Electrum

This is a small code cleanup in Electrum's transaction handling. It simplifies how raw transaction bytes are converted to hex strings. There is no obvious security bug being fixed here; it appears to be a follow-up simplification to a previous change.

This change is a performance optimization, not a security fix. It makes whitespace removal from transaction data optional, skipping it when loading transactions from the wallet's own stored files. The default behavior for user-provided input still removes whitespace. There is no direct security issue in the patch itself, though any future code that calls tx_from_any with untrusted input must remember to leave sanitization enabled.

This commit fixes a data-type consistency bug in Electrum's wallet database loader. When loading very old wallet files, the code could return numeric (integer) dictionary keys instead of string keys. Because the rest of the program expects string keys, this mismatch could later cause crashes or unexpected behavior when the wallet tries to read or update stored data. The fix forces all keys to become strings by converting the data through JSON.

This commit adds a command-line option to turn off a Linux memory-protection feature in Electrum. The option is mainly intended for developers using memory profilers, but it is also automatically enabled on Android builds. It does not by itself create a vulnerability, but it gives users a way to weaken a security hardening mechanism.

This commit updates the built-in lists of default servers that Electrum wallet users connect to for Bitcoin test networks (testnet3 and testnet4). It adds, removes, and changes server addresses and protocol versions. There is no code change and no claim in the commit that this fixes a security issue. However, changing default servers can affect user privacy and trust, because wallets rely on these servers to learn about transactions. If a malicious server were added, it could spy on users or feed them bad information. The commit itself does not show that any added server is malicious, so this is best viewed as a routine infrastructure update with a low but non-zero security-relevant aspect.

This commit is a small cleanup of internal developer scripts. It replaces direct calls to set the Bitcoin test network with a single call that asks the configuration object which chain to use. There is no user-facing change and no security issue.

This commit fixes a bug where Electrum's built-in list of default servers could be accidentally modified by normal code. The fix makes a deep copy of the server list before returning it, so callers cannot change the original. This is a defensive coding fix that prevents potential network misdirection or connection problems, but the commit itself does not describe a specific security vulnerability or active attack.

This is a routine fix for an Android CI build workflow. The GitHub Actions cache key was failing because it tried to hash files in a directory that could not be read. The patch explicitly excludes the problematic directory from the hash. There is no security issue here.

This commit simply changes the default internet relay address used by Electrum's NWC (Nostr Wallet Connect) plugin from Alby's server to Primal's server. It is a configuration change, not a code vulnerability fix. The commit message explains that Alby's relay appears to be timing out for older encrypted messages, so the developers are switching to a relay that still accepts them. There is no security bug being patched here.

This commit only changes the version number of an AI model used in an optional continuous-integration (CI) security-review script, from Claude 4.7 to Claude 4.8. It does not touch Electrum's wallet code, networking, cryptography, or any code that end users run. There is no security issue here.

This commit fixes a bug in Electrum's Lightning payment splitting logic. Previously, the software could create payment plans that included empty 'splits' for channels that weren't actually being used. This caused two downstream checks to misclassify payments: a single-channel payment could be treated as a multi-channel payment, and a direct payment to the intended recipient could be treated as a routed payment. These misclassifications could lead to less efficient routing, higher fees, or routing failures rather than direct payment success.

This commit only adds comments to two GitHub workflow files explaining where API keys come from and what permissions they need. It does not change any code behavior, secrets handling, or access controls. There is no security issue here.

This change fixes a potential denial-of-service weakness in Electrum's Lightning network peer handling. Previously, when Electrum replied to a peer's 'ping' message, it would add the reply to the outgoing socket buffer without waiting to confirm it could actually be sent. A malicious peer that accepts data very slowly (or not at all) could trick Electrum into piling up hundreds of megabytes of unsent replies in memory each hour. The patch makes the reply wait until the socket can drain the data, limiting memory growth.

This change adds a simple speed bump to stop a connected Lightning peer from bombarding an Electrum node with tiny 'ping' messages that force the node to send back large 'pong' replies. Before the patch, a peer could send pings as fast as the network allowed, making Electrum waste bandwidth and CPU generating replies. After the patch, Electrum waits at least one second between handling pings from the same peer, slowing any abuse to a trickle. The commit author notes this is not considered a serious issue.

This commit only changes a regression test script. It replaces a quick check that sometimes failed with a proper wait routine, and removes an unnecessary one-second sleep. There is no change to the actual Electrum wallet or Lightning code that users run.

This commit fixes a bug in Electrum's Lightning payment routing where the size of a per-hop authentication value (HMAC) was being counted twice when building onion packets. The fix removes the extra count, which could previously have caused Electrum to think a trampoline payment payload was larger than it actually is. The practical effect is likely limited to routing failures or incorrect payload budgeting for trampoline payments, rather than direct theft of funds.

This commit simply removes the old Cirrus CI configuration file and a small related check in a build script because the project has finished moving its automated testing and build tasks to GitHub Actions. There is no change to Electrum's wallet, networking, or cryptographic code, and no security vulnerability is introduced or fixed.

This commit simply moves Electrum's automated binary build process from one CI service (Cirrus CI) to another (GitHub Actions). It does not change the wallet application code, cryptography, or how users interact with Electrum. The nightly build schedule and produced artifacts (Windows installer, Android APK, AppImage, source tarball) remain the same in substance. There is no indication this introduces a security vulnerability.

This commit adds a new GitHub Actions workflow that runs an automated security review on pull requests using Anthropic's Claude Code tool. It is a defensive security measure, not a vulnerability fix. The workflow is intentionally restricted so it only auto-runs for trusted maintainers; external contributors must trigger it manually after review. The change also updates the existing Python review script to read GitHub Actions environment variables instead of Cirrus CI variables.

This commit adds a new GitHub Actions automation file that uploads translation files to Crowdin whenever code is pushed to the master branch. It does not change any wallet, payment, or network code, and it does not introduce any obvious security issue. It is a routine infrastructure migration from one CI service (Cirrus) to another (GitHub Actions).

This commit adds a new automated CI workflow that runs a submodule-checking script whenever a Git tag is pushed. It does not change application code, fix a bug, or alter security behavior of the Electrum wallet itself. It is purely an internal testing/verification automation addition.

This commit adds a new GitHub Actions workflow file that runs Electrum's automated regtest (regression testing) functional tests on every push, pull request, and tag. It does not change any application code, wallet logic, or network behavior. It is purely a CI/CD infrastructure addition.

This commit adds a new GitHub Actions configuration file that automatically runs code-quality checks and unit tests when code is pushed or a pull request is opened. It does not change any application code, user-facing behavior, or security-sensitive logic. It is purely an infrastructure change to the project's continuous integration (CI) system.

This commit tightens a Python package version pin. The developer had accidentally allowed any PyQt 6.x release (e.g., 6.11, 6.12) to be installed for the optional QML GUI, when they only wanted the 6.10.x line. The change itself is a preventive dependency fix, not a patch for an active vulnerability in Electrum's code. It reduces the risk that a future, incompatible, or buggy PyQt release could break or destabilize the QML GUI.

This commit simply increases the timeout for an automated security review script from 20 minutes to 60 minutes. It does not change any wallet, networking, or cryptographic code that could affect users. There is no security vulnerability here.