Sparrow Wallet

This commit fixes a bug in Sparrow Wallet's terminal (command-line) watch-only wallet creation. Previously, a user could accidentally paste an extended private key (xprv) into a dialog meant only for public keys or output descriptors, and the wallet would silently fail or create an empty wallet. Now the app rejects xprv keys with a clear error message and also shows import errors to the user instead of logging them silently.

This update makes Sparrow Wallet automatically tighten the file permissions on wallet and backup folders so only the computer's owner can read them. Previously, if those folders already existed with looser permissions (for example, created by an older version or another user), other accounts on the same machine might have been able to read wallet files. The change also adds a warning if the app cannot fix the permissions.

This commit adds a user-facing warning dialog when a BitBox02 hardware wallet fails an attestation check. Attestation is a process that helps verify the device is genuine and not a counterfeit or tampered unit. Previously, a failed attestation may not have been clearly communicated to the user. The change improves security by warning users not to store funds on a device that failed verification until they confirm it externally. It is a defensive hardening change, not an active vulnerability fix.

This commit strengthens how Sparrow Wallet checks Payjoin proposals received from a payment receiver. Payjoin lets a receiver add their own inputs to a transaction to improve privacy. The changes add missing checks that could previously let a malicious or buggy receiver: (1) silently lower the transaction fee rate, (2) add key-path or signature data that leaks wallet information, (3) substitute the payment output even when no change output exists, or (4) return arbitrary error text that the wallet would show to the user. The patch also fixes handling for modern Taproot (P2TR) transactions, which were not being copied or validated correctly. A new set of unit tests confirms these protections.

This commit removes leftover code that checked whether signatures from hardware card signers were valid, but then threw away the result. The signatures are still verified later by a different part of the wallet when the signed transaction is combined. The change is essentially a cleanup with no known security flaw, though it slightly reduces defense-in-depth by removing an early, unused sanity check.

This commit adds a user-facing checkbox labeled 'Ignore dust' to the private-key sweep feature in Sparrow Wallet. When enabled, very small ('dust') unspent outputs linked to the swept key are excluded from the transaction. This is a usability and privacy improvement, not a security fix, because dust outputs are often sent by third parties to track wallets or to make sweeps uneconomical due to fees. There is no evidence in the commit or supplied references that this addresses a vulnerability or was disclosed as a security issue.

This commit hardens how Sparrow Wallet talks to an external Tor proxy's control port. Previously, when asking Tor for a new identity, the app used an older authentication method that could send the contents of a secret cookie file over the local connection. The update switches to Tor's 'SAFECOOKIE' challenge-response authentication, verifies the server before revealing anything, and refuses to open the control connection unless the target address is on the local computer (loopback). This reduces the risk that a malicious or misconfigured remote proxy could steal the Tor cookie or abuse the control port.

This commit tightens how Sparrow Wallet checks that a scanned QR code or loaded file matches the transaction the user is currently working on. Previously, the app only compared the new transaction/PSBT against the single currently open tab. Now it checks all open transaction tabs. This reduces the chance that a user accidentally accepts a wrong or maliciously substituted transaction because they had the wrong tab active. It is a defensive hardening fix, not a clear-cut remote exploit.

This commit adds a safety check in the Sparrow Wallet desktop app to make sure a transaction loaded from a file or scanned from a QR code actually matches the PSBT (a partially-signed Bitcoin transaction) that was already open. Before this change, the app would accept any transaction or PSBT from a file/scan and display it, which could mislead a user into thinking a different transaction was the one they intended to sign. The fix shows an error dialog when the loaded or scanned data does not match the original PSBT, and includes a special message for silent-payment transactions that cannot be verified from a final transaction alone.

This commit fixes how Sparrow Wallet exports coin labels in the BIP-329 format. Previously, the export incorrectly marked every unspent coin as 'spendable=true' in the exported file, even though the BIP-329 specification says the 'spendable' field should only be used to mark coins as frozen (not spendable). Other wallets importing this file could have treated frozen coins as spendable, or made incorrect assumptions about the user's coins. The fix now only writes 'spendable=false' for frozen coins and leaves the field out otherwise.

This commit adds a safety check in Sparrow Wallet when opening a PSBT (a file format used to pass partially-signed Bitcoin transactions between wallets). Before this change, the wallet did not verify the signature-hash types declared inside the PSBT. A malicious or malformed PSBT could ask the wallet to sign in a way that unexpectedly alters what the signature covers, potentially leading to loss of funds. After the change, Sparrow warns the user and asks whether to continue.

This commit tightens the checks on web addresses used during two login-style features, Auth47 and LNURL-auth. Previously, a malicious or malformed callback address could use insecure schemes such as plain HTTP on the regular internet or non-web schemes like file:// or ftp://. The patch now requires callbacks to be HTTPS, a special 'srbn' scheme, or a Tor .onion address over HTTP, and adds tests to confirm the new behavior. This reduces the risk that an attacker could trick the wallet into sending authentication data to an unintended destination.

This commit adds a standard right-click menu (copy, paste, clear) to the signature text box in Sparrow Wallet's message signing dialog. It is a routine user-interface convenience improvement with no security relevance visible in the code or commit message.

This commit changes how Sparrow Wallet checks the silent payment addresses inside a loaded PSBT (a partially signed Bitcoin transaction). Previously, the wallet extracted and trusted the silent payment addresses directly from the PSBT file itself. Now it passes the PSBT to a wallet method that performs verification before returning the addresses. The change suggests the previous code may have accepted unverified or spoofed silent payment addresses from an external PSBT, which could lead to sending funds to an attacker's address, but the diff alone does not show what the new verification actually does or whether any bug was exploitable in practice.

This commit adds a safety check when extracting a BIP-322 signature from a signed PSBT file. Before, Sparrow would blindly copy the signature into the dialog even if the message inside the PSBT did not match the message the user originally asked to sign. Now it warns the user and asks whether to continue, and if the user declines (or the extraction returns null), it no longer overwrites the signature field. This reduces the risk of a malicious or mismatched PSBT tricking a user into accepting a signature for a different message than intended.

This commit adds the ability for Sparrow Wallet users with 'silent payments' wallets to sign messages using the BIP322 standard. It is a feature addition that extends existing message-signing support to a new wallet type. There is no indication in the commit that it fixes a security bug or vulnerability.

This commit changes Sparrow Wallet so that newly created or renamed single-signature (SINGLE_SP) wallets get a default 'birth date' set to the current time. The birth date tells the wallet how far back in the blockchain it needs to scan for transactions. Without it, the wallet would perform a full rescan of the entire blockchain, which is slow and resource-intensive. The change is a performance/usability improvement, not a security fix.

This commit adds support for loading and refreshing 'silent payments' (a newer Bitcoin privacy feature) wallets in Sparrow. It introduces server subscription management, scan caching, and UI wiring. There is no direct evidence in the commit of a security vulnerability, but the new code handles private scan keys and network state, so correctness matters. The change is large and touches concurrency, making subtle bugs possible, but nothing in the diff clearly enables theft, remote code execution, or data leakage.

This commit adds the ability to import a new kind of Bitcoin wallet—called a 'silent payment' (SP) singlesig wallet—through the same screens and file formats that already supported ordinary HD singlesig wallets. It updates dropdown menus, import logic, and several hardware-wallet/file parsers so users can choose between HD and SP when importing. There is no direct evidence in the commit of a security vulnerability; it reads as a feature expansion with explicit guardrails (some importers reject SP if they cannot support it).

This commit is a broad code change that threads a new 'policy type' value through many wallet import paths. The main practical effect visible in the diff is adding support for importing a new kind of Bitcoin wallet called 'silent payments' (policy type SINGLE_SP) from Coldcard hardware wallets. It also makes sure the correct extended public key or silent-payment scan key is set when a keystore is created, depending on the wallet type. There is no explicit mention of a security bug or fix in the commit message or code, but the change touches sensitive key-handling code and removes some workarounds that previously forced wallet-model labels.

This commit improves how Sparrow Wallet handles a newer Bitcoin address type called 'Silent Payments' (SP). It adds null-safety checks so the app doesn't crash when an extended public key is missing, supports exporting and importing labels tied to Silent Payment scan keys, and updates UI labels. Most changes are defensive or feature-related rather than fixes for active attacks.

This commit adds support for silent payment change outputs in the Sparrow Wallet and fixes related silent payment issues. Silent payments are a newer Bitcoin privacy feature that lets someone receive payments without publicly revealing their receiving address on the blockchain. The changes touch how transactions are displayed, how change is created, and how the wallet interacts with Bitcoin Core. There is no clear security bug being fixed in the diff itself; it looks like a feature/enhancement commit with some defensive checks, such as blocking Bitcoin Core scanning for silent payment wallets because that is not yet supported.