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Core Lightning

Modular C implementation of the Lightning Network protocol and node stack.

BitcoinLightning NetworkActive incident
Repository coverage

2330 commits in the local evidence base

Every captured commit receives deterministic security triage and a separate communication-quality score. Security candidates and broader second-pass signals receive full-patch Ollama analysis.

228security candidates319second-pass queue1977AI analyses
99commits · 30 days
229commits · 60 days
709commits · 180 days
1578commits · 365 days
Backfill bands
Aug 5 → Feb 61049 seen37 candidatesComplete
Feb 6 → Jun 6579 seen10 candidatesComplete
Jun 6 → Jul 678 seen1 candidatesComplete
Jul 6 → Aug 5147 seen16 candidatesComplete
Commit communication

Does the history explain itself?

Message quality measures whether a commit identifies its scope, purpose, rationale, testing, and supporting references. It does not change the security-severity score.

71/100 average clarity
628Strong · 80–100
1399Adequate · 60–79
272Thin · 40–59
31Opaque · 0–39
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Developer activity

Who is changing the project?

Public Git author strings; identities are not independently verified.

DeveloperCommitsCandidatesAnalyzedHigh riskMessage avg.
cdecker331217581
daywalker9019315113471
Níckolas Goline961252376
Amperstrand322278
Rusty Russell96977961173
Sangbida Chaudhuri18537157167
Vincenzo Palazzo19714185
Lagrang3115679170
dovgopoly18016165
Dusty Daemon821378066
ShahanaFarooqui931093063
Peter Neuroth1469110074
Analysis record

Published AI watches

Last scanned 38 minutes ago

Informational 15 AI analysisMessage 85 · Strong
EP Elements ProjectCore Lightning BitcoinLightning Network

doc: bring lightning-downgrade's version list up to v26.12.

This commit only updates documentation. It adds new version entries to the manual page for the lightning-downgrade tool and mentions the tool in the upgrade guide. No code, database logic, or security behavior is changed.

2e7a9f5aby Ken Sedgwick+9−12 files
No security note in commit
Informational 23 AI analysisMessage 66 · Adequate
EP Elements ProjectCore Lightning BitcoinLightning Network

Makefile: install lightning-downgrade.

This is a packaging/build fix, not a security vulnerability. The `lightning-downgrade` utility was being compiled but accidentally left out of the list of programs installed by `make install`. As a result, official release archives contain…

06ea9ba0by Ken Sedgwick+1−01 file
No security note in commit
Low 27 AI analysisMessage 83 · Strong
EP Elements ProjectCore Lightning BitcoinLightning Network

wallet: create bwatch tables before backfilling them

This commit fixes a database upgrade bug in Core Lightning. Wallets created with version v26.06.10 were missing two new tables (our_outputs and our_txs) because they skipped the migrations that create them. When users later upgraded, a fol…

Database migration failure could prevent node startup after upgradeFixes missing table creation before data backfillAdds regression test for upgrade path from v26.06.10
ce2a6836by daywalker90+105−02 files
No security note in commit
Informational 15 AI analysisMessage 5 · Opaque
EP Elements ProjectCore Lightning BitcoinLightning Network

v26.12rc1

This commit is a routine version bump from v26.06.10 to v26.12rc1 for Core Lightning. It only updates version strings in packaging files, a changelog, and a lockfile. There are no code changes that introduce, fix, or modify any security-se…

4002c4e9by Níckolas Goline+164−1110 files
No security note in commit
Low 30 AI analysisMessage 68 · Adequate
EP Elements ProjectCore Lightning BitcoinLightning Network

wallet: store payment failure details per groupid

This commit fixes a database bug in Core Lightning where failure details for a payment attempt were being overwritten by later retry attempts that shared the same payment identifier fragment. The fix makes the failure record match on an ad…

Data integrity bug causing incorrect error reporting across payment retry groupsNo memory safety, authentication, authorization, or cryptographic issues presentNo external input is trusted or validated differently
24082c6dby daywalker90+6−34 files
No security note in commit
Low 43 AI analysisMessage 83 · Strong
EP Elements ProjectCore Lightning BitcoinLightning Network

cln-plugin: do not panic when the log writer task is gone

This commit fixes a bug in Core Lightning's Rust plugin library where a plugin could crash with a panic if it tried to log a message after the internal log-writing task had already stopped, such as during shutdown. The fix makes the plugin…

panic on send failure replaced with stderr fallbacklog message no longer silently dropped on writer task exitunit test added for dropped-receiver scenario
8661ffabby cdecker+29−11 file
No security note in commit
Informational 15 AI analysisMessage 90 · Strong
EP Elements ProjectCore Lightning BitcoinLightning Network

docs: explain hsmtool HTLC recovery

This commit only adds documentation to the manual page for an existing command-line tool (hsmtool). It explains how to recover funds from old Lightning payment commitments (HTLCs) after losing channel state. There are no code changes, no n…

f90c140dby Sangbida Chaudhuri+85−01 file
No security note in commit
Informational 15 AI analysisMessage 68 · Adequate
EP Elements ProjectCore Lightning BitcoinLightning Network

tests: make test_delpay_works deterministic

This commit only changes a test file to make a flaky test more reliable. It does not modify any production code, so it has no security impact on real users.

a224ca81by daywalker90+16−161 file
No security note in commit
Informational 20 AI analysisMessage 73 · Adequate
EP Elements ProjectCore Lightning BitcoinLightning Network

doc: say that listtransactions gives blockheight 0 for a tx not in a block

This commit only updates documentation to explain that the `listtransactions` command reports a block height and transaction index of 0 when a transaction is not currently in a block (for example, because it hasn't been mined yet or was re…

bc281be3by Peter Neuroth+4−42 files
No security note in commit
Informational 20 AI analysisMessage 50 · Thin
EP Elements ProjectCore Lightning BitcoinLightning Network

fixup! pyln-client: don't crash Millisatoshi.to_approx_str() on zero

This is a small bug fix in a Python helper library used by Core Lightning. The Millisatoshi.to_approx_str() method previously crashed with a math error when converting a zero amount to a human-readable string. The patch makes zero return "…

No security-relevant signals presentFix is a routine correctness/robustness improvement
02612ed5by Amartya Singh+4−31 file
No security note in commit
Moderate 62 AI analysisMessage 73 · Adequate
EP Elements ProjectCore Lightning BitcoinLightning Network

wallet: reject unmodifiable PSBTs in addpsbtoutput/addpsbtinput

This update fixes a crash in two wallet commands, addpsbtoutput and addpsbtinput. These commands let users add extra transaction outputs or inputs to a PSBT (a Bitcoin transaction planning file). If a user supplied a PSBT whose version 2 '…

Daemon crash (assertion failure) on crafted/strict PSBT inputMissing validation of PSBT v2 modifiable flags before mutationUser-controlled input directly passed to libwally without precondition check
42472816by daywalker90+14−12 files
Vendor flagged security relevance
Moderate 59 AI analysisMessage 83 · Strong
EP Elements ProjectCore Lightning BitcoinLightning Network

tests: show addpsbtoutput/addpsbtinput crash on an unmodifiable v2 PSBT

This commit only adds a new test case that demonstrates two Core Lightning commands, addpsbtoutput and addpsbtinput, crash with an internal assertion when given a v2 PSBT that does not allow adding inputs or outputs. The test is marked as …

Daemon abort due to failed assertion in PSBT helper functionsRPC commands addpsbtoutput and addpsbtinput lack validation of PSBT modifiability flags before calling libwallyPotential denial-of-service vector: any caller able to submit a crafted v2 PSBT can crash lightningd
42e268abby daywalker90+60−01 file
No security note in commit
Informational 20 AI analysisMessage 73 · Adequate
EP Elements ProjectCore Lightning BitcoinLightning Network

pyln-client: don't crash Millisatoshi.to_approx_str() on zero

This commit fixes a minor bug in Core Lightning's Python client library where calling a pretty-printing method on a zero-amount payment would crash with a ValueError. It is a routine correctness fix, not a security vulnerability. There is …

5ebe365dby Amartya Singh+3−12 files
No security note in commit
Moderate 59 AI analysisMessage 83 · Strong
EP Elements ProjectCore Lightning BitcoinLightning Network

dualopen and splicing: add minimal verification of tx_signatures

This commit adds missing safety checks in Core Lightning when a peer sends signatures for opening or splicing a dual-funded Lightning channel. Before the patch, the software accepted peer-provided transaction witnesses without verifying th…

Missing input validation on peer-provided witness dataBOLT-2 compliance fix for tx_signaturesRejection of empty witness stacks
c6be4f71by Lagrang3+633−97 files
Vendor flagged security relevance
Moderate 54 AI analysisMessage 85 · Strong
EP Elements ProjectCore Lightning BitcoinLightning Network

channeld: abort_channels no longer fails a channel with a signed splice

This fix prevents a user-issued 'abort channels' command from incorrectly failing a Lightning channel when a splice transaction has already been signed. Previously, the code would pass the latest in-flight splice to a routine that aborts i…

Denial-of-service/availability impact: user-initiated abort could inadvertently fail a funded channelProtocol compliance fix: avoids sending tx_abort after tx_signatures, which BOLT 2 forbidsState-handling bug in splice negotiation lifecycle
c87f5573by Andezion+22−11 file
No security note in commit
Moderate 51 AI analysisMessage 73 · Adequate
EP Elements ProjectCore Lightning BitcoinLightning Network

lightningd: fix crash on mutual close of an unconfirmed dual-funded channel

This update fixes a bug where a specific type of Lightning channel close could crash the node. It only happens when both parties cooperatively close a dual-funded channel that has not yet been confirmed and has gone through a funding bump …

NULL pointer dereference leading to daemon crash (denial of service)Crash occurs in cooperative-close path for unconfirmed dual-funded/RBF channelsFix uses canonical channel funding key instead of splice-only field
555143beby Sangbida Chaudhuri+9−31 file
Vendor flagged security relevance
High 74 AI analysisMessage 73 · Adequate
EP Elements ProjectCore Lightning BitcoinLightning Network

cln-grpc: reject malformed request values instead of panicking

This commit fixes a security bug in Core Lightning's gRPC plugin (cln-grpc). Previously, a malformed request from a gRPC client could crash the plugin: bad public keys, hashes, secrets, channel IDs, or enum values triggered Rust 'unwrap()'…

Denial-of-service via malformed gRPC request causing tonic worker task panicDenial-of-service via std::process::exit(1) in ProofField conversion on missing oneofSilent integer truncation of u16/u8 fields via 'as' casts
b2703436by daywalker90+1558−12135 files
Vendor flagged security relevance
Informational 15 AI analysisMessage 51 · Thin
EP Elements ProjectCore Lightning BitcoinLightning Network

nix: drop protobuf again

This commit removes the protobuf package from the Nix build environment because it is no longer needed. A previous change made the cln-grpc component use its own bundled protoc compiler instead of relying on the system one. The Python bind…

a0459eeeby Peter Neuroth+0−11 file
No security note in commit
Informational 15 AI analysisMessage 73 · Adequate
EP Elements ProjectCore Lightning BitcoinLightning Network

make: check gRPC protos for breaking changes against the last release

This commit adds a new automated check to the project's build process that compares gRPC protocol definitions against the last release to catch accidental breaking changes early. It does not change any runtime code, fix a bug, or introduce…

db5fea70by daywalker90+43−84 files
No security note in commit
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Lower-prioritypytest: a confirmed splice output spent before splice_locked must be adoptedby Níckolas Goline · 1a46973e · Sep 18, 2026 · 1 fileMessage 73 · AdequateTriage 0Details
Commit message · Níckolas Goline

pytest: a confirmed splice output spent before splice_locked must be adopted

splice_locked needs both sides. A peer that never sends it and closes
on the confirmed splice output leaves us in CHANNELD_AWAITING_SPLICE
with channel->funding still the outpoint the splice spent, and the
candidate watch hands onchaind that stale funding. Expected to fail
until the next commit.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
(cherry picked from commit 3a91f44362d0d40ba1574835c9d61d98314920d0)

73/100 · AdequateMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context
Lower-prioritytests: fix test_blinded_forward_policy flakeby daywalker90 · e4a30698 · Sep 17, 2026 · 1 fileMessage 68 · AdequateTriage 0Details
Commit message · daywalker90

tests: fix test_blinded_forward_policy flake

l1 isn't part of the l2-l3 funding, so join_nodes([l2, l3]) can leave it
a block behind. The final CLTV only just meets l3's cltv-final, so l3
then rejects with "Expiry cltv too soon" and l1 reports the opaque
"Malformed error reply". Sync all nodes before reading the blockheight.

Changelog-None

68/100 · AdequateMessage clarity
✓ Descriptive subject✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Mentions testing or verification
AI review queuedwallet: fixed timestamps for invented bookkeeper depositsby daywalker90 · 498e5086 · Sep 17, 2026 · 1 fileMessage 73 · AdequateInformational 15Details
Commit message · daywalker90

wallet: fixed timestamps for invented bookkeeper deposits

migrate_setup_coinmoves() stamped wallet deposits with wall-clock time
via coinmvt_current_time(), so a slow migration could place the deposit
after the channel journal entry in bkpr-listaccountevents, flaking
test_migration_no_bkpr.

Use base_timestamp + 1, like the channel moves, so the order is stable.

Changelog-None

73/100 · AdequateMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context
Why it was queued
signing or wallet pathsecond-pass: security-sensitive path
AI analysis · Informational 15/100

This is a tiny internal fix to make a bookkeeping migration produce stable event ordering. It changes the timestamp used when creating historical 'deposit' records during a one-time database migration, so the records sort consistently with channel records instead of using the real-time clock. There is no security issue here.

Lower-prioritytests: wait for peer disconnect in test_blindedpath_noaddrby daywalker90 · 8cfd1fc9 · Sep 17, 2026 · 1 fileMessage 83 · StrongTriage 0Details
Commit message · daywalker90

tests: wait for peer disconnect in test_blindedpath_noaddr

l2.rpc.disconnect() returns before l3 notices the socket close, so l3
could still see l2 as connected and add a route hint, flaking the check
that a disconnected peer is not used as a blinded path entry.

Changelog-None

83/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Mentions testing or verification
Lower-prioritybitcoin: free the de-hexed block when parsing failsby Kyle 🐆 · 71fa6722 · Sep 16, 2026 · 1 fileMessage 65 · AdequateTriage 0Details
Commit message · Kyle 🐆

bitcoin: free the de-hexed block when parsing fails

linear_tx hangs off ctx, so the failure paths free b and leave it behind.

65/100 · AdequateMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides an explanatory body
Lower-prioritylightningd: refuse a dual-funded candidate that reuses a funding outpointby Níckolas Goline · 28ee9ea1 · Sep 16, 2026 · 2 filesMessage 73 · AdequateTriage 0Details
Commit message · Níckolas Goline

lightningd: refuse a dual-funded candidate that reuses a funding outpoint

The single-funded path refuses a second channel that names a funding
outpoint we already have (opening_control.c); the dual-funded path had
no equivalent check when the negotiated transaction reached lightningd.
Our funding pubkey is derived per channel, so an honest interactive-tx
negotiation cannot produce a duplicate outpoint; refuse one anyway so a
duplicate can never reach the wallet, where the v1 report showed it
strands the second channel's balance.

Changelog-None

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
(cherry picked from commit 105f6163ffcfc576f5e6c1950e1c395462c44db0)

73/100 · AdequateMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context
AI review queuedlightningd: watch a dual-funded channel's funding outputs before lock-inby Níckolas Goline · eedd50b3 · Sep 16, 2026 · 5 filesMessage 73 · AdequateHigh 79Details
Commit message · Níckolas Goline

lightningd: watch a dual-funded channel's funding outputs before lock-in

A dual-funded channel armed its funding-output spend watch only at
lock-in. Until then we watched whether the funding tx had confirmed and
how deep it was, neither of which fires when the output is spent. With
funding-confirms at 3 the opener can confirm the funding and close on it
in the next block: we never see the spend, lock in anyway, keep routing
over a channel with no funding output, and never notice the cheat once
the peer's commitment is revoked. The single-funded path has always
watched from channel creation.

Arm channel_watch_inflight_outs() as soon as a candidate is recorded,
before our commitment_signed goes out, since that is the moment the peer
can broadcast it; the restart path already re-arms for every channel
with inflights. When a spend arrives while we are still awaiting
lock-in, the spent candidate is by definition the one that got mined:
adopt it as the channel's funding, as opening_depth_cb would have,
before onchaind is started, so onchaind is not handed the latest
attempt's commitment for an outpoint that may never exist. The
candidate watch that fired becomes the channel's funding_spend_watch,
so drop_to_chain() does not add a second watch on the same outpoint
while the block scanner is still iterating it. At lock-in, drop the
candidate watches again: the outpoint is the channel's own from then on,
and a surviving candidate watch would fire funding_spent() twice on
every later close.

Changelog-Fixed: dual-funding: a channel whose funding output is spent before lock-in is now handed to onchaind instead of being locked in and used.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
(cherry picked from commit e44cf3401eccb9e6306aaa5ede8f9d52ead44b57)

73/100 · AdequateMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context
Why it was queued
signing or wallet pathsecond-pass: security-sensitive path
AI analysis · High 79/100

This fix closes a serious bug in Core Lightning's dual-funded channel opening. Before the patch, the node only started watching for a spend of the new channel's funding output after the channel had 'locked in.' A malicious or careless peer could confirm the funding transaction and immediately spend the funding output in a close transaction before lock-in. The node would miss the spend, still lock in the channel, continue routing payments over a channel whose funding no longer existed, and fail to detect a later cheating attempt. The patch arms the spend watch as soon as the funding candidate is recorded, and correctly hands the channel to onchaind if a spend is seen before lock-in.

Security candidatetests: fix test_funding_v2_cancel_race flakeby daywalker90 · b675b9df · Sep 16, 2026 · 1 fileMessage 68 · AdequateInformational 12Details
Commit message · daywalker90

tests: fix test_funding_v2_cancel_race flake

openchannel_update is idempotent: once the commitments are secured a
repeat call returns the existing inflight, so two racing
openchannel_update calls can both legitimately succeed and the "only up
to one should succeed" assertion no longer holds.

Keep the original intent (catching commands that fight over the shared
command pointer and hang) by relying on result(TIMEOUT) raising
TimeoutError, and assert at most one inflight instead of counting
successes: that catches a genuine double commitment, while comparing
the returned PSBTs does not work as inflight->funding_psbt is mutated
in place (wally_psbt_combine/psbt_finalize) once tx-signatures arrive.

Changelog-None

68/100 · AdequateMessage clarity
✓ Descriptive subject✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Mentions testing or verification
Why it was queued
signing boundary
AI analysis · Informational 12/100

This commit only changes a test file. It loosens an overly strict test assertion that was causing a flaky test failure. The test previously assumed only one of several racing openchannel_update calls could succeed, but the command is actually idempotent, so multiple calls can legitimately return the same existing commitment. The fix keeps the safety check by verifying the node ends up with at most one actual commitment 'inflight' rather than counting successful RPC responses. There is no change to production code and no security fix.

Lower-priorityaskrene: don't type-pun the node id when hashing node biasesby Níckolas Goline · 8bb20c54 · Sep 16, 2026 · 1 fileMessage 73 · AdequateTriage 0Details
Commit message · Níckolas Goline

askrene: don't type-pun the node id when hashing node biases

hash_nodeid() read the 33-byte node id through a size_t pointer. That
is undefined behaviour, and at -O3 the compiler is entitled to hoist
that load above the `bias->node = *node` copy in set_node_bias(), since
a u8 array and a size_t cannot alias. The entry then went into the
table under the hash of uninitialised memory and later lookups missed
it, so every load of a persistent layer created a second node_biases
entry for the same node. With load_node_bias() now setting the two
directions in two calls, the second call trips the NODUPS assertion in
node_bias_hash_add() and askrene, an important plugin, takes lightningd
down with it.

Hash the whole key with siphash, as hash_str() below already does.

Changelog-Fixed: askrene: node biases on a persistent layer were duplicated on every restart, and could abort the plugin when loading a layer.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
(cherry picked from commit b2cb54d1e405151e2564d2f7d9964e1b96104f1a)

73/100 · AdequateMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context
Lower-prioritydocs: fix typo in reckless schemaby enaples · f986d064 · Sep 16, 2026 · 3 filesMessage 57 · ThinTriage 0Details
Commit message · enaples

docs: fix typo in reckless schema

57/100 · ThinMessage clarity
✓ Descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Uses a recognizable type or scope! No meaningful explanatory body
Lower-prioritydocs: misc typoes fixedby enaples · 0ed2792f · Sep 16, 2026 · 8 filesMessage 40 · ThinTriage 0Details
Commit message · enaples

docs: misc typoes fixed

40/100 · ThinMessage clarity
✓ Subject identifies a change✓ Uses a recognizable type or scope! No meaningful explanatory body
Why it was queued
documentation-only discount
Lower-prioritylightningd: keep a late RBF attempt off a promoted dual-funding channelby Níckolas Goline · c955159e · Sep 15, 2026 · 1 fileMessage 73 · AdequateTriage 0Details
Commit message · Níckolas Goline

lightningd: keep a late RBF attempt off a promoted dual-funding channel

rbf_got_offer and openchannel_bump refuse to start an RBF once we have
promoted a mined candidate, but an attempt that was already past them
when the block arrived still runs to completion, and the peer decides
when: dualopend reads only the peer fd until commitment_signed has been
exchanged. Such an attempt was recorded exactly like a pre-promotion
one, moving channel->funding, our_msat and the reserve to a tx that was
never mined while the scid still named the mined one, and the later
commitment write pointed last_tx at the wrong funding. Lock-in then
cleared the inflight holding the real commitment.

Once channel->scid is set, record the attempt on its own inflight only,
skip the reserve update, and only let a commitment through to the
channel when its inflight is the funding we are promoted to. A reorg
that un-promotes the mined candidate leaves every inflight in place, so
a late attempt that gets mined afterwards is promoted from its inflight
like any other.

Changelog-None

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>

73/100 · AdequateMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context
Lower-prioritytests: fix flake in test_dataloss_protectionby daywalker90 · 946f700c · Sep 15, 2026 · 1 fileMessage 78 · AdequateTriage 0Details
Commit message · daywalker90

tests: fix flake in test_dataloss_protection

l2 detects the data loss and sends l1 an "Awaiting unilateral close"
error (after the channeld's 1 second delay), which l1 must receive to
drop to chain. But l1's channeld normally sends a warning and exits
first; if l2's error arrives before l1's connectd has torn that subd
down it is routed to the dying channeld and lost, so l1 never sees it
and we time out waiting for:

l1.daemon.wait_for_log("They sent ERROR.*Awaiting unilateral close")

Reconnect if we don't see it: channel->error is resent when the peer
reconnects, so l1 gets the error and drops to chain. We may already be
disconnected, in which case disconnect() fails with "Peer not
connected": that's fine, connect() is what matters.

This restores the workaround the test had before 6fdaec313 replaced it
with the channeld sleep.

Changelog-None

78/100 · AdequateMessage clarity
✓ Descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Mentions testing or verification
Lower-prioritytests: derive the crafted invoice HRP from the running networkby Amperstrand · 5346800b · Sep 15, 2026 · 1 fileMessage 83 · StrongTriage 0Details
Commit message · Amperstrand

tests: derive the crafted invoice HRP from the running network

The createinvoice expiry test hardcoded the lnbcrt prefix, but
liquid-regtest invoices carry the ert HRP (chainparams), so the
crafted string died at the bech32 parse there ('invalid bech32
string') before the bound check -- the liquid CI arm has been
failing on it. Take the HRP from a real invoice on the running
network instead; both arms pass locally now.

Changelog-None: test-only
Signed-off-by: Amperstrand <amperstrand@localhost>
(cherry picked from commit ebeaf7778551b2fc7867a99a91192e44b239553b)

83/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Mentions testing or verification
Lower-prioritylightningd: keep peer connected when rejecting a dead channel's reestablishby daywalker90 · 69d37254 · Sep 15, 2026 · 2 filesMessage 83 · StrongTriage 0Details
Commit message · daywalker90

lightningd: keep peer connected when rejecting a dead channel's reestablish

handle_peer_spoke() sent an error for a closed or unknown channel and
then unconditionally disconnected the peer. A node recovering from a
static channel backup reestablishes every channel it recovered,
including ones which have closed since the backup was taken. We
correctly reject the dead one, but hanging up there discards the
reestablishes for its still-live siblings, so we never reply to them
and they stay enabled forever.

Only disconnect if the peer has no other channel which still wants peer
comms.

This is what made "Update examples in doc schemas" intermittently time
out: l3 reestablished its already-closed 120x1x0 before its live
132x1x0, so l3 hung up on l4 and never processed 132x1x0:

tests/autogenerate-rpc-examples.py:1618: in generate_list_examples
wait_for(lambda: [c['active'] for c in l3.rpc.listchannels(c34_2)['channels'] if c['source'] == l3.info['id']] == [False])
ValueError: Timeout while waiting for <lambda>

Changelog-Fixed: lightningd: a node recovering from a static channel backup no longer hangs up on the peer when one of the recovered channels has already closed, so the peer can still close the channels which are still open.

83/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Mentions testing or verification
Lower-prioritytests: skip the feerate poison test unless the db is sqlite3by Níckolas Goline · b9b61761 · Sep 15, 2026 · 1 fileMessage 75 · AdequateTriage 0Details
Commit message · Níckolas Goline

tests: skip the feerate poison test unless the db is sqlite3

It writes the database directly.

Changelog-None

(cherry picked from commit a9ead6340a8cc1bb84248d3cb8a7a247b0477602)

75/100 · AdequateMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides an explanatory body✓ Mentions testing or verification
AI review queuedlightningd: refuse channels whose channel_id is already in useby cdecker · 7c6926c1 · Sep 15, 2026 · 7 filesMessage 73 · AdequateHigh 72Details
Commit message · cdecker

lightningd: refuse channels whose channel_id is already in use

A v1 channel_id is derived from the funding outpoint, which the peer
chooses and which we can't check until it confirms. We only refused an
outpoint already used by a live channel with the same peer, so a second
channel could end up sharing a forgotten channel's channel_id. When it
is closed too we abort in closed_channel_map_add() with
"Assertion `!closed_channel_map_getmatch_(...)' failed", and since the
channel is in the db, onchaind or a restart then crashes us again every
time.

Refuse to commit a channel whose channel_id is used by any live or closed
channel, in the fundee, funder and dual-funding paths, and allow
duplicates in the closed channel map so nodes which already have such
channels in their db can close and load them.

Changelog-Fixed: lightningd: a peer reusing a funding outpoint can no longer crash the node with a duplicate channel_id.
(cherry picked from commit 84bfdf4fe1f8176cf361d474a12df20cfa704778)

73/100 · AdequateMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context
Why it was queued
second-pass: broader security terminology
AI analysis · High 72/100

This update fixes a crash bug in Core Lightning. A malicious or careless peer could open a new Lightning channel using the same funding transaction details as an old, forgotten channel. Because the channel ID is derived from those details, the new channel would share the same ID. When either channel later closed, the program hit an internal 'this should never happen' assertion and crashed, then kept crashing on restart because the duplicate ID was stored in the database. The fix refuses to commit any new channel whose ID is already used by a live or closed channel, and allows the database to hold duplicates for already-affected nodes so they can close and restart safely.

Lower-prioritysendpay: idempotent success on replay of completed self-paymentsby Lagrang3 · b6841e4c · Sep 15, 2026 · 2 filesMessage 73 · AdequateTriage 0Details
Commit message · Lagrang3

sendpay: idempotent success on replay of completed self-payments

According to the documentation of sendpay:

Calls to sendpay with the same payment_hash,
amount_msat, and destination as a previous
successful payment (even if a different route
or partid) will return immediately with success.

A self payment is a special case, but the destination being
always ourselves should follow the same rule.

Changelog-Fixed: sendpay: immediate success when replaying a completed self payment.

Signed-off-by: Lagrang3 <lagrang3@protonmail.com>

73/100 · AdequateMessage clarity
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AI review queuedpytest: channels reusing a funding outpoint must not crash usby cdecker · 8e94554b · Sep 15, 2026 · 1 fileMessage 65 · AdequateModerate 50Details
Commit message · cdecker

pytest: channels reusing a funding outpoint must not crash us

(cherry picked from commit bc01ae602ced2a5c46312900e6cea02c617ecd69)

65/100 · AdequateMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides an explanatory body
Why it was queued
second-pass: broader security terminology
AI analysis · Moderate 50/100

This commit adds a test showing that Core Lightning can crash if a node's database ends up with two channels sharing the same internal channel ID—one already closed and another later closed with the same ID. The test is currently marked as expected to fail, meaning the underlying crash bug has not been fixed yet. It appears to be a denial-of-service issue: a malformed or manipulated local database state causes lightningd to crash on channel close and then again on every restart.

Security candidatehsmd: don't report forced channel secrets as memleaksby cdecker · 2f56c235 · Sep 15, 2026 · 1 fileMessage 83 · StrongInformational 18Details
Commit message · cdecker

hsmd: don't report forced channel secrets as memleaks

--dev-force-channel-secrets and its shaseed are allocated off NULL at
init and kept forever, like --dev-force-privkey and --dev-force-bip32-seed,
but only the latter two were excluded from dev-memleak, so any test using
the option failed teardown with memleak reports.

(cherry picked from commit c4b2b418fb9f852048f554fd428fc4e4e872252d)

83/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Mentions testing or verification
Why it was queued
secret or key material
AI analysis · Informational 18/100

This is a tiny developer-only fix for a memory-leak false alarm. When running tests with a special developer flag that forces fixed channel secrets, those secrets were wrongly reported as leaked memory during test teardown. The patch tells the memory-leak checker to ignore them, matching two similar developer-only flags already excluded. It does not change normal node behavior or affect production wallets.

Security candidateclosingd: fail the negotiation when lightningd rejects the peer's closing feeby Ken Sedgwick · a764f9c1 · Sep 14, 2026 · 4 filesMessage 73 · AdequateModerate 68Details
Commit message · Ken Sedgwick

closingd: fail the negotiation when lightningd rejects the peer's closing fee

lightningd's reply to closingd_received_signature carried only a txid.
closingd used it for the billboard and went on to agree to the offer,
so when lightningd had rejected the fee the close still completed and
drop_to_chain broadcast last_tx, which was still the commitment, while
the close command reported a mutual close.

Add the verdict to the reply. On a rejection lightningd logs it at
UNUSUAL, and closingd sends the peer a warning and exits instead of
agreeing, the same way it handles a fee range with no overlap. The
channel stays in CLOSINGD_SIGEXCHANGE: negotiation restarts on
reconnect with lightningd's current bounds, and the close command's
timeout decides when to close unilaterally.

Changelog-Fixed: lightningd: a closing fee lightningd rejects fails the negotiation instead of broadcasting the commitment as a mutual close.
(cherry picked from commit a944bebef3a95602b660444828882fc583241401)

73/100 · AdequateMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context
Why it was queued
signing boundary
AI analysis · Moderate 68/100

This fix repairs a bug in Core Lightning's channel-closing handshake. Previously, when the node rejected a peer's proposed closing fee, the rejection was not communicated back to the sub-process that negotiates with the peer. That sub-process would still treat the close as agreed and could broadcast the old commitment transaction while the user interface reported a successful mutual close. The patch adds an explicit 'acceptable' flag to the internal reply so the negotiation is aborted and the peer is warned instead of proceeding with a mismatched transaction.

Lower-prioritytests: reproduce closingd completing a close on a fee lightningd rejectedby Ken Sedgwick · a8a10324 · Sep 14, 2026 · 5 filesMessage 83 · StrongTriage 0Details
Commit message · Ken Sedgwick

tests: reproduce closingd completing a close on a fee lightningd rejected

When lightningd rejects a closing fee, closingd never learns it: the
reply only carries a txid, which closingd uses for its billboard. It
agrees to the offer, reports the close complete, and lightningd
broadcasts last_tx, still the commitment, as if it were the mutual
close.

The previous commits removed the known reasons for a rejection, so add
--dev-reject-closing-fee, which makes lightningd reject every closing
fee the peer offers. test_closing_rejected_fee_fails_negotiation runs
it on the non-opener: the opener's close must end in a unilateral close
at its timeout, and the rejecting node must never agree to a fee or
broadcast anything. Marked xfail until the following commit.

Changelog-None.

(cherry picked from commit 24d4335e49a0a92e124be28bcd87e5d5bc9676a0)

83/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Mentions testing or verification
Lower-prioritylightningd: honour the close feerange minimum when accepting a closing feeby Ken Sedgwick · dec58370 · Sep 14, 2026 · 2 filesMessage 73 · AdequateTriage 0Details
Commit message · Ken Sedgwick

lightningd: honour the close feerange minimum when accepting a closing fee

peer_start_closingd hands closingd the minimum of the feerange given to
`close` as its floor, so closingd negotiates down to it. The acceptance
check in closing_fee_is_acceptable kept using the floor derived from the
fee estimates, so with estimates above the range the agreed fee was
rejected as too low, the commitment stayed as last_tx, and the close
broadcast it while reporting a mutual close.

Use the range minimum as the floor there too, as calc_max_close_feerate
already does for the maximum. Both ends of the check now match the
bounds closingd negotiated within.

Changelog-Fixed: lightningd: `close` with a feerange below the fee estimates no longer falls back to broadcasting the commitment.
(cherry picked from commit 118bf9c7bcde61b183d8b8acd3b8038de0ebae67)

73/100 · AdequateMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context
Lower-prioritytests: reproduce a close with a feerange below the estimate floor falling back to the commitmentby Ken Sedgwick · 633dece8 · Sep 14, 2026 · 1 fileMessage 83 · StrongTriage 0Details
Commit message · Ken Sedgwick

tests: reproduce a close with a feerange below the estimate floor falling back to the commitment

closingd negotiates within the feerange given to `close`, and lightningd
hands it the range minimum as its floor. lightningd's own acceptance
check does not use that minimum: it checks the agreed fee against the
floor derived from its fee estimates. When the estimates sit above the
range, the agreed fee is rejected as too low, the commitment stays as
last_tx, and the close broadcasts it while reporting a mutual close.

test_closing_feerange_below_estimates opens at the floor, raises the
opener's estimates, closes with a feerange pinned at the floor, and
checks that the transaction returned by close is a two-output closing
transaction at the agreed fee. Marked xfail until the following commit.

Changelog-None.

(cherry picked from commit 9c0b9c2cc42250455edf835d3eea3d14f4281528)

83/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Mentions testing or verification
Lower-prioritylightningd: bound the negotiated closing fee, not the transaction's feeby Ken Sedgwick · b39e4252 · Sep 14, 2026 · 2 filesMessage 93 · StrongTriage 0Details
Commit message · Ken Sedgwick

lightningd: bound the negotiated closing fee, not the transaction's fee

closing_fee_is_acceptable checked the fee the closing transaction pays
against the maximum derived from the unilateral feerate. That fee is
larger than the fee_satoshis both sides agreed on whenever the outputs'
msat remainders were rounded away or an output was trimmed as dust.
With every estimate at the floor, closingd's minimum and maximum are the
same value, so any rounding put the transaction one satoshi over the
maximum and lightningd rejected it. The rejection left the commitment
as last_tx and the close broadcast it while reporting a mutual close.

Derive the negotiated fee from the transaction: our rounded-down balance
minus the output paying our shutdown script. closingd subtracts
fee_satoshis from the opener's output, and the maximum only applies when
we are the opener, so that difference is exactly the fee we agreed to
pay. Bound that instead. The minimum is still checked against the fee
the transaction actually pays, which is what relay depends on. If our
output was trimmed the whole fee is ours and is bounded as before.

Changelog-Fixed: lightningd: a mutual close at the fee ceiling no longer falls back to broadcasting the commitment because of satoshi rounding.
Fixes: #9495
(cherry picked from commit be5b62556391097b42723b8d77336517d5c4c917)

93/100 · StrongMessage clarity
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