Every captured commit receives deterministic security triage and a separate communication-quality score. Security candidates and broader second-pass signals receive full-patch Ollama analysis.
Message quality measures whether a commit identifies its scope, purpose, rationale, testing, and supporting references. It does not change the security-severity score.
This commit makes on-chain 'MonitorEvent' notifications durable and replay-safe. Previously, if a node crashed after a ChannelMonitor persisted a block update but before the ChannelManager processed the resulting event, the event could be …
Durability/atomicity fix for async persistence: prevents lost MonitorEvents across crashesNew ack-based event lifecycle with random event IDsArchival gating on unacknowledged events to avoid losing preimage/timeout information
This commit refactors how LDK nodes claim incoming Lightning payments. It replaces a separate 'claim with known custom TLVs' method with an options struct passed to the normal claim call, and fixes two edge cases in payment attribution dat…
API change: claim_funds now takes ClaimFundsOptions, consolidating TLV-known behavior into one pathFailure-packet length bound added to prevent oversized onion error messagesIncoming failure packet truncated at 32 KiB before processing
This change fixes a wallet bookkeeping problem in rust-lightning's built-in coin-selection wrappers. Previously, when a splice attempt failed or coin selection errored after picking UTXOs, those UTXOs stayed marked as 'reserved' in memory …
Resource exhaustion / denial-of-service via permanent in-memory UTXO reservationIncorrect state tracking in coin-selection wrapperNew API method required for correct lifecycle management (release_utxos)
This commit fixes a bug in the wallet's coin-selection code. When the wallet picked UTXOs to spend, it locked them immediately so they couldn't be reused. But if a later step—fetching the change address or the previous transaction—failed, …
Resource lock leak on error pathUTXO lock state inconsistency between selection and confirmationDenial-of-service/funds-unavailability risk from persistent UTXO locks
This commit rewrites how a Lightning wallet talks to Esplora block-explorer servers so that many status checks happen in parallel instead of one at a time. It is a performance/refactoring change. There is no direct evidence in the commit t…
Concurrency/timing change in transaction confirmation logicNew inconsistency check preserved when a previously-confirmed tx is reported unconfirmedAdded defensive error path for missing pre-fetched block status
This change stops the Electrum-based transaction sync client from downloading the very transaction that created an output it is watching. Previously, the client could request that transaction from Electrum, even though a transaction can ne…
Avoids unnecessary Electrum transaction.get requests for watched outputsReduces information disclosure to Electrum server about watched outpointsAdds regression test verifying request suppression
This change improves how the Lightning Dev Kit's Electrum and Esplora transaction-sync clients track watched Bitcoin transactions. Previously, the code ignored the script pubkey (the 'address' associated with a transaction) supplied when r…
Previously ignored `script_pubkey` argument in `register_tx` for transaction watchersElectrum script-history queries previously used an arbitrary transaction output, which could be OP_RETURN and therefore unindexed by some Electrum serversNew logic prefers caller-supplied script pubkey and falls back to non-OP_RETURN outputs
This commit changes how LDK stores pending event notifications. It adds serialization support for several event types that previously were not fully saved to disk, and introduces a helper method so the code can decide which events are wort…
Data-loss prevention: previously non-round-trippable event variants are now fully serialized, avoiding accidental event loss when users serialize Event queues themselvesState-consistency hardening: ChannelManager now explicitly skips events that describe non-surviving restart state, preventing replay of stale eventsDefensive assertion: debug builds assert that every persisted event round-trips to Some(event), catching serialization mismatches
This commit only adds documentation comments to two source files. It explains that certain funding-signing events can become stale if the underlying negotiation fails, and that callers may see specific harmless errors as a result. No code …
This commit fixes a design flaw in LDK's built-in wallet helper where coins selected for a splice-in (or other unclaimed funding) were permanently reserved in memory if the transaction was abandoned. Over repeated failed splices, all spend…
Denial-of-service via UTXO exhaustion from repeated failed splice negotiationsRisk of inability to broadcast fee-bumping/claim transactions due to lack of available UTXOsNew API surface (release_utxos) introduced to mitigate resource leak
This commit removes a fixed-version pin for the honggfuzz fuzzing tool in a continuous-integration script. The project now uses the current release of honggfuzz instead of an older pinned version. There is no change to the actual Lightning…
This commit changes the Rust toolchain used in the continuous integration (CI) fuzzing job from a fixed older version (1.75) to the latest stable release. It is purely a build/test infrastructure change to fix a dependency compatibility is…
This commit makes a previously internal helper function public so that outside developers can build dummy-hop tails for blinded payment paths without recreating the logic themselves. It is an API usability change, not a fix for a known sec…
No security-relevant behavior change in the diffAPI visibility broadened from crate-public to publicCLTV expiry overflow check already present and unchanged
This change adds a safety check in a Bitcoin Lightning Network library (LDK). Previously, if the software tried to verify a peer's commitment signature before it had learned the peer's channel parameters, it could crash with a panic. Now i…
Defensive check added on peer-driven code path to prevent panicMissing counterparty_parameters could previously cause panic during commitment transaction constructionChannel closure returned instead of panic
This commit only changes the wording of an error message sent to peers when a commitment transaction fails validation. It replaces the vague phrase 'Failed to validate our commitment' with the clearer 'Received commitment failed validation…
This commit moves the checks that validate a counterparty's signatures on the holder's commitment and HTLC transactions out of the general channel code and into the signer module (InMemorySigner). Previously, these signature checks were do…
Moved signature validation from channel state machine into signer moduleAdded new tests that corrupt signatures and verify rejectionChanged error message from 'Invalid commitment tx signature from peer' / 'Invalid funding_created signature from peer' to 'Failed to validate our commitment'
This change fixes a Lightning channel splicing bug: when two peers temporarily disconnect during a splice, any half-finished signature the other side already sent is now discarded. Before the fix, that stale signature could be reused after…
State-invalidation bug in multi-step protocol (splice negotiation)Stale cryptographic signature not cleared on disconnectPotential reuse of old commitment state after reconnect
This fix prevents a Lightning channel from being accidentally force-closed. During a splice (a way to resize a payment channel), one side's initial signature could be kept in memory after the peers disconnected. If the peers later reconnec…
State inconsistency: in-memory buffered message not cleared on disconnectDuplicate message processing after reconnectionForce-close consequence for active Lightning channel
This commit is a simple rename of a public function from `matches_invoice_signing_pubkey` to `key_can_sign_invoice`, plus matching updates to its documentation, callers, tests, and changelog. No behavior changed. It is not a security fix.
This commit is a simple rename of a function and its documentation from matches_invoice_signing_pubkey to key_can_sign_invoice. No logic, behavior, or security properties changed. It is a follow-up code-review naming cleanup.
Expand any commit for its author, full message, clarity score, changed files, triage signals, analysis, and source link.
Lower-priority`LSPS1ServiceHandler`: Use `TimeProvider` when creating new ordersby Elias Rohrer · 5db2fcc2 · Mar 18, 2026 · 3 filesMessage 73 · AdequateInformational 15Details
Commit message · Elias Rohrer
`LSPS1ServiceHandler`: Use `TimeProvider` when creating new orders
Since we by now have the `TimeProvider` trait, we might as well use it in `LSPS1ServiceHandler` instead of requiring the user to provide a `created_at` manually.
Signed-off-by: Elias Rohrer <dev@tnull.de>
73/100 · AdequateMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context
AI analysis · Informational 15/100
This commit is a routine internal refactoring of the Lightning Dev Kit's LSPS1 service handler. It replaces a manual user-provided timestamp parameter with an internal TimeProvider trait, so the code automatically fills in the creation time when a new order is created. There is no security bug being fixed here; it is purely a cleaner API design change.
AI review queuedDrop `OutboundCRChannel`by Elias Rohrer · 9cc5257e · Mar 18, 2026 · 1 fileMessage 33 · OpaqueInformational 15Details
Commit message · Elias Rohrer
Drop `OutboundCRChannel`
The `OutboundChannel` construct simply wrapped `ChannelOrder` which we can now simply use directly.
33/100 · OpaqueMessage clarity
✓ Subject identifies a change✓ Provides an explanatory body! Too few words to establish purpose
Why it was queued
second-pass: opaque commit message
AI analysis · Informational 15/100
This commit is a straightforward internal code cleanup. It removes a thin wrapper struct named OutboundCRChannel and uses the underlying ChannelOrder type directly in a hash map. There is no change to user-facing behavior, no bug fix, and no security-related modification.
Lower-priorityRespond to `GetOrder` requests from our saved stateby Elias Rohrer · a7f38884 · Mar 18, 2026 · 5 filesMessage 73 · AdequateInformational 21Details
Commit message · Elias Rohrer
Respond to `GetOrder` requests from our saved state
Previously, we'd use an event to have the user check the order status and then call back in. As we already track the order status, we here change that to a model where we respond immediately based on our state and have the user/LSP update that state whenever it detects a change (e.g., a received payment, reorg, etc.). In the next commmit we will add/modify the corresponding API methods to do so.
73/100 · AdequateMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context
AI analysis · Informational 21/100
This commit changes how a Lightning liquidity service responds to order-status lookups. Instead of asking the user/LSP to check payment status every time a client asks, it now answers immediately from saved state and lets the user/LSP push updates only when something actually changes. The change removes one event type and one callback step. It is a design/API refactor, not a clear security fix, though it does add a proper 'order not found' error response for unknown orders.
Lower-priorityActually remember the order state in `ChannelOrder`by Elias Rohrer · eb21bfd4 · Mar 18, 2026 · 2 filesMessage 65 · AdequateLow 26Details
Commit message · Elias Rohrer
Actually remember the order state in `ChannelOrder`
We here remember and update the order state and channel details in `ChannelOrder`
65/100 · AdequateMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides an explanatory body
AI analysis · Low 26/100
This commit fixes a bookkeeping bug in the LSPS1 (liquidity service) module. Previously, when a service updated an order's status (e.g., paid, channel opened), it did not actually store the new state or channel details in its internal record. The response was sent with the new state, but the internal `ChannelOrder` was left stale. This could cause the service to report inconsistent order information later, for example when a client later queries the order. The patch now stores and updates the order state and channel details correctly.
Lower-priorityRequire `supported_options` in `LSPS1ServiceConfig`by Elias Rohrer · 7adf9540 · Mar 18, 2026 · 3 filesMessage 63 · AdequateLow 42Details
Commit message · Elias Rohrer
Require `supported_options` in `LSPS1ServiceConfig`
In the future we might want to inline the fields in `LSPS1ServiceConfig` (especially once some are added that we'd want to always/never set for the user), but for now we just make the `supported_options` field in `LSPS1ServiceConfig` required, avoiding some dangerous `unwrap`s.
This commit removes several risky 'unwrap' calls in the LSPS1 liquidity service by making the 'supported_options' configuration field mandatory. Previously, if a service operator forgot to set this field, the code would panic (crash) when handling certain requests. Now the compiler enforces that the field is always provided, preventing that crash path at build time.
Lower-priorityUse `PeerState::{register,remove}_request` instead of map accessby Elias Rohrer · 15130047 · Mar 18, 2026 · 2 filesMessage 77 · AdequateLow 25Details
Commit message · Elias Rohrer
Use `PeerState::{register,remove}_request` instead of map access
We introduce two new methods on `PeerState` to avoid direct access to the internal `pending_requests` map.
77/100 · AdequateMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides an explanatory body✓ Explains rationale or failure mode
AI analysis · Low 25/100
This commit refactors how LSPS1 (a liquidity service protocol) tracks pending requests. Previously, code directly inserted or removed entries from an internal map. Now it uses two controlled methods that check for duplicate request IDs and unknown request IDs, returning clear errors instead of silently overwriting or missing entries. This is a defensive hardening change that reduces the chance of request-state confusion, but the commit itself does not claim to fix a specific exploitable vulnerability.
Lower-priorityUse `PeerState::{get_order, has_active_orders}` instead of mapby Elias Rohrer · bc8deb37 · Mar 18, 2026 · 3 filesMessage 85 · StrongInformational 11Details
Commit message · Elias Rohrer
Use `PeerState::{get_order, has_active_orders}` instead of map
Previously, we'd directly access the internal `outbound_` map of `PeerState`. Here we refactor the code to avoid this.
Note this also highlighted a bug in that we currently don't actually update/persist the order state in `update_order_state`. We don't fix this here, but just improve isolation for now, as all state update behavior will be reworked later.
Signed-off-by: Elias Rohrer <dev@tnull.de>
85/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Explains rationale or failure mode
AI analysis · Informational 11/100
This is a small internal code cleanup in the experimental LSPS1 (liquidity service) module. It hides a private map behind two helper methods and renames some fields for clarity. The commit message explicitly says it does not fix any bug, only improves isolation. There is no direct security fix here.
Lower-priorityDrop Arik from SECURITY.mdby Matt Corallo · 8760c1c5 · Mar 17, 2026 · 1 fileMessage 65 · AdequateInformational 15Details
Commit message · Matt Corallo
Drop Arik from SECURITY.md
Sadly Arik hasn't contributed to LDK in some time, so its time to drop him 😭.
65/100 · AdequateMessage clarity
✓ Descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides an explanatory body✓ Names security-relevant behavior explicitly
Why it was queued
documentation-only discount
AI analysis · Informational 15/100
This commit simply removes a former team member's contact information from the project's security policy file. It is an administrative cleanup, not a code change, and has no security vulnerability or functional impact.
Currently, the resolution of HTLCs (and decisions on when HTLCs can be forwarded) is the responsibility of Channel objects (a part of ChannelManager) until the channel is closed, and then the ChannelMonitor thereafter. This leads to some complexity around race conditions for HTLCs right around channel closure. Additionally, there is lots of complexity reconstructing the state of all HTLCs in the ChannelManager deserialization/loading logic.
Instead, we want to do all resolution in ChannelMonitors (in response to ChannelMonitorUpdates) and pass them back to ChannelManager in the form of MonitorEvents (similar to how HTLCs are resolved after channels are closed). In order to have reliable resolution, we'll need to keep MonitorEvents around in the ChannelMonitor until the ChannelManager has finished processing them. This will simplify things - on restart instead of examining the set of HTLCs in monitors we can simply replay all the pending MonitorEvents.
Here we complete work that was built on recent prior commits and actually start re-providing monitor events on startup if they went un-acked during runtime. We also remove a test that explicitly relied on the old non-persistent behavior.
This commit makes HTLC resolution events durable in the ChannelMonitor so they survive restarts. Previously, if a ChannelMonitor was persisted but the ChannelManager crashed before persisting, monitor events could be lost, potentially causing payment failures or funds to be stuck. The fix adds an acknowledgment mechanism: events are retained until the ChannelManager explicitly acks them, and unacked events are replayed on startup. A large test that verified the old, lossy behavior was removed.
Lower-priorityRe-enable signer op for one channel at a time in chanmon_consistencyby Wilmer Paulino · 16cba037 · Mar 17, 2026 · 1 fileMessage 83 · StrongInformational 15Details
Commit message · Wilmer Paulino
Re-enable signer op for one channel at a time in chanmon_consistency
Node B has two channels: one with A and another with C. Re-enabling signer ops only one channel at a time allows us to have them in different states, which may be helpful for fuzzing coverage.
83/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Mentions testing or verification
Why it was queued
fuzzing or regression evidence
AI analysis · Informational 15/100
This change only modifies an internal fuzz-testing harness. It splits a test control so that a simulated signer can be re-enabled for one channel at a time instead of all channels at once, purely to improve fuzzing coverage. There is no change to production code, no user-facing behavior, and no security fix.
Lower-priorityremove unnecessary clone in channel.rsby elnosh · cfde1cac · Mar 17, 2026 · 1 fileMessage 45 · ThinInformational 15Details
Commit message · elnosh
remove unnecessary clone in channel.rs
45/100 · ThinMessage clarity
✓ Descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component! No meaningful explanatory body
AI analysis · Informational 15/100
This is a tiny code cleanup that removes two unnecessary .clone() calls in a Lightning channel implementation. It does not change behavior, fix a bug, or address any security issue. It is purely a performance/maintainability micro-optimization.
Lower-priorityMove log channel_reestablish event when neededby elnosh · f1566480 · Mar 17, 2026 · 1 fileMessage 45 · ThinInformational 15Details
Commit message · elnosh
Move log channel_reestablish event when needed
45/100 · ThinMessage clarity
✓ Descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component! No meaningful explanatory body
AI analysis · Informational 15/100
This commit only changes where and how debug log messages are printed during peer reconnection. It moves a single log line deeper into the code and adds more detailed logging for each type of reconnection message. There is no change to program logic, message handling, or security behavior.
Lower-priorityMove feerate parameters from splice_channel/rbf_channel to FundingTemplateby Jeffrey Czyz · bf549289 · Mar 17, 2026 · 6 filesMessage 73 · AdequateLow 32Details
Commit message · Jeffrey Czyz
Move feerate parameters from splice_channel/rbf_channel to FundingTemplate
The user doesn't choose the feerate at splice_channel/rbf_channel time — they choose it when performing coin selection. Moving feerate to the FundingTemplate::splice_* methods gives users more control and lets rbf_channel expose the minimum RBF feerate (25/24 of previous) on the template so users can choose an appropriate feerate.
splice_channel and rbf_channel no longer take min_feerate/max_feerate. Instead, FundingTemplate gains a min_rbf_feerate() accessor that returns the RBF floor when applicable (from negotiated candidates or in-progress funding negotiations). The feerate parameters move to the splice_in_sync, splice_out_sync, and splice_in_and_out_sync methods (and their async variants), which validate that min_feerate >= min_rbf_feerate before coin selection.
Fee estimation documentation moves from splice_channel/rbf_channel to funding_contributed, where the contribution (and its feerate range) is actually provided and the splice process begins.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
73/100 · AdequateMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context
Why it was queued
defensive validation
AI analysis · Low 32/100
This commit is a routine API refactor for the experimental splicing feature in rust-lightning. It moves feerate parameters from the splice_channel/rbf_channel calls into the later FundingTemplate methods, and exposes a minimum RBF feerate floor so users can pick a valid feerate. It is not a security patch and does not fix a known vulnerability; it changes how users interact with the splicing API.
Currently, the resolution of HTLCs (and decisions on when HTLCs can be forwarded) is the responsibility of Channel objects (a part of ChannelManager) until the channel is closed, and then the ChannelMonitor thereafter. This leads to some complexity around race conditions for HTLCs right around channel closure. Additionally, there is lots of complexity reconstructing the state of all HTLCs in the ChannelManager deserialization/loading logic.
Instead, we want to do all resolution in ChannelMonitors (in response to ChannelMonitorUpdates) and pass them back to ChannelManager in the form of MonitorEvents (similar to how HTLCs are resolved after channels are closed). In order to have reliable resolution, we'll need to keep MonitorEvents around in the ChannelMonitor until the ChannelManager has finished processing them. This will simplify things - on restart instead of examining the set of HTLCs in monitors we can simply replay all the pending MonitorEvents.
Here for the purposes of merging initial support for persistent monitor events, we ack each immediately after it is received/handled by the ChannelManager, which is equivalent to the behavior we had prior to monitor events becoming persistent.
In upcoming work, we'll want to have much more special handling for HTLCUpdate monitor events in particular -- e.g. for outbound payment claim events, we should only ACK the monitor event when the PaymentSent event is processed, until that point we want it to keep being provided back to us on startup.
All the other monitor events are trivial to ACK, since they don't need to be re-processed on startup.
This commit changes how Lightning Dev Kit handles internal notifications called 'monitor events' that report things like completed payments or forced channel closures. Previously these events were not formally acknowledged after being processed. Now the code immediately acknowledges each event after handling it. This is a groundwork change to allow these events to be stored persistently in the future, so they can be safely replayed after a restart. It is described by the authors as behaviorally equivalent to the old code for now, not a security fix.
Lower-priorityDrop claude-review github action and just run it externally insteadby Matt Corallo · 83da0a13 · Mar 13, 2026 · 1 fileMessage 50 · ThinInformational 15Details
Commit message · Matt Corallo
Drop claude-review github action and just run it externally instead
50/100 · ThinMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component! No meaningful explanatory body
Why it was queued
documentation-only discount
AI analysis · Informational 15/100
This commit simply removes a GitHub Actions workflow that automatically used an Anthropic Claude AI tool to review pull requests. The project maintainers decided to run that review process externally instead of inside GitHub's CI system. No application code, cryptographic logic, or user-facing behavior changed.
Lower-priorityRefactor reorg_tests.rs to make formatting not span as many linesby Wilmer Paulino · e8211554 · Mar 13, 2026 · 1 fileMessage 50 · ThinInformational 15Details
Commit message · Wilmer Paulino
Refactor reorg_tests.rs to make formatting not span as many lines
50/100 · ThinMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component! No meaningful explanatory body
AI analysis · Informational 15/100
This commit is a pure code cleanup in a test file. It rewrites parts of the reorg_tests.rs file so lines are shorter and easier to read, without changing what the tests actually do or any production code.
Lower-prioritySet max channel dust limit to 10,000 sats for all zero-fee-htlc-tx chansby Leo Nash · 2d5f77b0 · Mar 12, 2026 · 2 filesMessage 81 · StrongLow 47Details
Commit message · Leo Nash
Set max channel dust limit to 10,000 sats for all zero-fee-htlc-tx chans
This includes both keyed anchor channels, and 0FC channels.
The dust limit for HTLCs in such channels is independent of the negotiated feerate, so a party may set a higher dust limit for such channels.
Fixes #4225
81/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference
AI analysis · Low 47/100
This change loosens the maximum 'dust limit' that rust-lightning will accept from a channel peer, but only for modern channel types that use zero-fee HTLC transactions (keyed-anchor and 0FC channels). For older channel types the old, stricter 546-satoshi limit remains. The patch is a protocol-compliance/robustness fix rather than a clear vulnerability fix, and it includes a test update.
Security candidateClamp our selected reserve to the counterparty's dust limitby Leo Nash · 4ae44e73 · Mar 12, 2026 · 6 filesMessage 73 · AdequateModerate 58Details
Commit message · Leo Nash
Clamp our selected reserve to the counterparty's dust limit
In a subsequent commit, we will allow the counterparty's dust limit to be greater than our `MIN_THEIR_CHANNEL_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`. Our selected reserve must always be greater than their dust limit, so we set our selected reserve to be equal to or greater than their dust limit.
73/100 · AdequateMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context
Why it was queued
boot or update path
AI analysis · Moderate 58/100
This commit changes how Lightning channels set a minimum 'reserve' amount that each side must keep in the channel. The reserve is now forced to be at least as large as the other side's 'dust limit' (the smallest transaction output considered worth tracking). Without this, a peer could set a very high dust limit while the reserve stayed low, potentially allowing tiny outputs to be treated as non-existent or causing the channel's accounting rules to disagree between the two sides. The change is defensive and prepares for a later feature allowing larger dust limits.
We plan to have a single channel signer type going forward, so this is unnecessary.
33/100 · OpaqueMessage clarity
✓ Subject identifies a change✓ Provides an explanatory body! Too few words to establish purpose! Opaque security-relevant change
Why it was queued
signing or wallet pathboot or update path
AI analysis · Informational 15/100
This commit is a routine internal code cleanup in the Lightning Dev Kit's Rust implementation. It removes a wrapper type called ChannelSignerType that previously distinguished between different kinds of channel signers, because the project now plans to support only one signer type (ECDSA). The change simplifies function signatures and removes now-unnecessary pattern matching, but does not fix a security bug or change cryptographic behavior.
Taproot support is not planned we see an increase in demand for it by users. The `musig2` crate is now owned by a third-party, and ultimately won't be used by the production version of Taproot that we end up releasing.
51/100 · ThinMessage clarity
✓ Subject identifies a change✓ Provides detailed explanatory context
Why it was queued
signing or wallet pathboot or update path
AI analysis · Informational 15/100
This commit removes an unused experimental Taproot/MuSig2 code path from the rust-lightning project. It deletes the optional `musig2` dependency, removes the `taproot` build flag, and strips out all conditional Taproot-related message fields and serialization logic. There is no indication this fixes a security vulnerability; it is a cleanup change because Taproot support is not currently planned and the external `musig2` crate is now owned by a third party.
AI review queuedRemove TaprootChannelSignerby Wilmer Paulino · 747788b8 · Mar 12, 2026 · 11 filesMessage 40 · ThinInformational 15Details
Commit message · Wilmer Paulino
Remove TaprootChannelSigner
We plan to have a single channel signer type going forward, so this is unnecessary.
40/100 · ThinMessage clarity
✓ Descriptive subject✓ Provides an explanatory body! Too few words to establish purpose
Why it was queued
signing or wallet pathsecond-pass: security-sensitive path
AI analysis · Informational 15/100
This commit removes an unfinished Taproot-specific signer type from the Lightning Dev Kit codebase. The removed code was behind a special compile-time flag ('taproot') and consisted almost entirely of placeholder 'todo!()' stubs that did not actually sign anything. The change is a cleanup/refactoring step toward having one unified channel signer type, not a security fix.
Filter prior contributions from SpliceFundingFailed events
SpliceFundingFailed events return contributed inputs and outputs to the user so they can unlock the associated UTXOs. When an RBF attempt is in progress, inputs/outputs already consumed by prior contributions must be excluded to avoid the user prematurely unlocking UTXOs that are still needed by the active funding negotiation.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
85/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Explains rationale or failure mode
AI analysis · Moderate 54/100
This commit fixes a bug in the Lightning Dev Kit's splicing feature. When a user tries to resize a Lightning channel (a 'splice') and the attempt fails, the software tells the user which bitcoins (UTXOs) are no longer tied up so they can spend them again. The bug was that during a follow-up fee-bump attempt (RBF), the software could incorrectly tell the user that UTXOs from the original splice attempt were free to spend, even though they were still needed. This could lead a user to accidentally double-spend their own funds and lose money. The fix filters out any UTXOs that are still committed to an earlier splice attempt before reporting the failed ones.
Preserve our funding contribution across counterparty RBF attempts
When the counterparty initiates an RBF and we have no new contribution queued via QuiescentAction, we must re-use our prior contribution so that our splice is not lost. Track contributions in a new field on PendingFunding so the last entry can be re-used in this scenario.
Each entry stores the feerate-adjusted version because that reflects what was actually negotiated and allows correct feerate re-adjustment on subsequent RBFs. Only explicitly provided contributions (from a QuiescentAction) append to the vec. Re-used contributions are replaced in-place with the version adjusted for the new feerate so they remain accurate for further RBF rounds, without growing the vec.
Add test_splice_rbf_acceptor_recontributes to verify that when the counterparty initiates an RBF and we have no new QuiescentAction queued, our prior contribution is automatically re-used so the splice is preserved.
Add test_splice_rbf_recontributes_feerate_too_high to verify that when the counterparty RBFs at a feerate too high for our prior contribution to cover, the RBF is rejected rather than proceeding without our contribution.
Add test for sequential RBF splice attempts
Add test_splice_rbf_sequential that exercises three consecutive RBF rounds on the same splice (initial → RBF #1 → RBF #2) to verify: - Each round requires the 25/24 feerate increase (253 → 264 → 275) - DiscardFunding events reference the correct funding txid from each replaced candidate - The final RBF splice can be mined and splice_locked successfully
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
100/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Explains rationale or failure mode✓ Mentions testing or verification✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference
AI analysis · Moderate 59/100
This commit fixes a bug in Lightning Dev Kit's splicing/RBF logic. When one party tried to speed up or replace a splice transaction (an RBF), and the other party had not queued a new contribution, the other party's original funds could be silently dropped from the new transaction. The fix remembers each side's last contribution and re-uses it automatically, or rejects the RBF if the new fee rate makes the old contribution impossible. Without the fix, a counterparty could potentially strip the victim's funds out of a splice, causing loss of funds or channel disruption.
Consider prior contributions when filtering unique inputs/outputs
When funding_contributed is called while a splice negotiation is already in progress, unique contributions are computed to determine what to return via FailSplice or DiscardFunding. Without considering negotiated candidates stored in PendingFunding::contributions, UTXOs locked in earlier candidates could be incorrectly returned as reclaimable.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
73/100 · AdequateMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context
AI analysis · Moderate 59/100
This patch fixes a bug in the Lightning Dev Kit's splicing feature. When a user tries to add funds to a channel while another splice negotiation is already ongoing, the code could mistakenly treat coins that are already locked into the earlier splice as 'reclaimable.' That could let a user discard or reclaim UTXOs that should stay reserved, potentially causing inconsistent channel state or loss of funds in edge cases.
Handle FeeRateAdjustmentError variants in splice acceptor path
Replace the generic error handling in splice_init and tx_init_rbf with explicit matching on FeeRateAdjustmentError variants:
- FeeRateTooLow: initiator's feerate is below our minimum. Proceed without contribution and preserve QuiescentAction for an RBF retry at our preferred feerate. - FeeRateTooHigh: initiator's feerate exceeds our maximum and would consume too much of our change output. Reject the splice with WarnAndDisconnect. - FeeBufferInsufficient: our fee buffer can't cover the acceptor's estimated fee at this feerate. Proceed without contribution.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
73/100 · AdequateMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context
Why it was queued
signing boundary
AI analysis · Low 44/100
This commit fixes how a Lightning node responds when a peer proposes a splice or RBF transaction fee rate that is too high for the node to afford. Previously, the node would silently drop its own contribution and continue, which could let the peer push through an unexpectedly expensive transaction. Now the node explicitly rejects the splice with a warning and disconnects when the fee rate is too high, while still allowing lower or retryable cases to proceed safely.