Every captured commit receives deterministic security triage and a separate communication-quality score. Security candidates and broader second-pass signals receive full-patch Ollama analysis.
Message quality measures whether a commit identifies its scope, purpose, rationale, testing, and supporting references. It does not change the security-severity score.
This commit only updates documentation. It adds new version entries to the manual page for the lightning-downgrade tool and mentions the tool in the upgrade guide. No code, database logic, or security behavior is changed.
This is a packaging/build fix, not a security vulnerability. The `lightning-downgrade` utility was being compiled but accidentally left out of the list of programs installed by `make install`. As a result, official release archives contain…
This commit fixes a database upgrade bug in Core Lightning. Wallets created with version v26.06.10 were missing two new tables (our_outputs and our_txs) because they skipped the migrations that create them. When users later upgraded, a fol…
Database migration failure could prevent node startup after upgradeFixes missing table creation before data backfillAdds regression test for upgrade path from v26.06.10
This commit is a routine version bump from v26.06.10 to v26.12rc1 for Core Lightning. It only updates version strings in packaging files, a changelog, and a lockfile. There are no code changes that introduce, fix, or modify any security-se…
This commit fixes a database bug in Core Lightning where failure details for a payment attempt were being overwritten by later retry attempts that shared the same payment identifier fragment. The fix makes the failure record match on an ad…
Data integrity bug causing incorrect error reporting across payment retry groupsNo memory safety, authentication, authorization, or cryptographic issues presentNo external input is trusted or validated differently
This commit fixes a bug in Core Lightning's Rust plugin library where a plugin could crash with a panic if it tried to log a message after the internal log-writing task had already stopped, such as during shutdown. The fix makes the plugin…
panic on send failure replaced with stderr fallbacklog message no longer silently dropped on writer task exitunit test added for dropped-receiver scenario
This commit only adds documentation to the manual page for an existing command-line tool (hsmtool). It explains how to recover funds from old Lightning payment commitments (HTLCs) after losing channel state. There are no code changes, no n…
This commit only changes a test file to make a flaky test more reliable. It does not modify any production code, so it has no security impact on real users.
This commit only updates documentation to explain that the `listtransactions` command reports a block height and transaction index of 0 when a transaction is not currently in a block (for example, because it hasn't been mined yet or was re…
This is a small bug fix in a Python helper library used by Core Lightning. The Millisatoshi.to_approx_str() method previously crashed with a math error when converting a zero amount to a human-readable string. The patch makes zero return "…
No security-relevant signals presentFix is a routine correctness/robustness improvement
This commit is a trivial formatting cleanup (removing an extra blank line and adding one) in a test file. It does not change any code behavior, fix any bug, or alter any security-relevant logic.
This update fixes a crash in two wallet commands, addpsbtoutput and addpsbtinput. These commands let users add extra transaction outputs or inputs to a PSBT (a Bitcoin transaction planning file). If a user supplied a PSBT whose version 2 '…
Daemon crash (assertion failure) on crafted/strict PSBT inputMissing validation of PSBT v2 modifiable flags before mutationUser-controlled input directly passed to libwally without precondition check
This commit only adds a new test case that demonstrates two Core Lightning commands, addpsbtoutput and addpsbtinput, crash with an internal assertion when given a v2 PSBT that does not allow adding inputs or outputs. The test is marked as …
Daemon abort due to failed assertion in PSBT helper functionsRPC commands addpsbtoutput and addpsbtinput lack validation of PSBT modifiability flags before calling libwallyPotential denial-of-service vector: any caller able to submit a crafted v2 PSBT can crash lightningd
This commit fixes a minor bug in Core Lightning's Python client library where calling a pretty-printing method on a zero-amount payment would crash with a ValueError. It is a routine correctness fix, not a security vulnerability. There is …
This commit adds missing safety checks in Core Lightning when a peer sends signatures for opening or splicing a dual-funded Lightning channel. Before the patch, the software accepted peer-provided transaction witnesses without verifying th…
Missing input validation on peer-provided witness dataBOLT-2 compliance fix for tx_signaturesRejection of empty witness stacks
This fix prevents a user-issued 'abort channels' command from incorrectly failing a Lightning channel when a splice transaction has already been signed. Previously, the code would pass the latest in-flight splice to a routine that aborts i…
Denial-of-service/availability impact: user-initiated abort could inadvertently fail a funded channelProtocol compliance fix: avoids sending tx_abort after tx_signatures, which BOLT 2 forbidsState-handling bug in splice negotiation lifecycle
This update fixes a bug where a specific type of Lightning channel close could crash the node. It only happens when both parties cooperatively close a dual-funded channel that has not yet been confirmed and has gone through a funding bump …
NULL pointer dereference leading to daemon crash (denial of service)Crash occurs in cooperative-close path for unconfirmed dual-funded/RBF channelsFix uses canonical channel funding key instead of splice-only field
This commit fixes a security bug in Core Lightning's gRPC plugin (cln-grpc). Previously, a malformed request from a gRPC client could crash the plugin: bad public keys, hashes, secrets, channel IDs, or enum values triggered Rust 'unwrap()'…
Denial-of-service via malformed gRPC request causing tonic worker task panicDenial-of-service via std::process::exit(1) in ProofField conversion on missing oneofSilent integer truncation of u16/u8 fields via 'as' casts
This commit removes the protobuf package from the Nix build environment because it is no longer needed. A previous change made the cln-grpc component use its own bundled protoc compiler instead of relying on the system one. The Python bind…
This commit adds a new automated check to the project's build process that compares gRPC protocol definitions against the last release to catch accidental breaking changes early. It does not change any runtime code, fix a bug, or introduce…
Expand any commit for its author, full message, clarity score, changed files, triage signals, analysis, and source link.
Lower-prioritytests: reproduce a mutual close at the fee ceiling falling back to the commitmentby Ken Sedgwick · f79ec8c4 · Sep 14, 2026 · 1 fileMessage 83 · StrongTriage 0Details
Commit message · Ken Sedgwick
tests: reproduce a mutual close at the fee ceiling falling back to the commitment
With every fee estimate at the floor, the opener's closing fee range is a single value. Each output is rounded down to whole satoshis, so the msat remainders end up in the fee and the closing transaction pays one satoshi more than the fee both sides agreed on. lightningd rejects that transaction as above its maximum, keeps the commitment as last_tx, and the close proceeds to broadcast the commitment while reporting a mutual close.
test_closing_fee_rounding_at_ceiling pins both nodes at the floor, leaves remainders of 999 and 1 msat, closes from the opener, and checks that the transaction returned by close is a two-output closing transaction paying the agreed fee plus one satoshi, and that both nodes see the output after one block. Marked xfail until the following commits.
Changelog-None.
(cherry picked from commit 0471b3b37b69b7a988aad6a396d8ed2456d09484)
83/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Mentions testing or verification
gossipwith was started before the final block was mined, without waiting for it to connect: if block processing won the race, our channel_announcement was force-broadcast before the peer existed and it received nothing, so gossipwith hung until the pytest timeout.
It also used --max-messages as the stop condition, but the number of timestamp_filter/query/ping messages is not deterministic, so under load the count was never reached and the test timed out:
subprocess.TimeoutExpired: Command '['devtools/gossipwith', '--no-gossip', '--hex', '--network=regtest', '--max-messages=10', '--handle-pings', ...]' timed out after 140 seconds
Finally, the channel_announcement can legitimately arrive twice (once via lightningd's own-gossip broadcast, once via connectd's stream, which sends our timestamp-0 channel_announcement even with a "none" filter), so don't assert an exact count:
Wait for the peer to connect before mining, read gossipwith's output until the messages we care about have arrived (bounded), and accept one or two channel_announcements. gossipwith now flushes each hex message so partial output survives the test terminating it.
Fixes: #9270 Changelog-None
81/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Mentions testing or verification✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference
l3 was watching its own (censored) commitment tx, so it can take a while before it notices l2's commitment is the one onchain and tries to fulfill the HTLC. If we released the censored txs before that, we only broadcast l3's own commitment txs, which conflict with l2's already-mined commitment and are rejected, leaving the mempool empty and making the final generate_block(wait_for_mempool=1) time out.
Wait for l3's fulfill attempt (a tx spending an output of l2's commitment) before releasing. Also release only those txs, deduped by txid and in capture order, so duplicate or RBF fulfill attempts are not broadcast as stale versions.
renepay: free pending routes when the payment finishes
A payment can complete while some of its routes are still in flight. This happens with MPP, or when a retry succeeds before all the parts of a previous attempt have resolved. payment_collect_results() only frees the routes that reached a final state, so the still-in-flight routes stay in the global pay_plugin->pending_routes map forever.
The serialized onion of such a route is only reachable through the tal tree (struct route does not keep a pointer to it), so memleak reports it at shutdown:
Implement the routetracker_cleanup() hook, which was a TODO: when the payment finishes, collect the routes that are still pending for it and free them, which removes them from the pending routes map through the existing destructor.
Changelog-Fixed: renepay: fix a memory leak of routes that were still in flight when the payment completed.
73/100 · AdequateMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context
Security candidatepytest: make test_grpc_wrong_auth cross the wires on one port, with deadlinesby cdecker · 8b546e46 · Sep 14, 2026 · 1 fileMessage 83 · StrongInformational 15Details
Commit message · cdecker
pytest: make test_grpc_wrong_auth cross the wires on one port, with deadlines
After l1 stopped, the old stub dialled l1's now-free gRPC port while l2 listened on a different one, so the test never checked a foreign certificate against a live node. Its gRPC calls also had no deadline: when the client keeps retrying a handshake the server rejects, the call blocked forever and hung the test.
Start l2 on l1's port, connect to 127.0.0.1 explicitly, and give every call a deadline. The call with the wrong credentials may now end in DEADLINE_EXCEEDED as well as UNAVAILABLE; both mean it was refused.
Changelog-None
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
83/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Mentions testing or verification
Why it was queued
credential or privilege state
AI analysis · Informational 15/100
This commit only changes a test file. It fixes a flaky test that was supposed to verify a gRPC client with the wrong certificate gets rejected by a different node, but the test was not actually checking the real scenario and could hang forever. There is no change to production code or any security fix to the software itself.
Lower-priorityccan: update to fix strmap warning, includes new COMPILER_WANTS_INIT.by Rusty Russell · b2d59056 · Sep 14, 2026 · 10 filesMessage 73 · AdequateTriage 0Details
Commit message · Rusty Russell
ccan: update to fix strmap warning, includes new COMPILER_WANTS_INIT.
Our own common/utils.h COMPILER_WANTS_INIT was promoted to a proper CCAN helper, but slightly generalized with another arg to indicate the initializer to use, rather than assuming "0". So fix up the handful of users.
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
73/100 · AdequateMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context
plugins/spender: fix false positive init warning from gcc-12 -O3.
In practice, this is behind a branch where it can't occur: gcc-13 doesn't mind, but gcc-12 does.
``` In function ‘handle_fee_and_ppm’, inlined from ‘continue_splice.part.0’ at plugins/spender/splice.c:1669:12: plugins/spender/splice.c:1415:38: error: ‘funding_wallet_index’ may be used uninitialized [-Werror=maybe-uninitialized] 1415 | && splice_cmd->states[funding_wallet_index]->state != SPLICE_CMD_PENDING) { | ^ plugins/spender/splice.c: In function ‘continue_splice.part.0’: plugins/spender/splice.c:1394:16: note: ‘funding_wallet_index’ was declared here 1394 | size_t funding_wallet_index; | ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ```
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
73/100 · AdequateMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context
``` In file included from ccan/ccan/strmap/strmap.h:5, from ./common/memleak.h:4, from lightningd/channel_gossip.c:5: lightningd/channel_gossip.c: In function ‘broadcast_new_gossip’: ccan/ccan/build_assert/build_assert.h:56:17: error: anonymous struct declared inside parameter list will not be visible outside of this definition or declaration [-Werror] 56 | (sizeof(struct { _Static_assert(cond, "BUILD_ASSERT_OR_ZERO"); char c; }) - 1) | ^~~~~~ ccan/ccan/typesafe_cb/typesafe_cb.h:35:46: note: in definition of macro ‘typesafe_cb_cast’ 35 | oktype), \ | ^~~~~~ ./lightningd/subd.h:184:19: note: in expansion of macro ‘typesafe_cb_preargs’ 184 | typesafe_cb_preargs(void, void *, \ | ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ lightningd/channel_gossip.c:415:9: note: in expansion of macro ‘subd_req’ 415 | subd_req(ld->gossip, ld->gossip, | ^~~~~~~~ ccan/ccan/cast/cast.h:47:14: note: in expansion of macro ‘BUILD_ASSERT_OR_ZERO’ 47 | (0 ? BUILD_ASSERT_OR_ZERO(cast_const_compat1((expr), type)) : \ | ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ lightningd/channel_gossip.c:417:42: note: in expansion of macro ‘cast_const’ 417 | -1, 0, addgossip_reply, cast_const(char *, desc)); | ^~~~~~~~~~ cc1: all warnings being treated as errors ```
And
``` ccan/ccan/cdump/cdump.c: In function ‘tok_take_conglom’: ccan/ccan/cdump/cdump.c:272:35: error: ‘%.*s’ directive argument is null [-Werror=format-overflow=] 272 | "Line %u: '%.*s': %s\n", | ^~~~ cc1: all warnings being treated as errors ```
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
73/100 · AdequateMessage clarity
✓ Descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Names security-relevant behavior explicitly
Why it was queued
memory safety
AI analysis · Informational 14/100
This commit updates two internal helper files in the CCAN library to silence compiler warnings when building with newer GCC versions. One change swaps an anonymous struct for an anonymous union inside a compile-time size check, because GCC 13 objects to anonymous structs in certain macro expansions. The other avoids passing a NULL pointer into a printf-style error message. There is no indication these changes fix a runtime security bug; they are build-hygiene fixes.
lightningd: check expiry bounds in createinvoice too
A crafted bolt11 can carry expiry >= 2^32 past the invoice RPC's gate: the expiry field is a varint and decode does not require a valid signature, so createinvoice fed b11->expiry straight into invoice creation -- hitting the same bolt11_encode() 60-bit abort and expiry-timer overflow as the invoice path. Same bound, same message, placed before the re-encode. Pointed out in the PR thread.
Changelog-Fixed: lightningd: refuse bolt11 `expiry` above 2^32 seconds in `createinvoice` too, instead of crashing or busy-looping. Signed-off-by: Amperstrand <amperstrand@localhost> (cherry picked from commit 5f433f04e84cda27a4298500860af18e6b9b8e87)
78/100 · AdequateMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Names security-relevant behavior explicitly
Why it was queued
signing boundarymemory safety
AI analysis · High 76/100
This commit fixes a bug in Core Lightning's createinvoice RPC. A malicious or malformed BOLT11 invoice could include an expiry time of 2^32 seconds or more. Because createinvoice decoded the invoice without checking signature validity, it would accept that oversized expiry and either crash the daemon (inside bolt11_encode) or cause the expiry timer to misbehave. The fix adds the same upper bound check that already existed for the invoice RPC, refusing such invoices with a clear error message instead of crashing or busy-looping.
docs: document missing and fix erroneous JSON-RPC error codes
Audit the `errors` sections of the RPC schemas against the error codes the handlers actually raise, and fix the discrepancies.
FUNDING_STILL_SYNCING_BITCOIN (304) is only raised by `fundpsbt` and `utxopsbt` (wallet/reservation.c), and is forwarded verbatim by every other command which can return it. Document it on `fundpsbt`, `utxopsbt`, `txprepare`, `withdraw`, `multiwithdraw`, `upgradewallet`, `fundchannel` and `multifundchannel`. Conversely, `fundchannel_start` and `openchannel_init` do not call either: when the node is not synced they delay via topology_add_sync_waiter() and retry, so drop their stale 304.
Also fix the remaining discrepancies:
- `delpay` documented 211 for a status mismatch, but that path returns 208 (PAY_NO_SUCH_PAYMENT); 211 is never raised by `delpay`, so replace it; - document missing codes: `createinvoice` 907 (INVOICE_OFFER_INACTIVE), `enableoffer` 1007 (OFFER_USED_SINGLE_USE), `getroutes` 217 (PAY_USER_ERROR) and `addpsbtoutput` 302/309; - add `errors` sections to `splice_init`, `splice_update` and `splice_signed` (351-356), `disableoffer` and `disableinvoicerequest` (1001), `preapproveinvoice` (213), `preapprovekeysend` (214) and `recover` (1600).
The splice commands can also fail asynchronously, after the command has gone pending, through the channeld message handlers in channel_control.c which resolve the pending command via splice_command_for_chan(). Document those codes too: 350 (SPLICE_BROADCAST_FAIL) on `splice_signed`; 357/359/360 (SPLICE_FUNDING_LOW/SPLICE_LOW_FEE/SPLICE_HIGH_FEE) on `splice_update`; and 358/362/363 (SPLICE_STATE_ERROR/SPLICE_ABORT/ SPLICE_CHANNEL_ERROR) on all three.
Changelog-None
85/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Uses a recognizable type or scope✓ Provides detailed explanatory context
Why it was queued
signing boundarysigning or wallet pathboot or update path
AI analysis · Informational 21/100
This commit is a documentation-only cleanup of the JSON-RPC command help files. It corrects which numeric error codes are listed for each command so the published schemas match what the software actually returns. No program logic, validation, or behavior was changed, so it cannot be exploited or cause runtime failures. It mainly helps developers and automated tools build correct clients.
Lower-prioritydualopen: add test for large output amountby Lagrang3 · fd848267 · Sep 11, 2026 · 2 filesMessage 78 · AdequateTriage 0Details
Commit message · Lagrang3
dualopen: add test for large output amount
During the negotiation of a dualopen channel a peer can send a tx_add_output with a very large amount. dualopend should handle it with tx_abort.
We add a test for splice as well since they share the same interactive transaction logic.
✓ Descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Mentions testing or verification
Lower-priorityinteractivetx: put the MAX_MONEY checks into one placeby Lagrang3 · 574b15df · Sep 11, 2026 · 4 filesMessage 73 · AdequateTriage 0Details
Commit message · Lagrang3
interactivetx: put the MAX_MONEY checks into one place
Make the MAX_MONEY checks of tx_add_output into an internal API that we can re-use in interactivetx (used by splices) and dualopend.
Changelog-None
Signed-off-by: Lagrang3 <lagrang3@protonmail.com>
73/100 · AdequateMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context
Lower-prioritydualopend: handle tx_add_output with over MAX_MONEYby Lagrang3 · f0cf91e4 · Sep 10, 2026 · 4 filesMessage 73 · AdequateTriage 8Details
Commit message · Lagrang3
dualopend: handle tx_add_output with over MAX_MONEY
Harden the handling of tx_add_output messages. Fail the negotiation if the sum of the outputs exceeds 21M BTC.
Changelog-Fixed: dual-fund/splice: fail the interactive channel negotiation if the sum of the outputs exceed 21M BTC (satisfy BOLT-02 cap of 21M BTC per output)
Signed-off-by: Lagrang3 <lagrang3@protonmail.com>
73/100 · AdequateMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context
Why it was queued
defensive validation
Lower-priorityonchaind: giving up on claiming their HTLC isn't only for timeoutsby cdecker · 261dead4 · Sep 10, 2026 · 2 filesMessage 91 · StrongTriage 0Details
Commit message · cdecker
onchaind: giving up on claiming their HTLC isn't only for timeouts
If lightningd can't make our claim on a THEIR_HTLC pay (a small HTLC, or a fee spike since the commitment was signed) it says so in the spend_created reply, and handle_spend_created() ignores the output. That's giving up just as a timeout is, but it left the fate as THEIR_HTLC_UNDECIDED, so neither the spend arm nor the exit recorded the htlc_timeout deposit: bkpr never saw the HTLC leave, and the channel was never resolved. master booked it exactly once here, so this was a regression of "onchaind: only record an HTLC as theirs once that's final".
The lowballed spend can also confirm anyway. We used to skip it at the already-resolved check and book nothing (and now would have booked it as theirs). Record it as ours, and re-anchor the resolution on the spending tx: that's what actually resolved the output, so the 100-block clock for irrevocable resolution runs from its confirmation. A lowball tx can mine long after the commitment itself is 100 deep, and counting from the commitment would let us forget the channel while the spend is a block deep and could still be reorged out. This delays forgetting a channel we gave up on until any spend we'd written off matures; test_onchain_all_dust checks that.
Only claims lightningd builds itself can be lowballed: pre-signed HTLC-success/-timeout txs always come back as worthwhile. So the test has l1 close, and forces the lowball with a fee spike after the commitment confirms. One variant then has l1 take the HTLC back, the other mines the lowballed claim directly (bitcoind won't relay it, since lightningd's weight estimate for a fulfill spend leaves out the preimage and so undershoots the relay minimum at the floor; that's a separate bug).
The tests above restart the node that wrote the claim off, after that claim's confirmation: propose_resolution_to_master() waits for the spend_created reply before anything else is processed, so replay re-derives the same ignore decision, re-matches the mined tx against our proposal, and re-books through this branch -- the tests assert bookkeeper sees it exactly once and depth counts from the confirmation all the same.
Changelog-None
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_019XZZWMuBhXrq41u9HhxVBM
91/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Mentions testing or verification✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference
Lower-priorityonchaind: name the depth at which outputs are irrevocably resolvedby cdecker · c8fde359 · Sep 10, 2026 · 1 fileMessage 81 · StrongTriage 0Details
Commit message · cdecker
onchaind: name the depth at which outputs are irrevocably resolved
Three bare 100s (the BOLT #5 quote above the first one explains what they are). Taken from Rusty's branch.
Changelog-None
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_019XZZWMuBhXrq41u9HhxVBM
81/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference
AI review queuedwss-proxy: time out handshakes so the accept loop can't be stalledby daywalker90 · 1950f99a · Sep 10, 2026 · 2 filesMessage 73 · AdequateModerate 63Details
Commit message · daywalker90
wss-proxy: time out handshakes so the accept loop can't be stalled
The TLS and websocket handshakes were awaited inline in the accept loop before per-connection work was spawned. A client which connected and never completed a handshake parked the loop, so no further accept() was serviced and the whole WSS endpoint was unavailable to everyone.
Spawn a task per accepted stream immediately, and run both handshakes inside that task under a 10 second timeout (matching the pattern used by other plugins), so an idle client is dropped and can never block new connections.
Changelog-Fixed: wss-proxy: an idle client no longer blocks the accept loop and prevents all new connections
(cherry picked from commit cadf29066fa5927e99039d23401973ab73b93949)
73/100 · AdequateMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context
Why it was queued
second-pass: broader security terminology
AI analysis · Moderate 63/100
This update fixes a bug in Core Lightning's WebSocket Secure (WSS) proxy where a single client could connect but never finish its handshake, accidentally freezing the entire WSS service so no one else could connect. The fix moves each connection's TLS and WebSocket handshakes into its own background task and adds a 10-second timeout, so a stuck client is dropped without blocking others.
wss-proxy: cap message size and concurrent connections
tungstenite's default max_message_size is 64 MiB, and the accept loop had no bound on concurrent connections, so a peer could have us buffer up to 64 MiB per connection without limit.
wss-proxy relays BOLT8 wire messages verbatim, which are at most 65535 bytes: set both max_message_size and max_frame_size to that bound so oversized messages are rejected instead of buffered.
Bound concurrent connections with a semaphore held for the lifetime of each relay, and abort the peer relay once either direction closes so idle half-open connections cannot hold a slot (or a task) forever.
Changelog-Fixed: wss-proxy: now rejects messages larger than a BOLT8 wire message (65535 bytes) and caps concurrent connections.
(cherry picked from commit 8e620bb82772bec30698b465ea8c968ce9de2a78)
73/100 · AdequateMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context
Lower-prioritydocs: remove old references to pay, use xpayby Lagrang3 · 78f4cd72 · Sep 9, 2026 · 4 filesMessage 72 · AdequateTriage 0Details
Commit message · Lagrang3
docs: remove old references to pay, use xpay
Changelog-None.
Signed-off-by: Lagrang3 <lagrang3@protonmail.com>
72/100 · AdequateMessage clarity
✓ Descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Uses a recognizable type or scope✓ Provides an explanatory body
Why it was queued
documentation-only discount
Lower-prioritybkpr: don't exit when an account's debits exceed its credits.by Ken Sedgwick · a617b780 · Sep 8, 2026 · 4 filesMessage 81 · StrongTriage 0Details
Commit message · Ken Sedgwick
bkpr: don't exit when an account's debits exceed its credits.
bkpr-listbalances calls plugin_err when the debit sum for an account is larger than its credit sum. The bookkeeper is an important plugin, so lightningd shuts down with it:
plugin-bookkeeper: Account balance underflow for account 906c4056... (credit 25339109661msat, debit 25351660836msat) plugin-bookkeeper: Killing plugin: exited during normal operation Plugin marked as important, shutting down lightningd!
An inconsistent ledger is a bookkeeping defect, not a reason to stop the node, and no other bkpr command treats it as fatal. Three different accounting bugs have reached this exit so far (#5557, #8549, and now one on a node that already has the #8574 dedup); each time it took the node down. Log it as BROKEN and report that account's balance as 0msat, as 29e0a1ddf already does for a missing open event.
Changelog-Fixed: Plugins: `bkpr-listbalances` no longer exits, taking lightningd down with it, when an account's debits exceed its credits; the inconsistency is logged and that account is reported as 0msat. Fixes: #9487
81/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference
Lower-prioritybitcoin: don't dereference a NULL transaction from a truncated blockby Kyle 🐆 · 7d0c1849 · Sep 8, 2026 · 2 filesMessage 83 · StrongTriage 0Details
Commit message · Kyle 🐆
bitcoin: don't dereference a NULL transaction from a truncated block
pull_bitcoin_tx_only() returns NULL once the cursor runs out, and the next line writes through it, so a block that ends mid-transaction segfaults lightningd instead of being rejected.
The block comes from the chain backend via getrawblockbyheight, so this needs a bitcoind serving a malformed or unparseable block rather than anything a peer can send.
Test walks every truncation of the existing test block; it segfaults at 162 bytes without the fix.
83/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Mentions testing or verification
dualopend: initialize state->reconnected on startup
state->reconnected was only set to true after do_reconnect_dance(), so a fresh dualopend never wrote it. A commitment_signed arriving out of turn in the main loop made handle_commit_signed() read an uninitialized bool, which UBSan flags as a load of an invalid bool value.
Default it to false, so an out-of-turn commitment_signed is always rejected unless we really reconnected.
peer->tx_sigs_allowed was only set in peer_reconnect() and when we receive channel_ready, so on a fresh channeld start a stray tx_signatures arriving before the peer's channel_ready made handle_unexpected_tx_sigs() read an uninitialized bool. UBSan flags this as a load of an invalid bool value, and in normal builds the "warn and disconnect" branch was effectively taken at random.
Default it to false: we only allow an unexpected tx_signatures when reconnecting.
Changelog-None
73/100 · AdequateMessage clarity
✓ Descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Names security-relevant behavior explicitly
Why it was queued
signing boundary
AI analysis · Low 46/100
This commit fixes a bug where a setting that controls whether unexpected transaction signatures are allowed was not initialized when the channel daemon starts. If a peer sent such signatures before the channel was fully ready, the program would read an uninitialized value. In practice this usually caused a random, harmless disconnection, but under undefined-behavior detection it was flagged as a serious bug. The fix simply sets the value to false at startup.
Three things stand between the restored scripts and a nightly that finishes:
pyln-testing sets CLN_TEST_NAME for every test, so the profiles land in $CLN_COVERAGE_DIR/<test-name>/ and never directly in $CLN_COVERAGE_DIR. The coverage-raw/*.profraw upload glob therefore matches nothing, under if-no-files-found: error. A local three-test run produced 515 profiles, all of them in subdirectories. Both jobs now hand the directory to collect-coverage.sh, which walks it and drops what crashed tests left half-written; that also retires the flattening cp, which could collide on <pid>-<signature>.profraw between matrix cells.
The build uses the runner's default clang while the report job installed LLVM 18 and symlinked llvm-profdata to it. There are no compatibility guarantees for the raw profile format across LLVM releases, so the two have to come from the same one.
Codecov cannot read a .profdata; it gets the lcov export instead.
Changelog-None Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01HGKo3ccLpkH2xFeEXUzEBK
100/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Uses a recognizable type or scope✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Mentions testing or verification✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference✓ Names security-relevant behavior explicitly
Why it was queued
signing boundarydocumentation-only discount
AI analysis · Informational 15/100
This commit fixes the project's internal nightly code-coverage CI workflow. It changes how test coverage files are collected, ensures the same LLVM compiler version is used to generate and merge coverage data, and uploads a Codecov-compatible lcov report instead of an unreadable .profdata file. There is no security issue here—just build-script maintenance.