AI analysis · Informational 11/100

This commit adds a new internal module for handling the secret key file used by Core Lightning's hardware security module (HSM). It introduces support for reading the existing plain and encrypted formats, plus new formats based on BIP39 word lists (mnemonics) with optional passphrases. The code uses modern password hashing (Argon2) and authenticated encryption (libsodium secretstream). There is no direct evidence in the commit that this fixes a known security vulnerability; it appears to be a feature/refactoring change to support new wallet backup formats.

Security candidatehsmd: take the passphrase raw, not the derived secret.by Sangbida Chaudhuri · e3fe739f · Oct 26, 2025 · 7 filesMessage 73 · AdequateLow 35Details
Commit message · Sangbida Chaudhuri

hsmd: take the passphrase raw, not the derived secret.

In preparation for BIP-39, we need to hand the passphrase (if any) to HSMD.

So we extend the hsmd wire protocol to allow that.

73/100 · AdequateMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context
Why it was queued
access controlsigning or wallet path
AI analysis · Low 35/100

This commit changes how Core Lightning's main daemon (lightningd) sends an HSM passphrase to the separate HSM daemon (hsmd). Previously, lightningd derived an encryption key from the passphrase locally and sent that derived key to hsmd. Now it sends the raw passphrase inside a new optional protocol field (a TLV extension), and lets hsmd derive the key itself. The change is framed as preparation for BIP-39 mnemonic support. It is a protocol and internal API change, not a clear-cut security fix, but it does alter where the passphrase is handled and how it travels between processes.

Security candidatehsmd: add BIP86 wire scaffolding (derive/check), no behavior yetby Sangbida Chaudhuri · 121fcfc9 · Oct 26, 2025 · 3 filesMessage 73 · AdequateInformational 15Details
Commit message · Sangbida Chaudhuri

hsmd: add BIP86 wire scaffolding (derive/check), no behavior yet

Here's some *foreshadowing* for what's to come. Here's what we're aiming for with our derivation flow:

Derivation split (hardened vs unhardened)
========================================

┌───────────────┐
│ HSM │ (secrets live here)
│ │
│ BIP39 → seed (64B)
│ ↓
│ m/86'/0'/0' ← derive hardened base (private)
│ ↓ (neuter)
│ BIP86 base xpub ← public-only + chain code
│ ↓
│ [send once over wire]
└───────────────┘
│
▼
┌───────────────────────┐
│ lightningd / wallet │
│ │
│ local (unhardened) derivations:
│ /0/i → external
│ /1/i → change
│ │
│ P2TR(BIP86) from pubkey_i
│ (optionally: CHECK with HSM)
└───────────────────────┘

We want to do part of the derivation inside hsmd and then send this base "pubkey" over the wire so our wallet can do the remaining derivation based on the address type and index. This lays the foundation for the base key wire message.

73/100 · AdequateMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context
Why it was queued
secret or key materialdefensive validation
AI analysis · Informational 15/100

This commit only adds placeholder message types and stubs for a future BIP86 key-derivation feature. The new wire messages return an explicit 'not implemented yet' error and perform no actual key derivation, signing, or secret handling. There is no active security issue in this patch itself.

Security candidatedoc: change encrypted-hsm to hsm-passphraseby Sangbida Chaudhuri · 5f67e7dd · Oct 26, 2025 · 1 fileMessage 45 · ThinInformational 15Details
Commit message · Sangbida Chaudhuri

doc: change encrypted-hsm to hsm-passphrase

45/100 · ThinMessage clarity
✓ Descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component! No meaningful explanatory body
Why it was queued
access controldocumentation-only discount
AI analysis · Informational 15/100

This commit only updates the user manual documentation for the Core Lightning node software. It renames the documented configuration option from 'encrypted-hsm' to 'hsm-passphrase' and explains how passphrases now work with both old-style encrypted secrets and new BIP39 mnemonic-based seeds. No program code was changed, so this cannot introduce or fix a security vulnerability by itself.

Security candidatehsmd_wire: add HSM wire protocol support for secret type detectionby Sangbida Chaudhuri · 266b8082 · Oct 26, 2025 · 8 filesMessage 73 · AdequateInformational 19Details
Commit message · Sangbida Chaudhuri

hsmd_wire: add HSM wire protocol support for secret type detection

Add TLV field to hsmd_init_reply_v4 to communicate the HSM secret type
(mnemonic vs legacy) from HSM to lightningd. This allows lightningd to
automatically determine whether to use BIP86 or BIP32 derivation without
needing separate address types.

73/100 · AdequateMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context
Why it was queued
secret or key materialsigning or wallet path
AI analysis · Informational 19/100

This commit adds a small metadata field to the internal HSM (Hardware Security Module) initialization message so that lightningd can tell whether the wallet seed was created from a mnemonic phrase or from an older legacy secret. It is a protocol plumbing change, not a fix for a known vulnerability, and does not by itself change how secrets are generated, stored, or protected.

Security candidatehsmd/libhsmd: add BIP86 base-keyby Sangbida Chaudhuri · 63001745 · Oct 26, 2025 · 4 filesMessage 68 · AdequateLow 33Details
Commit message · Sangbida Chaudhuri

hsmd/libhsmd: add BIP86 base-key

BIP86 wants the full 64-byte BIP32 seed (from BIP39). This wires up BIP86
support so the HSM derives the hardened base m/86'/0'/0' inside the box,
and exposes helpers:
• derive_bip86_base_key() // m/86'/0'/0'
• bip86_key(index) // m/86'/0'/0'/0/index

Spoiler: derive_bip86_base_key() and bip86_key() now live in libhsmd.c as they will later be used to check the derived wallet address against hsmd's derivation, this is just to sanity check that we haven't had an accidental bit flip while we have generated this address.

68/100 · AdequateMessage clarity
✓ Descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context
Why it was queued
secret or key materialdefensive validation
AI analysis · Low 33/100

This commit adds support for deriving Bitcoin BIP86-style keys inside Core Lightning's Hardware Security Module (HSM) daemon. It introduces two new wire messages that let authorized clients ask the HSM to derive a BIP86 base key and to check whether a public key matches the HSM's own derivation. The commit also adds a new permission bit controlling access to these messages. There is no direct evidence in the commit that this fixes an active vulnerability; it reads as feature work to support a new wallet/key derivation path, with a sanity-check helper to catch accidental derivation mismatches.

Security candidatehsmd: find correct P2TR key for utxoby Sangbida Chaudhuri · 1b3e881d · Oct 26, 2025 · 4 filesMessage 68 · AdequateLow 42Details
Commit message · Sangbida Chaudhuri

hsmd: find correct P2TR key for utxo

In the case where we receive a taproot utxo we want to be able to tell if it was derived using a BIP32 seed or a BIP86 seed. Considering we will only be supporting BI86 type wallet addresses for mnemonics we can check if the out secret is 64 bytes long and if it is we can use our BIP86 for the withdrawal.

68/100 · AdequateMessage clarity
✓ Descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context
Why it was queued
secret or key material
AI analysis · Low 42/100

This commit fixes a bug in Core Lightning's HSM (Hardware Security Module daemon) where the wrong private key could be derived when spending a taproot (P2TR) UTXO. Previously, the code always used the older BIP32-style derivation for taproot UTXOs. After the change, it checks whether the UTXO was actually created using the newer BIP86 derivation path (used with mnemonic-based wallets) and, if so, derives the correct key. If the wrong key is used, the node would be unable to sign a transaction spending that UTXO, effectively locking the funds until the bug is fixed. There is no direct evidence in the commit or supplied references that this was a security vulnerability exploitable by an attacker; it appears to be a correctness/functional bug.

Security candidatetest: Add a psbt test and an index boundary testby Sangbida Chaudhuri · c7f36951 · Oct 26, 2025 · 1 fileMessage 67 · AdequateInformational 15Details
Commit message · Sangbida Chaudhuri

test: Add a psbt test and an index boundary test

67/100 · AdequateMessage clarity
✓ Descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Uses a recognizable type or scope✓ Mentions testing or verification! No meaningful explanatory body
Why it was queued
signing boundarysigning or wallet path
AI analysis · Informational 15/100

This commit only adds two new automated tests to the project's test suite. It does not change any production code, so it cannot introduce a security vulnerability or fix one directly. The tests verify that BIP86 (a type of Bitcoin taproot wallet address) behaves correctly when generating many addresses and when used in transaction signing workflows.

Security candidateexposesecret: Add support for mnemonic-based HSM secretsby Sangbida Chaudhuri · de9c6305 · Oct 26, 2025 · 13 filesMessage 73 · AdequateInformational 15Details
Commit message · Sangbida Chaudhuri

exposesecret: Add support for mnemonic-based HSM secrets

Update the exposesecret plugin to work with the new unified HSM secret
format that supports BIP39 mnemonics.

Changelog-Added - exposesecret now has a mnemonic field

73/100 · AdequateMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context
Why it was queued
secret or key material
AI analysis · Informational 15/100

This commit adds a new feature to the Core Lightning 'exposesecret' plugin. It allows users who have set up their node with a BIP39 mnemonic (a human-readable seed phrase) to retrieve that mnemonic through the plugin's API. The change also includes some internal cleanup for how mnemonic secrets are handled and converted into cryptographic seeds. There is no indication in the commit that this fixes a security vulnerability; it is a feature addition.

Security candidatehsmd/libhsmd: change hsmd_init to have secret_data and secret_lenby Sangbida Chaudhuri · fc981f4d · Oct 26, 2025 · 3 filesMessage 73 · AdequateInformational 18Details
Commit message · Sangbida Chaudhuri

hsmd/libhsmd: change hsmd_init to have secret_data and secret_len

hsmd: plumb length-aware secret into hsmd_init; keep 32B mirror

BIP86 (from BIP39) wants the full 64-byte BIP32 seed. This commit plumbs a variable-length (32/64B) secret into hsmd and uses the accessors from the previous commit. We keep the old 32B hsm_secret mirror and, for now, only use the first 32 bytes so legacy paths keep working.

Spoiler: HKDFs will keep using the 32B seed; only wallet address derivation
will switch to the full 64B in a follow-up.

73/100 · AdequateMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context
Why it was queued
secret or key material
AI analysis · Informational 18/100

This is a preparatory code change for Core Lightning's HSM (the component that holds private keys). It changes an internal function so it can accept either a 32-byte or 64-byte root secret, keeping the existing 32-byte behavior intact. The commit itself does not change how keys are actually derived or fix any known vulnerability; it is plumbing for a future feature (BIP86 wallet addresses).

Security candidatewallet: make sure to watch all txids in transactions table.by Rusty Russell · 478a0d57 · Oct 24, 2025 · 5 filesMessage 85 · StrongInformational 24Details
Commit message · Rusty Russell

wallet: make sure to watch all txids in transactions table.

We watch if they are to do with a channel, or have outputs going to us, but otherwise
we didn't, so we never updated the blockheight in the db.

Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
Changelog-Fixed: JSON-RPC: `listtransactions` now correctly updates `blockheight` for txs created by `sendpsbt` which have no change outputs.

85/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Explains rationale or failure mode
Why it was queued
signing boundarysigning or wallet path
AI analysis · Informational 24/100

This commit fixes a bookkeeping bug in Core Lightning's wallet. When a user broadcast a transaction created with `sendpsbt` that had no change output coming back to the node, the node did not track the transaction's confirmation status. As a result, `listtransactions` would never show the correct `blockheight` for that transaction. The fix makes the node explicitly watch all unconfirmed transactions in its database so their confirmation height gets updated. There is no direct security exploit here; it is a data-correctness and user-experience issue.

Security candidatepytest: add test that we notice height change of sendpsbt with no change.by Rusty Russell · 2591ac48 · Oct 24, 2025 · 1 fileMessage 75 · AdequateInformational 12Details
Commit message · Rusty Russell

pytest: add test that we notice height change of sendpsbt with no change.

Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>

75/100 · AdequateMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides an explanatory body✓ Mentions testing or verification
Why it was queued
signing boundarysigning or wallet path
AI analysis · Informational 12/100

This commit only adds a new automated test to the project's test suite. It does not change any production code, so it cannot directly fix or introduce a security vulnerability. The test checks that a wallet transaction created via sendpsbt is correctly tracked from unconfirmed to confirmed status, including after a node restart. It is currently marked as expected to fail (xfail), meaning the underlying behavior may not yet work as intended.

Security candidateplugins: fix %*.s typo.by Rusty Russell · 8f6d3d87 · Oct 24, 2025 · 5 filesMessage 64 · AdequateModerate 68Details
Commit message · Rusty Russell

plugins: fix %*.s typo.

And add a check for new uses creeping in, since it got cut & paste
everywhere.

This means "this is a valid string, but truncate it to this many characters"
vs "%.*s" which means "only read this many characters of string":

```
['lightningd-3 2025-10-23T02:31:40.890Z **BROKEN** plugin-funder: Plugin marked as important, shutting down lightningd!']
--------------------------- Captured stderr teardown ---------------------------
#0 0x557da58ad1dc in printf_common(void*, char const*, __va_list_tag*) asan_interceptors.cpp.o
#1 0x557da5aff814 in json_out_addv /home/runner/work/lightning/lightning/ccan/ccan/json_out/json_out.c:239:11
#2 0x557da59740ce in plugin_logv /home/runner/work/lightning/lightning/plugins/libplugin.c:1777:2
#3 0x557da5969b6f in plugin_log /home/runner/work/lightning/lightning/plugins/libplugin.c:1934:2
#4 0x557da595c4f6 in datastore_del_success /home/runner/work/lightning/lightning/plugins/funder.c:161:2
#5 0x557da598b837 in handle_rpc_reply /home/runner/work/lightning/lightning/plugins/libplugin.c:1072:10
#6 0x557da598a4b0 in rpc_conn_read_response /home/runner/work/lightning/lightning/plugins/libplugin.c:1361:3
#7 0x557da5adbea5 in next_plan /home/runner/work/lightning/lightning/ccan/ccan/io/io.c:60:9
#8 0x557da5ae06ff in do_plan /home/runner/work/lightning/lightning/ccan/ccan/io/io.c:422:8
#9 0x557da5adfb58 in io_ready /home/runner/work/lightning/lightning/ccan/ccan/io/io.c:439:10
#10 0x557da5aec2ce in io_loop /home/runner/work/lightning/lightning/ccan/ccan/io/poll.c:455:5
#11 0x557da59757ac in plugin_main /home/runner/work/lightning/lightning/plugins/libplugin.c:2409:3
#12 0x557da594fe23 in main /home/runner/work/lightning/lightning/plugins/funder.c:1723:2
#13 0x7f6572229d8f in __libc_start_call_main csu/../sysdeps/nptl/libc_start_call_main.h:58:16
#14 0x7f6572229e3f in __libc_start_main csu/../csu/libc-start.c:392:3
#15 0x557da588b584 in _start (/home/runner/work/lightning/lightning/plugins/funder+0x10d584) (BuildId: 71ba63ab577fc6fa60573d3e8555f6db7d5c584d)

0x624000009d28 is located 0 bytes to the right of 7208-byte region [0x624000008100,0x624000009d28)
allocated by thread T0 here:
#0 0x557da590e7f6 in __interceptor_realloc (/home/runner/work/lightning/lightning/plugins/funder+0x1907f6) (BuildId: 71ba63ab577fc6fa60573d3e8555f6db7d5c584d)
#1 0x557da5b2149b in tal_resize_ /home/runner/work/lightning/lightning/ccan/ccan/tal/tal.c:755:13
#2 0x557da59f2032 in membuf_tal_resize /home/runner/work/lightning/lightning/common/utils.c:203:2
#3 0x557da5b03934 in membuf_prepare_space_ /home/runner/work/lightning/lightning/ccan/ccan/membuf/membuf.c:45:12
#4 0x557da59d4289 in jsonrpc_io_read_ /home/runner/work/lightning/lightning/common/jsonrpc_io.c:127:2
#5 0x557da598a635 in rpc_conn_read_response /home/runner/work/lightning/lightning/plugins/libplugin.c:1366:9
#6 0x557da5adbea5 in next_plan /home/runner/work/lightning/lightning/ccan/ccan/io/io.c:60:9
#7 0x557da5ae06ff in do_plan /home/runner/work/lightning/lightning/ccan/ccan/io/io.c:422:8
#8 0x557da5adfb58 in io_ready /home/runner/work/lightning/lightning/ccan/ccan/io/io.c:439:10
#9 0x557da5aec2ce in io_loop /home/runner/work/lightning/lightning/ccan/ccan/io/poll.c:455:5
#10 0x557da59757ac in plugin_main /home/runner/work/lightning/lightning/plugins/libplugin.c:2409:3
#11 0x557da594fe23 in main /home/runner/work/lightning/lightning/plugins/funder.c:1723:2
#12 0x7f6572229d8f in __libc_start_call_main csu/../sysdeps/nptl/libc_start_call_main.h:58:16

SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow asan_interceptors.cpp.o in printf_common(void*, char const*, __va_list_tag*)
Shadow bytes around the buggy address:
0x0c487fff9350: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
0x0c487fff9360: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
0x0c487fff9370: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
0x0c487fff9380: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
0x0c487fff9390: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
=>0x0c487fff93a0: 00 00 00 00 00[fa]fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa
0x0c487fff93b0: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa
0x0c487fff93c0: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa
0x0c487fff93d0: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa
0x0c487fff93e0: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa
0x0c487fff93f0: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa
Shadow byte legend (one shadow byte represents 8 application bytes):
Addressable: 00
Partially addressable: 01 02 03 04 05 06 07
Heap left redzone: fa
Freed heap region: fd
Stack left redzone: f1
Stack mid redzone: f2
Stack right redzone: f3
Stack after return: f5
Stack use after scope: f8
Global redzone: f9
Global init order: f6
Poisoned by user: f7
Container overflow: fc
Array cookie: ac
Intra object redzone: bb
ASan internal: fe
Left alloca redzone: ca
Right alloca redzone: cb
==26122==ABORTING
```

Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>

64/100 · AdequateMessage clarity
✓ Subject identifies a change✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference✓ Names security-relevant behavior explicitly
Why it was queued
memory safetydefensive validation
AI analysis · Moderate 68/100

This commit fixes a typo in several Core Lightning plugins where the wrong printf format string was used. The buggy '%*.s' tells the program to treat a string pointer as a width and then read an unlimited number of bytes from another pointer, which can read past the end of a buffer and crash or leak memory. The fix changes it to '%.*s', which correctly limits how many bytes are read from the string. The commit also adds a build-time check to stop the typo from being reintroduced.

Security candidateMakefile: create a library containing common, wire and bitcoin objects.by Rusty Russell · e120f870 · Oct 22, 2025 · 83 filesMessage 95 · StrongInformational 15Details
Commit message · Rusty Russell

Makefile: create a library containing common, wire and bitcoin objects.

This means we don't have to manually choose what to link against,
which is much of the complexity of our Makefiles: the compiler will
automatically use any object files it needs to link.

We already do this for ccan as libccan.a, now we have libcommon.a.

We don't link against it for *everything*, as some tests require their own
versions.

Notes:
1. I get rid of the weird plugins/test/Makefile2 (accidental commit?)
2. Many tests change due to update-mocks.
3. In some places I added the missing dependency on the Makefile itself, though most are in the next
patch.

Before:
Total program size: 221366528
Total tests size: 364243856

After:
Total program size: 190733656
Total tests size: 337880888

Build time from make clean (RUST=0) (includes building external libs):

Before:
real 0m38.227000-44.245000(41.8222+/-1.6)s
user 3m2.105000-33.696000(23.1442+/-8.4)s
sys 0m35.054000-42.269000(39.7231+/-2)s
After:
real 0m38.944000-40.416000(40.1131+/-0.4)s
user 3m6.790000-17.159000(15.0571+/-2.8)s
sys 0m35.304000-37.336000(36.8942+/-0.57)s

Build time after touch config.vars (RUST=0):

Before:
real 0m18.928000-22.776000(21.5084+/-1.1)s
user 2m8.613000-36.567000(27.7281+/-7.7)s
sys 0m20.458000-23.436000(22.3963+/-0.77)s

After:
real 0m19.831000-21.862000(21.5528+/-0.58)s
user 2m15.361000-30.731000(28.4798+/-4.4)s
sys 0m21.056000-22.339000(22.0346+/-0.35)s

Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>

rusty@rusty-Framework:~/devel/cvs/lightni

95/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Explains rationale or failure mode✓ Mentions testing or verification
Why it was queued
signing or wallet pathboot or update path
AI analysis · Informational 15/100

This commit is a build-system cleanup. It creates a new static library (libcommon.a) containing common, wire, and bitcoin object files so that Makefiles no longer need to list individual object files by hand. It also removes many auto-generated mock function stubs from unit tests because those functions are now provided by the library. There is no runtime behavior change to Core Lightning itself, and no security issue is introduced or fixed.