Every captured commit receives deterministic security triage and a separate communication-quality score. Security candidates and broader second-pass signals receive full-patch Ollama analysis.
Message quality measures whether a commit identifies its scope, purpose, rationale, testing, and supporting references. It does not change the security-severity score.
This commit changes how the Lightning networking code handles oversized encrypted messages. Previously, certain conditions would cause the program to crash with a panic. Now the code returns errors instead, which is a defensive improvement…
panic-to-error conversion for oversized message encryption/decryptiondenial-of-service hardening against oversized peer messagesdebug_assert retained to preserve test coverage of invariant violations
This commit simply updates the 'repository' web links in 15 package metadata files from GitHub to a self-hosted Forgejo instance. It does not change any program code, build logic, dependencies, or security behavior. There is no security is…
This commit fixes a bug in the Lightning Dev Kit where, after a disconnection, a node could fail to retransmit a 'splice_locked' message to a peer that was still waiting for transaction signatures. Without this retransmission, the two peer…
Protocol state desynchronization between channel peers after reconnectionMissing retransmission of splice_locked for 0-conf splice channelsPotential channel unusability or stuck splice negotiation
This commit fixes a small accounting bug in how the Lightning wallet estimates the size (and therefore transaction fee) of a special Bitcoin transaction that sweeps funds back to the user after a channel closes. The old code always assumed…
debug assertion failure possible in development/testing buildstransaction weight/fee estimate overestimation up to 3 WUconstant replaced with per-descriptor length computation
This commit changes the project's internal code-review workflow. It stops automatically assigning a human reviewer when a pull request is opened; instead, contributors must manually click a button to request a reviewer after first addressi…
This commit fixes a bug in LDK's Lightning channel reconnection logic after a splice (a way to resize a channel's on-chain funds). If one peer had already received the splice signatures but the other had not, and then they disconnected and…
Protocol-state inconsistency on reconnection after splice signature exchangePotential channel stall/force-close due to quiescence not being exited before commitment updateFuzzer-discovered edge case in Lightning splicing retransmission
This commit adds a new option for Lightning invoice creators to explicitly tell payers not to use multi-path payments (MPP) when paying an invoice. It does not change any enforcement rules; it only changes what feature bits are advertised …
New API surface for feature advertisement controlExplicit documentation that the method does not enforce single-HTLC receipt, shifting enforcement responsibility to callersNo removal or weakening of existing validation logic
This commit adjusts the project's continuous integration (CI) test script to pin an older version of a build-time helper crate called `jobserver` when using older Rust compilers. It is a build compatibility fix, not a security patch, and d…
This commit only adds new test code. It exercises how a newer version of LDK exchanges saved channel data with the older LDK 0.2 release when a channel has a pending splice. There is no change to production logic, no bug fix, and no securi…
This commit removes the 'Option' wrapper from several HTLC amount fields, making them required instead of optional. It is a cleanup/refactoring change that simplifies the code by assuming the amount is always known. The commit message fram…
Removal of Option wrapper for financial amount fieldsSerialization format change from optional to required TLV fieldsLoss of backward compatibility with older serialized monitor/channel state
This commit is a code cleanup inside the project's test suite. It replaces a helper function with several hard-to-read positional arguments (like bare `false` and `None`) with a 'builder' pattern that names each option. This makes the test…
This commit is a feature addition, not a vulnerability fix. It extends rust-lightning's BOLT 12 payment support so that when a wallet pays a BOLT 12 invoice, the paid invoice is saved through retries and restarts and is later exposed in th…
New BOLT 12 payer proof feature: persists paid invoice across retries/restarts and exposes it in Event::PaymentSentPayer signing key re-derived from invoice payer metadata rather than storing extra key materialAdds end-to-end test for proof creation, verification, and bech32 round-trip
This commit is a code cleanup (refactor) in the Lightning Dev Kit library. It moves existing payer key-derivation logic into shared helper functions so that future 'payer proof' features can reuse the same code. The change does not appear …
Refactor only: moves existing key derivation/verification logic into helpers without changing algorithmsAdds new public API `Bolt12Invoice::derive_payer_signing_keys` for payer proof key recoveryNo mention of vulnerability, bug, CVE, security fix, or exploit in commit title/message
This commit changes a CI workflow for the rust-lightning project. It stops trying to push new fuzz test inputs directly to a corpus repository from automated test runs, and instead uploads them as a temporary artifact that a separate sched…
This commit adds partial support in the Lightning Dev Kit node software for receiving and temporarily holding multi-part trampoline payments, then deliberately rejects them once all parts arrive because full outbound forwarding is not yet …
New trampoline forward handling path accumulates MPP parts before rejectingDebug assertion guards first-HTLC failure in MPP mergeTODO comment flags possible MPP inconsistency in next_node_id across trampoline parts
This commit removes a redundant 32-byte shared secret field from an internal data structure used when forwarding trampoline payments in the Lightning Dev Kit. The developers realized the secret was already stored inside each previous hop's…
Removes redundant secret field from in-memory/persisted stateChanges TLV serialization layout for HTLCSource::TrampolineForwardBreaking persistence change acknowledged by commit author
This commit changes the project's automated reviewer-assignment workflow to stop using a long-lived secret token and instead request a short-lived authentication token from the Forgejo CI service. This is a security-hardening improvement: …
Removal of long-lived repository secret from CI workflowAdoption of OIDC-based short-lived token for API authorizationWorkflow runs in pull_request_target context with no code checkout
This commit only adds new fuzz-testing commands to an existing test harness. It lets the fuzzer temporarily block and then re-enable the local node's own signing operations during simulated channel failures. There is no change to productio…
This commit hardens the project's automated build and test scripts by replacing loose version tags like 'actions/checkout@v4' with exact commit hashes served from a specific domain. This prevents a compromised or renamed third-party action…
CI/CD supply-chain hardeningAction reference pinning to immutable commit hashUse of explicit action mirror URL
This commit fixes a logic bug in the Lightning Dev Kit's channel splicing code. Previously, the code wrongly assumed that no unrelated monitor update could be pending when a splice `tx_signatures` message arrived while the channel was quie…
Assertion relaxation in state-machine handling of splice `tx_signatures`Race condition between unrelated HTLC preimage monitor update and splice signature exchangePotential panic or protocol stall due to overly strict debug assertion
ln: handle DecodedOnionFailure for local trampoline failures
While proper error handling will be added in a followup, we add the bare minimum required here for testing.
Note that we intentionally keep the behavior of not setting `payment_failed_permanently` for local failures because we can possibly retry it because we're the sender as a trampoline forwarder.
For example, a local ChannelClosed error is considered to be permanent, but we can still retry along another channel.
95/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Explains rationale or failure mode✓ Mentions testing or verification
ln: double encrypt errors received from downstream failures
If we're a trampoline node and received an error from downstream that we can't fully decrypt, we want to double-wrap it for the original sender. Previously not implemented because we'd only focused on receives, where there's no possibility of a downstream error.
While proper error handling will be added in a followup, we add the bare minimum required here for testing.
95/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Explains rationale or failure mode✓ Mentions testing or verification
ln: add trampoline mpp accumulation with rejection on completion
Add our MPP accumulation logic for trampoline payments, but reject them when they fully arrive. This allows us to test parts of our trampoline flow without fully implementing outbound dispatch.
This commit keeps the same first_claimable_htlc debug_assert behavior as MPP claims, asserting that we do not fail our check_claimable_incoming_htlc merge for the first HTLC that we add to a set. This assert can only be hit if our first part exceeds the `MAX_VALUE_MSAT`, which should not be hit because we check individual amounts elsewhere in the codebase (the check exists to check that multiple parts combined don't hit this overflow).
100/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Explains rationale or failure mode✓ Mentions testing or verification✓ Names security-relevant behavior explicitly
Why it was queued
memory safety
AI analysis · Low 25/100
This commit adds partial support in the Lightning Dev Kit node software for receiving and temporarily holding multi-part trampoline payments, then deliberately rejects them once all parts arrive because full outbound forwarding is not yet implemented. It is a development/testing step for the trampoline routing feature, not a finished payment path. The code includes safety checks and debug assertions to catch inconsistent payment data, and it explicitly fails unsupported forwards rather than silently mishandling them.
Make SpliceFundingFailed::contribution non-optional
`SpliceFundingFailed` is only constructed from a concrete `FundingContribution`, so store it directly. `Event::SpliceNegotiationFailed::contribution` still needs to be optional as it could be read from a prior version that did not store contribution data.
73/100 · AdequateMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context
Lower-priorityCheck channel is live while handling counterparty tx_init_rbfby Wilmer Paulino · 43c0fc71 · Jul 2, 2026 · 1 fileMessage 73 · AdequateTriage 0Details
Commit message · Wilmer Paulino
Check channel is live while handling counterparty tx_init_rbf
This mirrors what we do for counterparty `splice_init` messages, making sure we don't accept RBFs once a channel has requested shutdown.
73/100 · AdequateMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context
Prefer tx_abort over disconnection for splice negotiation errors
We keep some `WarnAndDisconnect` cases as mandated by the spec, but otherwise prefer sending `tx_abort` to terminate quiescence and avoid reconnection loops.
85/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Explains rationale or failure mode
Lower-priorityPrefer tx_abort over disconnection for inability to RBFby Wilmer Paulino · ff3d3886 · Jul 2, 2026 · 3 filesMessage 65 · AdequateTriage 0Details
Commit message · Wilmer Paulino
Prefer tx_abort over disconnection for inability to RBF
Send `tx_abort` to terminate quiescence and avoid reconnection loops.
65/100 · AdequateMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides an explanatory body
While a contribution may be valid at the time the splice is requested, quiescence still needs to happen, which can affect the balances of the channel as it fully settles all pending state. After doing so, it's possible that the contribution is no longer valid. Since quiescence itself doesn't have a terminal message, we see a `WarnAndDisconnect` event happen.
68/100 · AdequateMessage clarity
✓ Descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context
Always emit SpliceNegotiationFailed when contributing
Previously, this could result in an acceptor not receiving a `Event::SpliceNegotiationFailed` for a splice in which they reused the same contribution (except for the feerate change). Our API should guarantee that users should always see `SpliceNegotiated` and `SpliceNegotiationFailed` events for splices that they contribute to.
73/100 · AdequateMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context
Only emit Event::SpliceNegotiated when contributing
There's no need to inform users of negotiated splices when they're not contributing as it just produces noise. Once they do start contributing, they cannot stop, so we always emit the event going forward. Note that we still emit `Event::ChannelReady` with the new locked funding outpoint for each locked splice, so users can still learn that a splice occurred that way.
73/100 · AdequateMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context
Why it was queued
signing or wallet pathsecond-pass: security-sensitive path
ln: add awaiting_trampoline_forwards to accumulate inbound MPP
When we are a trampoline router, we need to accumulate incoming HTLCs (if MPP is used) before forwarding the trampoline-routed outgoing HTLC(s). This commit adds a new map in channel manager, and mimics the handling done for claimable_payments.
We will rely on our pending_outbound_payments (which will contain a payment for trampoline forwards) for completing MPP claims, not want to surface `PaymentClaimable` events for trampoline, so do not need to have pending_claiming_payments like we have for MPP receives.
This map is not persisted, as we're currently working on refactoring restart logic to depend on channel monitors. We should not use this accumulation map in production yet, as we can hit a force close if: - We are used as a trampoline, despite not supporting the feature - A trampoline MPP part arrives and is committed to the inbound channel and added to `awaiting_trampoline_forwards` - We restart and the MPP part is not re-added to `awaiting_trampoline_forwards`
In this scenario, we will not hit our MPP timeout logic for this HTLC because we have "forgotten" about it. It will be up to our counterparty to force close the channel on us, because we're not failing it back after we hit MPP timeout. Likewise, even if other MPP parts arrive, we won't consider the inbound accumulation to be complete so we'll fail them back but forget about the HTLC that came before the restart.
We currently reject trampoline HTLCs earlier in the lifecycle, so we are not at risk of producing a state that could trigger such a force close. In the commits that follow, we'll allow forwarding of trampoline HTLC for tests so that we can start to cover this code.
95/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Explains rationale or failure mode✓ Mentions testing or verification
ln: use outer onion values for trampoline NextPacketDetails
When we receive trampoline payments, we first want to validate the values in our outer onion to ensure that we've been given the amount/ expiry that the sender was intending us to receive to make sure that forwarding nodes haven't sent us less than they should.
85/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Explains rationale or failure mode
Why it was queued
defensive validation
Lower-priorityln: store next trampoline amount and cltv in PendingHTLCRoutingby Carla Kirk-Cohen · e14a28dd · Jul 2, 2026 · 2 filesMessage 73 · AdequateTriage 0Details
Commit message · Carla Kirk-Cohen
ln: store next trampoline amount and cltv in PendingHTLCRouting
When we're forwarding a trampoline payment, we need to remember the amount and CLTV that the next trampoline is expecting.
73/100 · AdequateMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context
Lower-priorityln: use outer onion values in PendingHTLCInfo for trampolineby Carla Kirk-Cohen · c58d1d83 · Jul 2, 2026 · 1 fileMessage 85 · StrongTriage 0Details
Commit message · Carla Kirk-Cohen
ln: use outer onion values in PendingHTLCInfo for trampoline
When we are a trampoline node receiving an incoming HTLC, we need access to our outer onion's amount_to_forward to check that we have been forwarded the correct amount. We can't use the amount in the inner onion, because that contains our fee budget - somebody could forward us less than we were intended to receive, and provided it is within the trampoline fee budget we wouldn't know.
In this commit we set our outer onion values in PendingHTLCInfo to perform this validation properly. In the commit that follows, we'll start tracking our expected trampoline values in trampoline-specific routing info.
85/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Explains rationale or failure mode
Lower-priorityln: store incoming mpp data in PendingHTLCRoutingby Carla Kirk-Cohen · a1260ed1 · Jul 2, 2026 · 2 filesMessage 68 · AdequateTriage 8Details
Commit message · Carla Kirk-Cohen
ln: store incoming mpp data in PendingHTLCRouting
When we receive a trampoline forward, we need to wait for MPP parts to arrive at our node before we can forward the outgoing payment onwards. This commit threads this information through to our pending htlc struct which we'll use to validate the parts we receive.
68/100 · AdequateMessage clarity
✓ Descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context
Why it was queued
defensive validation
Lower-priorityln: use total_msat to calculate the amount for our next trampolineby Carla Kirk-Cohen · 3e162db9 · Jul 2, 2026 · 1 fileMessage 85 · StrongTriage 0Details
Commit message · Carla Kirk-Cohen
ln: use total_msat to calculate the amount for our next trampoline
For regular blinded forwards, it's okay to use the amount in our update_add_htlc to calculate the amount that we need to foward onwards because we're only expecting on HTLC in and one HTLC out.
For blinded trampoline forwards, it's possible that we have multiple incoming HTLCs that need to accumulate at our node that make our total incoming amount from which we'll calculate the amount that we need to forward onwards to the next trampoline. This commit updates our next trampoline amount calculation to use the total intended incoming amount for the payment so we can correctly calculate our next trampoline's amount.
`decode_incoming_update_add_htlc_onion` is left unchanged because the call to `check_blinded` will be removed in upcoming commits.
85/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Explains rationale or failure mode
ln: remove incoming trampoline secret from HTLCSource
We don't need to track a single trampoline secret in our HTLCSource because this is already tracked in each of our previous hops contained in the source. This field was unnecessarily added under the belief that each inner trampoline onion we receive for inbound MPP trampoline would have the same session key.
It can be removed with breaking changes to persistence because we currently refuse to decode trampoline forwards, and will not read HTLCSource::Trampoline to prevent downgrades.
85/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Explains rationale or failure mode
Why it was queued
update trust
AI analysis · Informational 23/100
This commit removes a redundant 32-byte shared secret field from an internal data structure used when forwarding trampoline payments in the Lightning Dev Kit. The developers realized the secret was already stored inside each previous hop's data, so keeping a single copy at the top level was unnecessary. The change also updates serialization so older saved state cannot be cleanly loaded, but the code currently refuses to decode trampoline forwards anyway, so that downgrade risk is intentional and noted.
Request a local Authorized Integration JWT in the reviewer workflow.
Use bearer authorization for the reviewer request API call.
This avoids a long-lived user token.
The workflow still gets the missing reviewer-request capability.
Co-Authored-By: HAL 9000
73/100 · AdequateMessage clarity
✓ Descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Names security-relevant behavior explicitly
Why it was queued
access controlsigning or wallet path
AI analysis · Informational 19/100
This commit changes the project's automated reviewer-assignment workflow to stop using a long-lived secret token and instead request a short-lived authentication token from the Forgejo CI service. This is a security-hardening improvement: it reduces the risk that a stolen or leaked long-lived token could be misused. There is no indication of an active vulnerability being fixed, and the change itself does not introduce obvious new weaknesses.