Every captured commit receives deterministic security triage and a separate communication-quality score. Security candidates and broader second-pass signals receive full-patch Ollama analysis.
Message quality measures whether a commit identifies its scope, purpose, rationale, testing, and supporting references. It does not change the security-severity score.
This commit only updates documentation. It adds new version entries to the manual page for the lightning-downgrade tool and mentions the tool in the upgrade guide. No code, database logic, or security behavior is changed.
This is a packaging/build fix, not a security vulnerability. The `lightning-downgrade` utility was being compiled but accidentally left out of the list of programs installed by `make install`. As a result, official release archives contain…
This commit fixes a database upgrade bug in Core Lightning. Wallets created with version v26.06.10 were missing two new tables (our_outputs and our_txs) because they skipped the migrations that create them. When users later upgraded, a fol…
Database migration failure could prevent node startup after upgradeFixes missing table creation before data backfillAdds regression test for upgrade path from v26.06.10
This commit is a routine version bump from v26.06.10 to v26.12rc1 for Core Lightning. It only updates version strings in packaging files, a changelog, and a lockfile. There are no code changes that introduce, fix, or modify any security-se…
This commit fixes a database bug in Core Lightning where failure details for a payment attempt were being overwritten by later retry attempts that shared the same payment identifier fragment. The fix makes the failure record match on an ad…
Data integrity bug causing incorrect error reporting across payment retry groupsNo memory safety, authentication, authorization, or cryptographic issues presentNo external input is trusted or validated differently
This commit fixes a bug in Core Lightning's Rust plugin library where a plugin could crash with a panic if it tried to log a message after the internal log-writing task had already stopped, such as during shutdown. The fix makes the plugin…
panic on send failure replaced with stderr fallbacklog message no longer silently dropped on writer task exitunit test added for dropped-receiver scenario
This commit only adds documentation to the manual page for an existing command-line tool (hsmtool). It explains how to recover funds from old Lightning payment commitments (HTLCs) after losing channel state. There are no code changes, no n…
This commit only changes a test file to make a flaky test more reliable. It does not modify any production code, so it has no security impact on real users.
This commit only updates documentation to explain that the `listtransactions` command reports a block height and transaction index of 0 when a transaction is not currently in a block (for example, because it hasn't been mined yet or was re…
This is a small bug fix in a Python helper library used by Core Lightning. The Millisatoshi.to_approx_str() method previously crashed with a math error when converting a zero amount to a human-readable string. The patch makes zero return "…
No security-relevant signals presentFix is a routine correctness/robustness improvement
This commit is a trivial formatting cleanup (removing an extra blank line and adding one) in a test file. It does not change any code behavior, fix any bug, or alter any security-relevant logic.
This update fixes a crash in two wallet commands, addpsbtoutput and addpsbtinput. These commands let users add extra transaction outputs or inputs to a PSBT (a Bitcoin transaction planning file). If a user supplied a PSBT whose version 2 '…
Daemon crash (assertion failure) on crafted/strict PSBT inputMissing validation of PSBT v2 modifiable flags before mutationUser-controlled input directly passed to libwally without precondition check
This commit only adds a new test case that demonstrates two Core Lightning commands, addpsbtoutput and addpsbtinput, crash with an internal assertion when given a v2 PSBT that does not allow adding inputs or outputs. The test is marked as …
Daemon abort due to failed assertion in PSBT helper functionsRPC commands addpsbtoutput and addpsbtinput lack validation of PSBT modifiability flags before calling libwallyPotential denial-of-service vector: any caller able to submit a crafted v2 PSBT can crash lightningd
This commit fixes a minor bug in Core Lightning's Python client library where calling a pretty-printing method on a zero-amount payment would crash with a ValueError. It is a routine correctness fix, not a security vulnerability. There is …
This commit adds missing safety checks in Core Lightning when a peer sends signatures for opening or splicing a dual-funded Lightning channel. Before the patch, the software accepted peer-provided transaction witnesses without verifying th…
Missing input validation on peer-provided witness dataBOLT-2 compliance fix for tx_signaturesRejection of empty witness stacks
This fix prevents a user-issued 'abort channels' command from incorrectly failing a Lightning channel when a splice transaction has already been signed. Previously, the code would pass the latest in-flight splice to a routine that aborts i…
Denial-of-service/availability impact: user-initiated abort could inadvertently fail a funded channelProtocol compliance fix: avoids sending tx_abort after tx_signatures, which BOLT 2 forbidsState-handling bug in splice negotiation lifecycle
This update fixes a bug where a specific type of Lightning channel close could crash the node. It only happens when both parties cooperatively close a dual-funded channel that has not yet been confirmed and has gone through a funding bump …
NULL pointer dereference leading to daemon crash (denial of service)Crash occurs in cooperative-close path for unconfirmed dual-funded/RBF channelsFix uses canonical channel funding key instead of splice-only field
This commit fixes a security bug in Core Lightning's gRPC plugin (cln-grpc). Previously, a malformed request from a gRPC client could crash the plugin: bad public keys, hashes, secrets, channel IDs, or enum values triggered Rust 'unwrap()'…
Denial-of-service via malformed gRPC request causing tonic worker task panicDenial-of-service via std::process::exit(1) in ProofField conversion on missing oneofSilent integer truncation of u16/u8 fields via 'as' casts
This commit removes the protobuf package from the Nix build environment because it is no longer needed. A previous change made the cln-grpc component use its own bundled protoc compiler instead of relying on the system one. The Python bind…
This commit adds a new automated check to the project's build process that compares gRPC protocol definitions against the last release to catch accidental breaking changes early. It does not change any runtime code, fix a bug, or introduce…
Expand any commit for its author, full message, clarity score, changed files, triage signals, analysis, and source link.
Lower-prioritybuild-release: send ARM output to its own release directoryby Níckolas Goline · dfe70e81 · Oct 6, 2026 · 3 filesMessage 73 · AdequateTriage 0Details
Commit message · Níckolas Goline
build-release: send ARM output to its own release directory
RELEASEDIR is hardcoded to release/, and the zip block runs on the host before any builder container starts, so an ARM build would write into the amd64 release directory whichever builder image it used.
That block also removes release/clightning-$VERSION.zip before rebuilding it from the current HEAD. For an ARM build there is nothing to rebuild it from, so the file is simply lost.
Send -arm64 targets to release-arm64/ and -armv7 targets to release-armv7/, and skip the zip for them: the zip is the source archive and carries no architecture, so one copy serves every build. Targets without a suffix keep their current behaviour.
Suffix arm64 builder images in cl-repro.sh so both architectures can be present at once, and so bin-Ubuntu-<dist>-arm64 resolves to the right one. amd64 images keep their existing names.
Changelog-None
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
73/100 · AdequateMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context
Every pinned .deb in repro-build.sh is _amd64, so sha256sum -c fails outright on an arm64 builder.
Add tools/repro-build.arm64.sh: the same script with the same packages at the same upstream versions, built for arm64. Keeping it separate leaves the amd64 path isolated, so work on one architecture cannot disturb the other.
Pass VERSION to the install step as well as the build step. The Makefile falls back to git describe, which inside the builder reports the commit that was checked out rather than the release tag, so without this --force-version names the tarball but leaves the binaries stamped with the branch version.
Pick the script from the image's own architecture, so one Dockerfile still serves both. bin-Ubuntu-<dist>-arm64 already resolves to cl-repro-<dist>-arm64.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Lower-prioritycln-rpc: build the getinfo example where the Makefile expects itby Níckolas Goline · f924725c · Oct 6, 2026 · 1 fileMessage 73 · AdequateTriage 0Details
Commit message · Níckolas Goline
cln-rpc: build the getinfo example where the Makefile expects it
cln-rpc/Makefile names the example target/$(RUST_PROFILE)/..., while plugins/Makefile lists the same file under $(RUST_TARGET_DIR) in DEFAULT_TARGETS. The two only agree when TARGET is unset: with a cross TARGET, cargo writes to target/<triple>/<profile>/, and make stops with "No rule to make target 'target/<triple>/release/examples/cln-rpc-getinfo'".
Use $(RUST_TARGET_DIR) like the other Rust targets.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
73/100 · AdequateMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context
armv7 cannot build natively like arm64: cln-grpc's build script takes protoc from protoc-bin-vendored, which ships no armv7 binary, so the build panics there.
Add tools/repro-build.armv7.sh, which cross-compiles instead. It runs in the amd64 cl-repro-<dist> image, adds armhf from ports.ubuntu.com (same release pocket, updates and security still disabled), and pins the arm-linux-gnueabihf toolchain and armhf libraries the same way the other scripts pin theirs. The Rust plugins build for armv7-unknown-linux-gnueabihf.
The build runs a few armv7 programs (configure tests, tools/headerversions), so the host needs qemu-arm registered with binfmt_misc.
bin-Ubuntu-<dist>-armv7 runs the amd64 image with REPRO_ARCH=armv7, and the tarball lands in release-armv7/.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
83/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Mentions testing or verification✓ Names security-relevant behavior explicitly
Why it was queued
access control
AI analysis · Informational 14/100
This commit adds a new build script and updates Dockerfiles so that Core Lightning release tarballs can be produced for 32-bit ARM (armv7) devices. It is purely a build-system/infrastructure change for cross-compilation and does not alter any wallet, networking, or cryptographic code. There is no indication it fixes or introduces a security vulnerability.
AI review queuedtools: add sign-release-arm.shby Níckolas Goline · 224130eb · Oct 6, 2026 · 1 fileMessage 68 · AdequateInformational 15Details
Commit message · Níckolas Goline
tools: add sign-release-arm.sh
build-release.sh's sign target cannot be used for the ARM tarballs: it hardcodes `cd release/` rather than honouring RELEASEDIR, and globs the zip, so running it for an ARM build would rewrite the amd64 manifest.
Checksum one architecture's tarballs, from release-arm64/ or release-armv7/, into SHA256SUMS-<version>-<arch> and sign it. arm64 and armv7 keep separate manifests: arm64 builds natively and armv7 is cross-compiled, so they are reproduced and co-signed separately.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
68/100 · AdequateMessage clarity
✓ Descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context
Why it was queued
signing or wallet pathsecond-pass: security-sensitive path
AI analysis · Informational 15/100
This commit adds a new helper script used by Core Lightning release engineers to create and sign checksum files for ARM release tarballs. It does not change any wallet, network, or node code, and there is no indication it fixes or introduces a security vulnerability. It is purely a release tooling addition.
Lower-priorityCI: build and sign arm64 and armv7 release binariesby Níckolas Goline · 7b2bafe1 · Oct 6, 2026 · 3 filesMessage 85 · StrongTriage 0Details
Commit message · Níckolas Goline
CI: build and sign arm64 and armv7 release binaries
Add arm64 and armv7 targets for every Ubuntu release to the release build. arm64 builds natively on GitHub's ubuntu-24.04-arm runners; armv7 cross-compiles on the amd64 runners, with qemu registered for the few armv7 programs the build runs.
The arm64 and armv7 tarballs go into their own artifacts, are checksummed and signed per architecture with tools/sign-release-arm.sh, and are attached to the draft release with SHA256SUMS-<version>-arm64 and SHA256SUMS-<version>-armv7 and their .asc files, next to the amd64 manifest.
Document how to reproduce the ARM builds.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
85/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Uses a recognizable type or scope✓ Provides detailed explanatory context
Why it was queued
documentation-only discount
Security candidateCI: never replace files already on the releaseby Níckolas Goline · f918c23f · Oct 6, 2026 · 3 filesMessage 97 · StrongModerate 60Details
Commit message · Níckolas Goline
CI: never replace files already on the release
The release job uploaded release/* with action-gh-release, which replaces any asset of the same name. Re-running it after the release captains had added their signatures to SHA256SUMS-<version>.asc replaced that file with one carrying only the CI signature, so users verifying the release found the maintainers' signatures gone.
Upload with tools/publish-release-assets.sh instead:
- files the release does not have yet are uploaded; - files it already has must be identical, otherwise the job stops before touching anything (the builds disagree, and nothing should be signed); - an .asc it already has gets our signature appended, after normalising the armor so gpg reads every block; one that already carries our signature is left alone, so re-runs are harmless.
The draft release is created with gh when it does not exist yet, with the same title and pre-release flag as before.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
97/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Uses a recognizable type or scope✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Explains rationale or failure mode✓ Names security-relevant behavior explicitly
Why it was queued
signing boundary
AI analysis · Moderate 60/100
This commit fixes a release-pipeline bug where re-running the automated release job could accidentally wipe out human maintainers' cryptographic signatures from the release's checksum file. Before the fix, the CI tool replaced any existing file with the same name, so if release captains had already added their GPG signatures to SHA256SUMS-<version>.asc, a re-run would overwrite it with a version signed only by the CI bot. Users who later checked the signatures would see only one signature and could not verify that multiple maintainers had approved the release. The fix introduces a new script that only adds missing files, refuses to change files that differ, and appends the CI signature to existing signature files instead of replacing them.
AI review queuedchanneld: bound HTLC additions by our own splice-out amountby jaonoctus · 0b41f819 · Oct 5, 2026 · 1 fileMessage 73 · AdequateModerate 66Details
Commit message · jaonoctus
channeld: bound HTLC additions by our own splice-out amount
While a splice is inflight, every HTLC has to fit on the commitment for each funding candidate, so get_room_above_reserve() charges each side's lowest splice change (lowest_splice_amnt) against its balance. But update_view_from_inflights() set our side's bound from the inflight's new funding total, which is positive, so it stayed at zero and our splice-out was never charged.
We then admitted HTLCs that fit only the pre-splice commitment. Building the post-splice commitment took our balance negative, channel_txs() returned NULL, and channeld dereferenced it and crashed, then did the same on every reconnect:
during the splice, payments were forwarded out through the channel cumulatively they exceeded our post-splice balance (invalid on the post-splice commitment) ... channeld crashed building the post-splice commitment: our balance went negative, the commitment build returned nothing, and channeld dereferenced it every reconnect rebuilds the same commitment, so it loops
Use the inflight's signed local change for our bound, as the remote side already does. Also fix the REMOTE-view assignments, which compared against one side's bound and wrote the other's.
Reported-by: Ken Sedgwick <ken@bonsai.com> Changelog-Fixed: channeld: no longer crash-loops when an HTLC that only the pre-splice commitment can carry is added during a splice-out. Co-Authored-By: Ken Sedgwick <ken@bonsai.com>
(cherry picked from commit 733c42e823bb204e6d91cca4f0450158842404e3)
73/100 · AdequateMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context
Why it was queued
second-pass: broader security terminology
AI analysis · Moderate 66/100
This fix repairs a bug in Core Lightning's channel daemon that could crash and permanently loop-crash a node during a specific kind of Bitcoin channel upgrade called a 'splice-out.' While the splice was in progress, the program failed to subtract the node's outgoing splice amount when checking whether new forwarded payments would fit in the updated channel. It therefore allowed payments that were valid only for the old channel state. When it later tried to build the post-splice commitment transaction, the node's balance went negative, the builder returned nothing, and the daemon dereferenced that null pointer and crashed. On every reconnect it rebuilt the same bad commitment, so the node would crash again in a loop. The patch corrects the accounting so the splice-out amount is properly charged against the balance, and also fixes a related indexing mistake that mixed up local and remote views.
AI review queuedchanneld: fail the channel instead of crashing if we can't build a commitmentby jaonoctus · 77e1f180 · Oct 5, 2026 · 1 fileMessage 85 · StrongModerate 60Details
Commit message · jaonoctus
channeld: fail the channel instead of crashing if we can't build a commitment
channel_txs() returns NULL when it can't build a commitment, for example when a splice amount would take one side's balance below zero:
channel_txs fails to amount_msat_add_sat_s64 ... LOCAL (side_pay + splice_amnt)
Neither send_commit_part() nor handle_peer_commit_sig() checked for that, so channeld dereferenced NULL and crashed. Since every reconnect rebuilds the same commitment, it then crashed again on each one, leaving the channel stuck in a crash loop that only a unilateral close would end.
There's no way to continue on a commitment we can't build, so fail the channel and say why. The next commit stops the case we know about reaching here at all.
Changelog-None
Co-Authored-By: Ken Sedgwick <ken@bonsai.com>
(cherry picked from commit 2594edab350be11c68459e546921e6c0d1d07739)
85/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Explains rationale or failure mode
Why it was queued
second-pass: broader security terminology
AI analysis · Moderate 60/100
This update fixes a bug where a part of the Core Lightning node (channeld) would crash and enter an endless crash loop if it couldn't build a commitment transaction, for example due to a splice that would push one side's balance below zero. The fix makes the node fail the channel gracefully instead of crashing. A malicious or buggy peer could potentially trigger this crash repeatedly on reconnection, causing denial of service for that channel.
Lower-prioritylightningd: return after failing the channel on a missing inflightby Níckolas Goline · d53b4d3b · Oct 5, 2026 · 1 fileMessage 83 · StrongTriage 0Details
Commit message · Níckolas Goline
lightningd: return after failing the channel on a missing inflight
handle_peer_splice_locked(), handle_splice_confirmed_signed(), handle_splice_sending_sigs() and handle_update_inflight() call channel_internal_error() when they can't find the inflight for a txid, for example:
Unable to load inflight for locked_txid ...
channel_internal_error() fails the channel and returns, but they carried on and dereferenced the NULL inflight, crashing lightningd instead of just failing that channel. handle_update_inflight() likewise carried on after "Must set last_tx and last_sig together", storing a half-set pair.
Return after each of them. There's no test: reaching these needs channeld to name an inflight lightningd doesn't have.
Changelog-Fixed: lightningd: a splice message for an inflight we don't know about now fails that channel instead of crashing the node.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
(cherry picked from commit 973a108622d5d33e2f159d20ff5db50157ab6fe0)
83/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Mentions testing or verification
Security candidatelightningd: use a splice's HTLC sigs once we move onto its commitmentby jaonoctus · a34027c2 · Oct 5, 2026 · 6 filesMessage 85 · StrongModerate 68Details
Commit message · jaonoctus
lightningd: use a splice's HTLC sigs once we move onto its commitment
update_channel_from_inflight() moves channel->last_tx onto a splice's commitment, both when the splice locks and when we adopt a splice which confirmed before splice_locked because its output got spent. But channel->last_htlc_sigs stayed the peer's signatures for the pre-splice commitment until the next commitment update, or a restart, replaced them.
If that commitment is the one we close with first, onchaind gets signatures which can't spend its HTLC outputs, so our HTLC-timeout transactions are invalid and we can't get those HTLCs back. That's the case in a report of a lost balance after a close on an unlocked splice:
the close broadcasts our inflight commitment (it spends the splice funding output, because the splice had confirmed but never locked in) lightningd still treats the pre-splice output as the channel funding, so onchaind is started with the pre-splice funding, balance, and commitment
The sigs go with the commitment, so switch them in the same place: wallet_htlcsigs_confirm_inflight() now returns the sigs it makes current, and update_channel_from_inflight() calls it for a splice instead of handle_peer_splice_locked() doing so on the side.
Reported-by: Ken Sedgwick <ken@bonsai.com> Changelog-Fixed: splicing: closing with a splice's commitment before any later commitment update can now time out or claim the HTLCs on it. Co-Authored-By: Ken Sedgwick <ken@bonsai.com>
(cherry picked from commit 275086a9b8eb36abe0dbb7499d7e5425a77e32ed)
85/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Explains rationale or failure mode
Why it was queued
signing boundarysigning or wallet path
AI analysis · Moderate 68/100
This fix repairs a bug in Core Lightning's splicing feature. When a channel was moved onto a new 'splice' commitment transaction, the old HTLC (multi-hop payment) signatures were still being used. If the channel later closed using that new splice commitment, the stored signatures could not actually spend the HTLC outputs, meaning the node could lose money it was owed. The patch makes sure the correct HTLC signatures are kept and used whenever the channel switches to a splice commitment.
Security candidatechanneld: tell lightningd the HTLC sigs for a splice's first commitmentby jaonoctus · 61ab88e5 · Oct 5, 2026 · 5 filesMessage 78 · AdequateModerate 64Details
Commit message · jaonoctus
channeld: tell lightningd the HTLC sigs for a splice's first commitment
Every commitment the peer signs comes with its signatures for our HTLC transactions, and lightningd stores them so onchaind can spend the HTLC outputs if we close with that commitment. For a splice, got_commitsig stores them for each inflight on every later commitment update, but the inflight's first commitment, signed during the splice negotiation itself, goes to lightningd in channeld_update_inflight, which only carried the commitment and its signature. So any HTLC already pending when the splice was negotiated had no signature stored for the splice's commitment.
That matters once the channel moves onto that commitment: after splice_locked, wallet_htlcsigs_confirm_inflight() promotes the inflight's stored sigs, which then lack those HTLCs, and the same goes for a close on a splice which confirmed before splice_locked.
Add them to channeld_update_inflight, sent whenever it carries a new commitment, and have lightningd replace that inflight's stored sigs with them. channeld_update_inflight could be resent with the commitment lightningd already had when the user signs the splice; that now sends no commitment, so it can't replace those sigs with nothing.
Changelog-None
Co-Authored-By: Ken Sedgwick <ken@bonsai.com>
(cherry picked from commit ebf69a8e6ba29560584060304bfe4a1e2b75dd52)
78/100 · AdequateMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Names security-relevant behavior explicitly
Why it was queued
signing boundarysigning or wallet path
AI analysis · Moderate 64/100
This patch fixes a bug in Core Lightning's channel splicing feature. When a Bitcoin Lightning channel is being spliced (a fancy way of resizing the channel while it stays open), the software was forgetting to save the peer's signatures for any pending HTLC payments on the very first version of the new commitment transaction. If the channel later closed using that commitment, the node might not be able to claim its funds from those pending payments on the blockchain, potentially leading to loss of money. The fix makes sure those signatures are passed along and stored in the wallet database.
AI review queuedlightningd: conceal secret config values in listconfigsby Andezion · ef48dcd2 · Oct 5, 2026 · 5 filesMessage 73 · AdequateModerate 65Details
Commit message · Andezion
lightningd: conceal secret config values in listconfigs
Changelog-Changed: JSON-RPC: `listconfigs` shows `...` instead of the value of `wallet`, `recover`, `tor-service-password`, `bitcoin-rpcpassword` and the old `bookkeeper-db`, for every caller; unset ones are omitted. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
(cherry picked from commit 6ed212e4856bce2b3392bac1d2fe2df90f3edfde)
73/100 · AdequateMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context
Why it was queued
second-pass: broader security terminology
AI analysis · Moderate 65/100
This commit changes Core Lightning's `listconfigs` RPC command so that several secret or sensitive configuration values are hidden and shown as '...' instead of their real content. Previously, anyone who could call `listconfigs` could see values like the Bitcoin RPC password, wallet database connection string, recovery seed, Tor service password, and old bookkeeper database details. The commit also fixes a bug where concealed options were still being shown when they were not actually set. This is a security hardening change that reduces the risk of leaking credentials to unauthorized callers.
Lower-priorityrunes: record valid runes missing from the db on first useby Andezion · 25b7d06b · Oct 5, 2026 · 3 filesMessage 73 · AdequateTriage 0Details
Commit message · Andezion
runes: record valid runes missing from the db on first use
Changelog-Fixed: lightningd: a valid rune missing from the database (e.g. after restoring an older backup) is recorded on first use, so its `per` and `rate` limits apply and its id isn't reused. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
(cherry picked from commit a04ed5199856e7f0267ed13b69a1d242b1a151c9)
73/100 · AdequateMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context
Lower-priorityrunes: only unrestricted runes may create new runesby Andezion · 36f9bfa9 · Oct 5, 2026 · 3 filesMessage 78 · AdequateTriage 0Details
Commit message · Andezion
runes: only unrestricted runes may create new runes
Changelog-Security: runes: a rune with restrictions can no longer create a new rune without them. Changelog-Changed: JSON-RPC: `createrune` without a `rune` needs a rune without restrictions when called through a rune; any rune can still add restrictions to a rune it supplies. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
(cherry picked from commit 210b18a2a709d967e2e7d4fe218dd8779606eeb3)
78/100 · AdequateMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Names security-relevant behavior explicitly
Lower-priorityrunes: only unrestricted runes may relist blacklisted runesby Andezion · a4c72107 · Oct 5, 2026 · 3 filesMessage 78 · AdequateTriage 0Details
Commit message · Andezion
runes: only unrestricted runes may relist blacklisted runes
Changelog-Security: runes: a rune with restrictions can no longer relist blacklisted runes. Changelog-Changed: JSON-RPC: `blacklistrune` with `relist` needs a rune without restrictions when called through a rune, and refuses an `end` before `start`. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
(cherry picked from commit e81bc3695382149cfd03806dbf471b8ab034dc69)
78/100 · AdequateMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Names security-relevant behavior explicitly
lightningd: fix use-after-free of checkrune param cache keys
Changelog-Fixed: lightningd: `checkrune` no longer uses freed memory when a rune has several restrictions on the same parameter. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
(cherry picked from commit bbd8855b3ef5cf21519a28b6671a6926c4cf0b41)
73/100 · AdequateMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context
Lower-priorityrunes: treat invokerune/destroyrune as their real commands in checkruneby Andezion · 61cee0ee · Oct 5, 2026 · 5 filesMessage 78 · AdequateTriage 0Details
Commit message · Andezion
runes: treat invokerune/destroyrune as their real commands in checkrune
Changelog-Security: 'checkrune': 'method/createrune' and 'method/blacklistrune' restrictions can no longer be bypassed with the 'invokerune'/'destroyrune' aliases Changelog-Deprecated: JSON-RPC: 'invokerune' and 'destroyrune' (use 'createrune' and 'blacklistrune') Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
(cherry picked from commit 3f227cad487b093c5d6124af7be49a3919158370)
78/100 · AdequateMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Names security-relevant behavior explicitly
Security candidatecontrib: add jaonoctus's public keyby jaonoctus · 9ba88c5d · Oct 5, 2026 · 1 fileMessage 73 · AdequateInformational 15Details
Commit message · jaonoctus
contrib: add jaonoctus's public key
Commit 41278b4ef ("contrib: add jaonoctus's signing key") added jaonoctus's fingerprint to the "Signatures For Releases" table in SECURITY.md and the security-policy doc, but did not add the armored public key under contrib/keys/ as was done for the other signers.
Add it, so release signatures can be verified against the key shipped in the tree. The primary key fingerprint is 7B69 6A61 6F73 1337 520B 8A19 D8F3 1505 B581 D617, matching the table entry.
✓ Descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Names security-relevant behavior explicitly
Why it was queued
signing boundarydocumentation-only discount
AI analysis · Informational 15/100
This commit simply adds a public PGP key file for a release signer named jaonoctus. It is a housekeeping change to make the key available in the repository so people can verify release signatures. There is no code change, no vulnerability, and no security risk.
Lower-prioritytests: ordinary messages must not count against the gossip CPU budgetby Níckolas Goline · 9c617d73 · Oct 5, 2026 · 1 fileMessage 83 · StrongTriage 0Details
Commit message · Níckolas Goline
tests: ordinary messages must not count against the gossip CPU budget
The CPU throttle charges every message connectd handles locally: pings, pongs, onion messages, custom messages and gossip forwarded to gossipd, not only the gossip queries it exists to bound. The per-peer share is the budget divided by the number of connected peers, so on a busy node ordinary traffic exhausts it and we stop reading from the peer.
Changelog-None
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
83/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Mentions testing or verification
Lower-priorityconnectd: only charge gossip queries against the CPU budgetby Níckolas Goline · 019a5e19 · Oct 5, 2026 · 2 filesMessage 73 · AdequateTriage 0Details
Commit message · Níckolas Goline
connectd: only charge gossip queries against the CPU budget
The CPU throttle charged every message connectd handles itself against a budget split evenly across all connected peers, and on the way out it charged every check for pending query replies, which runs each time the output queue drains. On a node with many peers each share is tiny, so ordinary traffic (gossip, pings, onion messages) used it up and we stopped reading from the peer for a second or more, delaying its channel messages too, with an UNUSUAL "Throttling ... peer ...: too much CPU".
Charge only the gossip queries the throttle exists to bound: reading them, and answering them while one is pending. Onion messages have their own ratelimit. Keep the even split, with no minimum share: a minimum would let enough peers claim more than the whole budget between them, and a small share now only slows that peer's queries. Log throttling at debug: a peer hitting its budget is what it's for.
Changelog-Fixed: connectd: ordinary gossip, pings and onion messages no longer count against the gossip query CPU budget, so busy nodes no longer throttle their peers. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
73/100 · AdequateMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context
--dev-throttle-gossip shrinks the traffic limits along with the CPU budget, so a test can't tell which one throttled a peer. This sets only the total CPU budget for answering gossip queries (in usec per second), leaving the traffic limits alone.
Changelog-None
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
78/100 · AdequateMessage clarity
✓ Descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Mentions testing or verification
Lower-prioritychanneld: fail the channel if asked to resend a commitment they revoked pastby Níckolas Goline · 31299df9 · Oct 2, 2026 · 1 fileMessage 73 · AdequateTriage 0Details
Commit message · Níckolas Goline
channeld: fail the channel if asked to resend a commitment they revoked past
On reestablish, a peer asking for our last commitment_signed again was always given it, even when it had already sent the revoke_and_ack that proves it received it. By then remote_per_commit has moved on to the next commitment's point, so we signed that commitment number a second time with the wrong per-commitment point, and only noticed afterwards:
Retransmitted commitment_signed 1 but they already send revocation 1?
Fail the channel instead, like any other bad next_commitment_number. Splice resumption (next_funding) is unaffected: it legitimately asks for that commitment after the revocation, and signs it with old_remote_per_commit.
Changelog-Fixed: channeld: a peer's `channel_reestablish` asking for a commitment it has already acknowledged now fails the channel instead of getting it re-signed. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
(cherry picked from commit 516272a16b79746dbfaf49bcbe54ec239cdb462e)
73/100 · AdequateMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context
Lower-prioritylightningd: fail HTLCs whose onion we couldn't parse as malformedby Níckolas Goline · 040a8fdb · Oct 2, 2026 · 1 fileMessage 73 · AdequateTriage 0Details
Commit message · Níckolas Goline
lightningd: fail HTLCs whose onion we couldn't parse as malformed
When an incoming onion doesn't parse we have no shared secret, and the HTLC can only be failed with update_fail_malformed_htlc. That's what happened when the parse failure was the reason, but an HTLC rejected first for another reason (dust exposure, the channel shutting down, or a blinded path turning every error into invalid_onion_blinding) took the onion-wrapped path, which needs the secret, and lightningd crashed. As the reject is replayed on restart, it crashed again on every start.
Send malformed whenever there is no shared secret: with the parse failure code, or invalid_onion_blinding if the HTLC has a path_key.
Changelog-Fixed: lightningd: an incoming HTLC whose onion can't be parsed is now always failed as malformed, instead of crashing the node in some cases. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
(cherry picked from commit d721a801312a376e34d5da5d7a5e516aed901f6e)
73/100 · AdequateMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context
common: ignore proof-only fields when checking omitted markers
find_included_marker_predecessor treated every non-signature field as an invoice TLV. next_marker() of the signature range is 1000000000, so a proof whose only omitted marker was 1000000000 passed with no type-239 field. Skip 1001..999999999, same as next_field_check.
78/100 · AdequateMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Names security-relevant behavior explicitly
Why it was queued
signing boundary
AI analysis · Moderate 60/100
This commit fixes a validation bug in Core Lightning's handling of BOLT12 payer proofs. A payer proof is a cryptographic receipt that helps verify a payment. The bug allowed a malformed proof—one missing a required type-239 field—to be accepted as valid if it only contained a special 'omitted marker' value of 1,000,000,000. This happened because the code mistakenly treated certain proof-only fields as if they were regular invoice fields when checking whether a marker was legitimate. The fix makes the validator ignore those proof-only fields during that check, matching what another part of the code already did. A new test confirms the invalid proof is now rejected.