Every captured commit receives deterministic security triage and a separate communication-quality score. Security candidates and broader second-pass signals receive full-patch Ollama analysis.
Message quality measures whether a commit identifies its scope, purpose, rationale, testing, and supporting references. It does not change the security-severity score.
This commit is a routine post-release housekeeping change. It bumps the software version from 0.14.6 to 0.15.0-SNAPSHOT across several build files, adds a blank release-notes template for the next version, and intentionally adds a startup …
Startup guard added to block accidental execution of development snapshotNo vulnerability fix, cryptographic change, or trust-boundary modification present
This commit is the release packaging for Eclair v0.14.6. The release notes explicitly state it contains 'security hardening fixes' that can be exploited by malicious nodes, and thank a researcher for responsible disclosure. The actual code…
Vendor release notes explicitly label the release as containing 'security hardening fixes' exploitable by malicious nodesNew default-on configuration `require-confirmed-inputs-for-splicing` mitigates unconfirmed-input double-spend risk during splicingRelease notes credit @erickcestari for responsible disclosures
This commit hardens Eclair's Lightning channel 'splicing' feature against a malicious peer. Splicing lets users resize a channel by creating a new funding transaction. The patch fixes several ways an attacker could exploit unconfirmed spli…
New default-on configuration `require-confirmed-inputs-for-splicing` to prevent double-spend of unconfirmed splice inputsLimit on remote splice inputs/outputs (10) to bound CPFP costForce-close now selects a commitment whose funding tx is known to bitcoind, re-evaluated per block and splice spend events
This commit fixes a security gap in Eclair's Lightning node software. A peer could repeatedly get free channel funding ('liquidity') by backing out of payments meant to cover the fees right before the funding transaction was signed. Previo…
Fixes a logic flaw allowing repeated unpaid liquidity feesAdds peer suspicion flagging tied to funding txidExpands state handling for asynchronous LiquidityPurchaseAborted events
This commit is a routine post-release housekeeping change. It bumps the project version from 0.14.5 to 0.15.0-SNAPSHOT, removes published release checksums, and adds a blank release-notes template. It also adds a startup guard that refuses…
No vulnerability signals presentStartup guard added to block accidental use of development snapshot
This commit is the release packaging for Eclair v0.14.5. The release notes state it is a patch release containing 'security hardening fixes' that can be exploited by malicious nodes, and thank two people for responsible disclosures. The ac…
Release notes explicitly describe 'security hardening fixes' and warn that 'some of these issues can be exploited by malicious nodes'Two independent researchers are credited for responsible disclosuresRemoval of an 'unsafe startup' guard indicates the prior development snapshot was considered unsafe and this release is meant to be safe to run
This commit fixes a security bug in Eclair's taproot channel splicing. When two users splice a Lightning channel, one side can describe its bitcoin inputs by sending only a small summary (the txOut) instead of the full previous transaction…
Missing cryptographic/chain validation of peer-supplied transaction dataTaproot signature commits to spent outputs, making a signed-but-unconfirmable splice possiblePotential HTLC theft via old commitment publication after splice timeout
This fix closes a denial-of-service bug in Eclair's Lightning onion routing. A remote sender could craft a malformed per-hop payload length that, when converted from a large number to a normal integer, wrapped around to a negative or tiny …
Integer overflow / truncation from Long to IntNegative length bypasses upper-bound checkException escapes Try block causing DoS
This commit is a routine post-release housekeeping change. It bumps the project version from 0.14.4 to 0.15.0-SNAPSHOT, removes the published checksums for the 0.14.4 release, and adds a placeholder release-notes file for the next version.…
No security-relevant code changesAdded explicit unsafe-startup guard to prevent accidental use of development snapshotNo references to CVEs, advisories, or security issues in commit message or diff
This commit is the official release marker for Eclair v0.14.4. The release notes included in the commit describe it as a security-hardening patch release with fixes for multiple issues, some of which can be exploited by malicious nodes. Th…
Release notes explicitly label the release as containing 'security hardening fixes' exploitable by malicious nodesHTTP API now rejects Origin-header requests to mitigate browser-based CSRF against basic-authenticated endpointsSeed file length validation added (commit a07fff5)
This commit fixes a security bug in the Eclair Lightning node where a malicious peer could trick the node into permanently giving up on publishing its own commitment or penalty transactions. By publishing and then double-spending a conflic…
The commit message explicitly describes theft risk: "This lets them steal HTLCs by publishing their commitment later"Attack vector involves a malicious peer withholding tx_signatures and double-spending a splice inputFix changes abandonment logic for local commit anchor preconditions
This commit fixes a bug in Eclair, a Bitcoin Lightning Network node implementation. When the node received a duplicate command to settle a payment (fulfill or fail), it would mistakenly delete the still-pending settlement from its database…
Loss of pending HTLC settlement state on disconnect/reconnectUpstream HTLC timeout risk for relayed fulfilled downstream HTLCsDuplicate/conflicting command handling caused premature DB acknowledgement
This commit fixes a bug in Eclair, a Bitcoin Lightning Network node implementation. When one node force-closed a channel because its peer never finished signing a 'splice' (a way to resize a Lightning channel on-chain), and the peer later …
Funds-locking bug in channel close logicHTLCs not enforced on-chain after confirmed double-spendIncorrect re-force-close trigger condition
This commit fixes a set of vulnerabilities in Eclair's Lightning channel splicing protocol that could let a malicious peer trick the victim into signing a splice transaction that can never be published on the Bitcoin network. Because the v…
Commit title and message explicitly describe preventing a malicious peer from making us sign an unpublishable splice transactionAdds validation of absolute lockTime against current block height to prevent indefinite publication delayAdds rejection of BIP 68 relative lock time on all interactive-tx inputs, including shared splice input
This commit fixes a bug in how Eclair processes encrypted routing instructions (onion packets) for Lightning payments. A malicious sender could craft a packet that claimed its inner payload was longer than the packet itself. The old code e…
Unchecked length field from attacker-controlled onion packet used for slicingException thrown outside Try block, bypassing expected error handlingRelayer crash could leave HTLC un-failed
This commit fixes a cryptographic safety issue in a manual Bitcoin/Lightning recovery tool. When a user runs the `spendfromchanneladdress` operation, the code was re-reading a secret signing nonce from a stored map after using it once. Non…
nonce reuse prevention in Schnorr-like/MuSig2 partial signature flowprivate nonce removed from in-memory store after single usemanual recovery command affected, not hot path
This patch fixes a bug in the Eclair Bitcoin Lightning node where, if the node crashed while creating its secret seed file, it could leave an empty file behind. On the next restart, Eclair would silently use that empty seed to generate all…
Use of weak/predictable cryptographic seed for key derivationMissing input validation on security-critical seed fileNon-atomic file write creating corrupt/empty secret material
This commit updates the PostgreSQL database driver used by Eclair from version 42.7.11 to 42.7.12. It is a routine dependency bump by an automated tool. The commit itself does not say what bugs the new driver fixes, but small point-release…
Dependency version bump of a database driverPoint-release upgrade may include upstream security fixes, but none are named in the commitNo application code changes or direct vulnerability evidence in the diff
This commit updates Eclair's Bitcoin library dependency from version 0.48 to 0.49, which internally uses newer versions of bitcoin-kmp and secp256k1-kmp. The code changes only replace old property accesses (like `.txid`) with new method ca…
Dependency version bump for Bitcoin and secp256k1 cryptographic librariesSource changes are API adaptations (.txid -> .getTxid), not logic changesSecurity-critical validation code is touched (PSBT/transaction integrity checks against malicious Bitcoin Core)
This commit is a routine build-system update. It upgrades several Maven plugin versions, removes the git commit ID from one jar manifest field to avoid a build-time circular dependency, and adds an optional build profile for a fuzz-testing…
We connect to bitcoind over ZMQ right after spawning all actors in the system, which can consume a lot of our available sockets/bandwidth. We increase the default timeout from 5 seconds to 30 seconds.
76/100 · AdequateMessage clarity
✓ Descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference
AI analysis · Informational 19/100
This commit increases the startup timeout from 5 to 30 seconds for Eclair's connections to Bitcoin's ZMQ notification service and its own TCP server port. It is a reliability/configuration fix, not a security patch. There is no indication it fixes a vulnerability or was triggered by a security report.
Add threshold for disabling `from_future_htlc` (#3293)
When funding a transaction using `from_future_htlc`, we are taking the risk that the remote node doesn't fulfill the corresponding HTLCs. If we detect that too many peers fail such HTLCs, this may indicate a bug on the wallet side, so we automatically disable `from_future_htlc` to limit our exposure.
We also ensure that nodes that already had one suspicious payment are blacklisted for other payments. This issue can happen when wallet users use multiple devices in unsupported scenarios.
81/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference
AI analysis · Low 48/100
This commit adds a safety limit to a Lightning node feature called 'from_future_htlc,' which lets peers pay channel funding fees using HTLCs that haven't arrived yet. The change makes the node track how many distinct peers look suspicious (e.g., accept funding but then reject the future HTLCs), and once a threshold is reached, it stops allowing that funding method. It also lets operators keep specific nodes blacklisted when re-enabling the feature. This is a defensive hardening patch, not a fix for an active exploit in the code itself.
We add release notes about the peer scorer for node operators who like living on the bleeding edge. We also remove the workaround for the lack of DB data on restart.
We also add metrics to track rolling profit and payment volume.
76/100 · AdequateMessage clarity
✓ Descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference
AI analysis · Informational 15/100
This commit only adds user-facing documentation for a new experimental feature and adds metrics that report profit and payment volume. It also removes a temporary workaround that delayed automated actions until enough historical data was available. There is no security-relevant code change visible in the diff.
There's a race condition between Bob and Carol's router states, which aren't updated exactly at the same time. Retrying the condition should fix this race condition.
86/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Mentions testing or verification✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference
Why it was queued
second-pass: broader security terminology
AI analysis · Informational 15/100
This commit only changes a test file to make an integration test less flaky by retrying a condition until two nodes' routing data match. It does not modify production code, so it has no direct security impact on real Eclair users.
Don't load network graph twice on start-up (#3290)
We previously read the whole network graph from DB (channels and nodes) twice: once before starting any actor to verify that the DB has not been corrupted, and then again when initializing the `Router` actor.
We now keep the result of the first DB read instead of throwing it away and provide it as argument to the `Router`, which doesn't need to read from the DB on start-up anymore.
91/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Mentions testing or verification✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference
AI analysis · Informational 19/100
This commit is a performance and startup-time optimization for the Eclair Lightning node. It changes the startup sequence so the network graph (channels and nodes) is read from the database once instead of twice. The Router actor now receives the already-loaded data via a new Init message rather than loading it itself. There is no security vulnerability here; the change is purely about efficiency and code structure.
Don't try reconnecting automatically to mobile wallets (#3287)
It's useless as they will always have a different IP address, and they will be offline most of the time anyway. They will initiate connections either when the app is started or when they receive a push notification so we never need to initiate connections from the server side.
81/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference
AI analysis · Low 31/100
This change stops Eclair lightning nodes from automatically trying to reconnect to mobile wallets. Mobile wallets change IP addresses frequently and are usually offline, so server-initiated reconnections are wasteful and can leak information about which channels belong to mobile users. The mobile wallet will reconnect on its own when it opens the app or gets a push notification. This is a hardening and privacy improvement, not a fix for an active exploit.
Lower-priorityAdd delays when reading past payment events for stats (#3288)by Bastien Teinturier · 1a88ebe1 · Apr 15, 2026 · 7 filesMessage 81 · StrongInformational 17Details
Commit message · Bastien Teinturier
Add delays when reading past payment events for stats (#3288)
When we restart, we load past payments events into the peer stats tracker to inform our scoring algorithm. We read them in chunks, but it can be quite expensive in terms of bandwidth. Since this is low priority and there are a lot of DB reads already happening when starting up, we add a large initial delay and a small-ish chunk delay.
With the default values, all past events should be loaded ~20 minutes after starting up, and the first run of the scoring algorithm happens 1 hour after starting up, so this should work well.
81/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference
AI analysis · Informational 17/100
This commit is a performance and reliability improvement, not a security fix. It adds configurable delays when a restarted Eclair node reloads past payment events into its peer statistics tracker. Previously these database reads happened immediately and in rapid succession, which could strain the database during startup. Now the first batch waits 10 minutes and subsequent batches wait 10 seconds between reads. There is no indication this change addresses a vulnerability or is security-critical.
It fixes compatibility issues with alpine (which uses musl and not glibc), and is easier to maintain. Note that this makes the image about 190 Mb bigger.
76/100 · AdequateMessage clarity
✓ Descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference
AI analysis · Informational 18/100
This commit changes the Docker base image from Alpine Linux to Ubuntu Noble. The stated reason is to fix compatibility problems because Alpine uses a different C library (musl) than the one the Java build expects (glibc). It is a routine build/maintenance change, not a security patch. The image becomes larger, but there is no direct evidence in the commit of a vulnerability being fixed.
AI review queuedAdd fuzz tests for onion, route blinding and lightning message codecs (#3282)by Nishant Bansal · 0778eafa · Apr 13, 2026 · 4 filesMessage 91 · StrongInformational 15Details
Commit message · Nishant Bansal
Add fuzz tests for onion, route blinding and lightning message codecs (#3282)
- Expand LightningMessageCodecs fuzz tests to cover all message types - Add fuzz tests for payment and message onion payload codecs - Add fuzz tests for route blinding codecs - Add fuzz tests for onion failure message codecs
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Mentions testing or verification✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference
Why it was queued
fuzzing or regression evidenceparser or protocol pathsecond-pass: security-sensitive path
AI analysis · Informational 15/100
This commit only adds new automated fuzz tests for Lightning Network message and onion-payload codecs. It does not change any production code, so it cannot introduce a runtime vulnerability by itself. The tests are designed to catch crashes or inconsistent encoding/decoding in existing codec code by feeding them random bytes.
If the test runs too quickly and the message is processed in less than 1 millisecond, there is a race condition since reading from the database excludes the upper timestamp bound (`timestamp < now`).
We also remove our usage of the `BETWEEN` keyword for postgres. The `BETWEEN` keyword is inclusive of both bounds, while we want to exclude the upper bound to allow pagination.
86/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Mentions testing or verification✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference
Why it was queued
second-pass: broader security terminology
AI analysis · Informational 18/100
This commit fixes a flaky automated test and, as a side effect, changes several PostgreSQL database queries to exclude the upper time bound instead of including it. The change is described by the author as a correctness fix for pagination, not a security fix. There is no direct evidence of an exploitable vulnerability.
Lower-priorityAdd fee field to `findroute` full format response (#3283)by rorp · 9314fe99 · Apr 8, 2026 · 4 filesMessage 73 · AdequateInformational 15Details
Commit message · rorp
Add fee field to `findroute` full format response (#3283)
This can be helpful when analysis routes find by path-finding.
73/100 · AdequateMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides an explanatory body✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference
AI analysis · Informational 15/100
This commit simply adds a new 'fee' field to the JSON response of Eclair's route-finding API. It is a user-facing informational improvement and does not change any security-sensitive behavior, access controls, or payment logic.
``` A node receiving a ping message: - if num_pong_bytes is less than 65532: - MUST respond by sending a pong message, with byteslen equal to num_pong_bytes. - otherwise (num_pong_bytes is not less than 65532): - MUST ignore the ping. ```
These reply-less pings are used to insert cover traffic to thwart network-level traffic analysis. We wanted to allow them in #3278 but we missed this ping flood protection that needed to be updated.
We also had an off-by-one in the maximum pong length that is now fixed.
88/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Explains rationale or failure mode✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference
Why it was queued
cryptography-sensitive path
AI analysis · Moderate 51/100
This commit fixes two related bugs in how Eclair handles Lightning network 'ping' messages. First, it corrects an off-by-one error so pings asking for a 65532-byte reply are now ignored (matching the BOLT1 spec), instead of being answered. Second, it stops treating these 'reply-less' pings as a flood attack, so they no longer count toward the pending-ping limit that disconnects peers. The practical effect is that legitimate cover-traffic pings no longer risk getting a peer disconnected, and the protocol boundary now matches the specification.
Security candidateAdd backwards-compatible parts of the official splicing protocol (#3261)by Bastien Teinturier · 129df369 · Apr 3, 2026 · 12 filesMessage 86 · StrongLow 35Details
Commit message · Bastien Teinturier
Add backwards-compatible parts of the official splicing protocol (#3261)
* Add `funding_txid` to `commit_sig`
In https://github.com/lightning/bolts/pull/1160 we add a TLV field to `commit_sig` messages to let the receiver know to which `funding_txid` this signature applies. This is more resilient than relying on the order of the `commit_sig` messages in the batch. This is an odd TLV, so we can start writing it right now without creating compatibility issues.
We also slightly refactor existing code to make it easier to introduce a backwards-compat layer when migrating to the official splicing. We also increase the default number of RBF attempts allowed.
* Insert a `start_batch` message during splices
In https://github.com/lightning/bolts/pull/1160, we introduce a message to let our peer know how many `commit_sig` messages they will receive and treat them as a batch. This replaces our previous version that did something similar, but by adding a batch TLV in every `commit_sig` message we send.
We currently do both: we keep inserting the experimental batch TLV, and we start by sending a `start_batch` message (with the same information). Since it is an odd message (127), it should be safely ignored if our peer doesn't understand it.
86/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference✓ Names security-relevant behavior explicitly
Why it was queued
signing boundaryparser or protocol path
AI analysis · Low 35/100
This commit updates the Eclair Lightning node software to support a new, backwards-compatible draft of the official Bitcoin Lightning 'splicing' protocol. It adds a funding transaction identifier to commitment signatures and introduces a 'start_batch' message so peers know when multiple signatures belong together. It also keeps the older experimental batching mechanism for compatibility with older Phoenix wallets. The changes are primarily a protocol upgrade and compatibility shim, not a clear security fix, though they reduce ambiguity about which signature applies to which funding transaction during splices.
Lower-priorityFollow BOLT1 handling for "no reply" pings: ignore, don't warn. (#3278)by Rusty Russell · 6336d80c · Apr 2, 2026 · 2 filesMessage 81 · StrongInformational 18Details
Commit message · Rusty Russell
Follow BOLT1 handling for "no reply" pings: ignore, don't warn. (#3278)
These "oversize ping replies" are how we ask for no replies, such as when we're sending dummy traffic. From the rationale:
This allows a convenient cutoff for `num_pong_bytes` to indicate that no reply should be sent.
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au> Co-authored-by: t-bast <bastien@acinq.fr>
81/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference
AI analysis · Informational 18/100
This change updates how Eclair handles oversized ping messages from other Lightning nodes. Previously, Eclair would log a warning and send a 'Warning' message back. Now it silently ignores them. This aligns with the Lightning protocol spec (BOLT 1), which says large ping requests are a legitimate way to ask for no reply, often used for cover traffic. The old behavior was not a security vulnerability, but it was slightly noisy and could be used to generate warning logs or messages.
Add a fuzzing module based on Jazzer to allow fuzzing parts of eclair. This commit includes fuzz tests for codecs to be used as examples. It is a separate module (minimal interaction with the other modules). We include helper scripts to run many fuzz tests in parallel or generate reports.
76/100 · AdequateMessage clarity
✓ Descriptive subject✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Mentions testing or verification✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference
Why it was queued
fuzzing or regression evidencecryptography-sensitive pathparser or protocol path
AI analysis · Informational 15/100
This commit adds a new testing-only module that uses a fuzzing tool called Jazzer to automatically throw random data at Eclair's Lightning message parsers. It does not change any production code, network behavior, or security logic. It is purely a defensive testing improvement.
Lower-priorityInitialize peer stats with past events (#3272)by Bastien Teinturier · a05f5830 · Mar 31, 2026 · 3 filesMessage 88 · StrongInformational 18Details
Commit message · Bastien Teinturier
Initialize peer stats with past events (#3272)
We initialize peer statistics by reading past events from the `AuditDb`. We read events in chunks to avoid overloading the DB or the RAM. We only return peer statistics to callers once we've finished reading past data from the DB.
Note that on-chain statistics need to be computed whenever statistics are requested, because they require merging data from two distincts events (transaction published and transaction confirmed), which requires keeping state between those events and thus requires the DB (because the node may restart after publishing a transaction and before it confirms).
88/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Explains rationale or failure mode✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference
AI analysis · Informational 18/100
This commit changes how Eclair tracks peer statistics. Previously, after a restart, the node would start collecting statistics from scratch and wait for new events before making automated decisions. Now it loads up to 7 days of past payment and on-chain events from the database in chunks, and only returns complete statistics once that initial load is done. It also refreshes on-chain fee data from the database whenever statistics are requested, so fees from transactions confirmed while the node was offline are not missed. This is a correctness/operational improvement, not a security fix.
We more aggressively reclaim liquidity from idle channels. We start by identifying channels where the liquidity doesn't seem to be moving in either direction. Then we lower our relay fees until we reach our minimum configured value. Once we've reached that minimum fee, if the payment volume doesn't increase, we eventually close those channels (but we always keep one channel with those peers, we only close the redundant channels).
76/100 · AdequateMessage clarity
✓ Descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference
AI analysis · Informational 19/100
This commit adds an automated housekeeping feature to Eclair lightning nodes. It identifies channels where funds sit idle for a long time, lowers the routing fees on those channels to try to attract more payments, and eventually closes redundant idle channels if traffic still doesn't pick up. This is a normal business-logic change, not a security fix or vulnerability.
* der2compact() and compact2der() methods have been removed, new signInputCompact() method has been added
* Use Transaction.encodeWitnessEcdsaSig() instead of low-level calls
* Replace local der() methode with bitcoin-lib's encodeWitnessEcdsaSig()
76/100 · AdequateMessage clarity
✓ Descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference
Why it was queued
cryptography-sensitive pathsigning or wallet path
AI analysis · Informational 22/100
This commit updates Eclair to use a newer version of its underlying Bitcoin library (bitcoin-lib 0.47). Most changes are mechanical: replacing local helper functions with new library-provided equivalents for encoding signatures and signing transaction inputs. There is no direct evidence in the commit message or diff that this fixes a specific security vulnerability, but it does touch cryptographic code and updates a dependency, which can sometimes address bugs or weaknesses in the library itself.
Lower-priorityImprove data stored in `AuditDb` (#3245)by Bastien Teinturier · 890ccb37 · Mar 26, 2026 · 12 filesMessage 76 · AdequateInformational 18Details
Commit message · Bastien Teinturier
Improve data stored in `AuditDb` (#3245)
* Improve `channel_events` in the `AuditDb`
We improve the `channel_events` table in the `AuditDb` by:
- adding the `funding_txid` from each event - adding the `channel_type` from each event - using hex instead of blobs in sqlite - providing APIs to list these events - adding indexes on `channel_id` and `remote_node_id`
The added data isn't available in past events. We decide to simply rename the older tables and start fresh: previous data will not be available from the API, but can still be queried directly in SQL if necessary.
* Improve transaction events in the `AuditDb`
We improve the `transactions_published` and `transactions_confirmed` tables in the `AuditDb` by:
- adding more details about mining fees and feerates - adding input and output counts - using hex instead of blobs in sqlite - providing APIs to list transactions by `remote_node_id` - adding indexes for listing APIs
The added data isn't available in past events. We decide to simply rename the older tables and start fresh: previous data will not be available from the API, but can still be queried directly in SQL if necessary.
* Improve payment sent and received events in the `AuditDb`
We improve the `sent` and `received` payment tables in the `AuditDb` by:
- adding `start_at` / `settled_at` timestamps to measure duration - adding `remote_node_id` for every channel used - using hex instead of blobs in sqlite - reordering columns and renaming them wherever useful
The added data isn't available in past events. We decide to simply rename the older tables and start fresh: previous data will not be available from the API, but can still be queried directly in SQL if necessary.
* Improve payment relayed events in the `AuditDb`
We improve the `relayed` and `relayed_trampoline` payment tables in the `AuditDb` by:
- unifying the way we handle multi-part payments, by having one row per payment, whether incoming or outgoing, and reconciling based on type and direction when listing events - adding `remote_node_id` for every channel used - using hex instead of blobs in sqlite - renaming columns for better clarify
The added data isn't available in past events. We decide to simply rename the older tables and start fresh: previous data will not be available from the API, but can still be queried directly in SQL if necessary.
* Improve relay statistics computation
We change the relay statistics we compute, to more accurately reflect nodes that are good or bad peers and inform liquidity allocation decisions.
* Add liquidity purchase fees in transaction events
We now track liquidity purchases as well in transaction events, as their fees must be taken into account when evaluating the overall fees earned from a node.
We also add the number of on-chain transactions made with a given peer to its relay stats.
76/100 · AdequateMessage clarity
✓ Descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference
AI analysis · Informational 18/100
This commit is a planned database schema upgrade for Eclair's audit logging. It renames old audit tables, creates new ones with extra columns (such as remote node IDs, transaction details, and timestamps), and replaces two old API endpoints with a new 'relaystats' endpoint. There is no obvious security vulnerability in the diff itself; it is a backwards-incompatible but intentional data-model change.
Close connection when receiving malformed messages (#3273)
When receiving a message that we're supposed to be able to decode, for which decoding fails, we must send a warning and close the connection. This ensures that the connection state cannot become corrupted, which may otherwise happen if we fail to deserialize a `commit_sig` message (for example) and simply ignored it while continuing to process the next messages.
Fixes #3271
93/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Explains rationale or failure mode✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference
Why it was queued
cryptography-sensitive path
AI analysis · High 70/100
This patch fixes a bug in Eclair, a Bitcoin Lightning Network node implementation. Previously, if a peer sent a message that Eclair couldn't properly decode (for example, a corrupted or unexpected 'commit_sig' message), Eclair would log a warning but otherwise ignore it and keep processing later messages. This could cause the two peers' views of the channel state to drift out of sync, potentially leading to incorrect behavior or security issues. The fix makes Eclair send a warning back to the peer and immediately close the connection when it fails to decode a message it expected to understand.
This release contains improvements for v3 transactions, which we want for #3192.
68/100 · AdequateMessage clarity
✓ Descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides an explanatory body✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference
AI analysis · Informational 15/100
This commit simply updates Eclair's required Bitcoin Core version from 29.x to 30.2. It changes documentation, download URLs, SHA-256 checksums, and a runtime version check. There is no security vulnerability in this change itself.
We create a new set of actors that keep track of payment statistics across our peers and rank them to identify the top profit earners. Based on those statistics, the actors issue recommendations to:
- allocate more liquidity towards nodes that are generating revenue and may run out of liquidity in the next few days - reclaim liquidity from inactive channels - change our relay fees to optimize increases or decreases in outgoing flow and volume
76/100 · AdequateMessage clarity
✓ Descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference
Why it was queued
signing or wallet pathsecond-pass: security-sensitive path
AI analysis · Low 34/100
This commit adds a new optional 'peer profit scoring' feature to the Eclair Lightning node. When enabled, it automatically tracks payment statistics, ranks peers by profitability, and can automatically open channels, close idle channels, and adjust relay fees. By default all automatic actions are disabled, so the change is primarily an operational automation feature rather than an immediate security patch or vulnerability. The main security consideration is that enabling the automatic actions gives the node software control over on-chain funds and channel pricing, which could in theory be abused or misconfigured, but the commit itself does not introduce a known exploit.
AI review queuedFix race condition in `Postman` causing flaky `OfferPayment` tests (#3270)by Bastien Teinturier · 8c5f39f4 · Mar 19, 2026 · 1 fileMessage 100 · StrongLow 33Details
Commit message · Bastien Teinturier
Fix race condition in `Postman` causing flaky `OfferPayment` tests (#3270)
The integration test "send blinded multi-part payment a->b->c (single channel a->b)" in `OfferPaymentSpec` fails intermittently. The root cause is a race condition in `Postman` where the subscription for an onion message reply is registered after the message is sent, allowing the reply to arrive and be silently dropped before the subscription exists.
In integration tests where all 3 nodes run on the same JVM, the onion message round-trip (Alice -> Bob -> Carol -> creates invoice -> Carol -> Bob -> Alice) can complete in just a few milliseconds - fast enough to beat the `Subscribe` message to the `Postman`'s mailbox.
This explains why the test is flaky: it usually works (round-trip slower than subscribe), but occasionally fails (round-trip faster than subscribe, reply dropped).
We simply move the subscription registration to *before* the message is sent to the network.
100/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Explains rationale or failure mode✓ Mentions testing or verification✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference
Why it was queued
second-pass: broader security terminology
AI analysis · Low 33/100
This commit fixes a timing bug in Eclair's message-delivery component called Postman. When sending an onion message that expects a reply, the code used to register for the reply *after* sending the message. In fast local tests (and potentially fast real networks), the reply could arrive before the registration completed, causing the reply to be lost. The fix registers the subscription *before* sending the message. The commit describes this as a test flakiness issue, not a security vulnerability.
AI review queuedAdd bitcoin rpc call to check if an address belongs to our wallet (#3267)by Fabrice Drouin · a4d66adc · Mar 18, 2026 · 4 filesMessage 73 · AdequateInformational 17Details
Commit message · Fabrice Drouin
Add bitcoin rpc call to check if an address belongs to our wallet (#3267)
We use the "ismine" property that is returned by the "getaddressinfo" RPC call.
73/100 · AdequateMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides an explanatory body✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference
Why it was queued
signing or wallet pathsecond-pass: security-sensitive path
AI analysis · Informational 17/100
This commit adds a new helper function that lets Eclair ask Bitcoin Core whether a given bitcoin address belongs to the user's own wallet. It is a feature addition with no visible bug fix or security patch. There is no indication in the commit that it fixes a vulnerability.
AI review queuedImprove support for plugin-defined features (#3264)by Bastien Teinturier · a4f4abd9 · Mar 17, 2026 · 42 filesMessage 93 · StrongLow 35Details
Commit message · Bastien Teinturier
Improve support for plugin-defined features (#3264)
We allow injecting non-official features via plugins, by extending the `CustomFeaturePlugin` trait. However, we previously added those features to a set of unknown features: we can do better and add them to the known features map, which provides pretty-printing in logs and simplifies debugging.
We also had an issue where `hasFeature` would always return `false` for plugin features, even when they were supported by both nodes, because we only looked at our `activated` features map which only contains official features.
We get rid of the `UnknownFeature` class entirely and keep the encoded feature bits after deserializing them. We take those feature bits into account in `hasFeature`, which fixes the issue.
This creates a slightly weird asymmetry because our local features, which are created based on our `eclair.conf`, will not have this field set while features that are read from network messages or the DB will have this field set. A better architecture would be to remove the `activated` map entirely and directly wrap the feature bits, while providing helper functions to interact with features without having to directly read a `BitVector`. This is a larger refactoring though, because we'd need to add support for filtering `init` / `node` features using bitmasks, which isn't entirely trivial to handle and requires careful management of plugin features.
93/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Explains rationale or failure mode✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference
Why it was queued
signing or wallet pathparser or protocol pathsecond-pass: broader security terminologysecond-pass: unusually broad changesecond-pass: security-sensitive path
AI analysis · Low 35/100
This commit fixes a bug where Eclair did not correctly recognize custom features added by plugins when checking if another node supports them. Previously, plugin features were treated as 'unknown' and `hasFeature` always returned false for them, even when both nodes supported the same plugin feature. The change stores the raw feature bits after decoding and uses them in feature checks, while removing the old 'UnknownFeature' class. It is a correctness and compatibility improvement rather than a critical security patch, but it could affect whether nodes agree on required features during connection.