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Core Lightning

Modular C implementation of the Lightning Network protocol and node stack.

BitcoinLightning NetworkActive incident
Repository coverage

2330 commits in the local evidence base

Every captured commit receives deterministic security triage and a separate communication-quality score. Security candidates and broader second-pass signals receive full-patch Ollama analysis.

228security candidates319second-pass queue1977AI analyses
99commits · 30 days
229commits · 60 days
709commits · 180 days
1578commits · 365 days
Backfill bands
Aug 5 → Feb 61049 seen37 candidatesComplete
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Commit communication

Does the history explain itself?

Message quality measures whether a commit identifies its scope, purpose, rationale, testing, and supporting references. It does not change the security-severity score.

71/100 average clarity
628Strong · 80–100
1399Adequate · 60–79
272Thin · 40–59
31Opaque · 0–39
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Developer activity

Who is changing the project?

Public Git author strings; identities are not independently verified.

DeveloperCommitsCandidatesAnalyzedHigh riskMessage avg.
cdecker331217581
daywalker9019315113471
Níckolas Goline961252376
Amperstrand322278
Rusty Russell96977961173
Sangbida Chaudhuri18537157167
Vincenzo Palazzo19714185
Lagrang3115679170
dovgopoly18016165
Dusty Daemon821378066
ShahanaFarooqui931093063
Peter Neuroth1469110074
Analysis record

Published AI watches

Last scanned 48 minutes ago

Informational 15 AI analysisMessage 85 · Strong
EP Elements ProjectCore Lightning BitcoinLightning Network

doc: bring lightning-downgrade's version list up to v26.12.

This commit only updates documentation. It adds new version entries to the manual page for the lightning-downgrade tool and mentions the tool in the upgrade guide. No code, database logic, or security behavior is changed.

2e7a9f5aby Ken Sedgwick+9−12 files
No security note in commit
Informational 23 AI analysisMessage 66 · Adequate
EP Elements ProjectCore Lightning BitcoinLightning Network

Makefile: install lightning-downgrade.

This is a packaging/build fix, not a security vulnerability. The `lightning-downgrade` utility was being compiled but accidentally left out of the list of programs installed by `make install`. As a result, official release archives contain…

06ea9ba0by Ken Sedgwick+1−01 file
No security note in commit
Low 27 AI analysisMessage 83 · Strong
EP Elements ProjectCore Lightning BitcoinLightning Network

wallet: create bwatch tables before backfilling them

This commit fixes a database upgrade bug in Core Lightning. Wallets created with version v26.06.10 were missing two new tables (our_outputs and our_txs) because they skipped the migrations that create them. When users later upgraded, a fol…

Database migration failure could prevent node startup after upgradeFixes missing table creation before data backfillAdds regression test for upgrade path from v26.06.10
ce2a6836by daywalker90+105−02 files
No security note in commit
Informational 15 AI analysisMessage 5 · Opaque
EP Elements ProjectCore Lightning BitcoinLightning Network

v26.12rc1

This commit is a routine version bump from v26.06.10 to v26.12rc1 for Core Lightning. It only updates version strings in packaging files, a changelog, and a lockfile. There are no code changes that introduce, fix, or modify any security-se…

4002c4e9by Níckolas Goline+164−1110 files
No security note in commit
Low 30 AI analysisMessage 68 · Adequate
EP Elements ProjectCore Lightning BitcoinLightning Network

wallet: store payment failure details per groupid

This commit fixes a database bug in Core Lightning where failure details for a payment attempt were being overwritten by later retry attempts that shared the same payment identifier fragment. The fix makes the failure record match on an ad…

Data integrity bug causing incorrect error reporting across payment retry groupsNo memory safety, authentication, authorization, or cryptographic issues presentNo external input is trusted or validated differently
24082c6dby daywalker90+6−34 files
No security note in commit
Low 43 AI analysisMessage 83 · Strong
EP Elements ProjectCore Lightning BitcoinLightning Network

cln-plugin: do not panic when the log writer task is gone

This commit fixes a bug in Core Lightning's Rust plugin library where a plugin could crash with a panic if it tried to log a message after the internal log-writing task had already stopped, such as during shutdown. The fix makes the plugin…

panic on send failure replaced with stderr fallbacklog message no longer silently dropped on writer task exitunit test added for dropped-receiver scenario
8661ffabby cdecker+29−11 file
No security note in commit
Informational 15 AI analysisMessage 90 · Strong
EP Elements ProjectCore Lightning BitcoinLightning Network

docs: explain hsmtool HTLC recovery

This commit only adds documentation to the manual page for an existing command-line tool (hsmtool). It explains how to recover funds from old Lightning payment commitments (HTLCs) after losing channel state. There are no code changes, no n…

f90c140dby Sangbida Chaudhuri+85−01 file
No security note in commit
Informational 15 AI analysisMessage 68 · Adequate
EP Elements ProjectCore Lightning BitcoinLightning Network

tests: make test_delpay_works deterministic

This commit only changes a test file to make a flaky test more reliable. It does not modify any production code, so it has no security impact on real users.

a224ca81by daywalker90+16−161 file
No security note in commit
Informational 20 AI analysisMessage 73 · Adequate
EP Elements ProjectCore Lightning BitcoinLightning Network

doc: say that listtransactions gives blockheight 0 for a tx not in a block

This commit only updates documentation to explain that the `listtransactions` command reports a block height and transaction index of 0 when a transaction is not currently in a block (for example, because it hasn't been mined yet or was re…

bc281be3by Peter Neuroth+4−42 files
No security note in commit
Informational 20 AI analysisMessage 50 · Thin
EP Elements ProjectCore Lightning BitcoinLightning Network

fixup! pyln-client: don't crash Millisatoshi.to_approx_str() on zero

This is a small bug fix in a Python helper library used by Core Lightning. The Millisatoshi.to_approx_str() method previously crashed with a math error when converting a zero amount to a human-readable string. The patch makes zero return "…

No security-relevant signals presentFix is a routine correctness/robustness improvement
02612ed5by Amartya Singh+4−31 file
No security note in commit
Moderate 62 AI analysisMessage 73 · Adequate
EP Elements ProjectCore Lightning BitcoinLightning Network

wallet: reject unmodifiable PSBTs in addpsbtoutput/addpsbtinput

This update fixes a crash in two wallet commands, addpsbtoutput and addpsbtinput. These commands let users add extra transaction outputs or inputs to a PSBT (a Bitcoin transaction planning file). If a user supplied a PSBT whose version 2 '…

Daemon crash (assertion failure) on crafted/strict PSBT inputMissing validation of PSBT v2 modifiable flags before mutationUser-controlled input directly passed to libwally without precondition check
42472816by daywalker90+14−12 files
Vendor flagged security relevance
Moderate 59 AI analysisMessage 83 · Strong
EP Elements ProjectCore Lightning BitcoinLightning Network

tests: show addpsbtoutput/addpsbtinput crash on an unmodifiable v2 PSBT

This commit only adds a new test case that demonstrates two Core Lightning commands, addpsbtoutput and addpsbtinput, crash with an internal assertion when given a v2 PSBT that does not allow adding inputs or outputs. The test is marked as …

Daemon abort due to failed assertion in PSBT helper functionsRPC commands addpsbtoutput and addpsbtinput lack validation of PSBT modifiability flags before calling libwallyPotential denial-of-service vector: any caller able to submit a crafted v2 PSBT can crash lightningd
42e268abby daywalker90+60−01 file
No security note in commit
Informational 20 AI analysisMessage 73 · Adequate
EP Elements ProjectCore Lightning BitcoinLightning Network

pyln-client: don't crash Millisatoshi.to_approx_str() on zero

This commit fixes a minor bug in Core Lightning's Python client library where calling a pretty-printing method on a zero-amount payment would crash with a ValueError. It is a routine correctness fix, not a security vulnerability. There is …

5ebe365dby Amartya Singh+3−12 files
No security note in commit
Moderate 59 AI analysisMessage 83 · Strong
EP Elements ProjectCore Lightning BitcoinLightning Network

dualopen and splicing: add minimal verification of tx_signatures

This commit adds missing safety checks in Core Lightning when a peer sends signatures for opening or splicing a dual-funded Lightning channel. Before the patch, the software accepted peer-provided transaction witnesses without verifying th…

Missing input validation on peer-provided witness dataBOLT-2 compliance fix for tx_signaturesRejection of empty witness stacks
c6be4f71by Lagrang3+633−97 files
Vendor flagged security relevance
Moderate 54 AI analysisMessage 85 · Strong
EP Elements ProjectCore Lightning BitcoinLightning Network

channeld: abort_channels no longer fails a channel with a signed splice

This fix prevents a user-issued 'abort channels' command from incorrectly failing a Lightning channel when a splice transaction has already been signed. Previously, the code would pass the latest in-flight splice to a routine that aborts i…

Denial-of-service/availability impact: user-initiated abort could inadvertently fail a funded channelProtocol compliance fix: avoids sending tx_abort after tx_signatures, which BOLT 2 forbidsState-handling bug in splice negotiation lifecycle
c87f5573by Andezion+22−11 file
No security note in commit
Moderate 51 AI analysisMessage 73 · Adequate
EP Elements ProjectCore Lightning BitcoinLightning Network

lightningd: fix crash on mutual close of an unconfirmed dual-funded channel

This update fixes a bug where a specific type of Lightning channel close could crash the node. It only happens when both parties cooperatively close a dual-funded channel that has not yet been confirmed and has gone through a funding bump …

NULL pointer dereference leading to daemon crash (denial of service)Crash occurs in cooperative-close path for unconfirmed dual-funded/RBF channelsFix uses canonical channel funding key instead of splice-only field
555143beby Sangbida Chaudhuri+9−31 file
Vendor flagged security relevance
High 74 AI analysisMessage 73 · Adequate
EP Elements ProjectCore Lightning BitcoinLightning Network

cln-grpc: reject malformed request values instead of panicking

This commit fixes a security bug in Core Lightning's gRPC plugin (cln-grpc). Previously, a malformed request from a gRPC client could crash the plugin: bad public keys, hashes, secrets, channel IDs, or enum values triggered Rust 'unwrap()'…

Denial-of-service via malformed gRPC request causing tonic worker task panicDenial-of-service via std::process::exit(1) in ProofField conversion on missing oneofSilent integer truncation of u16/u8 fields via 'as' casts
b2703436by daywalker90+1558−12135 files
Vendor flagged security relevance
Informational 15 AI analysisMessage 51 · Thin
EP Elements ProjectCore Lightning BitcoinLightning Network

nix: drop protobuf again

This commit removes the protobuf package from the Nix build environment because it is no longer needed. A previous change made the cln-grpc component use its own bundled protoc compiler instead of relying on the system one. The Python bind…

a0459eeeby Peter Neuroth+0−11 file
No security note in commit
Informational 15 AI analysisMessage 73 · Adequate
EP Elements ProjectCore Lightning BitcoinLightning Network

make: check gRPC protos for breaking changes against the last release

This commit adds a new automated check to the project's build process that compares gRPC protocol definitions against the last release to catch accidental breaking changes early. It does not change any runtime code, fix a bug, or introduce…

db5fea70by daywalker90+43−84 files
No security note in commit
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Lower-prioritytests: reproduce a mutual close at the fee ceiling falling back to the commitmentby Ken Sedgwick · f79ec8c4 · Sep 14, 2026 · 1 fileMessage 83 · StrongTriage 0Details
Commit message · Ken Sedgwick

tests: reproduce a mutual close at the fee ceiling falling back to the commitment

With every fee estimate at the floor, the opener's closing fee range is a
single value. Each output is rounded down to whole satoshis, so the msat
remainders end up in the fee and the closing transaction pays one satoshi
more than the fee both sides agreed on. lightningd rejects that
transaction as above its maximum, keeps the commitment as last_tx, and
the close proceeds to broadcast the commitment while reporting a mutual
close.

test_closing_fee_rounding_at_ceiling pins both nodes at the floor, leaves
remainders of 999 and 1 msat, closes from the opener, and checks that the
transaction returned by close is a two-output closing transaction paying
the agreed fee plus one satoshi, and that both nodes see the output after
one block. Marked xfail until the following commits.

Changelog-None.

(cherry picked from commit 0471b3b37b69b7a988aad6a396d8ed2456d09484)

83/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Mentions testing or verification
Lower-prioritytests: fix test_gossip_force_broadcast_channel_msgs flakeby daywalker90 · 0c171100 · Sep 14, 2026 · 2 filesMessage 81 · StrongTriage 0Details
Commit message · daywalker90

tests: fix test_gossip_force_broadcast_channel_msgs flake

gossipwith was started before the final block was mined, without waiting
for it to connect: if block processing won the race, our
channel_announcement was force-broadcast before the peer existed and it
received nothing, so gossipwith hung until the pytest timeout.

It also used --max-messages as the stop condition, but the number of
timestamp_filter/query/ping messages is not deterministic, so under load
the count was never reached and the test timed out:

subprocess.TimeoutExpired: Command '['devtools/gossipwith',
'--no-gossip', '--hex', '--network=regtest', '--max-messages=10',
'--handle-pings', ...]' timed out after 140 seconds

Finally, the channel_announcement can legitimately arrive twice (once via
lightningd's own-gossip broadcast, once via connectd's stream, which
sends our timestamp-0 channel_announcement even with a "none" filter), so
don't assert an exact count:

AssertionError: {'channel_announce': 2, ...} != {'channel_announce': 1, ...}

Wait for the peer to connect before mining, read gossipwith's output
until the messages we care about have arrived (bounded), and accept one
or two channel_announcements. gossipwith now flushes each hex message so
partial output survives the test terminating it.

Fixes: #9270
Changelog-None

81/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Mentions testing or verification✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference
Lower-prioritytests: fix test_htlc_no_force_close flakeby daywalker90 · 356cdf19 · Sep 14, 2026 · 1 fileMessage 68 · AdequateTriage 0Details
Commit message · daywalker90

tests: fix test_htlc_no_force_close flake

l3 was watching its own (censored) commitment tx, so it can take a while before it notices l2's commitment is the one onchain and tries to fulfill the HTLC. If we released the censored txs before that, we only broadcast l3's own commitment txs, which conflict with l2's already-mined commitment and are rejected, leaving the mempool empty and making the final generate_block(wait_for_mempool=1) time out.

Wait for l3's fulfill attempt (a tx spending an output of l2's commitment) before releasing. Also release only those txs, deduped by txid and in capture order, so duplicate or RBF fulfill attempts are not broadcast as stale versions.

Changelog-None

68/100 · AdequateMessage clarity
✓ Descriptive subject✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Mentions testing or verification
Lower-priorityrenepay: free pending routes when the payment finishesby daywalker90 · 3e950097 · Sep 14, 2026 · 2 filesMessage 73 · AdequateTriage 0Details
Commit message · daywalker90

renepay: free pending routes when the payment finishes

A payment can complete while some of its routes are still in flight.
This happens with MPP, or when a retry succeeds before all the parts of
a previous attempt have resolved. payment_collect_results() only frees
the routes that reached a final state, so the still-in-flight routes
stay in the global pay_plugin->pending_routes map forever.

The serialized onion of such a route is only reachable through the tal
tree (struct route does not keep a pointer to it), so memleak reports
it at shutdown:

**BROKEN** plugin-cln-renepay: MEMLEAK: 0x55c92426bfc8
**BROKEN** plugin-cln-renepay: label=u8[]
**BROKEN** plugin-cln-renepay: alloc:
**BROKEN** plugin-cln-renepay: common/sphinx.c:183 (serialize_onionpacket)
**BROKEN** plugin-cln-renepay: plugins/renepay/routetracker.c:353 (create_onion)
**BROKEN** plugin-cln-renepay: plugins/renepay/routetracker.c:410 (route_sendpay_request)
**BROKEN** plugin-cln-renepay: parents:
**BROKEN** plugin-cln-renepay: struct route
**BROKEN** plugin-cln-renepay: struct pay_plugin

Implement the routetracker_cleanup() hook, which was a TODO: when the
payment finishes, collect the routes that are still pending for it and
free them, which removes them from the pending routes map through the
existing destructor.

Changelog-Fixed: renepay: fix a memory leak of routes that were still in flight when the payment completed.

73/100 · AdequateMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context
Lower-prioritytests: fix test_htlc_sig_persistence flakeby daywalker90 · 43acdddd · Sep 14, 2026 · 1 fileMessage 45 · ThinTriage 0Details
Commit message · daywalker90

tests: fix test_htlc_sig_persistence flake

Changelog-None

45/100 · ThinMessage clarity
✓ Descriptive subject✓ Mentions testing or verification! No meaningful explanatory body
Lower-prioritytests: fix test_rbf_non_last_mined flakeby daywalker90 · 72fa1a60 · Sep 14, 2026 · 1 fileMessage 68 · AdequateTriage 0Details
Commit message · daywalker90

tests: fix test_rbf_non_last_mined flake

```
# The funding transaction gets mined (should be the 2nd inflight)
bitcoind.generate_block(6, wait_for_mempool=1)

# l2 comes back up
l2.start()

# everybody's got the right things now
l1.daemon.wait_for_log(r'to CHANNELD_NORMAL')
l2.daemon.wait_for_log(r'to CHANNELD_NORMAL')

channel = only_one(l1.rpc.listpeerchannels()['channels'])
> assert channel['funding_txid'] == inflights[1]['funding_txid']
E AssertionError: assert '12f2577bf10d40dd85e2de4ea867b59145fdcad541e861cf5993fbc5428b3aa7' == '1b8c5be4b21f8b741202cc2fcb1eb4ee0d529196870cfdeea03b1e69f88b436d'
E
E - 1b8c5be4b21f8b741202cc2fcb1eb4ee0d529196870cfdeea03b1e69f88b436d
E + 12f2577bf10d40dd85e2de4ea867b59145fdcad541e861cf5993fbc5428b3aa7

tests/test_opening.py:1448: AssertionError
```

Changelog-None

68/100 · AdequateMessage clarity
✓ Descriptive subject✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Mentions testing or verification
Security candidatepytest: make test_grpc_wrong_auth cross the wires on one port, with deadlinesby cdecker · 8b546e46 · Sep 14, 2026 · 1 fileMessage 83 · StrongInformational 15Details
Commit message · cdecker

pytest: make test_grpc_wrong_auth cross the wires on one port, with deadlines

After l1 stopped, the old stub dialled l1's now-free gRPC port while l2
listened on a different one, so the test never checked a foreign
certificate against a live node. Its gRPC calls also had no deadline: when
the client keeps retrying a handshake the server rejects, the call blocked
forever and hung the test.

Start l2 on l1's port, connect to 127.0.0.1 explicitly, and give every call
a deadline. The call with the wrong credentials may now end in
DEADLINE_EXCEEDED as well as UNAVAILABLE; both mean it was refused.

Changelog-None

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

83/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Mentions testing or verification
Why it was queued
credential or privilege state
AI analysis · Informational 15/100

This commit only changes a test file. It fixes a flaky test that was supposed to verify a gRPC client with the wrong certificate gets rejected by a different node, but the test was not actually checking the real scenario and could hang forever. There is no change to production code or any security fix to the software itself.

Lower-priorityccan: update to fix strmap warning, includes new COMPILER_WANTS_INIT.by Rusty Russell · b2d59056 · Sep 14, 2026 · 10 filesMessage 73 · AdequateTriage 0Details
Commit message · Rusty Russell

ccan: update to fix strmap warning, includes new COMPILER_WANTS_INIT.

Our own common/utils.h COMPILER_WANTS_INIT was promoted to a proper
CCAN helper, but slightly generalized with another arg to indicate the
initializer to use, rather than assuming "0". So fix up the handful
of users.

Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>

73/100 · AdequateMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context
Lower-priorityplugins/spender: fix false positive init warning from gcc-12 -O3.by Rusty Russell · c32111ab · Sep 14, 2026 · 1 fileMessage 73 · AdequateTriage 0Details
Commit message · Rusty Russell

plugins/spender: fix false positive init warning from gcc-12 -O3.

In practice, this is behind a branch where it can't occur: gcc-13 doesn't
mind, but gcc-12 does.

```
In function ‘handle_fee_and_ppm’,
inlined from ‘continue_splice.part.0’ at plugins/spender/splice.c:1669:12:
plugins/spender/splice.c:1415:38: error: ‘funding_wallet_index’ may be used uninitialized [-Werror=maybe-uninitialized]
1415 | && splice_cmd->states[funding_wallet_index]->state != SPLICE_CMD_PENDING) {
| ^
plugins/spender/splice.c: In function ‘continue_splice.part.0’:
plugins/spender/splice.c:1394:16: note: ‘funding_wallet_index’ was declared here
1394 | size_t funding_wallet_index;
| ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
```

Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>

73/100 · AdequateMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context
Security candidateccan: update for newer compiler fixes.by Rusty Russell · e3dc8e9f · Sep 14, 2026 · 3 filesMessage 73 · AdequateInformational 14Details
Commit message · Rusty Russell

ccan: update for newer compiler fixes.

Two more commits, which fix warnings:

```
In file included from ccan/ccan/strmap/strmap.h:5,
from ./common/memleak.h:4,
from lightningd/channel_gossip.c:5:
lightningd/channel_gossip.c: In function ‘broadcast_new_gossip’:
ccan/ccan/build_assert/build_assert.h:56:17: error: anonymous struct declared inside parameter list will not be visible outside of this definition or declaration [-Werror]
56 | (sizeof(struct { _Static_assert(cond, "BUILD_ASSERT_OR_ZERO"); char c; }) - 1)
| ^~~~~~
ccan/ccan/typesafe_cb/typesafe_cb.h:35:46: note: in definition of macro ‘typesafe_cb_cast’
35 | oktype), \
| ^~~~~~
./lightningd/subd.h:184:19: note: in expansion of macro ‘typesafe_cb_preargs’
184 | typesafe_cb_preargs(void, void *, \
| ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
lightningd/channel_gossip.c:415:9: note: in expansion of macro ‘subd_req’
415 | subd_req(ld->gossip, ld->gossip,
| ^~~~~~~~
ccan/ccan/cast/cast.h:47:14: note: in expansion of macro ‘BUILD_ASSERT_OR_ZERO’
47 | (0 ? BUILD_ASSERT_OR_ZERO(cast_const_compat1((expr), type)) : \
| ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
lightningd/channel_gossip.c:417:42: note: in expansion of macro ‘cast_const’
417 | -1, 0, addgossip_reply, cast_const(char *, desc));
| ^~~~~~~~~~
cc1: all warnings being treated as errors
```

And

```
ccan/ccan/cdump/cdump.c: In function ‘tok_take_conglom’:
ccan/ccan/cdump/cdump.c:272:35: error: ‘%.*s’ directive argument is null [-Werror=format-overflow=]
272 | "Line %u: '%.*s': %s\n",
| ^~~~
cc1: all warnings being treated as errors
```

Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>

73/100 · AdequateMessage clarity
✓ Descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Names security-relevant behavior explicitly
Why it was queued
memory safety
AI analysis · Informational 14/100

This commit updates two internal helper files in the CCAN library to silence compiler warnings when building with newer GCC versions. One change swaps an anonymous struct for an anonymous union inside a compile-time size check, because GCC 13 objects to anonymous structs in certain macro expansions. The other avoids passing a NULL pointer into a printf-style error message. There is no indication these changes fix a runtime security bug; they are build-hygiene fixes.

Security candidatelightningd: check expiry bounds in createinvoice tooby Amperstrand · 6882d164 · Sep 11, 2026 · 2 filesMessage 78 · AdequateHigh 76Details
Commit message · Amperstrand

lightningd: check expiry bounds in createinvoice too

A crafted bolt11 can carry expiry >= 2^32 past the invoice RPC's
gate: the expiry field is a varint and decode does not require a
valid signature, so createinvoice fed b11->expiry straight into
invoice creation -- hitting the same bolt11_encode() 60-bit abort
and expiry-timer overflow as the invoice path. Same bound, same
message, placed before the re-encode. Pointed out in the PR thread.

Changelog-Fixed: lightningd: refuse bolt11 `expiry` above 2^32 seconds in `createinvoice` too, instead of crashing or busy-looping.
Signed-off-by: Amperstrand <amperstrand@localhost>
(cherry picked from commit 5f433f04e84cda27a4298500860af18e6b9b8e87)

78/100 · AdequateMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Names security-relevant behavior explicitly
Why it was queued
signing boundarymemory safety
AI analysis · High 76/100

This commit fixes a bug in Core Lightning's createinvoice RPC. A malicious or malformed BOLT11 invoice could include an expiry time of 2^32 seconds or more. Because createinvoice decoded the invoice without checking signature validity, it would accept that oversized expiry and either crash the daemon (inside bolt11_encode) or cause the expiry timer to misbehave. The fix adds the same upper bound check that already existed for the invoice RPC, refusing such invoices with a clear error message instead of crashing or busy-looping.

Security candidatedocs: document missing and fix erroneous JSON-RPC error codesby daywalker90 · d1b6963b · Sep 11, 2026 · 24 filesMessage 85 · StrongInformational 21Details
Commit message · daywalker90

docs: document missing and fix erroneous JSON-RPC error codes

Audit the `errors` sections of the RPC schemas against the error codes
the handlers actually raise, and fix the discrepancies.

FUNDING_STILL_SYNCING_BITCOIN (304) is only raised by `fundpsbt` and
`utxopsbt` (wallet/reservation.c), and is forwarded verbatim by every
other command which can return it. Document it on `fundpsbt`,
`utxopsbt`, `txprepare`, `withdraw`, `multiwithdraw`, `upgradewallet`,
`fundchannel` and `multifundchannel`. Conversely, `fundchannel_start`
and `openchannel_init` do not call either: when the node is not synced
they delay via topology_add_sync_waiter() and retry, so drop their
stale 304.

Also fix the remaining discrepancies:

- `delpay` documented 211 for a status mismatch, but that path returns
208 (PAY_NO_SUCH_PAYMENT); 211 is never raised by `delpay`, so replace
it;
- document missing codes: `createinvoice` 907 (INVOICE_OFFER_INACTIVE),
`enableoffer` 1007 (OFFER_USED_SINGLE_USE), `getroutes` 217
(PAY_USER_ERROR) and `addpsbtoutput` 302/309;
- add `errors` sections to `splice_init`, `splice_update` and
`splice_signed` (351-356), `disableoffer` and `disableinvoicerequest`
(1001), `preapproveinvoice` (213), `preapprovekeysend` (214) and
`recover` (1600).

The splice commands can also fail asynchronously, after the command has
gone pending, through the channeld message handlers in channel_control.c
which resolve the pending command via splice_command_for_chan().
Document those codes too: 350 (SPLICE_BROADCAST_FAIL) on `splice_signed`;
357/359/360 (SPLICE_FUNDING_LOW/SPLICE_LOW_FEE/SPLICE_HIGH_FEE) on
`splice_update`; and 358/362/363 (SPLICE_STATE_ERROR/SPLICE_ABORT/
SPLICE_CHANNEL_ERROR) on all three.

Changelog-None

85/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Uses a recognizable type or scope✓ Provides detailed explanatory context
Why it was queued
signing boundarysigning or wallet pathboot or update path
AI analysis · Informational 21/100

This commit is a documentation-only cleanup of the JSON-RPC command help files. It corrects which numeric error codes are listed for each command so the published schemas match what the software actually returns. No program logic, validation, or behavior was changed, so it cannot be exploited or cause runtime failures. It mainly helps developers and automated tools build correct clients.

Lower-prioritydualopen: add test for large output amountby Lagrang3 · fd848267 · Sep 11, 2026 · 2 filesMessage 78 · AdequateTriage 0Details
Commit message · Lagrang3

dualopen: add test for large output amount

During the negotiation of a dualopen channel a peer can send a
tx_add_output with a very large amount. dualopend should handle it with
tx_abort.

We add a test for splice as well since they share the same interactive
transaction logic.

Changelog-None

Signed-off-by: Lagrang3 <lagrang3@protonmail.com>
Suggeded-by: @erickcestari

78/100 · AdequateMessage clarity
✓ Descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Mentions testing or verification
Lower-priorityinteractivetx: put the MAX_MONEY checks into one placeby Lagrang3 · 574b15df · Sep 11, 2026 · 4 filesMessage 73 · AdequateTriage 0Details
Commit message · Lagrang3

interactivetx: put the MAX_MONEY checks into one place

Make the MAX_MONEY checks of tx_add_output into an internal API that we
can re-use in interactivetx (used by splices) and dualopend.

Changelog-None

Signed-off-by: Lagrang3 <lagrang3@protonmail.com>

73/100 · AdequateMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context
Lower-prioritydualopend: handle tx_add_output with over MAX_MONEYby Lagrang3 · f0cf91e4 · Sep 10, 2026 · 4 filesMessage 73 · AdequateTriage 8Details
Commit message · Lagrang3

dualopend: handle tx_add_output with over MAX_MONEY

Harden the handling of tx_add_output messages.
Fail the negotiation if the sum of the outputs exceeds 21M BTC.

Changelog-Fixed: dual-fund/splice: fail the interactive channel negotiation if the sum of the outputs exceed 21M BTC (satisfy BOLT-02 cap of 21M BTC per output)

Signed-off-by: Lagrang3 <lagrang3@protonmail.com>

73/100 · AdequateMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context
Why it was queued
defensive validation
Lower-priorityonchaind: giving up on claiming their HTLC isn't only for timeoutsby cdecker · 261dead4 · Sep 10, 2026 · 2 filesMessage 91 · StrongTriage 0Details
Commit message · cdecker

onchaind: giving up on claiming their HTLC isn't only for timeouts

If lightningd can't make our claim on a THEIR_HTLC pay (a small HTLC,
or a fee spike since the commitment was signed) it says so in the
spend_created reply, and handle_spend_created() ignores the output.
That's giving up just as a timeout is, but it left the fate as
THEIR_HTLC_UNDECIDED, so neither the spend arm nor the exit recorded
the htlc_timeout deposit: bkpr never saw the HTLC leave, and the
channel was never resolved. master booked it exactly once here, so
this was a regression of "onchaind: only record an HTLC as theirs once
that's final".

The lowballed spend can also confirm anyway. We used to skip it at the
already-resolved check and book nothing (and now would have booked it
as theirs). Record it as ours, and re-anchor the resolution on the
spending tx: that's what actually resolved the output, so the 100-block
clock for irrevocable resolution runs from its confirmation. A lowball
tx can mine long after the commitment itself is 100 deep, and counting
from the commitment would let us forget the channel while the spend is
a block deep and could still be reorged out. This delays forgetting a
channel we gave up on until any spend we'd written off matures;
test_onchain_all_dust checks that.

Only claims lightningd builds itself can be lowballed: pre-signed
HTLC-success/-timeout txs always come back as worthwhile. So the test
has l1 close, and forces the lowball with a fee spike after the
commitment confirms. One variant then has l1 take the HTLC back, the
other mines the lowballed claim directly (bitcoind won't relay it,
since lightningd's weight estimate for a fulfill spend leaves out the
preimage and so undershoots the relay minimum at the floor; that's a
separate bug).

The tests above restart the node that wrote the claim off, after
that claim's confirmation: propose_resolution_to_master() waits for the
spend_created reply before anything else is processed, so replay
re-derives the same ignore decision, re-matches the mined tx against
our proposal, and re-books through this branch -- the tests assert
bookkeeper sees it exactly once and depth counts from the confirmation
all the same.

Changelog-None

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_019XZZWMuBhXrq41u9HhxVBM

91/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Mentions testing or verification✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference
Lower-priorityonchaind: name the depth at which outputs are irrevocably resolvedby cdecker · c8fde359 · Sep 10, 2026 · 1 fileMessage 81 · StrongTriage 0Details
Commit message · cdecker

onchaind: name the depth at which outputs are irrevocably resolved

Three bare 100s (the BOLT #5 quote above the first one explains what
they are). Taken from Rusty's branch.

Changelog-None

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_019XZZWMuBhXrq41u9HhxVBM

81/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference
AI review queuedwss-proxy: time out handshakes so the accept loop can't be stalledby daywalker90 · 1950f99a · Sep 10, 2026 · 2 filesMessage 73 · AdequateModerate 63Details
Commit message · daywalker90

wss-proxy: time out handshakes so the accept loop can't be stalled

The TLS and websocket handshakes were awaited inline in the accept loop
before per-connection work was spawned. A client which connected and
never completed a handshake parked the loop, so no further accept() was
serviced and the whole WSS endpoint was unavailable to everyone.

Spawn a task per accepted stream immediately, and run both handshakes
inside that task under a 10 second timeout (matching the pattern used
by other plugins), so an idle client is dropped and can never block new
connections.

Changelog-Fixed: wss-proxy: an idle client no longer blocks the accept loop and prevents all new connections

(cherry picked from commit cadf29066fa5927e99039d23401973ab73b93949)

73/100 · AdequateMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context
Why it was queued
second-pass: broader security terminology
AI analysis · Moderate 63/100

This update fixes a bug in Core Lightning's WebSocket Secure (WSS) proxy where a single client could connect but never finish its handshake, accidentally freezing the entire WSS service so no one else could connect. The fix moves each connection's TLS and WebSocket handshakes into its own background task and adds a 10-second timeout, so a stuck client is dropped without blocking others.

Lower-prioritywss-proxy: cap message size and concurrent connectionsby daywalker90 · ffe6c8ac · Sep 9, 2026 · 1 fileMessage 73 · AdequateTriage 0Details
Commit message · daywalker90

wss-proxy: cap message size and concurrent connections

tungstenite's default max_message_size is 64 MiB, and the accept loop had
no bound on concurrent connections, so a peer could have us buffer up to
64 MiB per connection without limit.

wss-proxy relays BOLT8 wire messages verbatim, which are at most 65535
bytes: set both max_message_size and max_frame_size to that bound so
oversized messages are rejected instead of buffered.

Bound concurrent connections with a semaphore held for the lifetime of
each relay, and abort the peer relay once either direction closes so
idle half-open connections cannot hold a slot (or a task) forever.

Changelog-Fixed: wss-proxy: now rejects messages larger than a BOLT8 wire message (65535 bytes) and caps concurrent connections.

(cherry picked from commit 8e620bb82772bec30698b465ea8c968ce9de2a78)

73/100 · AdequateMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context
Lower-prioritydocs: remove old references to pay, use xpayby Lagrang3 · 78f4cd72 · Sep 9, 2026 · 4 filesMessage 72 · AdequateTriage 0Details
Commit message · Lagrang3

docs: remove old references to pay, use xpay

Changelog-None.

Signed-off-by: Lagrang3 <lagrang3@protonmail.com>

72/100 · AdequateMessage clarity
✓ Descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Uses a recognizable type or scope✓ Provides an explanatory body
Why it was queued
documentation-only discount
Lower-prioritybkpr: don't exit when an account's debits exceed its credits.by Ken Sedgwick · a617b780 · Sep 8, 2026 · 4 filesMessage 81 · StrongTriage 0Details
Commit message · Ken Sedgwick

bkpr: don't exit when an account's debits exceed its credits.

bkpr-listbalances calls plugin_err when the debit sum for an account is
larger than its credit sum. The bookkeeper is an important plugin, so
lightningd shuts down with it:

plugin-bookkeeper: Account balance underflow for account 906c4056... (credit 25339109661msat, debit 25351660836msat)
plugin-bookkeeper: Killing plugin: exited during normal operation
Plugin marked as important, shutting down lightningd!

An inconsistent ledger is a bookkeeping defect, not a reason to stop the
node, and no other bkpr command treats it as fatal. Three different
accounting bugs have reached this exit so far (#5557, #8549, and now one
on a node that already has the #8574 dedup); each time it took the node
down. Log it as BROKEN and report that account's balance as 0msat, as
29e0a1ddf already does for a missing open event.

Changelog-Fixed: Plugins: `bkpr-listbalances` no longer exits, taking lightningd down with it, when an account's debits exceed its credits; the inconsistency is logged and that account is reported as 0msat.
Fixes: #9487

81/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference
Lower-prioritybitcoin: don't dereference a NULL transaction from a truncated blockby Kyle 🐆 · 7d0c1849 · Sep 8, 2026 · 2 filesMessage 83 · StrongTriage 0Details
Commit message · Kyle 🐆

bitcoin: don't dereference a NULL transaction from a truncated block

pull_bitcoin_tx_only() returns NULL once the cursor runs out, and the
next line writes through it, so a block that ends mid-transaction
segfaults lightningd instead of being rejected.

The block comes from the chain backend via getrawblockbyheight, so this
needs a bitcoind serving a malformed or unparseable block rather than
anything a peer can send.

Test walks every truncation of the existing test block; it segfaults at
162 bytes without the fix.

83/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Mentions testing or verification
Lower-prioritydualopend: initialize state->reconnected on startupby Erick Cestari · 8c8fdf4e · Sep 8, 2026 · 1 fileMessage 73 · AdequateTriage 0Details
Commit message · Erick Cestari

dualopend: initialize state->reconnected on startup

state->reconnected was only set to true after do_reconnect_dance(),
so a fresh dualopend never wrote it. A commitment_signed arriving
out of turn in the main loop made handle_commit_signed() read an
uninitialized bool, which UBSan flags as a load of an invalid bool
value.

Default it to false, so an out-of-turn commitment_signed is always
rejected unless we really reconnected.

Changelog-None

Signed-off-by: Erick Cestari <erickcestari03@gmail.com>

73/100 · AdequateMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context
Security candidatechanneld: initialize tx_sigs_allowed on startupby Erick Cestari · c09c4520 · Sep 8, 2026 · 1 fileMessage 73 · AdequateLow 46Details
Commit message · Erick Cestari

channeld: initialize tx_sigs_allowed on startup

peer->tx_sigs_allowed was only set in peer_reconnect() and when we
receive channel_ready, so on a fresh channeld start a stray
tx_signatures arriving before the peer's channel_ready made
handle_unexpected_tx_sigs() read an uninitialized bool. UBSan flags
this as a load of an invalid bool value, and in normal builds the
"warn and disconnect" branch was effectively taken at random.

Default it to false: we only allow an unexpected tx_signatures when
reconnecting.

Changelog-None

73/100 · AdequateMessage clarity
✓ Descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Names security-relevant behavior explicitly
Why it was queued
signing boundary
AI analysis · Low 46/100

This commit fixes a bug where a setting that controls whether unexpected transaction signatures are allowed was not initialized when the channel daemon starts. If a peer sent such signatures before the channel was fully ready, the program would read an uninitialized value. In practice this usually caused a random, harmless disconnection, but under undefined-behavior detection it was flagged as a serious bug. The fix simply sets the value to false at startup.

Security candidateci: fix the coverage nightly's profile handlingby cdecker · 5685c9a3 · Sep 8, 2026 · 1 fileMessage 100 · StrongInformational 15Details
Commit message · cdecker

ci: fix the coverage nightly's profile handling

Three things stand between the restored scripts and a nightly that
finishes:

pyln-testing sets CLN_TEST_NAME for every test, so the profiles land in
$CLN_COVERAGE_DIR/<test-name>/ and never directly in $CLN_COVERAGE_DIR.
The coverage-raw/*.profraw upload glob therefore matches nothing, under
if-no-files-found: error. A local three-test run produced 515 profiles,
all of them in subdirectories. Both jobs now hand the directory to
collect-coverage.sh, which walks it and drops what crashed tests left
half-written; that also retires the flattening cp, which could collide
on <pid>-<signature>.profraw between matrix cells.

The build uses the runner's default clang while the report job installed
LLVM 18 and symlinked llvm-profdata to it. There are no compatibility
guarantees for the raw profile format across LLVM releases, so the two
have to come from the same one.

Codecov cannot read a .profdata; it gets the lcov export instead.

Changelog-None
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01HGKo3ccLpkH2xFeEXUzEBK

100/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Uses a recognizable type or scope✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Mentions testing or verification✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference✓ Names security-relevant behavior explicitly
Why it was queued
signing boundarydocumentation-only discount
AI analysis · Informational 15/100

This commit fixes the project's internal nightly code-coverage CI workflow. It changes how test coverage files are collected, ensures the same LLVM compiler version is used to generate and merge coverage data, and uploads a Codecov-compatible lcov report instead of an unreadable .profdata file. There is no security issue here—just build-script maintenance.