Every captured commit receives deterministic security triage and a separate communication-quality score. Security candidates and broader second-pass signals receive full-patch Ollama analysis.
Message quality measures whether a commit identifies its scope, purpose, rationale, testing, and supporting references. It does not change the security-severity score.
This commit rewrites how a Lightning wallet talks to Esplora block-explorer servers so that many status checks happen in parallel instead of one at a time. It is a performance/refactoring change. There is no direct evidence in the commit t…
Concurrency/timing change in transaction confirmation logicNew inconsistency check preserved when a previously-confirmed tx is reported unconfirmedAdded defensive error path for missing pre-fetched block status
This change stops the Electrum-based transaction sync client from downloading the very transaction that created an output it is watching. Previously, the client could request that transaction from Electrum, even though a transaction can ne…
Avoids unnecessary Electrum transaction.get requests for watched outputsReduces information disclosure to Electrum server about watched outpointsAdds regression test verifying request suppression
This change improves how the Lightning Dev Kit's Electrum and Esplora transaction-sync clients track watched Bitcoin transactions. Previously, the code ignored the script pubkey (the 'address' associated with a transaction) supplied when r…
Previously ignored `script_pubkey` argument in `register_tx` for transaction watchersElectrum script-history queries previously used an arbitrary transaction output, which could be OP_RETURN and therefore unindexed by some Electrum serversNew logic prefers caller-supplied script pubkey and falls back to non-OP_RETURN outputs
This commit changes how LDK stores pending event notifications. It adds serialization support for several event types that previously were not fully saved to disk, and introduces a helper method so the code can decide which events are wort…
Data-loss prevention: previously non-round-trippable event variants are now fully serialized, avoiding accidental event loss when users serialize Event queues themselvesState-consistency hardening: ChannelManager now explicitly skips events that describe non-surviving restart state, preventing replay of stale eventsDefensive assertion: debug builds assert that every persisted event round-trips to Some(event), catching serialization mismatches
This commit only adds documentation comments to two source files. It explains that certain funding-signing events can become stale if the underlying negotiation fails, and that callers may see specific harmless errors as a result. No code …
This commit removes a fixed-version pin for the honggfuzz fuzzing tool in a continuous-integration script. The project now uses the current release of honggfuzz instead of an older pinned version. There is no change to the actual Lightning…
This commit changes the Rust toolchain used in the continuous integration (CI) fuzzing job from a fixed older version (1.75) to the latest stable release. It is purely a build/test infrastructure change to fix a dependency compatibility is…
This commit makes a previously internal helper function public so that outside developers can build dummy-hop tails for blinded payment paths without recreating the logic themselves. It is an API usability change, not a fix for a known sec…
No security-relevant behavior change in the diffAPI visibility broadened from crate-public to publicCLTV expiry overflow check already present and unchanged
This change adds a safety check in a Bitcoin Lightning Network library (LDK). Previously, if the software tried to verify a peer's commitment signature before it had learned the peer's channel parameters, it could crash with a panic. Now i…
Defensive check added on peer-driven code path to prevent panicMissing counterparty_parameters could previously cause panic during commitment transaction constructionChannel closure returned instead of panic
This commit only changes the wording of an error message sent to peers when a commitment transaction fails validation. It replaces the vague phrase 'Failed to validate our commitment' with the clearer 'Received commitment failed validation…
This commit moves the checks that validate a counterparty's signatures on the holder's commitment and HTLC transactions out of the general channel code and into the signer module (InMemorySigner). Previously, these signature checks were do…
Moved signature validation from channel state machine into signer moduleAdded new tests that corrupt signatures and verify rejectionChanged error message from 'Invalid commitment tx signature from peer' / 'Invalid funding_created signature from peer' to 'Failed to validate our commitment'
This change fixes a Lightning channel splicing bug: when two peers temporarily disconnect during a splice, any half-finished signature the other side already sent is now discarded. Before the fix, that stale signature could be reused after…
State-invalidation bug in multi-step protocol (splice negotiation)Stale cryptographic signature not cleared on disconnectPotential reuse of old commitment state after reconnect
This fix prevents a Lightning channel from being accidentally force-closed. During a splice (a way to resize a payment channel), one side's initial signature could be kept in memory after the peers disconnected. If the peers later reconnec…
State inconsistency: in-memory buffered message not cleared on disconnectDuplicate message processing after reconnectionForce-close consequence for active Lightning channel
This commit is a simple rename of a public function from `matches_invoice_signing_pubkey` to `key_can_sign_invoice`, plus matching updates to its documentation, callers, tests, and changelog. No behavior changed. It is not a security fix.
This commit is a simple rename of a function and its documentation from matches_invoice_signing_pubkey to key_can_sign_invoice. No logic, behavior, or security properties changed. It is a follow-up code-review naming cleanup.
This commit adds a new public helper method, Offer::matches_invoice_signed_by (later renamed matches_invoice_signing_pubkey), that lets callers check whether an invoice signing key belongs to the recipient named by a BOLT 12 offer. It also…
Refactors existing BOLT 12 invoice-signing-pubkey validation into a reusable helperAdds public API to bind an invoice signing key to an offer recipientAdds unit tests for issuer-id vs. path-last-hop matching behavior
This commit is a feature enhancement for LDK's internal serialization macros. It allows developers to mark old protocol fields as 'retired' (reserved but no longer used) in more places, so those type numbers cannot be accidentally reused. …
TLV type-number reservation mechanism extended to more macro-generated code pathsPrevents accidental reuse of retired protocol field type numbersAvoids UnknownRequiredFeature decode failures for obsolete even-type fields
This commit is a test-only cleanup in the Lightning Dev Kit (LDK) Rust codebase. It removes low-level byte-level tests for splice failure events and replaces them with a single cross-version test that actually loads a 0.2 node with seriali…
Cross-version serialization compatibility test addedRemoval of byte-level tests that could not detect real 0.2 mismatchesNo production code changes
This commit only adds a code comment explaining an existing quirk: if a revoked old channel transaction contains two identical-looking payment forwards and the other side claims both, the software may only claim one upstream while letting …
Behavioral quirk in revoked-commitment HTLC resolution documentedDuplicate (payment_hash, amount) HTLCs can map to the same upstream sourcePotential missed upstream preimage claim on second identical HTLC
This commit fixes a state-handling bug in Lightning Dev Kit's splicing feature. When a user tries to speed up or replace a pending splice (an 'RBF' attempt) and the older splice transaction unexpectedly gets confirmed on-chain, the softwar…
State-conflict handling between confirmed splice candidate and active RBF negotiationStructured abort propagation through chain-event pathConditional abort based on holder signature progress to avoid unsafe cancellation
Expand any commit for its author, full message, clarity score, changed files, triage signals, analysis, and source link.
AI review queuedCheck v2 reserves after `funding_contribution_satoshis` is appliedby Leo Nash · 85a02cac · Sep 2, 2025 · 2 filesMessage 73 · AdequateModerate 59Details
Commit message · Leo Nash
Check v2 reserves after `funding_contribution_satoshis` is applied
We check this when validating `splice_init`, `splice_ack` messages, and also when validating user-specified contributions.
From BOLT 2: ``` - If `funding_contribution_satoshis` is negative and its absolute value is greater than the sending node's current channel balance: - MUST send a `warning` and close the connection or send an `error` and fail the channel. ```
and further down: ``` If a side does not meet the reserve requirements, that's OK: but if they take funds out of the channel, they must ensure that they do meet them. If your peer adds a massive amount to the channel, then you only have to add more reserve if you want to contribute to the splice (and you can use `tx_remove_output` and/or `tx_remove_input` part-way through if this happens). ```
Therefore, we check the v2 reserve anytime `funding_contribution_satoshis` is not equal to zero.
We allow parties to draw from their previous reserve, as long as they satisfy their v2 reserve.
73/100 · AdequateMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context
Why it was queued
signing or wallet pathsecond-pass: security-sensitive path
AI analysis · Moderate 59/100
This commit tightens the rules for Lightning channel splicing (a way to add or remove funds from an existing channel). It makes sure that after a splice, each side still has enough money left in the channel to meet the required 'channel reserve'—a safety buffer meant to discourage cheating. Before this change, the code did not fully enforce that reserve check when a splice removed funds, which could have let one party drain too much money and leave the channel in a risky state. The patch also cleans up overflow checks and fee handling.
AI review queuedMake `for_splice` infallibleby Leo Nash · bfa0f95c · Sep 2, 2025 · 1 fileMessage 35 · OpaqueLow 29Details
Commit message · Leo Nash
Make `for_splice` infallible
35/100 · OpaqueMessage clarity
✓ Descriptive subject! No meaningful explanatory body
Why it was queued
second-pass: opaque commit message
AI analysis · Low 29/100
This commit changes an internal function called `for_splice` so it no longer returns an error. Previously, the function could fail and callers used `?` to propagate that failure. Now it always succeeds. The change is small and appears to be a code-cleanup step in the unfinished splicing feature, but the commit message gives no explanation of why the function was made infallible or what error conditions were removed. Without more context, it is unclear whether this removes a safety check that protected against invalid splice parameters.
AI review queuedAdd `NextCommitmentStats::get_balances_including_fee`by Leo Nash · 13ccaa35 · Sep 2, 2025 · 1 fileMessage 63 · AdequateInformational 17Details
`NextCommitmentStats` provides the commitment transaction fee as a separate value to assist with applying a multiplier on it in `can_accept_incoming_htlc`.
Nonetheless in most cases, we want the balances to include the commitment transaction fee, so here we add a helper that gives us these balances.
Also make the style of `tx_builder::subtract_addl_outputs` consistent with `get_balances_including_fee`.
signing or wallet pathsecond-pass: security-sensitive path
AI analysis · Informational 17/100
This commit adds a small helper function to include transaction fees when calculating Lightning channel balances. It also makes an existing internal function's code style match the new helper. There is no obvious security bug being fixed; it appears to be a routine code cleanup and convenience addition.
✓ Descriptive subject! No meaningful explanatory body
Why it was queued
second-pass: opaque commit message
AI analysis · Informational 15/100
This commit only reformats a single Rust function using rustfmt. It removes a #[rustfmt::skip] attribute and adjusts line breaks and indentation. No logic, behavior, or security properties of the code are changed.
AI review queuedPush splice initiation through the quiescent pipelineby Matt Corallo · 92f19617 · Aug 28, 2025 · 6 filesMessage 73 · AdequateLow 26Details
Commit message · Matt Corallo
Push splice initiation through the quiescent pipeline
Now that we have a `QuiescentAction` to track what we intend to do once we reach quiescence, we need to use it to initiate splices.
Here we do so, adding a new `SpliceInstructions` to track the arguments that are currently passed to `splice_channel`. While these may not be exactly the right arguments to track in the end, a lot of the splice logic is still in flight, so we can worry about it later.
73/100 · AdequateMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context
Why it was queued
signing or wallet pathsecond-pass: security-sensitive path
AI analysis · Low 26/100
This commit changes how Lightning channel 'splicing' (a way to resize a payment channel's on-chain funds) is started. Instead of immediately sending a splice request, the code now first enters a 'quiet' (quiescent) state where both sides pause normal updates, then sends the splice request once both sides agree. It also adds serialization support for new internal data structures so node state can be saved and restored. There is no direct evidence in the commit that this fixes a security vulnerability; it appears to be a protocol-correctness and state-management improvement for an in-development splicing feature.
AI review queuedAdd a quick TODO about merging cp- and locally-initiated splicesby Matt Corallo · 9200308e · Aug 28, 2025 · 1 fileMessage 30 · OpaqueInformational 15Details
Commit message · Matt Corallo
Add a quick TODO about merging cp- and locally-initiated splices
30/100 · OpaqueMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component! No meaningful explanatory body! Contains work-in-progress language
Why it was queued
second-pass: opaque commit message
AI analysis · Informational 15/100
This commit only adds a code comment (a TODO note) suggesting future work on combining two types of channel funding updates. It changes no program logic, no data handling, and no security behavior. There is nothing here that could directly cause a bug or be exploited.
AI review queuedRun fmt on `can_send_update_fee`by Leo Nash · 37e69dba · Aug 26, 2025 · 1 fileMessage 35 · OpaqueInformational 15Details
Commit message · Leo Nash
Run fmt on `can_send_update_fee`
35/100 · OpaqueMessage clarity
✓ Descriptive subject! No meaningful explanatory body
Why it was queued
second-pass: opaque commit message
AI analysis · Informational 15/100
This commit is purely a formatting cleanup. It removes a `#[rustfmt::skip]` directive and lets rustfmt reformat the `can_send_update_fee` function in the Lightning channel code. No logic, behavior, or security checks were changed.
AI review queuedRun fmt on `can_accept_incoming_htlc`by Leo Nash · b58d1d05 · Aug 26, 2025 · 1 fileMessage 35 · OpaqueInformational 15Details
Commit message · Leo Nash
Run fmt on `can_accept_incoming_htlc`
35/100 · OpaqueMessage clarity
✓ Descriptive subject! No meaningful explanatory body
Why it was queued
second-pass: opaque commit message
AI analysis · Informational 15/100
This commit is purely a code formatting cleanup. It removes a `#[rustfmt::skip]` annotation and lets rustfmt reformat the `can_accept_incoming_htlc` function in a single file. No logic, behavior, or security checks were changed.
AI review queuedRun fmt on `validate_update_fee`by Leo Nash · f67143a0 · Aug 26, 2025 · 1 fileMessage 35 · OpaqueInformational 15Details
Commit message · Leo Nash
Run fmt on `validate_update_fee`
35/100 · OpaqueMessage clarity
✓ Descriptive subject! No meaningful explanatory body
This commit is purely a code-formatting cleanup. It removes a `#[rustfmt::skip]` directive and lets rustfmt reformat the `validate_update_fee` function. No logic, behavior, or security checks were changed.
AI review queuedRun fmt on `validate_update_add_htlc`by Leo Nash · e3ab0ea4 · Aug 26, 2025 · 1 fileMessage 35 · OpaqueInformational 15Details
Commit message · Leo Nash
Run fmt on `validate_update_add_htlc`
35/100 · OpaqueMessage clarity
✓ Descriptive subject! No meaningful explanatory body
This commit is purely a code formatting cleanup. It removes a `#[rustfmt::skip]` annotation and lets rustfmt reformat the `validate_update_add_htlc` function in the Lightning channel code. No logic, behavior, or security checks were changed.
AI review queuedRun fmt on `get_next_commitment_htlcs`by Leo Nash · 59ae9e2a · Aug 26, 2025 · 1 fileMessage 35 · OpaqueInformational 15Details
Commit message · Leo Nash
Run fmt on `get_next_commitment_htlcs`
35/100 · OpaqueMessage clarity
✓ Descriptive subject! No meaningful explanatory body
Why it was queued
second-pass: opaque commit message
AI analysis · Informational 15/100
This commit is purely a code formatting cleanup. It removes a `#[rustfmt::skip]` annotation and lets rustfmt reformat the `get_next_commitment_htlcs` function in the Lightning channel code. No logic, behavior, or security properties of the code were changed.
AI review queuedRemove all `rustfmt::skip` in `tx_builder`by Leo Nash · 3f53f3ac · Aug 26, 2025 · 1 fileMessage 45 · ThinInformational 15Details
Commit message · Leo Nash
Remove all `rustfmt::skip` in `tx_builder`
45/100 · ThinMessage clarity
✓ Descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component! No meaningful explanatory body
Why it was queued
signing or wallet pathsecond-pass: security-sensitive path
AI analysis · Informational 15/100
This commit is purely a code cleanup: it removes formatting suppression markers (`#[rustfmt::skip]`) from one file and lets the Rust formatter reformat the code. The actual logic, calculations, and behavior of the transaction builder do not change.
AI review queuedAdd `TxBuilder::get_next_commitment_stats`by Leo Nash · 0a75f927 · Aug 21, 2025 · 2 filesMessage 58 · ThinInformational 11Details
Commit message · Leo Nash
Add `TxBuilder::get_next_commitment_stats`
Given a snapshot of the lightning state machine, `TxBuilder::get_next_commitment_stats` calculates the transaction fees, the dust exposure, and the holder and counterparty balances (the balances themselves do *not* account for the transaction fee).
signing or wallet pathsecond-pass: security-sensitive path
AI analysis · Informational 11/100
This commit adds a new internal helper method that estimates the fees, dust exposure, and balances for a future Lightning channel commitment transaction. It does not change any existing behavior or fix a known bug; it appears to be preparatory/refactoring work to support future channel-fee logic. There is no indication in the commit that it addresses a security vulnerability.
AI review queuedAdjust dust exposure due to excess fees for clarityby Leo Nash · 3a3e7eb8 · Aug 21, 2025 · 1 fileMessage 62 · AdequateInformational 12Details
Commit message · Leo Nash
Adjust dust exposure due to excess fees for clarity
62/100 · AdequateMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Explains rationale or failure mode! No meaningful explanatory body
Why it was queued
signing or wallet pathsecond-pass: security-sensitive path
AI analysis · Informational 12/100
This commit is a code clarity and variable-naming refactor in a function that calculates how much money a Lightning channel could lose due to tiny ('dust') transactions plus extra fees. It renames variables, removes an unnecessary mutable parameter, and reorders calculations so the math is easier to follow. The actual arithmetic result appears unchanged, so this is not a security fix.
AI review queuedRemove #[rustfmt] from test_peer_storageby Aditya Sharma · e51028c5 · Aug 18, 2025 · 1 fileMessage 35 · OpaqueInformational 15Details
Commit message · Aditya Sharma
Remove #[rustfmt] from test_peer_storage
35/100 · OpaqueMessage clarity
✓ Descriptive subject! No meaningful explanatory body
Why it was queued
second-pass: opaque commit message
AI analysis · Informational 15/100
This commit is purely a code-style cleanup. It removes a `#[rustfmt::skip]` annotation from a single test function and reformats the code so that the project's automated formatter can handle it. No behavior of the program or test logic was changed.
AI review queuedFix panic when calling `batch_funding_transaction_generated` earlyby Matt Corallo · e2988543 · Aug 18, 2025 · 3 filesMessage 73 · AdequateLow 33Details
Commit message · Matt Corallo
Fix panic when calling `batch_funding_transaction_generated` early
If a user calls `batch_funding_transaction_generated` before a channel is ready to fund its possible to hit an `unwrap` when the transaction-scanning logic attempts to fetch the channel's expected output `scriptPubKey`.
While users shouldn't be doing this, we should also avoid the panic, so here check the channel state first.
Found by the `full_stack_target` fuzzer.
73/100 · AdequateMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context
Why it was queued
fuzzing or regression evidencesecond-pass: broader security terminology
AI analysis · Low 33/100
This commit fixes a crash (panic) in the Lightning Dev Kit's rust-lightning library. The crash could happen if a user called a specific function, `batch_funding_transaction_generated`, too early in the channel-opening process—before the channel was actually ready to be funded. The fix adds a state check so the function returns a normal error instead of crashing. It was discovered by an internal fuzzer, not reported by an outside researcher.
AI review queuedAdd the blamed HTLC payment hash to `ClosureReason::HTLCsTimedOut`by olegkubrakov · e77c83d0 · Aug 13, 2025 · 5 filesMessage 85 · StrongInformational 20Details
Commit message · olegkubrakov
Add the blamed HTLC payment hash to `ClosureReason::HTLCsTimedOut`
When an HTLC timing out causes a channel to force-close, its useful to have the payment hash available in a programatic way so that it is always available for debugging. Thus, here, it is added to `ClosureReason::HTLCsTimedOut` for inclusion in `Event::ChanelClosed`.
Co-authored-by: Matt Corallo <git@bluematt.me>
85/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Explains rationale or failure mode
Why it was queued
second-pass: broader security terminology
AI analysis · Informational 20/100
This change is a small observability improvement, not a security fix. When a Lightning channel is force-closed because an HTLC (a conditional payment) timed out, the payment hash of the blamed HTLC is now included in the channel-closed event. Previously only a generic 'HTLCs timed out' reason was reported. This helps developers debug payment failures but does not change when or how channels close, nor does it fix any vulnerability.
AI review queuedAdd fuzzing for `StaticInvoice`by elnosh · 0854152f · Aug 12, 2025 · 5 filesMessage 35 · OpaqueInformational 15Details
Commit message · elnosh
Add fuzzing for `StaticInvoice`
35/100 · OpaqueMessage clarity
✓ Descriptive subject! No meaningful explanatory body
Why it was queued
fuzzing or regression evidencesecond-pass: opaque commit message
AI analysis · Informational 15/100
This commit only adds a new fuzzing test target for StaticInvoice deserialization. It does not change any production code, fix any bug, or alter behavior. It is a testing/infrastructure addition with no direct security relevance.
AI review queuedAlways emit bump events, even when fees are sufficientby Willem Van Lint · d99e59bd · Aug 8, 2025 · 6 filesMessage 73 · AdequateLow 35Details
Commit message · Willem Van Lint
Always emit bump events, even when fees are sufficient
Currently, the anchor commitment bump events are bypassed when the commitment transaction has sufficient fees. However, this makes it difficult for users to defer force-closures to a trusted party (such as an LSP) while not maintaining reserves. Broadcasting a commitment transaction without maintaining reserves would make HTLCs unclaimable against that commitment transaction.
In this change, anchor commitment bump events will always be emitted so users can capture and choose not to process them.
73/100 · AdequateMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context
Why it was queued
signing or wallet pathsecond-pass: security-sensitive path
AI analysis · Low 35/100
This change alters how Lightning anchor channel commitment transactions are broadcast. Previously, if a commitment transaction already paid enough in fees, the software would silently broadcast it without telling the user. Now it always emits a 'bump' event so the user (or a delegated service like an LSP) can see what is happening and decide whether to broadcast. The change is described as a safety improvement: broadcasting a commitment without reserves can make HTLCs unclaimable, so users should be notified and given control.
AI review queuedFix useless concatby Duncan Dean · 3e4b54ca · Aug 8, 2025 · 1 fileMessage 28 · OpaqueInformational 15Details
Commit message · Duncan Dean
Fix useless concat
28/100 · OpaqueMessage clarity
✓ Subject identifies a change! No meaningful explanatory body
Why it was queued
second-pass: opaque commit message
AI analysis · Informational 15/100
This commit removes unnecessary uses of the `concat!` macro in test code. The `concat!` macro was being called with only a single string literal, which has no effect. The change is purely cosmetic and only affects unit tests in a serialization utility module. There is no security relevance.
AI review queuedFix cloned_ref_to_slice_refsby Duncan Dean · b104f3af · Aug 8, 2025 · 2 filesMessage 25 · OpaqueInformational 12Details
Commit message · Duncan Dean
Fix cloned_ref_to_slice_refs
25/100 · OpaqueMessage clarity
✓ Descriptive subject! Too few words to establish purpose! No meaningful explanatory body
Why it was queued
second-pass: opaque commit message
AI analysis · Informational 12/100
This commit only changes test code. It replaces a few instances of cloning a test value to make a single-element slice with a helper that borrows the value instead. This avoids an unnecessary clone in unit tests and has no effect on the production library or real Lightning node behavior.
AI review queuedFix clippy::mismatched-lifetime-syntaxesby Duncan Dean · 9d662586 · Aug 8, 2025 · 20 filesMessage 68 · AdequateInformational 15Details
Commit message · Duncan Dean
Fix clippy::mismatched-lifetime-syntaxes
Hiding a lifetime that's elided elsewhere is confusing.
✓ Descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides an explanatory body✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference
Why it was queued
signing or wallet pathsecond-pass: unusually broad changesecond-pass: security-sensitive path
AI analysis · Informational 15/100
This commit is a code-cleanup change only. It updates Rust lifetime syntax in type signatures to satisfy a new Clippy lint. There is no functional change, no bug fix, and no security impact.
AI review queuedBump `electrum-client` to v0.24.0by Elias Rohrer · 10b0ddb1 · Aug 8, 2025 · 1 fileMessage 68 · AdequateInformational 15Details
Commit message · Elias Rohrer
Bump `electrum-client` to v0.24.0
We bump the `electrum-client` dependency to the recently-introduced version v0.24.0. We also bump `electrsd` to v0.35.0 and `corepc-node` to v0.8.
68/100 · AdequateMessage clarity
✓ Descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context
Why it was queued
signing or wallet pathsecond-pass: broader security terminologysecond-pass: security-sensitive path
AI analysis · Informational 15/100
This commit simply updates three dependency version numbers in a package configuration file (Cargo.toml). It bumps electrum-client from 0.23.1 to 0.24.0, electrsd from 0.34.0 to 0.35.0, and corepc-node from 0.7.0 to 0.8.0. There is no code change and no claim in the commit that this fixes a security issue.