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Core Lightning

Modular C implementation of the Lightning Network protocol and node stack.

BitcoinLightning NetworkActive incident
Repository coverage

1979 commits in the local evidence base

Every captured commit receives deterministic security triage and a separate communication-quality score. Security candidates and broader second-pass signals receive full-patch Ollama analysis.

184security candidates280second-pass queue1894AI analyses
26commits · 30 days
185commits · 60 days
659commits · 180 days
1641commits · 365 days
Backfill bands
Aug 5 → Feb 61049 seen37 candidatesComplete
Feb 6 → Jun 6579 seen10 candidatesComplete
Jun 6 → Jul 678 seen1 candidatesComplete
Jul 6 → Aug 5147 seen16 candidatesComplete
Commit communication

Does the history explain itself?

Message quality measures whether a commit identifies its scope, purpose, rationale, testing, and supporting references. It does not change the security-severity score.

71/100 average clarity
484Strong · 80–100
1224Adequate · 60–79
241Thin · 40–59
30Opaque · 0–39
Read the scoring rubric →
Developer activity

Who is changing the project?

Public Git author strings; identities are not independently verified.

DeveloperCommitsCandidatesAnalyzedHigh riskMessage avg.
cdecker14910384
Níckolas Goline63844277
Rusty Russell96475958172
daywalker90113895164
Lagrang386578170
Vincenzo Palazzo13411182
dovgopoly15015164
Sangbida Chaudhuri14931146066
Dusty Daemon821378066
ShahanaFarooqui931093063
Peter Neuroth1024101071
Christian Decker36436072
Analysis record

Published AI watches

Last scanned 16 minutes ago

Informational 15 AI analysisMessage 73 · Adequate
EP Elements ProjectCore Lightning BitcoinLightning Network

contrib: add jaonoctus's signing key

This commit simply adds a new person's PGP public-key fingerprint to the list of trusted release signers in two documentation files. It does not change any code, fix any bug, or alter any security behavior of the software itself.

41278b4eby jaonoctus+2−02 files
No security note in commit
Informational 15 AI analysisMessage 73 · Adequate
EP Elements ProjectCore Lightning BitcoinLightning Network

wallet: fixed timestamps for invented bookkeeper deposits

This is a tiny internal fix to make a bookkeeping migration produce stable event ordering. It changes the timestamp used when creating historical 'deposit' records during a one-time database migration, so the records sort consistently with…

498e5086by daywalker90+2−01 file
No security note in commit
Informational 21 AI analysisMessage 85 · Strong
EP Elements ProjectCore Lightning BitcoinLightning Network

docs: document missing and fix erroneous JSON-RPC error codes

This commit is a documentation-only cleanup of the JSON-RPC command help files. It corrects which numeric error codes are listed for each command so the published schemas match what the software actually returns. No program logic, validati…

Documentation-only change with no executable code modificationsCorrects RPC schema error-code metadata to match actual handler behaviorNo change to input parsing, authorization, cryptography, or network behavior
d1b6963bby daywalker90+204−1224 files
No security note in commit
Low 46 AI analysisMessage 73 · Adequate
EP Elements ProjectCore Lightning BitcoinLightning Network

channeld: initialize tx_sigs_allowed on startup

This commit fixes a bug where a setting that controls whether unexpected transaction signatures are allowed was not initialized when the channel daemon starts. If a peer sent such signatures before the channel was fully ready, the program …

use of uninitialized variableundefined behavior (invalid bool load)network-triggered code path
c09c4520by Erick Cestari+1−01 file
No security note in commit
Informational 15 AI analysisMessage 100 · Strong
EP Elements ProjectCore Lightning BitcoinLightning Network

ci: fix the coverage nightly's profile handling

This commit fixes the project's internal nightly code-coverage CI workflow. It changes how test coverage files are collected, ensures the same LLVM compiler version is used to generate and merge coverage data, and uploads a Codecov-compati…

5685c9a3by cdecker+12−211 file
No security note in commit
Low 37 AI analysisMessage 78 · Adequate
EP Elements ProjectCore Lightning BitcoinLightning Network

schemas: make required fields match the code

This commit is a large cleanup of Core Lightning's API schemas, generated RPC bindings, and related plugin code. The stated goal is to make the documented 'required' fields match what the C code actually always produces or expects. In prac…

Large schema-only change with no accompanying security advisory or CVEOne semantic change to plugin hook response: invoice_payment hook can now reject with only failure_message and no resultMany fields change from optional to required in public RPC/protobuf interfaces
ddbd2963by daywalker90+1786−173950 files
No security note in commit
Informational 15 AI analysisMessage 73 · Adequate
EP Elements ProjectCore Lightning BitcoinLightning Network

doc: document error 313 on every command which can return it

This commit only updates documentation. It adds error code 313 to the documented error lists for several Core Lightning commands (fundpsbt, utxopsbt, txprepare, multiwithdraw, and upgradewallet). The error code already existed in the code …

a34b9758by Peter Neuroth+30−86 files
No security note in commit
Low 25 AI analysisMessage 88 · Strong
EP Elements ProjectCore Lightning BitcoinLightning Network

tools/build-release.sh: name the checksum file when verifying the signature

This commit fixes a release-script check that verifies the cryptographic signature on a file of checksums. Previously, the script only told GPG to verify the signature file itself. If someone replaced that signature file with an inline-sig…

Incorrect cryptographic verification logic in release toolingPotential false-positive signature verification with inline-signed .asc substitutionRelease-integrity hardening
8e495707by Peter Neuroth+5−21 file
No security note in commit
Low 42 AI analysisMessage 95 · Strong
EP Elements ProjectCore Lightning BitcoinLightning Network

doc: pass the manifest explicitly to gpg --verify

This commit updates Core Lightning's release documentation to tell users and release managers to run gpg --verify with both the signature file and the manifest file named explicitly. The old one-argument form can silently succeed even if t…

Verification bypass risk in release artifact validationgpg --verify single-argument form can exit 0 without reading the intended manifestDocumentation-only hardening of release process
2dee8699by Peter Neuroth+9−62 files
Vendor flagged security relevance
Low 25 AI analysisMessage 58 · Thin
EP Elements ProjectCore Lightning BitcoinLightning Network

Cargo.lock: update dependencies

This commit is a routine update to the Rust dependency lock file (Cargo.lock), bumping many third-party libraries to newer patch or minor versions. The commit message gives no security reason for the update, and no verified references link…

Routine dependency refresh with no stated security rationaleUpdates to security-sensitive transitive crates (rustls, hyper, h2, tokio, webpki-roots) but no evidence these versions fix known vulnerabilitiesNo source-code changes or patch-specific fixes visible in the diff
c1551c55by daywalker90+298−2761 file
No security note in commit
High 80 AI analysisMessage 85 · Strong
EP Elements ProjectCore Lightning BitcoinLightning Network

common: bound JSON nesting depth when parsing

This commit fixes a stack-overflow risk in Core Lightning's JSON parser. Before the fix, an attacker could send a valid JSON-RPC message containing thousands of nested brackets or braces. The parser's own helper functions used recursion fo…

Stack-overflow via deeply nested JSONRecursive JSON traversal without depth boundDenial-of-service vector in JSON-RPC input parsing
83f92e4bby Níckolas Goline+90−22 files
Vendor flagged security relevance
Informational 15 AI analysisMessage 28 · Opaque
EP Elements ProjectCore Lightning BitcoinLightning Network

common: minor typo fixes

This commit only fixes typos and comment style. It changes two C-style comments from // to /* */ and corrects a grammar error in a documentation comment ('element' to 'elements'). There are no code behavior changes, no bug fixes, and no se…

273d7f02by w3lld1+3−32 files
No security note in commit
Informational 20 AI analysisMessage 90 · Strong
EP Elements ProjectCore Lightning BitcoinLightning Network

pyln-testing: truncate long testnames

This change fixes a test-infrastructure bug in Core Lightning's Python testing helpers. When running tests against a PostgreSQL database, very long test names could be silently shortened by PostgreSQL, causing different test runs or nodes …

No security-relevant signal: change is in test framework code onlyFixes a test reliability issue, not a runtime vulnerabilityNo input sanitization, authentication, cryptography, or network changes
c4fe4cbaby Peter Neuroth+59−12 files
No security note in commit
Moderate 60 AI analysisMessage 73 · Adequate
EP Elements ProjectCore Lightning BitcoinLightning Network

wallet: exclude immature coinbase outputs from fee rescue selection

This fix prevents Core Lightning from trying to use freshly created bitcoins (immature coinbase rewards) as emergency funds for fee-bump transactions. Such a transaction would be invalid under Bitcoin's rules and would be rejected by the n…

Consensus-invalid transaction generation preventedFee rescue / CPFP failure mode mitigatedCoinbase maturity check added to coin selection
34883ff7by cdecker+5−12 files
Vendor flagged security relevance
Moderate 59 AI analysisMessage 91 · Strong
EP Elements ProjectCore Lightning BitcoinLightning Network

askrene: fix crash loading node bias with description

This commit fixes a bug in Core Lightning's askrene plugin that could prevent a node from restarting. When a saved routing layer contained a node bias with a description, the plugin accidentally freed the description's memory while using i…

Use-after-free / double-take of a tal-allocated string during plugin startupDenial-of-service-like symptom: lightningd aborts before replying to init, node cannot restartFixes publicly reported issue #9433 by endothermicdev
4681177dby Vincenzo Palazzo+2−32 files
No security note in commit
Informational 12 AI analysisMessage 91 · Strong
EP Elements ProjectCore Lightning BitcoinLightning Network

tests: restart the node which owns the layer in node bias test

This commit only fixes a test case so it actually exercises the intended code path. It does not change any production code, so it cannot introduce or fix a real-world security vulnerability by itself. The test change is a reproducer for a …

0f3f67a0by Vincenzo Palazzo+3−21 file
No security note in commit
High 78 AI analysisMessage 68 · Adequate
EP Elements ProjectCore Lightning BitcoinLightning Network

dualopend: bound the feerates a peer opens at

This commit fixes a bug in Core Lightning's experimental dual-funded channel feature. When another node tried to open a channel, Core Lightning was not checking whether the proposed transaction fees were reasonable. A peer could request a …

Missing input validation on wire-parsed feerate fieldsPeer could induce signing and storage of feerate == 0RBF remote path allowed unbounded upward feerate walks
ba08356fby cdecker+140−04 files
Vendor flagged security relevance
High 72 AI analysisMessage 100 · Strong
EP Elements ProjectCore Lightning BitcoinLightning Network

tests: regression coverage for out-of-range feerates

This commit adds regression tests for three related bugs where wildly wrong Bitcoin transaction feerates could enter Core Lightning. In the worst case, a malicious or broken fee source could make the node think a feerate was zero (due to a…

Integer overflow in feerate conversion (u32 wrap from 0xFFFFFFFF perkb to 0 perkw)Absurd feerate from external fee source bypassing sanity ceilingDatabase-stored out-of-range feerate causing startup abort/crash loop
65bdbc47by cdecker+137−02 files
No security note in commit
Moderate 64 AI analysisMessage 86 · Strong
EP Elements ProjectCore Lightning BitcoinLightning Network

lightningd: don't assert on funding feerates read from the db

This update fixes a crash bug in Core Lightning. When the software tried to list details of a channel opening in progress, it could crash if a stored fee rate was extremely large or zero. The crash happened because the code used an interna…

Integer overflow in RBF escalation (u32 * 25 / 24) leading to assertion failureAssertion failure in read-only introspection RPC (listpeerchannels) causing crash-loop at startupDatabase value treated as invariant despite originating from external fee estimator
d67c4936by cdecker+72−227 files
Vendor flagged security relevance
Moderate 53 AI analysisMessage 86 · Strong
EP Elements ProjectCore Lightning BitcoinLightning Network

wallet: clamp absurd inflight funding feerates on upgrade

This commit fixes a bug where Core Lightning nodes could get stuck in a crash loop. If a node had previously stored an extremely high or zero fee rate for an in-progress channel funding operation (a 'splice' or dual-funded channel RBF), a …

Integer overflow in fee-rate calculation (u32 overflow when multiplying by 25/24)Assertion failure leading to daemon crash loop at startupDatabase migration clamps out-of-range stored funding feerates
f057c692by cdecker+34−01 file
Vendor flagged security relevance
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Explore captured commits

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Security candidatehsmd_wire: add HSM wire protocol support for secret type detectionby Sangbida Chaudhuri · 266b8082 · Oct 26, 2025 · 8 filesMessage 73 · AdequateInformational 19Details
Commit message · Sangbida Chaudhuri

hsmd_wire: add HSM wire protocol support for secret type detection

Add TLV field to hsmd_init_reply_v4 to communicate the HSM secret type
(mnemonic vs legacy) from HSM to lightningd. This allows lightningd to
automatically determine whether to use BIP86 or BIP32 derivation without
needing separate address types.

73/100 · AdequateMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context
Why it was queued
secret or key materialsigning or wallet path
AI analysis · Informational 19/100

This commit adds a small metadata field to the internal HSM (Hardware Security Module) initialization message so that lightningd can tell whether the wallet seed was created from a mnemonic phrase or from an older legacy secret. It is a protocol plumbing change, not a fix for a known vulnerability, and does not by itself change how secrets are generated, stored, or protected.

Security candidatecommon: add unified HSM secret handling moduleby Sangbida Chaudhuri · 9977b72e · Oct 26, 2025 · 3 filesMessage 68 · AdequateInformational 11Details
Commit message · Sangbida Chaudhuri

common: add unified HSM secret handling module

This is a newer API to replace hsm_encryption.c and hsm_encryption.c, this tidies up the API to be used and also cleans things up to support our new formats. Our hsm_secret formats now include:
- Legacy 32-byte plain format
- Legacy 73-byte encrypted format
- New mnemonic format without passphrase (32 zero bytes + mnemonic)
- New mnemonic format with passphrase (32-byte hash + mnemonic)

This commit includes support to detect the format based on the file size and content structure. The hsm will store mnemonics in the hsm_secret file as:

`passphraseHash`mnemonic`

68/100 · AdequateMessage clarity
✓ Descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context
Why it was queued
access control
AI analysis · Informational 11/100

This commit adds a new internal module for handling the secret key file used by Core Lightning's hardware security module (HSM). It introduces support for reading the existing plain and encrypted formats, plus new formats based on BIP39 word lists (mnemonics) with optional passphrases. The code uses modern password hashing (Argon2) and authenticated encryption (libsodium secretstream). There is no direct evidence in the commit that this fixes a known security vulnerability; it appears to be a feature/refactoring change to support new wallet backup formats.

Security candidatewallet: make sure to watch all txids in transactions table.by Rusty Russell · 478a0d57 · Oct 24, 2025 · 5 filesMessage 85 · StrongInformational 24Details
Commit message · Rusty Russell

wallet: make sure to watch all txids in transactions table.

We watch if they are to do with a channel, or have outputs going to us, but otherwise
we didn't, so we never updated the blockheight in the db.

Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
Changelog-Fixed: JSON-RPC: `listtransactions` now correctly updates `blockheight` for txs created by `sendpsbt` which have no change outputs.

85/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Explains rationale or failure mode
Why it was queued
signing boundarysigning or wallet path
AI analysis · Informational 24/100

This commit fixes a bookkeeping bug in Core Lightning's wallet. When a user broadcast a transaction created with `sendpsbt` that had no change output coming back to the node, the node did not track the transaction's confirmation status. As a result, `listtransactions` would never show the correct `blockheight` for that transaction. The fix makes the node explicitly watch all unconfirmed transactions in its database so their confirmation height gets updated. There is no direct security exploit here; it is a data-correctness and user-experience issue.

Security candidatepytest: add test that we notice height change of sendpsbt with no change.by Rusty Russell · 2591ac48 · Oct 24, 2025 · 1 fileMessage 75 · AdequateInformational 12Details
Commit message · Rusty Russell

pytest: add test that we notice height change of sendpsbt with no change.

Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>

75/100 · AdequateMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides an explanatory body✓ Mentions testing or verification
Why it was queued
signing boundarysigning or wallet path
AI analysis · Informational 12/100

This commit only adds a new automated test to the project's test suite. It does not change any production code, so it cannot directly fix or introduce a security vulnerability. The test checks that a wallet transaction created via sendpsbt is correctly tracked from unconfirmed to confirmed status, including after a node restart. It is currently marked as expected to fail (xfail), meaning the underlying behavior may not yet work as intended.

Security candidateplugins: fix %*.s typo.by Rusty Russell · 8f6d3d87 · Oct 24, 2025 · 5 filesMessage 64 · AdequateModerate 68Details
Commit message · Rusty Russell

plugins: fix %*.s typo.

And add a check for new uses creeping in, since it got cut & paste
everywhere.

This means "this is a valid string, but truncate it to this many characters"
vs "%.*s" which means "only read this many characters of string":

```
['lightningd-3 2025-10-23T02:31:40.890Z **BROKEN** plugin-funder: Plugin marked as important, shutting down lightningd!']
--------------------------- Captured stderr teardown ---------------------------
#0 0x557da58ad1dc in printf_common(void*, char const*, __va_list_tag*) asan_interceptors.cpp.o
#1 0x557da5aff814 in json_out_addv /home/runner/work/lightning/lightning/ccan/ccan/json_out/json_out.c:239:11
#2 0x557da59740ce in plugin_logv /home/runner/work/lightning/lightning/plugins/libplugin.c:1777:2
#3 0x557da5969b6f in plugin_log /home/runner/work/lightning/lightning/plugins/libplugin.c:1934:2
#4 0x557da595c4f6 in datastore_del_success /home/runner/work/lightning/lightning/plugins/funder.c:161:2
#5 0x557da598b837 in handle_rpc_reply /home/runner/work/lightning/lightning/plugins/libplugin.c:1072:10
#6 0x557da598a4b0 in rpc_conn_read_response /home/runner/work/lightning/lightning/plugins/libplugin.c:1361:3
#7 0x557da5adbea5 in next_plan /home/runner/work/lightning/lightning/ccan/ccan/io/io.c:60:9
#8 0x557da5ae06ff in do_plan /home/runner/work/lightning/lightning/ccan/ccan/io/io.c:422:8
#9 0x557da5adfb58 in io_ready /home/runner/work/lightning/lightning/ccan/ccan/io/io.c:439:10
#10 0x557da5aec2ce in io_loop /home/runner/work/lightning/lightning/ccan/ccan/io/poll.c:455:5
#11 0x557da59757ac in plugin_main /home/runner/work/lightning/lightning/plugins/libplugin.c:2409:3
#12 0x557da594fe23 in main /home/runner/work/lightning/lightning/plugins/funder.c:1723:2
#13 0x7f6572229d8f in __libc_start_call_main csu/../sysdeps/nptl/libc_start_call_main.h:58:16
#14 0x7f6572229e3f in __libc_start_main csu/../csu/libc-start.c:392:3
#15 0x557da588b584 in _start (/home/runner/work/lightning/lightning/plugins/funder+0x10d584) (BuildId: 71ba63ab577fc6fa60573d3e8555f6db7d5c584d)

0x624000009d28 is located 0 bytes to the right of 7208-byte region [0x624000008100,0x624000009d28)
allocated by thread T0 here:
#0 0x557da590e7f6 in __interceptor_realloc (/home/runner/work/lightning/lightning/plugins/funder+0x1907f6) (BuildId: 71ba63ab577fc6fa60573d3e8555f6db7d5c584d)
#1 0x557da5b2149b in tal_resize_ /home/runner/work/lightning/lightning/ccan/ccan/tal/tal.c:755:13
#2 0x557da59f2032 in membuf_tal_resize /home/runner/work/lightning/lightning/common/utils.c:203:2
#3 0x557da5b03934 in membuf_prepare_space_ /home/runner/work/lightning/lightning/ccan/ccan/membuf/membuf.c:45:12
#4 0x557da59d4289 in jsonrpc_io_read_ /home/runner/work/lightning/lightning/common/jsonrpc_io.c:127:2
#5 0x557da598a635 in rpc_conn_read_response /home/runner/work/lightning/lightning/plugins/libplugin.c:1366:9
#6 0x557da5adbea5 in next_plan /home/runner/work/lightning/lightning/ccan/ccan/io/io.c:60:9
#7 0x557da5ae06ff in do_plan /home/runner/work/lightning/lightning/ccan/ccan/io/io.c:422:8
#8 0x557da5adfb58 in io_ready /home/runner/work/lightning/lightning/ccan/ccan/io/io.c:439:10
#9 0x557da5aec2ce in io_loop /home/runner/work/lightning/lightning/ccan/ccan/io/poll.c:455:5
#10 0x557da59757ac in plugin_main /home/runner/work/lightning/lightning/plugins/libplugin.c:2409:3
#11 0x557da594fe23 in main /home/runner/work/lightning/lightning/plugins/funder.c:1723:2
#12 0x7f6572229d8f in __libc_start_call_main csu/../sysdeps/nptl/libc_start_call_main.h:58:16

SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow asan_interceptors.cpp.o in printf_common(void*, char const*, __va_list_tag*)
Shadow bytes around the buggy address:
0x0c487fff9350: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
0x0c487fff9360: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
0x0c487fff9370: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
0x0c487fff9380: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
0x0c487fff9390: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
=>0x0c487fff93a0: 00 00 00 00 00[fa]fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa
0x0c487fff93b0: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa
0x0c487fff93c0: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa
0x0c487fff93d0: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa
0x0c487fff93e0: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa
0x0c487fff93f0: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa
Shadow byte legend (one shadow byte represents 8 application bytes):
Addressable: 00
Partially addressable: 01 02 03 04 05 06 07
Heap left redzone: fa
Freed heap region: fd
Stack left redzone: f1
Stack mid redzone: f2
Stack right redzone: f3
Stack after return: f5
Stack use after scope: f8
Global redzone: f9
Global init order: f6
Poisoned by user: f7
Container overflow: fc
Array cookie: ac
Intra object redzone: bb
ASan internal: fe
Left alloca redzone: ca
Right alloca redzone: cb
==26122==ABORTING
```

Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>

64/100 · AdequateMessage clarity
✓ Subject identifies a change✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference✓ Names security-relevant behavior explicitly
Why it was queued
memory safetydefensive validation
AI analysis · Moderate 68/100

This commit fixes a typo in several Core Lightning plugins where the wrong printf format string was used. The buggy '%*.s' tells the program to treat a string pointer as a width and then read an unlimited number of bytes from another pointer, which can read past the end of a buffer and crash or leak memory. The fix changes it to '%.*s', which correctly limits how many bytes are read from the string. The commit also adds a build-time check to stop the typo from being reintroduced.

Security candidatetests/fuzz: fix include order.by Rusty Russell · d8ee3a5e · Oct 22, 2025 · 7 filesMessage 70 · AdequateInformational 15Details
Commit message · Rusty Russell

tests/fuzz: fix include order.

Nobody ever runs `make check-includes` with fuzzing enabled.

Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>

70/100 · AdequateMessage clarity
✓ Descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides an explanatory body✓ Mentions testing or verification
Why it was queued
fuzzing or regression evidencecryptography-sensitive pathparser or protocol path
AI analysis · Informational 15/100

This commit only reorders #include lines in fuzz-test source files and adds minor indentation to two direct .c file includes. It is a coding-style/build-hygiene fix with no functional code changes and no security relevance.

Security candidateMakefile: create a library containing common, wire and bitcoin objects.by Rusty Russell · e120f870 · Oct 22, 2025 · 83 filesMessage 95 · StrongInformational 15Details
Commit message · Rusty Russell

Makefile: create a library containing common, wire and bitcoin objects.

This means we don't have to manually choose what to link against,
which is much of the complexity of our Makefiles: the compiler will
automatically use any object files it needs to link.

We already do this for ccan as libccan.a, now we have libcommon.a.

We don't link against it for *everything*, as some tests require their own
versions.

Notes:
1. I get rid of the weird plugins/test/Makefile2 (accidental commit?)
2. Many tests change due to update-mocks.
3. In some places I added the missing dependency on the Makefile itself, though most are in the next
patch.

Before:
Total program size: 221366528
Total tests size: 364243856

After:
Total program size: 190733656
Total tests size: 337880888

Build time from make clean (RUST=0) (includes building external libs):

Before:
real 0m38.227000-44.245000(41.8222+/-1.6)s
user 3m2.105000-33.696000(23.1442+/-8.4)s
sys 0m35.054000-42.269000(39.7231+/-2)s
After:
real 0m38.944000-40.416000(40.1131+/-0.4)s
user 3m6.790000-17.159000(15.0571+/-2.8)s
sys 0m35.304000-37.336000(36.8942+/-0.57)s

Build time after touch config.vars (RUST=0):

Before:
real 0m18.928000-22.776000(21.5084+/-1.1)s
user 2m8.613000-36.567000(27.7281+/-7.7)s
sys 0m20.458000-23.436000(22.3963+/-0.77)s

After:
real 0m19.831000-21.862000(21.5528+/-0.58)s
user 2m15.361000-30.731000(28.4798+/-4.4)s
sys 0m21.056000-22.339000(22.0346+/-0.35)s

Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>

rusty@rusty-Framework:~/devel/cvs/lightni

95/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Explains rationale or failure mode✓ Mentions testing or verification
Why it was queued
signing or wallet pathboot or update path
AI analysis · Informational 15/100

This commit is a build-system cleanup. It creates a new static library (libcommon.a) containing common, wire, and bitcoin object files so that Makefiles no longer need to list individual object files by hand. It also removes many auto-generated mock function stubs from unit tests because those functions are now provided by the library. There is no runtime behavior change to Core Lightning itself, and no security issue is introduced or fixed.

Security candidateglobal: remove unnecessary includes from headers.by Rusty Russell · f6a4e794 · Oct 22, 2025 · 212 filesMessage 68 · AdequateInformational 15Details
Commit message · Rusty Russell

global: remove unnecessary includes from headers.

Each header should only include the other headers it needs to compile;
`devtools/reduce-includes.sh */*.h` does this. The C files then need
additional includes if they don't compile.

And remove the entirely useless wire/onion_wire.h, which only serves to include wire/onion_wiregen.h.

Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>

68/100 · AdequateMessage clarity
✓ Descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context
Why it was queued
cryptography-sensitive pathsigning or wallet pathparser or protocol path
AI analysis · Informational 15/100

This is a large but purely mechanical cleanup of C header file #include directives across the Core Lightning codebase. The goal is to make each header include only what it actually needs, and to add missing includes to the .c source files that now need them. It also deletes a tiny wrapper header that did nothing but include another generated header. There is no change to program logic, data handling, or security behavior.

Security candidateMakefile: run fuzzing corpora as normal unit tests in non-fuzzing mode.by Rusty Russell · 2adfdfd0 · Oct 22, 2025 · 15 filesMessage 83 · StrongInformational 15Details
Commit message · Rusty Russell

Makefile: run fuzzing corpora as normal unit tests in non-fuzzing mode.

This means we can make sure the compile and run in normal builds.

Side note: various tests call common_setup(), which means we called it
twice in unit testing mode, so we conditionalize those.

Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>

83/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Mentions testing or verification
Why it was queued
fuzzing or regression evidencecryptography-sensitive pathparser or protocol path
AI analysis · Informational 15/100

This commit changes the build system so that existing fuzz tests can also run as ordinary unit tests in normal (non-fuzzing) builds. It does not fix a bug, change runtime behavior of Core Lightning in production, or introduce any user-facing feature. It is purely a testing/CI infrastructure improvement.

Security candidateglobal: remove unnecessary includes from C files.by Rusty Russell · 6e5cb299 · Oct 22, 2025 · 177 filesMessage 68 · AdequateInformational 15Details
Commit message · Rusty Russell

global: remove unnecessary includes from C files.

Basically, `devtools/reduce-includes.sh */*.c`.

Build time from make clean (RUST=0) (includes building external libs):

Before:
real 0m38.944000-40.416000(40.1131+/-0.4)s
user 3m6.790000-17.159000(15.0571+/-2.8)s
sys 0m35.304000-37.336000(36.8942+/-0.57)s
After:
real 0m37.872000-39.974000(39.5466+/-0.59)s
user 3m1.211000-14.968000(12.4556+/-3.9)s
sys 0m35.008000-36.830000(36.4143+/-0.5)s

Build time after touch config.vars (RUST=0):

Before:
real 0m19.831000-21.862000(21.5528+/-0.58)s
user 2m15.361000-30.731000(28.4798+/-4.4)s
sys 0m21.056000-22.339000(22.0346+/-0.35)s

After:
real 0m18.384000-21.307000(20.8605+/-0.92)s
user 2m5.585000-26.843000(23.6017+/-6.7)s
sys 0m19.650000-22.003000(21.4943+/-0.69)s

Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>

68/100 · AdequateMessage clarity
✓ Descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context
Why it was queued
signing or wallet pathauthentication pathparser or protocol path
AI analysis · Informational 15/100

This commit is a routine code cleanup: it removes unused C-language #include directives from many source files and adds a few that were needed but previously inherited indirectly. The stated goal is faster build times, and the diff shows no functional code changes. There is no security-relevant behavior change.

Security candidatemakefile: fix glob expansion for macOSby Sangbida Chaudhuri · ad0c7318 · Oct 22, 2025 · 1 fileMessage 73 · AdequateInformational 15Details
Commit message · Sangbida Chaudhuri

makefile: fix glob expansion for macOS

when bash expands bitcoin/*.h, it returns the files in lexicographically sorted order by default this is not necessarily the case for macOS so it has be explicitly sorted. I get a fairly uninformative error like this:

make: *** [check-bitcoin-makefile] Error 1

The error is now more informative and does not error on a clean branch on macOS:

BITCOIN_HEADERS missing: bitcoin/signature.h bitcoin/tx_parts.h bitcoin/tx.h bitcoin/varint.h
make: *** [check-bitcoin-makefile] Error 1

73/100 · AdequateMessage clarity
✓ Descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Names security-relevant behavior explicitly
Why it was queued
signing boundary
AI analysis · Informational 15/100

This commit fixes a build script check that was too strict on macOS. The Makefile check compares a manually maintained list of Bitcoin header files against files found on disk. On Linux, the shell lists files in sorted order, but macOS does not, causing the check to fail even when nothing is wrong. The patch makes the comparison order-independent and prints clearer error messages. It is a build tooling fix with no security relevance.

Security candidatetools: Read the correct default-key from gpgconfby ShahanaFarooqui · ea2f7607 · Oct 20, 2025 · 1 fileMessage 80 · StrongInformational 18Details
Commit message · ShahanaFarooqui

tools: Read the correct default-key from gpgconf

Workflow error `gpg: using "4129A994AA7E9852" is thrown due to incorrect gpg parsing. Update the awk parsing logic to properly locate and extract the key fingerprint within the gpgconf --list-options output structure, ensuring automated signing uses the correct key.

Changelog-None.

80/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Explains rationale or failure mode
Why it was queued
signing boundary
AI analysis · Informational 18/100

This is a one-line fix in the release build script. It changes how the script tells GnuPG which key to use when signing release checksum files. Previously the key fingerprint was accidentally passed as a filename argument to gpg, which caused a harmless workflow error and could have led to the wrong key being used for signing. The fix moves the fingerprint to the proper --default-key option so signing uses the intended key.

Security candidatebookkeeper: only read listchannelmoves 1000 entries at a time.by Rusty Russell · e522aedc · Oct 20, 2025 · 1 fileMessage 73 · AdequateModerate 53Details
Commit message · Rusty Russell

bookkeeper: only read listchannelmoves 1000 entries at a time.

If we read all of them, we might get 1.6M at once (after initial
migration). Then we submit a few hundred thousand simultaneous
requests to lightningd, and it gets upset, queueing them all on the
xpay command hook and running out of memory.

Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
Changelog-Fixed: plugins: bookkeeper first invocation after migration from prior to 25.09 with very large databases will not crash.

73/100 · AdequateMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context
Why it was queued
resource exhaustion
AI analysis · Moderate 53/100

This update fixes a bug in the bookkeeper plugin of Core Lightning. After a large database migration, the plugin could ask for too many records at once, flood the main lightningd process with hundreds of thousands of requests, and cause it to run out of memory and crash. The fix reads records in batches of 1,000 instead of all at once.

Security candidatepytest: fix flakes in feerates.by Rusty Russell · 992771bb · Oct 13, 2025 · 1 fileMessage 83 · StrongInformational 13Details
Commit message · Rusty Russell

pytest: fix flakes in feerates.

Sometimes we get a shorter signature than expected, and we're supposed
to disable the feerate tests in that case. But we didn't catch all the
cases where we make signatures.

```
2025-10-13T02:36:24.1901527Z ____________________________ test_peer_anchor_push _____________________________
2025-10-13T02:36:24.1902251Z [gw5] linux -- Python 3.10.18 /home/runner/work/lightning/lightning/.venv/bin/python
2025-10-13T02:36:24.1902731Z
2025-10-13T02:36:24.1903045Z node_factory = <pyln.testing.utils.NodeFactory object at 0x7f17fdffd6f0>
2025-10-13T02:36:24.1903740Z bitcoind = <pyln.testing.utils.BitcoinD object at 0x7f17fdffe830>
2025-10-13T02:36:24.1904495Z executor = <concurrent.futures.thread.ThreadPoolExecutor object at 0x7f17fdffcbb0>
2025-10-13T02:36:24.1906158Z chainparams = {'bip173_prefix': 'bcrt', 'chain_hash': '06226e46111a0b59caaf126043eb5bbf28c34f3a5e332a1fc7b2b73cf188910f', 'elements': False, 'example_addr': 'bcrt1qeyyk6sl5pr49ycpqyckvmttus5ttj25pd0zpvg', ...}
2025-10-13T02:36:24.1907285Z
2025-10-13T02:36:24.1907600Z @unittest.skipIf(TEST_NETWORK != 'regtest', 'elementsd anchors not supportd')
2025-10-13T02:36:24.1908344Z def test_peer_anchor_push(node_factory, bitcoind, executor, chainparams):
2025-10-13T02:36:24.1909033Z """Test that we use anchor on peer's commit to CPFP tx"""
2025-10-13T02:36:24.1909853Z l1, l2, l3 = node_factory.line_graph(3, opts=[{},
2025-10-13T02:36:24.1910334Z {'min-emergency-msat': 546000,
2025-10-13T02:36:24.1910825Z 'dev-warn-on-overgrind': None,
2025-10-13T02:36:24.1911313Z 'broken_log': 'overgrind: short signature length'},
2025-10-13T02:36:24.1911662Z {'disconnect': ['-WIRE_UPDATE_FULFILL_HTLC'],
2025-10-13T02:36:24.1911976Z 'dev-warn-on-overgrind': None,
2025-10-13T02:36:24.1912304Z 'broken_log': 'overgrind: short signature length'}],
2025-10-13T02:36:24.1912790Z wait_for_announce=True)
2025-10-13T02:36:24.1913041Z
2025-10-13T02:36:24.1913305Z # We splinter l2's funds so it's forced to use more than one UTXO to push.
2025-10-13T02:36:24.1914043Z fundsats = int(Millisatoshi(only_one(l2.rpc.listfunds()['outputs'])['amount_msat']).to_satoshi())
2025-10-13T02:36:24.1914443Z OUTPUT_SAT = 10000
2025-10-13T02:36:24.1914647Z NUM_OUTPUTS = 10
2025-10-13T02:36:24.1914903Z psbt = l2.rpc.fundpsbt("all", "1000perkw", 1000)['psbt']
2025-10-13T02:36:24.1915520Z # Pay 5k sats in fees.
2025-10-13T02:36:24.1916329Z psbt = l2.rpc.addpsbtoutput(fundsats - OUTPUT_SAT * NUM_OUTPUTS - 5000, psbt, destination=l3.rpc.newaddr()['bech32'])['psbt']
2025-10-13T02:36:24.1917156Z for _ in range(NUM_OUTPUTS):
2025-10-13T02:36:24.1917638Z psbt = l2.rpc.addpsbtoutput(OUTPUT_SAT, psbt)['psbt']
2025-10-13T02:36:24.1918194Z l2.rpc.sendpsbt(l2.rpc.signpsbt(psbt)['signed_psbt'])
2025-10-13T02:36:24.1918731Z bitcoind.generate_block(1, wait_for_mempool=1)
2025-10-13T02:36:24.1919232Z sync_blockheight(bitcoind, [l1, l2])
2025-10-13T02:36:24.1919634Z
2025-10-13T02:36:24.1919847Z # Make sure all amounts are below OUTPUT_SAT sats!
2025-10-13T02:36:24.1920318Z assert [x for x in l2.rpc.listfunds()['outputs'] if x['amount_msat'] > Millisatoshi(str(OUTPUT_SAT) + "sat")] == []
2025-10-13T02:36:24.1920735Z
2025-10-13T02:36:24.1920957Z # Get HTLC stuck, so l2 has reason to push commitment tx.
2025-10-13T02:36:24.1921244Z amt = 100_000_000
2025-10-13T02:36:24.1921517Z sticky_inv = l3.rpc.invoice(amt, 'sticky', 'sticky')
2025-10-13T02:36:24.1921842Z route = l1.rpc.getroute(l3.info['id'], amt, 1)['route']
2025-10-13T02:36:24.1922277Z l1.rpc.sendpay(route, sticky_inv['payment_hash'], payment_secret=sticky_inv['payment_secret'])
2025-10-13T02:36:24.1922751Z l3.daemon.wait_for_log('dev_disconnect: -WIRE_UPDATE_FULFILL_HTLC')
2025-10-13T02:36:24.1923060Z
2025-10-13T02:36:24.1923241Z # Make sure HTLC expiry is what we expect!
2025-10-13T02:36:24.1923637Z l2.daemon.wait_for_log('Adding HTLC 0 amount=100000000msat cltv=119 gave CHANNEL_ERR_ADD_OK')
2025-10-13T02:36:24.1923998Z
2025-10-13T02:36:24.1924229Z # l3 drops to chain, but make sure it doesn't CPFP its own anchor.
2025-10-13T02:36:24.1924685Z wait_for(lambda: only_one(l3.rpc.listpeerchannels(l2.info['id'])['channels'])['htlcs'] != [])
2025-10-13T02:36:24.1925688Z closetx = l3.rpc.dev_sign_last_tx(l2.info['id'])['tx']
2025-10-13T02:36:24.1926132Z l3.stop()
2025-10-13T02:36:24.1926337Z # We don't care about l1 any more, either
2025-10-13T02:36:24.1926579Z l1.stop()
2025-10-13T02:36:24.1926739Z
2025-10-13T02:36:24.1926941Z # We put l3's tx in the mempool, but won't mine it.
2025-10-13T02:36:24.1927316Z bitcoind.rpc.sendrawtransaction(closetx)
2025-10-13T02:36:24.1927754Z
2025-10-13T02:36:24.1928139Z # We aim for feerate ~3750, so this won't mine l3's unilateral close.
2025-10-13T02:36:24.1928991Z # HTLC's going to time out at block 120 (we give one block grace)
2025-10-13T02:36:24.1929527Z for block in range(110, 120):
2025-10-13T02:36:24.1929989Z bitcoind.generate_block(1, needfeerate=5000)
2025-10-13T02:36:24.1930510Z assert bitcoind.rpc.getblockcount() == block
2025-10-13T02:36:24.1931014Z sync_blockheight(bitcoind, [l2])
2025-10-13T02:36:24.1931715Z assert only_one(l2.rpc.listpeerchannels(l3.info['id'])['channels'])['state'] == 'CHANNELD_NORMAL'
2025-10-13T02:36:24.1932368Z
2025-10-13T02:36:24.1932642Z # Drops to chain
2025-10-13T02:36:24.1933030Z bitcoind.generate_block(1, needfeerate=5000)
2025-10-13T02:36:24.1933824Z wait_for(lambda: only_one(l2.rpc.listpeerchannels(l3.info['id'])['channels'])['state'] == 'AWAITING_UNILATERAL')
2025-10-13T02:36:24.1934522Z
2025-10-13T02:36:24.1935254Z # But, l3's tx already there, and identical feerate will not RBF.
2025-10-13T02:36:24.1935839Z l2.daemon.wait_for_log("rejecting replacement")
2025-10-13T02:36:24.1936357Z wait_for(lambda: len(bitcoind.rpc.getrawmempool()) == 2)
2025-10-13T02:36:24.1936801Z
2025-10-13T02:36:24.1937127Z # As blocks pass, we will use anchor to boost l3's tx.
2025-10-13T02:36:24.1937666Z for block, feerate in zip(range(120, 124), (12000, 13000, 14000, 15000)):
2025-10-13T02:36:24.1938560Z l2.daemon.wait_for_log(fr"Worth fee [0-9]*sat for remote commit tx to get 100000000msat at block 125 \(\+{125 - block}\) at feerate {feerate}perkw")
2025-10-13T02:36:24.1939369Z l2.daemon.wait_for_log("sendrawtx exit 0")
2025-10-13T02:36:24.1939902Z # Check feerate for entire package (commitment tx + anchor) is ~ correct
2025-10-13T02:36:24.1940473Z details = bitcoind.rpc.getrawmempool(True).values()
2025-10-13T02:36:24.1940920Z print(f"mempool = {details}")
2025-10-13T02:36:24.1941347Z total_weight = sum([d['weight'] for d in details])
2025-10-13T02:36:24.1941903Z total_fees = sum([float(d['fees']['base']) * 100_000_000 for d in details])
2025-10-13T02:36:24.1942467Z total_feerate_perkw = total_fees / total_weight * 1000
2025-10-13T02:36:24.1942972Z > check_feerate([l3, l2], total_feerate_perkw, feerate)
2025-10-13T02:36:24.1943279Z
2025-10-13T02:36:24.1943411Z tests/test_closing.py:4064:
2025-10-13T02:36:24.1943813Z _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
2025-10-13T02:36:24.1944170Z
2025-10-13T02:36:24.1944685Z nodes = [<fixtures.LightningNode object at 0x7f17fdf684f0>, <fixtures.LightningNode object at 0x7f17fdf6af50>]
2025-10-13T02:36:24.1945708Z actual_feerate = 13005.66942869603, expected_feerate = 13000
2025-10-13T02:36:24.1946091Z
2025-10-13T02:36:24.1946247Z def check_feerate(nodes, actual_feerate, expected_feerate):
2025-10-13T02:36:24.1946558Z # Feerate can't be lower.
2025-10-13T02:36:24.1946870Z assert actual_feerate > expected_feerate - 2
2025-10-13T02:36:24.1947365Z if actual_feerate >= expected_feerate + 2:
2025-10-13T02:36:24.1947830Z if any([did_short_sig(n) for n in nodes]):
2025-10-13T02:36:24.1948239Z return
2025-10-13T02:36:24.1948589Z # Use assert as it shows the actual values on failure
2025-10-13T02:36:24.1949043Z > assert actual_feerate < expected_feerate + 2
2025-10-13T02:36:24.1949489Z E AssertionError
2025-10-13T02:36:24.1949704Z
```

Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>

83/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Mentions testing or verification✓ Names security-relevant behavior explicitly
Why it was queued
signing boundary
AI analysis · Informational 13/100

This change only adds extra test-only logging to catch abnormally short cryptographic signatures during automated testing. It does not alter how signatures are created, verified, or used in real transactions, so it is not a security fix and does not affect normal users.

Security candidatebump minimum python to 3.9.2 and downgrade coincurveby Alex Myers · 8a0e473e · Oct 10, 2025 · 3 filesMessage 91 · StrongInformational 19Details
Commit message · Alex Myers

bump minimum python to 3.9.2 and downgrade coincurve

This allows compatibility with python 3.14.0 which coincurve 21.0.0 did
not support. The next coincurve release should restore compatibility.

Fixes: #8591

Changelog-changed: pyln-testing requires python>=3.9.2

91/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Mentions testing or verification✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference
Why it was queued
update trust
AI analysis · Informational 19/100

This commit adjusts Python package versions so the project's testing tools install correctly on the newly released Python 3.14. It lowers the required 'coincurve' library from version 21.0.0 to 20.0.0 and raises the minimum Python version from 3.9 to 3.9.2. The change is framed by the developer as a compatibility fix, not a security fix. There is no direct evidence in the commit that it repairs a vulnerability.

Security candidatedualopend: handle ANNOUNCEMENT_SIGNATURES from peer.by Rusty Russell · 89bce951 · Oct 1, 2025 · 3 filesMessage 81 · StrongLow 34Details
Commit message · Rusty Russell

dualopend: handle ANNOUNCEMENT_SIGNATURES from peer.

This can happen if we haven't transitioned to channeld yet, but logic is simply to hand
it to lightningd, exactly as channeld does.

```
2025-09-30T03:04:57.8951627Z lightningd-1 2025-09-30T02:59:14.150Z DEBUG 022d223620a359a47ff7f7ac447c85c46c923da53389221a0054c11c1e3ca31d59-dualopend-chan#1: peer_out WIRE_WARNING
2025-09-30T03:04:57.8952126Z lightningd-1 2025-09-30T02:59:14.150Z **BROKEN** 022d223620a359a47ff7f7ac447c85c46c923da53389221a0054c11c1e3ca31d59-dualopend-chan#1: Unexpected message WIRE_ANNOUNCEMENT_SIGNATURES
2025-09-30T03:04:57.8952521Z lightningd-1 2025-09-30T02:59:14.150Z INFO 022d223620a359a47ff7f7ac447c85c46c923da53389221a0054c11c1e3ca31d59-dualopend-chan#1: Peer connection lost
2025-09-30T03:04:57.8953124Z lightningd-1 2025-09-30T02:59:14.150Z INFO 022d223620a359a47ff7f7ac447c85c46c923da53389221a0054c11c1e3ca31d59-chan#1: Peer transient failure in DUALOPEND_AWAITING_LOCKIN: dualopend: Owning subdaemon dualopend died (62208)
```

Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>

81/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference
Why it was queued
signing boundary
AI analysis · Low 34/100

This patch fixes a bug where Core Lightning's dual-funding channel opener (dualopend) would crash with a 'BROKEN' error if a peer sent ANNOUNCEMENT_SIGNATURES messages before the channel had fully transitioned to the normal channel daemon. The fix simply forwards those messages to the main lightningd process, just as the regular channel daemon already does. Without the patch, a peer could cause transient connection failures and daemon restarts during channel setup.

Security candidateRefactor Dockerfile, Add TODOsby Claudio Raimondi · 13c5db51 · Sep 28, 2025 · 40 filesMessage 76 · AdequateInformational 17Details
Commit message · Claudio Raimondi

Refactor Dockerfile, Add TODOs

all these changelogs only apply to the Docker image.

Changelog-Added: added verification of GPG keys for the bitcoin and litecoin tarballs.
Changelog-Fixed: fixed compilation on all target architectures; each had their own bugs (poetry, missing packages...).
Changelog-Fixed: fixed cargo cross compilation. it was mistakenly using QEMU before.
Changelog-Fixed: fixed CPU compatibility bug described in issue 8456
Changelog-Changed: improve build time by 8.8x
Changelog-Changed: improve image size by 2.07x

more detailed changelog can be found on the PR: https://github.com/ElementsProject/lightning/pull/8429

76/100 · AdequateMessage clarity
✓ Descriptive subject✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Mentions testing or verification✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference
Why it was queued
defensive validationauthentication path
AI analysis · Informational 17/100

This commit is a large refactor of the Docker build files for Core Lightning. It mainly improves how Docker images are built, adds verification of downloaded Bitcoin and Litecoin binaries using GPG signatures, fixes cross-compilation issues, and updates build documentation. There is no obvious security vulnerability introduced by the changes; in fact, adding GPG verification is a security improvement. However, the commit removes the use of `tini` as the container init process and switches the entrypoint directly to a shell script, which is a minor operational change. The commit does not appear to fix or introduce a serious security bug in the Core Lightning software itself.

Security candidatefuzz-tests: fix overflow of u32 in `fuzz-close-tx`by Chandra Pratap · 20e252b5 · Sep 15, 2025 · 1 fileMessage 88 · StrongInformational 18Details
Commit message · Chandra Pratap

fuzz-tests: fix overflow of u32 in `fuzz-close-tx`

Changelog-None: The value WALLY_SATOSHI_PER_BTC * WALLY_BTC_MAX
is equal to 2.1e15, which is much higher than the maximum capacity
of a u32, which is 4.29e9.

Hence, use a u64 to store this value instead.

88/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Mentions testing or verification✓ Names security-relevant behavior explicitly
Why it was queued
memory safetyfuzzing or regression evidence
AI analysis · Informational 18/100

This commit fixes a variable type bug in a fuzz test, not in the main Core Lightning software. A fuzz test is an automated testing tool that feeds random data to a program to find crashes. The bug was that a calculation used a 32-bit integer (u32) to hold a value far larger than it can represent, causing an overflow. The fix changes the variable type to a 64-bit integer (u64). Because this is only in a test file, it does not directly affect real Lightning nodes or user funds.

Security candidatedoc: rc1 build-release instructions.by Rusty Russell · f920c1e7 · Sep 10, 2025 · 1 fileMessage 68 · AdequateInformational 15Details
Commit message · Rusty Russell

doc: rc1 build-release instructions.

Signing `--without-zip` will not work. You will end up with a empty SHA256SUMS file.

Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>

68/100 · AdequateMessage clarity
✓ Descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context
Why it was queued
signing boundarydocumentation-only discount
AI analysis · Informational 15/100

This is a one-line documentation fix in the release checklist. It removes the `--without-zip` flag from an example command because using that flag would produce an empty SHA256SUMS file. There is no code change and no security vulnerability.

Security candidatecontrib: add Madeline's signing key.by Rusty Russell · bc753a2f · Sep 2, 2025 · 1 fileMessage 60 · AdequateInformational 15Details
Commit message · Rusty Russell

contrib: add Madeline's signing key.

Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>

60/100 · AdequateMessage clarity
✓ Descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides an explanatory body
Why it was queued
signing boundarydocumentation-only discount
AI analysis · Informational 15/100

This commit simply adds a new PGP public key file for a person named Madeline to the project's contributor key directory. It is a routine administrative change with no code modifications and no direct security impact.

Security candidatepytest: test coinmoves in the case of unexpected fulfill.by Rusty Russell · 397fdd9e · Aug 19, 2025 · 1 fileMessage 88 · StrongInformational 15Details
Commit message · Rusty Russell

pytest: test coinmoves in the case of unexpected fulfill.

This happens if l1 doesn't get a signature, so it doesn't consider
the fulfill complete, but l2 does (and thus credits l1).

This is a trivial test, but will matter should we later correctly
account for channelmoves when onchain: in that case it will actually
hard to tell, in general, what HTLC(s) were fulfilled.

Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>

88/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Mentions testing or verification✓ Names security-relevant behavior explicitly
Why it was queued
signing boundary
AI analysis · Informational 15/100

This commit only adds a new test case to the project's test suite. It simulates a scenario where one side of a Lightning payment channel believes an HTLC was fulfilled while the other side does not, then verifies that the internal accounting records (called 'coinmoves') are produced correctly. There is no change to production code, no fix, and no vulnerability being patched.

Security candidatecommon: set errno=0 before calling strto{l,ul,ull}by Matt Whitlock · ea2feccb · Aug 15, 2025 · 3 filesMessage 78 · AdequateLow 35Details
Commit message · Matt Whitlock

common: set errno=0 before calling strto{l,ul,ull}

The strto{l,ul,ull} functions do not set errno upon a successful return, so a
successful return from a maximally valued input could be misinterpreted as an
overflow error if errno happened already to be set to ERANGE before the call.
To guard against this edge case, always set errno to zero before calling these
functions if checking errno afterward.

Changelog-None

78/100 · AdequateMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Names security-relevant behavior explicitly
Why it was queued
memory safety
AI analysis · Low 35/100

This commit fixes a subtle programming bug in how Core Lightning converts text strings to numbers. Functions like strtoull only set an error flag (errno) when a value is too large, but they leave it unchanged on success. If some earlier code had already set that flag to 'overflow,' a later successful conversion of the largest possible number could be wrongly rejected as an overflow. The patch clears the error flag before each conversion so the check afterward is reliable. The practical security impact is limited because the bug only triggers when a prior operation happens to leave that specific error flag set, and the affected conversions are mostly for amounts, route hints, and JSON parsing rather than cryptographic checks.

Security candidatelightningd: fix race with crossover pings.by Rusty Russell · 5f544038 · Aug 14, 2025 · 8 filesMessage 68 · AdequateLow 37Details
Commit message · Rusty Russell

lightningd: fix race with crossover pings.

We cannot use subd_req() here: replies will come out of order, and the
we should not simply assign the reponses in FIFO order.

Changelog-Fixed: lightningd: don't get confused with parallel ping commands.
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>

68/100 · AdequateMessage clarity
✓ Descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context
Why it was queued
authentication path
AI analysis · Low 37/100

This commit fixes a bug in Core Lightning's handling of multiple ping commands sent at the same time. Previously, if two ping commands were issued in parallel, the replies could arrive out of order and be matched to the wrong command, potentially causing incorrect responses or confusion in the node. The fix adds a unique request ID to each ping so replies can be correctly paired with their original commands.

Security candidatesplice: Remove `batch_size` from `commitment_signed`by Dusty Daemon · e755be0c · Aug 14, 2025 · 4 filesMessage 73 · AdequateLow 31Details
Commit message · Dusty Daemon

splice: Remove `batch_size` from `commitment_signed`

The new spec sends `batch_size` in `start_batch` and removes it from `commitment_signed` so we need to stop processing it in `commitment_signed`.

Since the tlv is now reduced to one element and that automagically turns it into a direct use TLV so we have to update the code everywhere it is referenced.

73/100 · AdequateMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context
Why it was queued
boot or update path
AI analysis · Low 31/100

This commit updates Core Lightning's implementation of the Lightning Network splicing protocol to match a newer version of the specification. It removes a 'batch_size' field from the 'commitment_signed' message and moves that information to a different message ('start_batch'). The code changes are mostly mechanical: updating data structures, removing checks that used batch_size, and adjusting how messages are parsed and compared. There is no direct evidence in the commit or supplied references that this fixes a security vulnerability; it appears to be a protocol compatibility/spec-compliance update.

Security candidatesplice: Add `start_batch` and an internal wire typeby Dusty Daemon · 07f4bc39 · Aug 14, 2025 · 11 filesMessage 73 · AdequateInformational 23Details
Commit message · Dusty Daemon

splice: Add `start_batch` and an internal wire type

We add `start_batch` to match t-bast’s splicing spec and we add a new internal wire type `WIRE_PROTOCOL_BATCH_ELEMENT` using the type number 0

Changelog-Added: support for `start_batch`

73/100 · AdequateMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context
Why it was queued
boot or update path
AI analysis · Informational 23/100

This commit adds support for two new Lightning protocol messages used in splicing: `start_batch` and an internal-only `protocol_batch_element`. The code mostly ignores or routes these messages; it does not appear to fix a security bug. The change is a feature addition matching a draft specification, with no clear security relevance in the diff itself.