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Low 32 Bitcoin

Move feerate parameters from splice_channel/rbf_channel to FundingTemplate

Public commit record

What the developer wrote

Authored by Jeffrey Czyz

73/100 · Adequate
Move feerate parameters from splice_channel/rbf_channel to FundingTemplate

The user doesn't choose the feerate at splice_channel/rbf_channel time —
they choose it when performing coin selection. Moving feerate to the
FundingTemplate::splice_* methods gives users more control and lets
rbf_channel expose the minimum RBF feerate (25/24 of previous) on the
template so users can choose an appropriate feerate.

splice_channel and rbf_channel no longer take min_feerate/max_feerate.
Instead, FundingTemplate gains a min_rbf_feerate() accessor that returns
the RBF floor when applicable (from negotiated candidates or in-progress
funding negotiations). The feerate parameters move to the splice_in_sync,
splice_out_sync, and splice_in_and_out_sync methods (and their async
variants), which validate that min_feerate >= min_rbf_feerate before
coin selection.

Fee estimation documentation moves from splice_channel/rbf_channel to
funding_contributed, where the contribution (and its feerate range)
is actually provided and the splice process begins.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context
The short version

What changed, and why it matters

This commit is a routine API refactor for the experimental splicing feature in rust-lightning. It moves feerate parameters from the splice_channel/rbf_channel calls into the later FundingTemplate methods, and exposes a minimum RBF feerate floor so users can pick a valid feerate. It is not a security patch and does not fix a known vulnerability; it changes how users interact with the splicing API.

Recommended action

No immediate security action required. Review downstream code that calls splice_channel/rbf_channel or FundingTemplate splice methods to update to the new API signature and ensure callers respect the returned min_rbf_feerate floor.

Security signals we found

01

API refactor of experimental splicing/RBF feature

02

RBF feerate floor (25/24 rule) is now exposed to callers via FundingTemplate::min_rbf_feerate

03

Validation that chosen min_feerate meets the RBF floor is moved into FundingTemplate splice methods

04

No removal of security-critical checks; existing 25/24 rule is preserved and surfaced earlier

05

No CVE, advisory, or vendor security disclosure referenced in commit

Risk score

Why this scored 32/100

Our methodology →
Potential impact 5/30
Exploitability 5/25
Stealth signal 5/15
Affected reach 5/15
Confidence 8/10
Evidence quality 4/5
Human-validated context

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