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Core Lightning

Modular C implementation of the Lightning Network protocol and node stack.

BitcoinLightning NetworkActive incident
Repository coverage

2330 commits in the local evidence base

Every captured commit receives deterministic security triage and a separate communication-quality score. Security candidates and broader second-pass signals receive full-patch Ollama analysis.

228security candidates319second-pass queue1977AI analyses
99commits · 30 days
229commits · 60 days
709commits · 180 days
1578commits · 365 days
Backfill bands
Aug 5 → Feb 61049 seen37 candidatesComplete
Feb 6 → Jun 6579 seen10 candidatesComplete
Jun 6 → Jul 678 seen1 candidatesComplete
Jul 6 → Aug 5147 seen16 candidatesComplete
Commit communication

Does the history explain itself?

Message quality measures whether a commit identifies its scope, purpose, rationale, testing, and supporting references. It does not change the security-severity score.

71/100 average clarity
628Strong · 80–100
1399Adequate · 60–79
272Thin · 40–59
31Opaque · 0–39
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Developer activity

Who is changing the project?

Public Git author strings; identities are not independently verified.

DeveloperCommitsCandidatesAnalyzedHigh riskMessage avg.
cdecker331217581
daywalker9019315113471
Níckolas Goline961252376
Amperstrand322278
Rusty Russell96977961173
Sangbida Chaudhuri18537157167
Vincenzo Palazzo19714185
Lagrang3115679170
dovgopoly18016165
Dusty Daemon821378066
ShahanaFarooqui931093063
Peter Neuroth1469110074
Analysis record

Published AI watches

Last scanned 10 minutes ago

Informational 15 AI analysisMessage 85 · Strong
EP Elements ProjectCore Lightning BitcoinLightning Network

doc: bring lightning-downgrade's version list up to v26.12.

This commit only updates documentation. It adds new version entries to the manual page for the lightning-downgrade tool and mentions the tool in the upgrade guide. No code, database logic, or security behavior is changed.

2e7a9f5aby Ken Sedgwick+9−12 files
No security note in commit
Informational 23 AI analysisMessage 66 · Adequate
EP Elements ProjectCore Lightning BitcoinLightning Network

Makefile: install lightning-downgrade.

This is a packaging/build fix, not a security vulnerability. The `lightning-downgrade` utility was being compiled but accidentally left out of the list of programs installed by `make install`. As a result, official release archives contain…

06ea9ba0by Ken Sedgwick+1−01 file
No security note in commit
Low 27 AI analysisMessage 83 · Strong
EP Elements ProjectCore Lightning BitcoinLightning Network

wallet: create bwatch tables before backfilling them

This commit fixes a database upgrade bug in Core Lightning. Wallets created with version v26.06.10 were missing two new tables (our_outputs and our_txs) because they skipped the migrations that create them. When users later upgraded, a fol…

Database migration failure could prevent node startup after upgradeFixes missing table creation before data backfillAdds regression test for upgrade path from v26.06.10
ce2a6836by daywalker90+105−02 files
No security note in commit
Informational 15 AI analysisMessage 5 · Opaque
EP Elements ProjectCore Lightning BitcoinLightning Network

v26.12rc1

This commit is a routine version bump from v26.06.10 to v26.12rc1 for Core Lightning. It only updates version strings in packaging files, a changelog, and a lockfile. There are no code changes that introduce, fix, or modify any security-se…

4002c4e9by Níckolas Goline+164−1110 files
No security note in commit
Low 30 AI analysisMessage 68 · Adequate
EP Elements ProjectCore Lightning BitcoinLightning Network

wallet: store payment failure details per groupid

This commit fixes a database bug in Core Lightning where failure details for a payment attempt were being overwritten by later retry attempts that shared the same payment identifier fragment. The fix makes the failure record match on an ad…

Data integrity bug causing incorrect error reporting across payment retry groupsNo memory safety, authentication, authorization, or cryptographic issues presentNo external input is trusted or validated differently
24082c6dby daywalker90+6−34 files
No security note in commit
Low 43 AI analysisMessage 83 · Strong
EP Elements ProjectCore Lightning BitcoinLightning Network

cln-plugin: do not panic when the log writer task is gone

This commit fixes a bug in Core Lightning's Rust plugin library where a plugin could crash with a panic if it tried to log a message after the internal log-writing task had already stopped, such as during shutdown. The fix makes the plugin…

panic on send failure replaced with stderr fallbacklog message no longer silently dropped on writer task exitunit test added for dropped-receiver scenario
8661ffabby cdecker+29−11 file
No security note in commit
Informational 15 AI analysisMessage 90 · Strong
EP Elements ProjectCore Lightning BitcoinLightning Network

docs: explain hsmtool HTLC recovery

This commit only adds documentation to the manual page for an existing command-line tool (hsmtool). It explains how to recover funds from old Lightning payment commitments (HTLCs) after losing channel state. There are no code changes, no n…

f90c140dby Sangbida Chaudhuri+85−01 file
No security note in commit
Informational 15 AI analysisMessage 68 · Adequate
EP Elements ProjectCore Lightning BitcoinLightning Network

tests: make test_delpay_works deterministic

This commit only changes a test file to make a flaky test more reliable. It does not modify any production code, so it has no security impact on real users.

a224ca81by daywalker90+16−161 file
No security note in commit
Informational 20 AI analysisMessage 73 · Adequate
EP Elements ProjectCore Lightning BitcoinLightning Network

doc: say that listtransactions gives blockheight 0 for a tx not in a block

This commit only updates documentation to explain that the `listtransactions` command reports a block height and transaction index of 0 when a transaction is not currently in a block (for example, because it hasn't been mined yet or was re…

bc281be3by Peter Neuroth+4−42 files
No security note in commit
Informational 20 AI analysisMessage 50 · Thin
EP Elements ProjectCore Lightning BitcoinLightning Network

fixup! pyln-client: don't crash Millisatoshi.to_approx_str() on zero

This is a small bug fix in a Python helper library used by Core Lightning. The Millisatoshi.to_approx_str() method previously crashed with a math error when converting a zero amount to a human-readable string. The patch makes zero return "…

No security-relevant signals presentFix is a routine correctness/robustness improvement
02612ed5by Amartya Singh+4−31 file
No security note in commit
Moderate 62 AI analysisMessage 73 · Adequate
EP Elements ProjectCore Lightning BitcoinLightning Network

wallet: reject unmodifiable PSBTs in addpsbtoutput/addpsbtinput

This update fixes a crash in two wallet commands, addpsbtoutput and addpsbtinput. These commands let users add extra transaction outputs or inputs to a PSBT (a Bitcoin transaction planning file). If a user supplied a PSBT whose version 2 '…

Daemon crash (assertion failure) on crafted/strict PSBT inputMissing validation of PSBT v2 modifiable flags before mutationUser-controlled input directly passed to libwally without precondition check
42472816by daywalker90+14−12 files
Vendor flagged security relevance
Moderate 59 AI analysisMessage 83 · Strong
EP Elements ProjectCore Lightning BitcoinLightning Network

tests: show addpsbtoutput/addpsbtinput crash on an unmodifiable v2 PSBT

This commit only adds a new test case that demonstrates two Core Lightning commands, addpsbtoutput and addpsbtinput, crash with an internal assertion when given a v2 PSBT that does not allow adding inputs or outputs. The test is marked as …

Daemon abort due to failed assertion in PSBT helper functionsRPC commands addpsbtoutput and addpsbtinput lack validation of PSBT modifiability flags before calling libwallyPotential denial-of-service vector: any caller able to submit a crafted v2 PSBT can crash lightningd
42e268abby daywalker90+60−01 file
No security note in commit
Informational 20 AI analysisMessage 73 · Adequate
EP Elements ProjectCore Lightning BitcoinLightning Network

pyln-client: don't crash Millisatoshi.to_approx_str() on zero

This commit fixes a minor bug in Core Lightning's Python client library where calling a pretty-printing method on a zero-amount payment would crash with a ValueError. It is a routine correctness fix, not a security vulnerability. There is …

5ebe365dby Amartya Singh+3−12 files
No security note in commit
Moderate 59 AI analysisMessage 83 · Strong
EP Elements ProjectCore Lightning BitcoinLightning Network

dualopen and splicing: add minimal verification of tx_signatures

This commit adds missing safety checks in Core Lightning when a peer sends signatures for opening or splicing a dual-funded Lightning channel. Before the patch, the software accepted peer-provided transaction witnesses without verifying th…

Missing input validation on peer-provided witness dataBOLT-2 compliance fix for tx_signaturesRejection of empty witness stacks
c6be4f71by Lagrang3+633−97 files
Vendor flagged security relevance
Moderate 54 AI analysisMessage 85 · Strong
EP Elements ProjectCore Lightning BitcoinLightning Network

channeld: abort_channels no longer fails a channel with a signed splice

This fix prevents a user-issued 'abort channels' command from incorrectly failing a Lightning channel when a splice transaction has already been signed. Previously, the code would pass the latest in-flight splice to a routine that aborts i…

Denial-of-service/availability impact: user-initiated abort could inadvertently fail a funded channelProtocol compliance fix: avoids sending tx_abort after tx_signatures, which BOLT 2 forbidsState-handling bug in splice negotiation lifecycle
c87f5573by Andezion+22−11 file
No security note in commit
Moderate 51 AI analysisMessage 73 · Adequate
EP Elements ProjectCore Lightning BitcoinLightning Network

lightningd: fix crash on mutual close of an unconfirmed dual-funded channel

This update fixes a bug where a specific type of Lightning channel close could crash the node. It only happens when both parties cooperatively close a dual-funded channel that has not yet been confirmed and has gone through a funding bump …

NULL pointer dereference leading to daemon crash (denial of service)Crash occurs in cooperative-close path for unconfirmed dual-funded/RBF channelsFix uses canonical channel funding key instead of splice-only field
555143beby Sangbida Chaudhuri+9−31 file
Vendor flagged security relevance
High 74 AI analysisMessage 73 · Adequate
EP Elements ProjectCore Lightning BitcoinLightning Network

cln-grpc: reject malformed request values instead of panicking

This commit fixes a security bug in Core Lightning's gRPC plugin (cln-grpc). Previously, a malformed request from a gRPC client could crash the plugin: bad public keys, hashes, secrets, channel IDs, or enum values triggered Rust 'unwrap()'…

Denial-of-service via malformed gRPC request causing tonic worker task panicDenial-of-service via std::process::exit(1) in ProofField conversion on missing oneofSilent integer truncation of u16/u8 fields via 'as' casts
b2703436by daywalker90+1558−12135 files
Vendor flagged security relevance
Informational 15 AI analysisMessage 51 · Thin
EP Elements ProjectCore Lightning BitcoinLightning Network

nix: drop protobuf again

This commit removes the protobuf package from the Nix build environment because it is no longer needed. A previous change made the cln-grpc component use its own bundled protoc compiler instead of relying on the system one. The Python bind…

a0459eeeby Peter Neuroth+0−11 file
No security note in commit
Informational 15 AI analysisMessage 73 · Adequate
EP Elements ProjectCore Lightning BitcoinLightning Network

make: check gRPC protos for breaking changes against the last release

This commit adds a new automated check to the project's build process that compares gRPC protocol definitions against the last release to catch accidental breaking changes early. It does not change any runtime code, fix a bug, or introduce…

db5fea70by daywalker90+43−84 files
No security note in commit
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Lower-prioritytests: cover htlc_accepted replay during shutdownby Sangbida Chaudhuri · a0c8ab07 · Oct 13, 2026 · 1 fileMessage 70 · AdequateTriage 0Details
Commit message · Sangbida Chaudhuri

tests: cover htlc_accepted replay during shutdown

Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>

70/100 · AdequateMessage clarity
✓ Descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides an explanatory body✓ Mentions testing or verification
Lower-priorityrunes: reject runes longer than 64KiB before decodingby Andezion · b66c0abf · Oct 12, 2026 · 2 filesMessage 65 · AdequateTriage 0Details
Commit message · Andezion

runes: reject runes longer than 64KiB before decoding

Changelog-Fixed: commando and rune RPCs reject oversized runes instead of spending quadratic time decoding them.

65/100 · AdequateMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides an explanatory body
Lower-prioritytests: run the heavy ASan tests one at a timeby daywalker90 · 1a1dc8d7 · Oct 12, 2026 · 5 filesMessage 78 · AdequateTriage 0Details
Commit message · daywalker90

tests: run the heavy ASan tests one at a time

Under ASan a handful of tests each need several GB and some reach
15-20 GB. When they land in the same shard and run together, the
shard is killed by the 16 GB runner. Mark them xdist_group('heavy')
and run the ASan/UBSan job with --dist loadgroup so they share one
worker and never overlap. Other jobs do not use loadgroup, so the
marker has no effect there.

78/100 · AdequateMessage clarity
✓ Descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Mentions testing or verification
Lower-prioritytests: shrink ASan-heavy tests to fit the CI runnerby daywalker90 · 24120fa2 · Oct 12, 2026 · 1 fileMessage 83 · StrongTriage 8Details
Commit message · daywalker90

tests: shrink ASan-heavy tests to fit the CI runner

test_parallel_opens starts about 600 channeld processes at full size.
Under ASan that peaks near 33 GB, more than a 16 GB CI runner has, so
the sanitizer shard is killed. Use 2 pairs x 10 opens when ASAN=1. The
code path is unchanged and the full size still runs everywhere else.

test_funding_cancel_race peaks near 15 GB PSS under ASan with 20 nodes,
close to the 16 GB limit. Use 10 nodes when ASAN=1 (peak about 8 GB).
The race is still exercised against each node.

83/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Mentions testing or verification
Why it was queued
defensive validation
Lower-priorityxpay: add onion budget helpersby Lagrang3 · 7e0cbb25 · Oct 12, 2026 · 6 filesMessage 68 · AdequateTriage 0Details
Commit message · Lagrang3

xpay: add onion budget helpers

Add onion budget and payload constructors to the internal xpay API.
Onion budget computation can be used to know a realistic number of hops
that constraints our payment before calling askrene.

Changelog-None

Signed-off-by: Lagrang3 <lagrang3@protonmail.com>

68/100 · AdequateMessage clarity
✓ Descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context
Lower-prioritylsps-plugin: client skips opening fee params with inverted payment limitsby Peter Neuroth · 73fea3b5 · Oct 11, 2026 · 1 fileMessage 83 · StrongTriage 0Details
Commit message · Peter Neuroth

lsps-plugin: client skips opening fee params with inverted payment limits

bLIP-52 gives `min_payment_size_msat` and `max_payment_size_msat` as
"the limits of the payment size, inclusive". An `opening_fee_params`
entry with min above max allows no payment size at all, so a JIT
channel bought with it can't be paid. The spec has no rule for this
case; skipping such entries is our choice.

When selecting from the `lsps2.get_info` menu, `lsps-jitchannel` now
treats such an entry like an expired one: it is skipped with a warning,
and if no entry is left the call fails before `lsps2.buy`. min equal to
max stays valid.

The selection is moved into `select_opening_fee_params()` so it can be
unit-tested; the expiry rule is unchanged.

Behavior change for the client.

Changelog-Fixed: lsps-plugin: `lsps-jitchannel` no longer selects fee parameters whose `min_payment_size_msat` is above `max_payment_size_msat`, which no payment can satisfy.

83/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Mentions testing or verification
Lower-prioritylsps-types: check the payment size against the params' limits in lsps2.buyby Peter Neuroth · 236f5880 · Oct 11, 2026 · 2 filesMessage 91 · StrongTriage 8Details
Commit message · Peter Neuroth

lsps-types: check the payment size against the params' limits in lsps2.buy

bLIP-52, "2. Request JIT Channel":

The LSP MUST validate that the `payment_size_msat` is within the
previous `min_payment_size_msat` and `max_payment_size_msat`
parameters from the LSP.

The service did not: a `payment_size_msat` outside the limits was
accepted as long as the opening fee was below it. Its tests
`buy_rejects_payment_below_min` and `buy_rejects_payment_above_max`
passed for other reasons (fee above the payment size, and a mock that
fails every buy with an internal error).

`OpeningFeeParams::check_payment_size()`, which `validate()` runs on
`lsps2.buy`, now rejects sizes outside the inclusive limits before
computing the fee. The spec names no error code for this; below the
minimum maps to `payment_size_too_small` (202) and above the maximum to
`payment_size_too_large` (203), as in #8948. The service tests now
check the codes and the limits themselves.

Behavior change for the service only; the client already checked the
limits before calling `lsps2.buy`.

Changelog-Fixed: lsps-plugin: the LSPS2 service now rejects `lsps2.buy` with a `payment_size_msat` outside the offered `min_payment_size_msat`/`max_payment_size_msat`.

91/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Mentions testing or verification✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference
Why it was queued
defensive validation
AI review queuedlsps-types: echo valid_until verbatim and send the LSPS0 datetime formatby Peter Neuroth · 2d187383 · Oct 11, 2026 · 3 filesMessage 85 · StrongLow 35Details
Commit message · Peter Neuroth

lsps-types: echo valid_until verbatim and send the LSPS0 datetime format

bLIP-52, "2. Request JIT Channel":

Clients MUST copy it verbatim from an entry of
`opening_fee_params_menu` from a result of a `lsps2.get_info` call.

bLIP-50, LSPS0.datetime:

Particular points of time in the modern era (a "datetime") MUST be
encoded as a JSON string containing the [ISO 8601][] format
`"YYYY-MM-DDThh:mm:ss.uuuZ"`.
These are always in the UTC timezone.

`DateTime` was serialized by chrono, which writes as many fractional
digits as needed: a spec-conforming "2023-02-23T08:47:30.000Z" from an
LSP came back from the client as "2023-02-23T08:47:30Z", and
"...30.5112Z" as "...30.511200Z". That only worked because the in-tree
service checks its promise against the parsed value; an LSP that
checks the string it sent would reject the client. The service itself
sent whole seconds without the milliseconds.

`DateTime` now keeps the string it was deserialized from and serializes
it back unchanged. A datetime built from a chrono value is truncated to
milliseconds and serialized as `YYYY-MM-DDThh:mm:ss.uuuZ`. Equality,
ordering and hashing still only compare the point in time. Parsing is
unchanged. `DateTime` is no longer `Copy`.

The service builds the `valid_until` it sends from the policy plugin's
value this way and computes the promise over the truncated value, so
the promise still verifies on what the client echoes.

Behavior change: the client echoes `valid_until` exactly as received;
the service sends `valid_until` with millisecond precision in the
LSPS0 format.

Changelog-Fixed: lsps-plugin: the LSPS2 client now copies `opening_fee_params` verbatim (including `valid_until`), and the service sends `valid_until` in the LSPS0 datetime format.

85/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Explains rationale or failure mode
Why it was queued
second-pass: broader security terminology
AI analysis · Low 35/100

This commit fixes a protocol-compatibility bug in Core Lightning's LSPS (Lightning Service Provider Specification) support. When a client received an opening-fee offer from a service provider, it was accidentally changing the exact timestamp text before echoing it back. Some strict providers would then reject the client's reply because the timestamp no longer matched. The fix makes the client preserve the original timestamp text exactly, and makes the service send timestamps in the precise format the spec requires. There is no direct theft-of-funds or remote-code-execution vulnerability here, but the bug could cause legitimate JIT-channel requests to fail.

Lower-prioritylsps-types: reject out-of-range short channel id componentsby Peter Neuroth · ff51f115 · Oct 11, 2026 · 1 fileMessage 73 · AdequateTriage 0Details
Commit message · Peter Neuroth

lsps-types: reject out-of-range short channel id components

bLIP-50, LSPS0.scid:

SCIDs MUST be encoded as a JSON string containing the
"human-readable" format of `BBBxTTTxOOO`, as defined
in [BOLT7 Definition of `short_channel_id`][].

`BBB` is the top 24 bits in decimal text.
`TTT` is the middle 24 bits in decimal text.
`OOO` is the lowest 16 bits in decimal text.

The parser (like cln-rpc's, which the plugin used before) accepted any
u64 per component and OR-ed the shifted values together, so an
out-of-range component silently turned into a different scid:
"1x1x70000" parsed as 1x1x4464, the high bit of 70000 landing in the
txindex. Reject components that don't fit their bit width, and anything
that isn't plain decimal digits (u64's parser also accepts a leading
'+').

Behavior change: a `jit_channel_scid` from an LSP with an out-of-range
component now fails to parse instead of becoming a different scid.

Changelog-Fixed: lsps-plugin: a short channel id with an out-of-range component is now rejected instead of being parsed as a different channel.

73/100 · AdequateMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context
Lower-prioritylsps-plugin: import the protocol types from lsps-typesby Peter Neuroth · c51a54c4 · Oct 11, 2026 · 16 filesMessage 78 · AdequateTriage 0Details
Commit message · Peter Neuroth

lsps-plugin: import the protocol types from lsps-types

Import the shared protocol types directly from lsps-types instead of
through re-exports in the plugin's proto modules, and remove those
re-exports. proto/ now only holds plugin code: the `into_request()`
extension with a random id, and the service-only LSPS2 types.

No functional change.

Changelog-None

78/100 · AdequateMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Names security-relevant behavior explicitly
Security candidatelsps-plugin: use lsps-types for the protocol typesby Peter Neuroth · 8ecf4b62 · Oct 11, 2026 · 12 filesMessage 78 · AdequateInformational 24Details
Commit message · Peter Neuroth

lsps-plugin: use lsps-types for the protocol types

Replace the plugin's copies of the JSON-RPC, LSPS0 and LSPS2 protocol
types and of the opening fee computation with the ones from
lsps-types, so client and service share one implementation. The
plugin's proto modules re-export lsps-types for now; the imports are
switched in the next commit.

Service-only code stays in proto/lsps2.rs: the policy plugin API, the
datastore entry, JIT scid generation, the BOLT4 failure codes and the
HMAC promise. The HMAC check moves out of `OpeningFeeParams::validate`
into `verify_promise()`, which `lsps2.buy` calls before
`OpeningFeeParams::validate()`. The order of the checks and the error
codes are unchanged: bad promise or expired params -> 201, fee overflow
-> 203, fee not below the payment size -> 202.

Other adaptations, no behavior change:
- `into_request()` with a random id becomes an extension trait in the
plugin, so lsps-types does not need `rand` and `hex`.
- `ShortChannelId` is converted via u64 where it meets cln-rpc (the
`htlc_accepted` onion, the client's datastore record).
- `DateTime` is converted with `as_chrono()` where the plugin computes
with chrono values.

The one behavior change from switching is the promise character check
that lsps-types added in "lsps-types: restrict promise to printable
ASCII without JSON escapes".

Changelog-None

78/100 · AdequateMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Names security-relevant behavior explicitly
Why it was queued
memory safetydefensive validation
AI analysis · Informational 24/100

This commit is a code cleanup in Core Lightning's LSPS (Lightning Service Provider Specification) plugin. It removes duplicated protocol type definitions and replaces them with a shared library called lsps-types. The only functional change mentioned is a stricter check on the 'promise' string, limiting it to printable ASCII characters without JSON escape characters. This is a hardening improvement, not an obvious vulnerability fix.

Lower-prioritylsps-types: add serde roundtrip tests for all message typesby Peter Neuroth · 31791a4f · Oct 11, 2026 · 1 fileMessage 83 · StrongTriage 0Details
Commit message · Peter Neuroth

lsps-types: add serde roundtrip tests for all message types

Property tests serialize every LSPS0, LSPS2 and JSON-RPC message type
to JSON and back and check that the value is unchanged. The example
messages from bLIP-52 must parse and serialize back to the same JSON.

Changelog-None

83/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Mentions testing or verification
Security candidatelsps-types: test the opening fee computationby Peter Neuroth · 41df2752 · Oct 11, 2026 · 3 filesMessage 83 · StrongInformational 15Details
Commit message · Peter Neuroth

lsps-types: test the opening fee computation

Unit tests for the rounding boundaries (a product of k*10^6 gives a fee
of k, k*10^6+1 gives k+1), the min_fee_msat floor, and overflow of the
multiplication and of the `+ 999999` addition near u64::MAX. Property
tests compare the function against an independent u128 reference and
check that it is the ceiling of the proportional part.

bLIP-52 has no test vectors for the fee computation.

Adds proptest as a dev-dependency.

Changelog-None

83/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Mentions testing or verification✓ Names security-relevant behavior explicitly
Why it was queued
memory safetyfuzzing or regression evidence
AI analysis · Informational 15/100

This commit only adds unit tests and property-based tests for an existing fee-calculation function. It does not change the function's behavior, fix a bug, or alter any production code paths. There is no security issue introduced or resolved by this change.

Lower-prioritylsps-types: restrict promise to printable ASCII without JSON escapesby Peter Neuroth · 4442befd · Oct 11, 2026 · 1 fileMessage 73 · AdequateTriage 0Details
Commit message · Peter Neuroth

lsps-types: restrict promise to printable ASCII without JSON escapes

bLIP-52, "The LSP, when generating the `promise` field":

* MUST ensure the promise is no longer than 512 bytes (not including
the `"` delimiters) when encoded as a UTF8-encoded JSON string.
* MUST avoid characters outside of the printable ASCII range.
* MUST avoid characters that would require escapes in JSON format.

"Clients, when reading the `promise` field":

* MUST abort this flow if `promise` exceeds 512 bytes (not including
the `"` delimiters) when encoded as a UTF8-encoded JSON string.

`Promise` only checked the length of the decoded string, which is
shorter than the JSON encoding as soon as the string contains anything
that needs an escape. Also reject everything outside 0x20 to 0x7E, and
`"` and `\`. With that character set decoded and encoded length are
equal, so the existing 512-byte check now measures what the spec
measures.

Behavior change, once the plugin uses lsps-types: the in-tree service
only generates hex promises and is not affected. The client rejects an
`lsps2.get_info` result whose menu contains a promise with other
characters, which aborts the flow. The spec puts the character rule on
the LSP only; enforcing it on the client too is our choice, so a
non-conforming LSP fails early instead of producing a promise the
client can't measure correctly.

Changelog-Fixed: lsps-plugin: an LSPS2 `promise` must be printable ASCII without JSON escapes, so its 512-byte limit is measured on the encoded string as bLIP-52 requires.

73/100 · AdequateMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context
Lower-prioritylsps-types: make Promise opaqueby Peter Neuroth · 9e9d5d3d · Oct 11, 2026 · 1 fileMessage 68 · AdequateTriage 0Details
Commit message · Peter Neuroth

lsps-types: make Promise opaque

bLIP-52 says clients "MUST NOT parse or interpret this string, and only
provide it verbatim later". Make the inner string private so a
`Promise` can only be built through `TryFrom`, which enforces the
length limit, and expose it only through `as_str()`. `Display` is
dropped; use `as_str()`.

The validation rule is unchanged (at most 512 bytes).

Changelog-None

68/100 · AdequateMessage clarity
✓ Descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context
Lower-prioritylsps-types: document the opening fee computation against bLIP-52by Peter Neuroth · 64b614bb · Oct 11, 2026 · 1 fileMessage 85 · StrongTriage 0Details
Commit message · Peter Neuroth

lsps-types: document the opening fee computation against bLIP-52

Quote the bLIP-52 rule in the doc comment of `compute_opening_fee` and
explain why it divides by 1000000 although the spec's pseudocode says
10000000: the pseudocode and the "+ 9999999" in the prose are typos
that contradict the spec's own C and Rust reference implementations and
the parts-per-million definition of `proportional`.

Write the computation with `?` instead of the `and_then` chain. Same
arithmetic: checked multiplication and addition, division rounding
down, then the `min_fee_msat` floor.

Changelog-None

85/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Explains rationale or failure mode
Security candidatelsps-types: add LSPS2 messages and opening fee paramsby Peter Neuroth · fee9b0e7 · Oct 11, 2026 · 5 filesMessage 78 · AdequateInformational 15Details
Commit message · Peter Neuroth

lsps-types: add LSPS2 messages and opening fee params

Move the LSPS2 messages, `OpeningFeeParams`, `Promise` and
`compute_opening_fee` from plugins/lsps-plugin/src/proto/lsps2.rs into
lsps-types. Promise and fee computation are unchanged here; they are
reworked in their own commits.

`OpeningFeeParams::validate` in the plugin mixed the LSP's HMAC promise
check with the checks every LSP must do. Only the latter move: the
promise format is the LSP's own business and stays with the service.
`validate(now, payment_size)` keeps the order and error mapping of the
plugin (expired -> 201, fee overflow -> 203, fee >= payment size ->
202) and takes `now` from the caller. The unused `receivable` argument
is dropped. New are `check_limits()` for min <= max payment size,
`is_expired_at()`, `check_payment_size()` and `opening_fee()`.

Also add the `unrecognized_or_stale_token` (200) error code from
bLIP-52, which was missing.

Service-only types (policy plugin API, datastore entry, JIT scid
generation, BOLT4 failure codes) stay in the plugin.

Changelog-None

78/100 · AdequateMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Names security-relevant behavior explicitly
Why it was queued
memory safetydefensive validation
AI analysis · Informational 15/100

This commit is a routine code reorganization for the Core Lightning project. It moves data structures and helper functions related to the LSPS2 (Just-In-Time channel) protocol from one internal plugin file into a shared library module. It also adds validation helpers and one missing error code. There is no indication this fixes or introduces a security vulnerability; it is a structural refactor with tests.

Lower-prioritylsps-types: add JSON-RPC and LSPS0 typesby Peter Neuroth · b5c68215 · Oct 11, 2026 · 5 filesMessage 81 · StrongTriage 0Details
Commit message · Peter Neuroth

lsps-types: add JSON-RPC and LSPS0 types

Move the JSON-RPC 2.0 envelope and the LSPS0 types from
plugins/lsps-plugin/src/proto into lsps-types. The plugin is switched
over in a later commit; until then both copies exist.

Differences to the plugin's copy:
- `JsonRpcRequest::into_request()` is gone: it generated a random id and
pulled in `rand` and `hex`. Callers pass the id to
`into_request_with_id()`.
- `ShortChannelId` is an own type instead of an alias of cln-rpc's (as
in #8948), so the crate does not depend on cln-rpc. Same string format
and bit layout.
- `DateTime` is a newtype over `chrono::DateTime<Utc>` with the same
serde format, so its wire representation can be changed in one place.
- `Msat` gains `checked_add`/`checked_sub`. The unused `from_sat`,
`to_sats_floor` and `Ppm::apply_to` are not carried over.
- The frame decoding error is a plain enum (`FrameError`) without the
never-constructed `InvalidUtf8` variant, so the crate does not need
`thiserror`.

Dependencies: serde, serde_json and chrono (RFC 3339 parsing for
LSPS0.datetime, without default features).

Changelog-None

81/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference✓ Names security-relevant behavior explicitly
AI review queuedlsps-types: add empty crateby Peter Neuroth · e5ca96e3 · Oct 11, 2026 · 9 filesMessage 80 · StrongInformational 15Details
Commit message · Peter Neuroth

lsps-types: add empty crate

Add a new top-level crate `lsps-types` for the LSPS0 and LSPS2 protocol
types and the LSPS2 opening fee computation, so that LSPS clients and
services share one implementation and cannot disagree on amounts.

The crate is wired up like cln-rpc: a workspace member and workspace
dependency versioned in lockstep with cln-rpc, cln-grpc and cln-plugin,
a Makefile included when building with Rust, and a crates.io publish
step. The LSPS plugin binaries list its sources as prerequisites so
they rebuild once the plugin depends on it.

Changelog-None

80/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Explains rationale or failure mode
Why it was queued
second-pass: broader security terminology
AI analysis · Informational 15/100

This commit adds a new, empty Rust code crate called lsps-types to the Core Lightning project. It contains no executable logic, only build and packaging configuration. There is no security issue in this change.

Lower-priorityCI: stream memory usage during Valgrind/ASanby daywalker90 · b69a7471 · Oct 9, 2026 · 1 fileMessage 90 · StrongTriage 0Details
Commit message · daywalker90

CI: stream memory usage during Valgrind/ASan

`if: failure()` does not trigger when the VM gets killed, neither would
`if: always()`. Instead we print used/available memory and the top five
processes by total RSS every 15 seconds during the test step, so the
readings before a kill survive in the job log. Per-process RSS alone was
misleading since many lightningd processes each show small RSS.

Changelog-None

90/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Uses a recognizable type or scope✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Mentions testing or verification
Why it was queued
documentation-only discount
Lower-prioritytests: wait for announcements in test_splice_rbf_htlc_sigsby daywalker90 · 22207863 · Oct 8, 2026 · 1 fileMessage 83 · StrongTriage 0Details
Commit message · daywalker90

tests: wait for announcements in test_splice_rbf_htlc_sigs

The splice changes the channel's short_channel_id. If the test does not
wait for the channel to be announced first, a node can receive a
node_announcement for a peer before the channel_announcement for the new
scid. gossipd then logs "Bad gossip order: node_announcement: unknown
node", and the teardown check fails the test even though its body passes.

Wait for announcements before splicing, as the other splice tests do.

Changelog-None

83/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Mentions testing or verification
Lower-prioritychanneld: reject HTLC amounts exceeding the BOLT #1 ceilingby bhuvan-somisetty · 653dc2be · Oct 8, 2026 · 2 filesMessage 93 · StrongTriage 0Details
Commit message · bhuvan-somisetty

channeld: reject HTLC amounts exceeding the BOLT #1 ceiling

BOLT #1 specifies that milli-satoshi amounts MUST be at most
0x1d24b2dfac520000 (21 million BTC).

channeld represents balances as signed 64-bit integers. When an incoming
update_add_htlc has an amount with bit 63 set (e.g. UINT64_MAX), the balance
subtraction underflows and erroneously increases balance->msat. As a result,
the balance check passes, and channeld later aborts on assertion failure
when attempting to build the commitment transaction.

Enforce the BOLT #1 amount ceiling in add_htlc() so oversized amounts are
safely rejected with CHANNEL_ERR_MAX_HTLC_VALUE_EXCEEDED before any balance
arithmetic.

Changelog-Fixed: channeld: reject HTLC amounts exceeding the BOLT 1 maximum to avoid signed balance underflow and abort.
Fixes: #9576
Signed-off-by: bhuvan-somisetty <somisettybhuvan5@gmail.com>

93/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Explains rationale or failure mode✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference
Lower-priorityCHANGELOG: add the 26.06.9 release entryby Níckolas Goline · fd7ff67b · Oct 7, 2026 · 1 fileMessage 60 · AdequateTriage 0Details
Commit message · Níckolas Goline

CHANGELOG: add the 26.06.9 release entry

Copied from the v26.06.9 tag.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

60/100 · AdequateMessage clarity
✓ Descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides an explanatory body
Why it was queued
documentation-only discount
Lower-priorityrunes: start deprecating invokerune/destroyrune in v26.12by Níckolas Goline · 1c0daed3 · Oct 6, 2026 · 2 filesMessage 73 · AdequateTriage 0Details
Commit message · Níckolas Goline

runes: start deprecating invokerune/destroyrune in v26.12

The deprecation was written for a v26.09 release that is not happening.
Start it with the next major release instead, keeping the same three
releases until removal.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

73/100 · AdequateMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context
Lower-prioritydocs: remove references to IRC and retired c-lightning mailing listby cdecker · 4df4325a · Oct 6, 2026 · 2 filesMessage 85 · StrongTriage 0Details
Commit message · cdecker

docs: remove references to IRC and retired c-lightning mailing list

The c-lightning mailing list is being retired in favor of more
frequently used communication channels (Discord, Telegram).

Changelog-None.

85/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Uses a recognizable type or scope✓ Provides detailed explanatory context
Why it was queued
documentation-only discount