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Core Lightning

Modular C implementation of the Lightning Network protocol and node stack.

BitcoinLightning NetworkActive incident
Repository coverage

2330 commits in the local evidence base

Every captured commit receives deterministic security triage and a separate communication-quality score. Security candidates and broader second-pass signals receive full-patch Ollama analysis.

228security candidates319second-pass queue1977AI analyses
99commits · 30 days
229commits · 60 days
709commits · 180 days
1578commits · 365 days
Backfill bands
Aug 5 → Feb 61049 seen37 candidatesComplete
Feb 6 → Jun 6579 seen10 candidatesComplete
Jun 6 → Jul 678 seen1 candidatesComplete
Jul 6 → Aug 5147 seen16 candidatesComplete
Commit communication

Does the history explain itself?

Message quality measures whether a commit identifies its scope, purpose, rationale, testing, and supporting references. It does not change the security-severity score.

71/100 average clarity
628Strong · 80–100
1399Adequate · 60–79
272Thin · 40–59
31Opaque · 0–39
Read the scoring rubric →
Developer activity

Who is changing the project?

Public Git author strings; identities are not independently verified.

DeveloperCommitsCandidatesAnalyzedHigh riskMessage avg.
cdecker331217581
daywalker9019315113471
Níckolas Goline961252376
Amperstrand322278
Rusty Russell96977961173
Sangbida Chaudhuri18537157167
Vincenzo Palazzo19714185
Lagrang3115679170
dovgopoly18016165
Dusty Daemon821378066
ShahanaFarooqui931093063
Peter Neuroth1469110074
Analysis record

Published AI watches

Last scanned 18 minutes ago

Informational 15 AI analysisMessage 85 · Strong
EP Elements ProjectCore Lightning BitcoinLightning Network

doc: bring lightning-downgrade's version list up to v26.12.

This commit only updates documentation. It adds new version entries to the manual page for the lightning-downgrade tool and mentions the tool in the upgrade guide. No code, database logic, or security behavior is changed.

2e7a9f5aby Ken Sedgwick+9−12 files
No security note in commit
Informational 23 AI analysisMessage 66 · Adequate
EP Elements ProjectCore Lightning BitcoinLightning Network

Makefile: install lightning-downgrade.

This is a packaging/build fix, not a security vulnerability. The `lightning-downgrade` utility was being compiled but accidentally left out of the list of programs installed by `make install`. As a result, official release archives contain…

06ea9ba0by Ken Sedgwick+1−01 file
No security note in commit
Low 27 AI analysisMessage 83 · Strong
EP Elements ProjectCore Lightning BitcoinLightning Network

wallet: create bwatch tables before backfilling them

This commit fixes a database upgrade bug in Core Lightning. Wallets created with version v26.06.10 were missing two new tables (our_outputs and our_txs) because they skipped the migrations that create them. When users later upgraded, a fol…

Database migration failure could prevent node startup after upgradeFixes missing table creation before data backfillAdds regression test for upgrade path from v26.06.10
ce2a6836by daywalker90+105−02 files
No security note in commit
Informational 15 AI analysisMessage 5 · Opaque
EP Elements ProjectCore Lightning BitcoinLightning Network

v26.12rc1

This commit is a routine version bump from v26.06.10 to v26.12rc1 for Core Lightning. It only updates version strings in packaging files, a changelog, and a lockfile. There are no code changes that introduce, fix, or modify any security-se…

4002c4e9by Níckolas Goline+164−1110 files
No security note in commit
Low 30 AI analysisMessage 68 · Adequate
EP Elements ProjectCore Lightning BitcoinLightning Network

wallet: store payment failure details per groupid

This commit fixes a database bug in Core Lightning where failure details for a payment attempt were being overwritten by later retry attempts that shared the same payment identifier fragment. The fix makes the failure record match on an ad…

Data integrity bug causing incorrect error reporting across payment retry groupsNo memory safety, authentication, authorization, or cryptographic issues presentNo external input is trusted or validated differently
24082c6dby daywalker90+6−34 files
No security note in commit
Low 43 AI analysisMessage 83 · Strong
EP Elements ProjectCore Lightning BitcoinLightning Network

cln-plugin: do not panic when the log writer task is gone

This commit fixes a bug in Core Lightning's Rust plugin library where a plugin could crash with a panic if it tried to log a message after the internal log-writing task had already stopped, such as during shutdown. The fix makes the plugin…

panic on send failure replaced with stderr fallbacklog message no longer silently dropped on writer task exitunit test added for dropped-receiver scenario
8661ffabby cdecker+29−11 file
No security note in commit
Informational 15 AI analysisMessage 90 · Strong
EP Elements ProjectCore Lightning BitcoinLightning Network

docs: explain hsmtool HTLC recovery

This commit only adds documentation to the manual page for an existing command-line tool (hsmtool). It explains how to recover funds from old Lightning payment commitments (HTLCs) after losing channel state. There are no code changes, no n…

f90c140dby Sangbida Chaudhuri+85−01 file
No security note in commit
Informational 15 AI analysisMessage 68 · Adequate
EP Elements ProjectCore Lightning BitcoinLightning Network

tests: make test_delpay_works deterministic

This commit only changes a test file to make a flaky test more reliable. It does not modify any production code, so it has no security impact on real users.

a224ca81by daywalker90+16−161 file
No security note in commit
Informational 20 AI analysisMessage 73 · Adequate
EP Elements ProjectCore Lightning BitcoinLightning Network

doc: say that listtransactions gives blockheight 0 for a tx not in a block

This commit only updates documentation to explain that the `listtransactions` command reports a block height and transaction index of 0 when a transaction is not currently in a block (for example, because it hasn't been mined yet or was re…

bc281be3by Peter Neuroth+4−42 files
No security note in commit
Informational 20 AI analysisMessage 50 · Thin
EP Elements ProjectCore Lightning BitcoinLightning Network

fixup! pyln-client: don't crash Millisatoshi.to_approx_str() on zero

This is a small bug fix in a Python helper library used by Core Lightning. The Millisatoshi.to_approx_str() method previously crashed with a math error when converting a zero amount to a human-readable string. The patch makes zero return "…

No security-relevant signals presentFix is a routine correctness/robustness improvement
02612ed5by Amartya Singh+4−31 file
No security note in commit
Moderate 62 AI analysisMessage 73 · Adequate
EP Elements ProjectCore Lightning BitcoinLightning Network

wallet: reject unmodifiable PSBTs in addpsbtoutput/addpsbtinput

This update fixes a crash in two wallet commands, addpsbtoutput and addpsbtinput. These commands let users add extra transaction outputs or inputs to a PSBT (a Bitcoin transaction planning file). If a user supplied a PSBT whose version 2 '…

Daemon crash (assertion failure) on crafted/strict PSBT inputMissing validation of PSBT v2 modifiable flags before mutationUser-controlled input directly passed to libwally without precondition check
42472816by daywalker90+14−12 files
Vendor flagged security relevance
Moderate 59 AI analysisMessage 83 · Strong
EP Elements ProjectCore Lightning BitcoinLightning Network

tests: show addpsbtoutput/addpsbtinput crash on an unmodifiable v2 PSBT

This commit only adds a new test case that demonstrates two Core Lightning commands, addpsbtoutput and addpsbtinput, crash with an internal assertion when given a v2 PSBT that does not allow adding inputs or outputs. The test is marked as …

Daemon abort due to failed assertion in PSBT helper functionsRPC commands addpsbtoutput and addpsbtinput lack validation of PSBT modifiability flags before calling libwallyPotential denial-of-service vector: any caller able to submit a crafted v2 PSBT can crash lightningd
42e268abby daywalker90+60−01 file
No security note in commit
Informational 20 AI analysisMessage 73 · Adequate
EP Elements ProjectCore Lightning BitcoinLightning Network

pyln-client: don't crash Millisatoshi.to_approx_str() on zero

This commit fixes a minor bug in Core Lightning's Python client library where calling a pretty-printing method on a zero-amount payment would crash with a ValueError. It is a routine correctness fix, not a security vulnerability. There is …

5ebe365dby Amartya Singh+3−12 files
No security note in commit
Moderate 59 AI analysisMessage 83 · Strong
EP Elements ProjectCore Lightning BitcoinLightning Network

dualopen and splicing: add minimal verification of tx_signatures

This commit adds missing safety checks in Core Lightning when a peer sends signatures for opening or splicing a dual-funded Lightning channel. Before the patch, the software accepted peer-provided transaction witnesses without verifying th…

Missing input validation on peer-provided witness dataBOLT-2 compliance fix for tx_signaturesRejection of empty witness stacks
c6be4f71by Lagrang3+633−97 files
Vendor flagged security relevance
Moderate 54 AI analysisMessage 85 · Strong
EP Elements ProjectCore Lightning BitcoinLightning Network

channeld: abort_channels no longer fails a channel with a signed splice

This fix prevents a user-issued 'abort channels' command from incorrectly failing a Lightning channel when a splice transaction has already been signed. Previously, the code would pass the latest in-flight splice to a routine that aborts i…

Denial-of-service/availability impact: user-initiated abort could inadvertently fail a funded channelProtocol compliance fix: avoids sending tx_abort after tx_signatures, which BOLT 2 forbidsState-handling bug in splice negotiation lifecycle
c87f5573by Andezion+22−11 file
No security note in commit
Moderate 51 AI analysisMessage 73 · Adequate
EP Elements ProjectCore Lightning BitcoinLightning Network

lightningd: fix crash on mutual close of an unconfirmed dual-funded channel

This update fixes a bug where a specific type of Lightning channel close could crash the node. It only happens when both parties cooperatively close a dual-funded channel that has not yet been confirmed and has gone through a funding bump …

NULL pointer dereference leading to daemon crash (denial of service)Crash occurs in cooperative-close path for unconfirmed dual-funded/RBF channelsFix uses canonical channel funding key instead of splice-only field
555143beby Sangbida Chaudhuri+9−31 file
Vendor flagged security relevance
High 74 AI analysisMessage 73 · Adequate
EP Elements ProjectCore Lightning BitcoinLightning Network

cln-grpc: reject malformed request values instead of panicking

This commit fixes a security bug in Core Lightning's gRPC plugin (cln-grpc). Previously, a malformed request from a gRPC client could crash the plugin: bad public keys, hashes, secrets, channel IDs, or enum values triggered Rust 'unwrap()'…

Denial-of-service via malformed gRPC request causing tonic worker task panicDenial-of-service via std::process::exit(1) in ProofField conversion on missing oneofSilent integer truncation of u16/u8 fields via 'as' casts
b2703436by daywalker90+1558−12135 files
Vendor flagged security relevance
Informational 15 AI analysisMessage 51 · Thin
EP Elements ProjectCore Lightning BitcoinLightning Network

nix: drop protobuf again

This commit removes the protobuf package from the Nix build environment because it is no longer needed. A previous change made the cln-grpc component use its own bundled protoc compiler instead of relying on the system one. The Python bind…

a0459eeeby Peter Neuroth+0−11 file
No security note in commit
Informational 15 AI analysisMessage 73 · Adequate
EP Elements ProjectCore Lightning BitcoinLightning Network

make: check gRPC protos for breaking changes against the last release

This commit adds a new automated check to the project's build process that compares gRPC protocol definitions against the last release to catch accidental breaking changes early. It does not change any runtime code, fix a bug, or introduce…

db5fea70by daywalker90+43−84 files
No security note in commit
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Lower-prioritybuild-release: send ARM output to its own release directoryby Níckolas Goline · dfe70e81 · Oct 6, 2026 · 3 filesMessage 73 · AdequateTriage 0Details
Commit message · Níckolas Goline

build-release: send ARM output to its own release directory

RELEASEDIR is hardcoded to release/, and the zip block runs on the host
before any builder container starts, so an ARM build would write into the
amd64 release directory whichever builder image it used.

That block also removes release/clightning-$VERSION.zip before rebuilding
it from the current HEAD. For an ARM build there is nothing to rebuild it
from, so the file is simply lost.

Send -arm64 targets to release-arm64/ and -armv7 targets to
release-armv7/, and skip the zip for them:
the zip is the source archive and carries no architecture, so one copy
serves every build. Targets without a suffix keep their current behaviour.

Suffix arm64 builder images in cl-repro.sh so both architectures can be
present at once, and so bin-Ubuntu-<dist>-arm64 resolves to the right one.
amd64 images keep their existing names.

Changelog-None

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

73/100 · AdequateMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context
Lower-priorityreprobuild: build arm64 tarballsby Níckolas Goline · 2c44bf2d · Oct 6, 2026 · 4 filesMessage 58 · ThinTriage 0Details
Commit message · Níckolas Goline

reprobuild: build arm64 tarballs

Every pinned .deb in repro-build.sh is _amd64, so sha256sum -c fails
outright on an arm64 builder.

Add tools/repro-build.arm64.sh: the same script with the same packages at
the same upstream versions, built for arm64. Keeping it separate leaves the
amd64 path isolated, so work on one architecture cannot disturb the other.

Pass VERSION to the install step as well as the build step. The Makefile
falls back to git describe, which inside the builder reports the commit
that was checked out rather than the release tag, so without this
--force-version names the tarball but leaves the binaries stamped with the
branch version.

Pick the script from the image's own architecture, so one Dockerfile still
serves both. bin-Ubuntu-<dist>-arm64 already resolves to
cl-repro-<dist>-arm64.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

58/100 · ThinMessage clarity
✓ Descriptive subject✓ Provides detailed explanatory context
Lower-prioritycln-rpc: build the getinfo example where the Makefile expects itby Níckolas Goline · f924725c · Oct 6, 2026 · 1 fileMessage 73 · AdequateTriage 0Details
Commit message · Níckolas Goline

cln-rpc: build the getinfo example where the Makefile expects it

cln-rpc/Makefile names the example target/$(RUST_PROFILE)/..., while
plugins/Makefile lists the same file under $(RUST_TARGET_DIR) in
DEFAULT_TARGETS. The two only agree when TARGET is unset: with a cross
TARGET, cargo writes to target/<triple>/<profile>/, and make stops with
"No rule to make target 'target/<triple>/release/examples/cln-rpc-getinfo'".

Use $(RUST_TARGET_DIR) like the other Rust targets.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

73/100 · AdequateMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context
Security candidatereprobuild: cross-compile armv7 tarballsby Níckolas Goline · b09099be · Oct 6, 2026 · 5 filesMessage 83 · StrongInformational 14Details
Commit message · Níckolas Goline

reprobuild: cross-compile armv7 tarballs

armv7 cannot build natively like arm64: cln-grpc's build script takes
protoc from protoc-bin-vendored, which ships no armv7 binary, so the build
panics there.

Add tools/repro-build.armv7.sh, which cross-compiles instead. It runs in
the amd64 cl-repro-<dist> image, adds armhf from ports.ubuntu.com (same
release pocket, updates and security still disabled), and pins the
arm-linux-gnueabihf toolchain and armhf libraries the same way the other
scripts pin theirs. The Rust plugins build for
armv7-unknown-linux-gnueabihf.

The build runs a few armv7 programs (configure tests,
tools/headerversions), so the host needs qemu-arm registered with
binfmt_misc.

bin-Ubuntu-<dist>-armv7 runs the amd64 image with REPRO_ARCH=armv7, and
the tarball lands in release-armv7/.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

83/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Mentions testing or verification✓ Names security-relevant behavior explicitly
Why it was queued
access control
AI analysis · Informational 14/100

This commit adds a new build script and updates Dockerfiles so that Core Lightning release tarballs can be produced for 32-bit ARM (armv7) devices. It is purely a build-system/infrastructure change for cross-compilation and does not alter any wallet, networking, or cryptographic code. There is no indication it fixes or introduces a security vulnerability.

AI review queuedtools: add sign-release-arm.shby Níckolas Goline · 224130eb · Oct 6, 2026 · 1 fileMessage 68 · AdequateInformational 15Details
Commit message · Níckolas Goline

tools: add sign-release-arm.sh

build-release.sh's sign target cannot be used for the ARM tarballs: it
hardcodes `cd release/` rather than honouring RELEASEDIR, and globs the
zip, so running it for an ARM build would rewrite the amd64 manifest.

Checksum one architecture's tarballs, from release-arm64/ or
release-armv7/, into SHA256SUMS-<version>-<arch> and sign it. arm64 and
armv7 keep separate manifests: arm64 builds natively and armv7 is
cross-compiled, so they are reproduced and co-signed separately.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

68/100 · AdequateMessage clarity
✓ Descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context
Why it was queued
signing or wallet pathsecond-pass: security-sensitive path
AI analysis · Informational 15/100

This commit adds a new helper script used by Core Lightning release engineers to create and sign checksum files for ARM release tarballs. It does not change any wallet, network, or node code, and there is no indication it fixes or introduces a security vulnerability. It is purely a release tooling addition.

Lower-priorityCI: build and sign arm64 and armv7 release binariesby Níckolas Goline · 7b2bafe1 · Oct 6, 2026 · 3 filesMessage 85 · StrongTriage 0Details
Commit message · Níckolas Goline

CI: build and sign arm64 and armv7 release binaries

Add arm64 and armv7 targets for every Ubuntu release to the release build.
arm64 builds natively on GitHub's ubuntu-24.04-arm runners; armv7
cross-compiles on the amd64 runners, with qemu registered for the few
armv7 programs the build runs.

The arm64 and armv7 tarballs go into their own artifacts, are checksummed
and signed per architecture with tools/sign-release-arm.sh, and are
attached to the draft release with SHA256SUMS-<version>-arm64 and
SHA256SUMS-<version>-armv7 and their .asc files, next to the amd64
manifest.

Document how to reproduce the ARM builds.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

85/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Uses a recognizable type or scope✓ Provides detailed explanatory context
Why it was queued
documentation-only discount
Security candidateCI: never replace files already on the releaseby Níckolas Goline · f918c23f · Oct 6, 2026 · 3 filesMessage 97 · StrongModerate 60Details
Commit message · Níckolas Goline

CI: never replace files already on the release

The release job uploaded release/* with action-gh-release, which replaces
any asset of the same name. Re-running it after the release captains had
added their signatures to SHA256SUMS-<version>.asc replaced that file with
one carrying only the CI signature, so users verifying the release found
the maintainers' signatures gone.

Upload with tools/publish-release-assets.sh instead:

- files the release does not have yet are uploaded;
- files it already has must be identical, otherwise the job stops before
touching anything (the builds disagree, and nothing should be signed);
- an .asc it already has gets our signature appended, after normalising
the armor so gpg reads every block; one that already carries our
signature is left alone, so re-runs are harmless.

The draft release is created with gh when it does not exist yet, with the
same title and pre-release flag as before.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

97/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Uses a recognizable type or scope✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Explains rationale or failure mode✓ Names security-relevant behavior explicitly
Why it was queued
signing boundary
AI analysis · Moderate 60/100

This commit fixes a release-pipeline bug where re-running the automated release job could accidentally wipe out human maintainers' cryptographic signatures from the release's checksum file. Before the fix, the CI tool replaced any existing file with the same name, so if release captains had already added their GPG signatures to SHA256SUMS-<version>.asc, a re-run would overwrite it with a version signed only by the CI bot. Users who later checked the signatures would see only one signature and could not verify that multiple maintainers had approved the release. The fix introduces a new script that only adds missing files, refuses to change files that differ, and appends the CI signature to existing signature files instead of replacing them.

AI review queuedchanneld: bound HTLC additions by our own splice-out amountby jaonoctus · 0b41f819 · Oct 5, 2026 · 1 fileMessage 73 · AdequateModerate 66Details
Commit message · jaonoctus

channeld: bound HTLC additions by our own splice-out amount

While a splice is inflight, every HTLC has to fit on the commitment for
each funding candidate, so get_room_above_reserve() charges each side's
lowest splice change (lowest_splice_amnt) against its balance. But
update_view_from_inflights() set our side's bound from the inflight's
new funding total, which is positive, so it stayed at zero and our
splice-out was never charged.

We then admitted HTLCs that fit only the pre-splice commitment. Building
the post-splice commitment took our balance negative, channel_txs()
returned NULL, and channeld dereferenced it and crashed, then did the same
on every reconnect:

during the splice, payments were forwarded out through the channel
cumulatively they exceeded our post-splice balance (invalid on the
post-splice commitment)
...
channeld crashed building the post-splice commitment: our balance
went negative, the commitment build returned nothing, and channeld
dereferenced it
every reconnect rebuilds the same commitment, so it loops

Use the inflight's signed local change for our bound, as the remote side
already does. Also fix the REMOTE-view assignments, which compared
against one side's bound and wrote the other's.

Reported-by: Ken Sedgwick <ken@bonsai.com>
Changelog-Fixed: channeld: no longer crash-loops when an HTLC that only the pre-splice commitment can carry is added during a splice-out.
Co-Authored-By: Ken Sedgwick <ken@bonsai.com>

(cherry picked from commit 733c42e823bb204e6d91cca4f0450158842404e3)

73/100 · AdequateMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context
Why it was queued
second-pass: broader security terminology
AI analysis · Moderate 66/100

This fix repairs a bug in Core Lightning's channel daemon that could crash and permanently loop-crash a node during a specific kind of Bitcoin channel upgrade called a 'splice-out.' While the splice was in progress, the program failed to subtract the node's outgoing splice amount when checking whether new forwarded payments would fit in the updated channel. It therefore allowed payments that were valid only for the old channel state. When it later tried to build the post-splice commitment transaction, the node's balance went negative, the builder returned nothing, and the daemon dereferenced that null pointer and crashed. On every reconnect it rebuilt the same bad commitment, so the node would crash again in a loop. The patch corrects the accounting so the splice-out amount is properly charged against the balance, and also fixes a related indexing mistake that mixed up local and remote views.

AI review queuedchanneld: fail the channel instead of crashing if we can't build a commitmentby jaonoctus · 77e1f180 · Oct 5, 2026 · 1 fileMessage 85 · StrongModerate 60Details
Commit message · jaonoctus

channeld: fail the channel instead of crashing if we can't build a commitment

channel_txs() returns NULL when it can't build a commitment, for example
when a splice amount would take one side's balance below zero:

channel_txs fails to amount_msat_add_sat_s64 ... LOCAL (side_pay + splice_amnt)

Neither send_commit_part() nor handle_peer_commit_sig() checked for that,
so channeld dereferenced NULL and crashed. Since every reconnect rebuilds
the same commitment, it then crashed again on each one, leaving the
channel stuck in a crash loop that only a unilateral close would end.

There's no way to continue on a commitment we can't build, so fail the
channel and say why. The next commit stops the case we know about
reaching here at all.

Changelog-None

Co-Authored-By: Ken Sedgwick <ken@bonsai.com>

(cherry picked from commit 2594edab350be11c68459e546921e6c0d1d07739)

85/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Explains rationale or failure mode
Why it was queued
second-pass: broader security terminology
AI analysis · Moderate 60/100

This update fixes a bug where a part of the Core Lightning node (channeld) would crash and enter an endless crash loop if it couldn't build a commitment transaction, for example due to a splice that would push one side's balance below zero. The fix makes the node fail the channel gracefully instead of crashing. A malicious or buggy peer could potentially trigger this crash repeatedly on reconnection, causing denial of service for that channel.

Lower-prioritylightningd: return after failing the channel on a missing inflightby Níckolas Goline · d53b4d3b · Oct 5, 2026 · 1 fileMessage 83 · StrongTriage 0Details
Commit message · Níckolas Goline

lightningd: return after failing the channel on a missing inflight

handle_peer_splice_locked(), handle_splice_confirmed_signed(),
handle_splice_sending_sigs() and handle_update_inflight() call
channel_internal_error() when they can't find the inflight for a txid,
for example:

Unable to load inflight for locked_txid ...

channel_internal_error() fails the channel and returns, but they carried
on and dereferenced the NULL inflight, crashing lightningd instead of
just failing that channel. handle_update_inflight() likewise carried
on after "Must set last_tx and last_sig together", storing a half-set
pair.

Return after each of them. There's no test: reaching these needs
channeld to name an inflight lightningd doesn't have.

Changelog-Fixed: lightningd: a splice message for an inflight we don't know about now fails that channel instead of crashing the node.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

(cherry picked from commit 973a108622d5d33e2f159d20ff5db50157ab6fe0)

83/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Mentions testing or verification
Security candidatelightningd: use a splice's HTLC sigs once we move onto its commitmentby jaonoctus · a34027c2 · Oct 5, 2026 · 6 filesMessage 85 · StrongModerate 68Details
Commit message · jaonoctus

lightningd: use a splice's HTLC sigs once we move onto its commitment

update_channel_from_inflight() moves channel->last_tx onto a splice's
commitment, both when the splice locks and when we adopt a splice which
confirmed before splice_locked because its output got spent. But
channel->last_htlc_sigs stayed the peer's signatures for the pre-splice
commitment until the next commitment update, or a restart, replaced them.

If that commitment is the one we close with first, onchaind gets
signatures which can't spend its HTLC outputs, so our HTLC-timeout
transactions are invalid and we can't get those HTLCs back. That's the
case in a report of a lost balance after a close on an unlocked splice:

the close broadcasts our inflight commitment (it spends the splice
funding output, because the splice had confirmed but never locked
in)
lightningd still treats the pre-splice output as the channel
funding, so onchaind is started with the pre-splice funding,
balance, and commitment

The sigs go with the commitment, so switch them in the same place:
wallet_htlcsigs_confirm_inflight() now returns the sigs it makes current,
and update_channel_from_inflight() calls it for a splice instead of
handle_peer_splice_locked() doing so on the side.

Reported-by: Ken Sedgwick <ken@bonsai.com>
Changelog-Fixed: splicing: closing with a splice's commitment before any later commitment update can now time out or claim the HTLCs on it.
Co-Authored-By: Ken Sedgwick <ken@bonsai.com>

(cherry picked from commit 275086a9b8eb36abe0dbb7499d7e5425a77e32ed)

85/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Explains rationale or failure mode
Why it was queued
signing boundarysigning or wallet path
AI analysis · Moderate 68/100

This fix repairs a bug in Core Lightning's splicing feature. When a channel was moved onto a new 'splice' commitment transaction, the old HTLC (multi-hop payment) signatures were still being used. If the channel later closed using that new splice commitment, the stored signatures could not actually spend the HTLC outputs, meaning the node could lose money it was owed. The patch makes sure the correct HTLC signatures are kept and used whenever the channel switches to a splice commitment.

Security candidatechanneld: tell lightningd the HTLC sigs for a splice's first commitmentby jaonoctus · 61ab88e5 · Oct 5, 2026 · 5 filesMessage 78 · AdequateModerate 64Details
Commit message · jaonoctus

channeld: tell lightningd the HTLC sigs for a splice's first commitment

Every commitment the peer signs comes with its signatures for our HTLC
transactions, and lightningd stores them so onchaind can spend the HTLC
outputs if we close with that commitment. For a splice, got_commitsig
stores them for each inflight on every later commitment update, but the
inflight's first commitment, signed during the splice negotiation itself,
goes to lightningd in channeld_update_inflight, which only carried the
commitment and its signature. So any HTLC already pending when the splice
was negotiated had no signature stored for the splice's commitment.

That matters once the channel moves onto that commitment: after
splice_locked, wallet_htlcsigs_confirm_inflight() promotes the inflight's
stored sigs, which then lack those HTLCs, and the same goes for a close on
a splice which confirmed before splice_locked.

Add them to channeld_update_inflight, sent whenever it carries a new
commitment, and have lightningd replace that inflight's stored sigs with
them. channeld_update_inflight could be resent with the commitment
lightningd already had when the user signs the splice; that now sends no
commitment, so it can't replace those sigs with nothing.

Changelog-None

Co-Authored-By: Ken Sedgwick <ken@bonsai.com>

(cherry picked from commit ebf69a8e6ba29560584060304bfe4a1e2b75dd52)

78/100 · AdequateMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Names security-relevant behavior explicitly
Why it was queued
signing boundarysigning or wallet path
AI analysis · Moderate 64/100

This patch fixes a bug in Core Lightning's channel splicing feature. When a Bitcoin Lightning channel is being spliced (a fancy way of resizing the channel while it stays open), the software was forgetting to save the peer's signatures for any pending HTLC payments on the very first version of the new commitment transaction. If the channel later closed using that commitment, the node might not be able to claim its funds from those pending payments on the blockchain, potentially leading to loss of money. The fix makes sure those signatures are passed along and stored in the wallet database.

AI review queuedlightningd: conceal secret config values in listconfigsby Andezion · ef48dcd2 · Oct 5, 2026 · 5 filesMessage 73 · AdequateModerate 65Details
Commit message · Andezion

lightningd: conceal secret config values in listconfigs

Changelog-Changed: JSON-RPC: `listconfigs` shows `...` instead of the value of `wallet`, `recover`, `tor-service-password`, `bitcoin-rpcpassword` and the old `bookkeeper-db`, for every caller; unset ones are omitted.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

(cherry picked from commit 6ed212e4856bce2b3392bac1d2fe2df90f3edfde)

73/100 · AdequateMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context
Why it was queued
second-pass: broader security terminology
AI analysis · Moderate 65/100

This commit changes Core Lightning's `listconfigs` RPC command so that several secret or sensitive configuration values are hidden and shown as '...' instead of their real content. Previously, anyone who could call `listconfigs` could see values like the Bitcoin RPC password, wallet database connection string, recovery seed, Tor service password, and old bookkeeper database details. The commit also fixes a bug where concealed options were still being shown when they were not actually set. This is a security hardening change that reduces the risk of leaking credentials to unauthorized callers.

Lower-priorityrunes: record valid runes missing from the db on first useby Andezion · 25b7d06b · Oct 5, 2026 · 3 filesMessage 73 · AdequateTriage 0Details
Commit message · Andezion

runes: record valid runes missing from the db on first use

Changelog-Fixed: lightningd: a valid rune missing from the database (e.g. after restoring an older backup) is recorded on first use, so its `per` and `rate` limits apply and its id isn't reused.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

(cherry picked from commit a04ed5199856e7f0267ed13b69a1d242b1a151c9)

73/100 · AdequateMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context
Lower-priorityrunes: only unrestricted runes may create new runesby Andezion · 36f9bfa9 · Oct 5, 2026 · 3 filesMessage 78 · AdequateTriage 0Details
Commit message · Andezion

runes: only unrestricted runes may create new runes

Changelog-Security: runes: a rune with restrictions can no longer create a new rune without them.
Changelog-Changed: JSON-RPC: `createrune` without a `rune` needs a rune without restrictions when called through a rune; any rune can still add restrictions to a rune it supplies.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

(cherry picked from commit 210b18a2a709d967e2e7d4fe218dd8779606eeb3)

78/100 · AdequateMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Names security-relevant behavior explicitly
Lower-priorityrunes: only unrestricted runes may relist blacklisted runesby Andezion · a4c72107 · Oct 5, 2026 · 3 filesMessage 78 · AdequateTriage 0Details
Commit message · Andezion

runes: only unrestricted runes may relist blacklisted runes

Changelog-Security: runes: a rune with restrictions can no longer relist blacklisted runes.
Changelog-Changed: JSON-RPC: `blacklistrune` with `relist` needs a rune without restrictions when called through a rune, and refuses an `end` before `start`.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

(cherry picked from commit e81bc3695382149cfd03806dbf471b8ab034dc69)

78/100 · AdequateMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Names security-relevant behavior explicitly
Lower-prioritylightningd: fix use-after-free of checkrune param cache keysby Andezion · 6743beb0 · Oct 5, 2026 · 1 fileMessage 73 · AdequateTriage 0Details
Commit message · Andezion

lightningd: fix use-after-free of checkrune param cache keys

Changelog-Fixed: lightningd: `checkrune` no longer uses freed memory when a rune has several restrictions on the same parameter.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

(cherry picked from commit bbd8855b3ef5cf21519a28b6671a6926c4cf0b41)

73/100 · AdequateMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context
Lower-priorityrunes: treat invokerune/destroyrune as their real commands in checkruneby Andezion · 61cee0ee · Oct 5, 2026 · 5 filesMessage 78 · AdequateTriage 0Details
Commit message · Andezion

runes: treat invokerune/destroyrune as their real commands in checkrune

Changelog-Security: 'checkrune': 'method/createrune' and 'method/blacklistrune' restrictions can no longer be bypassed with the 'invokerune'/'destroyrune' aliases
Changelog-Deprecated: JSON-RPC: 'invokerune' and 'destroyrune' (use 'createrune' and 'blacklistrune')
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

(cherry picked from commit 3f227cad487b093c5d6124af7be49a3919158370)

78/100 · AdequateMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Names security-relevant behavior explicitly
Security candidatecontrib: add jaonoctus's public keyby jaonoctus · 9ba88c5d · Oct 5, 2026 · 1 fileMessage 73 · AdequateInformational 15Details
Commit message · jaonoctus

contrib: add jaonoctus's public key

Commit 41278b4ef ("contrib: add jaonoctus's signing key") added
jaonoctus's fingerprint to the "Signatures For Releases" table in
SECURITY.md and the security-policy doc, but did not add the armored
public key under contrib/keys/ as was done for the other signers.

Add it, so release signatures can be verified against the key shipped
in the tree. The primary key fingerprint is
7B69 6A61 6F73 1337 520B 8A19 D8F3 1505 B581 D617, matching the
table entry.

Changelog-None
Signed-off-by: jaonoctus <jaonoctus@protonmail.com>

73/100 · AdequateMessage clarity
✓ Descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Names security-relevant behavior explicitly
Why it was queued
signing boundarydocumentation-only discount
AI analysis · Informational 15/100

This commit simply adds a public PGP key file for a release signer named jaonoctus. It is a housekeeping change to make the key available in the repository so people can verify release signatures. There is no code change, no vulnerability, and no security risk.

Lower-prioritytests: ordinary messages must not count against the gossip CPU budgetby Níckolas Goline · 9c617d73 · Oct 5, 2026 · 1 fileMessage 83 · StrongTriage 0Details
Commit message · Níckolas Goline

tests: ordinary messages must not count against the gossip CPU budget

The CPU throttle charges every message connectd handles locally: pings,
pongs, onion messages, custom messages and gossip forwarded to gossipd,
not only the gossip queries it exists to bound. The per-peer share is
the budget divided by the number of connected peers, so on a busy node
ordinary traffic exhausts it and we stop reading from the peer.

Changelog-None

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

83/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Mentions testing or verification
Lower-priorityconnectd: only charge gossip queries against the CPU budgetby Níckolas Goline · 019a5e19 · Oct 5, 2026 · 2 filesMessage 73 · AdequateTriage 0Details
Commit message · Níckolas Goline

connectd: only charge gossip queries against the CPU budget

The CPU throttle charged every message connectd handles itself against
a budget split evenly across all connected peers, and on the way out it
charged every check for pending query replies, which runs each time the
output queue drains. On a node with many peers each share is tiny, so
ordinary traffic (gossip, pings, onion messages) used it up and we
stopped reading from the peer for a second or more, delaying its channel
messages too, with an UNUSUAL "Throttling ... peer ...: too much CPU".

Charge only the gossip queries the throttle exists to bound: reading
them, and answering them while one is pending. Onion messages have
their own ratelimit. Keep the even split, with no minimum share: a
minimum would let enough peers claim more than the whole budget between
them, and a small share now only slows that peer's queries. Log
throttling at debug: a peer hitting its budget is what it's for.

Changelog-Fixed: connectd: ordinary gossip, pings and onion messages no longer count against the gossip query CPU budget, so busy nodes no longer throttle their peers.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

73/100 · AdequateMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context
Lower-prioritylightningd: add --dev-gossip-cpu-budgetby Níckolas Goline · 13900189 · Oct 5, 2026 · 6 filesMessage 78 · AdequateTriage 0Details
Commit message · Níckolas Goline

lightningd: add --dev-gossip-cpu-budget

--dev-throttle-gossip shrinks the traffic limits along with the CPU
budget, so a test can't tell which one throttled a peer. This sets
only the total CPU budget for answering gossip queries (in usec per
second), leaving the traffic limits alone.

Changelog-None

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

78/100 · AdequateMessage clarity
✓ Descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Mentions testing or verification
Lower-prioritychanneld: fail the channel if asked to resend a commitment they revoked pastby Níckolas Goline · 31299df9 · Oct 2, 2026 · 1 fileMessage 73 · AdequateTriage 0Details
Commit message · Níckolas Goline

channeld: fail the channel if asked to resend a commitment they revoked past

On reestablish, a peer asking for our last commitment_signed again was
always given it, even when it had already sent the revoke_and_ack that
proves it received it. By then remote_per_commit has moved on to the
next commitment's point, so we signed that commitment number a second
time with the wrong per-commitment point, and only noticed afterwards:

Retransmitted commitment_signed 1 but they already send revocation 1?

Fail the channel instead, like any other bad next_commitment_number.
Splice resumption (next_funding) is unaffected: it legitimately asks
for that commitment after the revocation, and signs it with
old_remote_per_commit.

Changelog-Fixed: channeld: a peer's `channel_reestablish` asking for a commitment it has already acknowledged now fails the channel instead of getting it re-signed.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

(cherry picked from commit 516272a16b79746dbfaf49bcbe54ec239cdb462e)

73/100 · AdequateMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context
Lower-prioritylightningd: fail HTLCs whose onion we couldn't parse as malformedby Níckolas Goline · 040a8fdb · Oct 2, 2026 · 1 fileMessage 73 · AdequateTriage 0Details
Commit message · Níckolas Goline

lightningd: fail HTLCs whose onion we couldn't parse as malformed

When an incoming onion doesn't parse we have no shared secret, and the
HTLC can only be failed with update_fail_malformed_htlc. That's what
happened when the parse failure was the reason, but an HTLC rejected
first for another reason (dust exposure, the channel shutting down, or a
blinded path turning every error into invalid_onion_blinding) took the
onion-wrapped path, which needs the secret, and lightningd crashed. As
the reject is replayed on restart, it crashed again on every start.

Send malformed whenever there is no shared secret: with the parse
failure code, or invalid_onion_blinding if the HTLC has a path_key.

Changelog-Fixed: lightningd: an incoming HTLC whose onion can't be parsed is now always failed as malformed, instead of crashing the node in some cases.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

(cherry picked from commit d721a801312a376e34d5da5d7a5e516aed901f6e)

73/100 · AdequateMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context
Security candidatecommon: ignore proof-only fields when checking omitted markersby Vincenzo Palazzo · 53ad856f · Sep 30, 2026 · 2 filesMessage 78 · AdequateModerate 60Details
Commit message · Vincenzo Palazzo

common: ignore proof-only fields when checking omitted markers

find_included_marker_predecessor treated every non-signature field as an
invoice TLV. next_marker() of the signature range is 1000000000, so a
proof whose only omitted marker was 1000000000 passed with no type-239
field. Skip 1001..999999999, same as next_field_check.

78/100 · AdequateMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Names security-relevant behavior explicitly
Why it was queued
signing boundary
AI analysis · Moderate 60/100

This commit fixes a validation bug in Core Lightning's handling of BOLT12 payer proofs. A payer proof is a cryptographic receipt that helps verify a payment. The bug allowed a malformed proof—one missing a required type-239 field—to be accepted as valid if it only contained a special 'omitted marker' value of 1,000,000,000. This happened because the code mistakenly treated certain proof-only fields as if they were regular invoice fields when checking whether a marker was legitimate. The fix makes the validator ignore those proof-only fields during that check, matching what another part of the code already did. A new test confirms the invalid proof is now rejected.