Every captured commit receives deterministic security triage and a separate communication-quality score. Security candidates and broader second-pass signals receive full-patch Ollama analysis.
Message quality measures whether a commit identifies its scope, purpose, rationale, testing, and supporting references. It does not change the security-severity score.
This commit simply adds a new person's PGP public-key fingerprint to the list of trusted release signers in two documentation files. It does not change any code, fix any bug, or alter any security behavior of the software itself.
This is a tiny internal fix to make a bookkeeping migration produce stable event ordering. It changes the timestamp used when creating historical 'deposit' records during a one-time database migration, so the records sort consistently with…
This commit is a documentation-only cleanup of the JSON-RPC command help files. It corrects which numeric error codes are listed for each command so the published schemas match what the software actually returns. No program logic, validati…
Documentation-only change with no executable code modificationsCorrects RPC schema error-code metadata to match actual handler behaviorNo change to input parsing, authorization, cryptography, or network behavior
This commit fixes a bug where a setting that controls whether unexpected transaction signatures are allowed was not initialized when the channel daemon starts. If a peer sent such signatures before the channel was fully ready, the program …
use of uninitialized variableundefined behavior (invalid bool load)network-triggered code path
This commit fixes the project's internal nightly code-coverage CI workflow. It changes how test coverage files are collected, ensures the same LLVM compiler version is used to generate and merge coverage data, and uploads a Codecov-compati…
This commit is a large cleanup of Core Lightning's API schemas, generated RPC bindings, and related plugin code. The stated goal is to make the documented 'required' fields match what the C code actually always produces or expects. In prac…
Large schema-only change with no accompanying security advisory or CVEOne semantic change to plugin hook response: invoice_payment hook can now reject with only failure_message and no resultMany fields change from optional to required in public RPC/protobuf interfaces
This commit only updates documentation. It adds error code 313 to the documented error lists for several Core Lightning commands (fundpsbt, utxopsbt, txprepare, multiwithdraw, and upgradewallet). The error code already existed in the code …
This commit fixes a release-script check that verifies the cryptographic signature on a file of checksums. Previously, the script only told GPG to verify the signature file itself. If someone replaced that signature file with an inline-sig…
Incorrect cryptographic verification logic in release toolingPotential false-positive signature verification with inline-signed .asc substitutionRelease-integrity hardening
This commit updates Core Lightning's release documentation to tell users and release managers to run gpg --verify with both the signature file and the manifest file named explicitly. The old one-argument form can silently succeed even if t…
Verification bypass risk in release artifact validationgpg --verify single-argument form can exit 0 without reading the intended manifestDocumentation-only hardening of release process
This commit is a routine update to the Rust dependency lock file (Cargo.lock), bumping many third-party libraries to newer patch or minor versions. The commit message gives no security reason for the update, and no verified references link…
Routine dependency refresh with no stated security rationaleUpdates to security-sensitive transitive crates (rustls, hyper, h2, tokio, webpki-roots) but no evidence these versions fix known vulnerabilitiesNo source-code changes or patch-specific fixes visible in the diff
This commit fixes a stack-overflow risk in Core Lightning's JSON parser. Before the fix, an attacker could send a valid JSON-RPC message containing thousands of nested brackets or braces. The parser's own helper functions used recursion fo…
Stack-overflow via deeply nested JSONRecursive JSON traversal without depth boundDenial-of-service vector in JSON-RPC input parsing
This commit only fixes typos and comment style. It changes two C-style comments from // to /* */ and corrects a grammar error in a documentation comment ('element' to 'elements'). There are no code behavior changes, no bug fixes, and no se…
This change fixes a test-infrastructure bug in Core Lightning's Python testing helpers. When running tests against a PostgreSQL database, very long test names could be silently shortened by PostgreSQL, causing different test runs or nodes …
No security-relevant signal: change is in test framework code onlyFixes a test reliability issue, not a runtime vulnerabilityNo input sanitization, authentication, cryptography, or network changes
This fix prevents Core Lightning from trying to use freshly created bitcoins (immature coinbase rewards) as emergency funds for fee-bump transactions. Such a transaction would be invalid under Bitcoin's rules and would be rejected by the n…
This commit fixes a bug in Core Lightning's askrene plugin that could prevent a node from restarting. When a saved routing layer contained a node bias with a description, the plugin accidentally freed the description's memory while using i…
Use-after-free / double-take of a tal-allocated string during plugin startupDenial-of-service-like symptom: lightningd aborts before replying to init, node cannot restartFixes publicly reported issue #9433 by endothermicdev
This commit only fixes a test case so it actually exercises the intended code path. It does not change any production code, so it cannot introduce or fix a real-world security vulnerability by itself. The test change is a reproducer for a …
This commit fixes a bug in Core Lightning's experimental dual-funded channel feature. When another node tried to open a channel, Core Lightning was not checking whether the proposed transaction fees were reasonable. A peer could request a …
Missing input validation on wire-parsed feerate fieldsPeer could induce signing and storage of feerate == 0RBF remote path allowed unbounded upward feerate walks
This commit adds regression tests for three related bugs where wildly wrong Bitcoin transaction feerates could enter Core Lightning. In the worst case, a malicious or broken fee source could make the node think a feerate was zero (due to a…
Integer overflow in feerate conversion (u32 wrap from 0xFFFFFFFF perkb to 0 perkw)Absurd feerate from external fee source bypassing sanity ceilingDatabase-stored out-of-range feerate causing startup abort/crash loop
This update fixes a crash bug in Core Lightning. When the software tried to list details of a channel opening in progress, it could crash if a stored fee rate was extremely large or zero. The crash happened because the code used an interna…
Integer overflow in RBF escalation (u32 * 25 / 24) leading to assertion failureAssertion failure in read-only introspection RPC (listpeerchannels) causing crash-loop at startupDatabase value treated as invariant despite originating from external fee estimator
This commit fixes a bug where Core Lightning nodes could get stuck in a crash loop. If a node had previously stored an extremely high or zero fee rate for an in-progress channel funding operation (a 'splice' or dual-funded channel RBF), a …
Integer overflow in fee-rate calculation (u32 overflow when multiplying by 25/24)Assertion failure leading to daemon crash loop at startupDatabase migration clamps out-of-range stored funding feerates
When doing a multi channel splice, we need to break the deadlock by signing the shared output early (even though it is not sent to the peer until later).
68/100 · AdequateMessage clarity
✓ Descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context
Why it was queued
signing boundary
AI analysis · Low 31/100
This change adjusts how Core Lightning handles 'splicing' (a way to resize a Lightning channel's on-chain funding). When a user splices multiple channels at the same time, the software now signs a shared piece of the transaction earlier than before, so it can build a complete signatures message for all peers. The commit describes this as fixing a deadlock, not as a security vulnerability. There is no direct evidence in the commit or supplied references that this is exploitable by an attacker.
Make the failure reason more clear by adding more information to the signature failure message.
65/100 · AdequateMessage clarity
✓ Descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides an explanatory body✓ Names security-relevant behavior explicitly
Why it was queued
signing boundary
AI analysis · Informational 16/100
This change only improves an error message shown when a splicing (channel funding update) negotiation fails because the remote peer did not send enough signatures. It adds a count of how many remote inputs need signatures and how many signature bundles were actually received. There is no code behavior change that fixes or introduces a vulnerability; it is purely a diagnostic/logging improvement.
Security candidatesplice: Change abort rules to sent sigsby Dusty Daemon · dd1e183b · Aug 13, 2025 · 1 fileMessage 68 · AdequateLow 43Details
Commit message · Dusty Daemon
splice: Change abort rules to sent sigs
Previous behavior was to fail on abort when we have signatures in the inflight — change this behavior to fail on abort if we have sent our peer our signatures.
68/100 · AdequateMessage clarity
✓ Descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context
Why it was queued
signing boundary
AI analysis · Low 43/100
This commit tightens the conditions under which Core Lightning's channel daemon will abort a splice operation. Previously, the daemon treated a splice as unabortable if any signatures existed in the 'inflight' (pending) channel state. Now it only blocks abort if this specific node has actually sent its signatures to the peer. The change is one line and appears aimed at preventing a node from backing out of a splice after it has already committed to it cryptographically, which could otherwise let a malicious or buggy peer exploit inconsistent state.
Security candidatesplice: Add field to DB to track if we’ve sent sigsby Dusty Daemon · a8ff8ce7 · Aug 13, 2025 · 12 filesMessage 78 · AdequateInformational 24Details
Commit message · Dusty Daemon
splice: Add field to DB to track if we’ve sent sigs
We used to use a check on the active psbt to see if our splice signature was in it — but now we need to generate the signature early.
So we have to add a field tracking if we’ve sent it and add it to the database, wire protocols, and inflight objects.
78/100 · AdequateMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Names security-relevant behavior explicitly
Why it was queued
signing boundarysigning or wallet path
AI analysis · Informational 24/100
This commit adds a new bookkeeping flag, 'i_sent_sigs', to track whether a splice signature has already been sent. It changes how the node decides that question: previously it inspected the active PSBT, but now it records the fact explicitly in memory, wire messages, and the wallet database. The change is described as a refactor to support generating splice signatures earlier. There is no direct evidence in the commit of a security vulnerability, but any mismatch in this flag could in principle cause a node to send signatures twice, omit them, or resume a splice incorrectly after a restart.
When doing a cross channel splice, inputs move from having no SIGHASH to having SIGHASH_ALL assigned.
This causes psbt_get_changeset to flag the input as having changed, as the sighash value is compared.
This causes the second channel splice to `tx_remove_input` the input as it doesn’t match anymore, breaking the splice.
We fix this by removing the sighash value from input comparisions.
68/100 · AdequateMessage clarity
✓ Descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context
Why it was queued
signing boundarysigning or wallet path
AI analysis · Low 41/100
This commit fixes a bug in Core Lightning's splicing feature where a transaction input could be incorrectly removed during a 'cross-channel splice' because the software compared a newly-added signature hash flag. The fix tells the comparison logic to ignore the signature-hash value so the input is not treated as changed and wrongly dropped. It is a functional bug fix rather than an obvious security vulnerability, but it could cause a splice to fail or funds to be handled incorrectly.
✓ Descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component! No meaningful explanatory body
Why it was queued
signing boundarysigning or wallet path
AI analysis · Low 32/100
This commit fixes a small bug in how Core Lightning builds Bitcoin witness data from a PSBT. Previously, when a witness item had a declared length of zero, the code would still try to copy data from a pointer that could be NULL. The fix skips the copy when the length is zero and adds an assertion that the pointer is valid when length is non-zero. This is a defensive correctness fix; it likely prevents a potential NULL-pointer read or undefined behavior rather than an obvious remote exploit.
Security candidatesplice: Even if the psbt’s “match” the sig data may varyby Dusty Daemon · 122dae10 · Aug 13, 2025 · 1 fileMessage 78 · AdequateModerate 52Details
Commit message · Dusty Daemon
splice: Even if the psbt’s “match” the sig data may vary
Since the signature data may vary, we must copy the new psbt into splicing->current_psbt.
This never occured during normal operation, but when doing a cross splice there may be vital signature(s) in the psbt that came from another splice that get dropped without this step.
78/100 · AdequateMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Names security-relevant behavior explicitly
Why it was queued
signing boundary
AI analysis · Moderate 52/100
This change fixes a bug in Core Lightning's channel-splicing code. During a splice, two versions of a Bitcoin transaction structure (a PSBT) might look identical in their main transaction data but differ in their attached signatures. Previously, the code would skip copying the new PSBT if the main transaction hadn't changed, which could discard signatures from a related splice. The fix always copies the latest PSBT so signatures are preserved. The commit describes this as a bug that could affect 'cross splice' scenarios, but it does not label it as a security vulnerability.
Security candidateplugin: Allow json_object and json_group_array functions in sql pluginby ShahanaFarooqui · d5c73185 · Aug 13, 2025 · 1 fileMessage 78 · AdequateInformational 18Details
Commit message · ShahanaFarooqui
plugin: Allow json_object and json_group_array functions in sql plugin
Changelog-Added: Plugins: `sql` also supports functions `json_object(key1, value1, ...)` to construct JSON objects and `json_group_array(value)` to aggregate rows into JSON array.
Security Considerations - No new SQL injection risks: Functions only process explicitly provided column values (no arbitrary string parsing). - Explicit column requirements: Wildcards (*) are not supported, all fields must be named (e.g., json_object('peer_id', id)). - Permission-bound data access: Functions adhere to the same table/row permissions as the underlying query.
Performance Impact - Optimized native execution: Leverages SQLite’s built-in JSON1 extension (when available) for efficiency. - Moderate CPU overhead: Complex nesting may impact performance on large datasets but still faster than application-layer JSON conversion.
78/100 · AdequateMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Names security-relevant behavior explicitly
Why it was queued
credential or privilege state
AI analysis · Informational 18/100
This commit adds two SQLite JSON helper functions, json_object and json_group_array, to the list of functions allowed by Core Lightning's SQL plugin. The change is a small whitelist expansion in the plugin's query authorization code. The commit message explicitly states this does not introduce new SQL injection risks and that the functions follow existing table and row permissions. There is no direct evidence in the commit of a security vulnerability.
Security candidatesqlite3: consistently comment where we want to upgrade.by Rusty Russell · e051ba6b · Aug 11, 2025 · 3 filesMessage 78 · AdequateInformational 15Details
Commit message · Rusty Russell
sqlite3: consistently comment where we want to upgrade.
Now you can grep for 'sqlite3 version' and see where we would like to update.
Debian 11 (Bullseye) and Ubuntu 20.04 (Focal) ship with SQLite 3.31.1. RHEL 9 ships with 3.34.1. Fedora 38+ uses SQLite 3.40+.
Unfortunately, RHEL8 ships with 3.26.0, and is still on maintenance Support (security fixes, no new features): runs until May 31, 2029.
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
78/100 · AdequateMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Names security-relevant behavior explicitly
Why it was queued
explicit security languagesigning or wallet path
AI analysis · Informational 15/100
This commit only adds and rewords comments in the source code to make it easier to find places where the project would like to require a newer SQLite version in the future. It does not change any actual behavior, fix any bug, or alter any security-related logic.