Commit message · Wilmer PaulinoSupport async fetching of commitment point during channel reestablish
`HolderCommitmentPoint` currently tracks the current and next point used
on counterparty commitments, which are unrevoked. When we reestablish a
channel, the counterparty sends us the commitment height, along with the
corresponding secret, for the state they believe to be the latest. We
compare said secret to the derived point we fetch from the signer to
know if the peer is being honest.
Since the protocol does not allow peers (assuming no data loss) to be
behind the current state by more than one update, we can cache the two
latest revoked commitment points alongside `HolderCommitmentPoint`, such
that we no longer need to reach the signer asynchronously when handling
`channel_reestablish` messages throughout the happy path. By doing so,
we avoid complexity in needing to pause the state machine (which may
also result in needing to stash any update messages from the
counterparty) while the signer response is pending.
The only remaining case left to handle is when the counterparty presents
a `channel_reestablish` with a state later than what we know. This can
only result in two terminal cases: either they provided a valid
commitment secret proving we are behind and we need to panic, or they
lied and we force close the channel. This is the only case we choose to
handle asynchronously as it's relatively trivial to handle.
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AI analysis · Low 42/100This commit improves how the Lightning node handles reconnections after a network interruption. Previously, when re-establishing a channel, the node sometimes had to ask an external signer for a cryptographic proof point and could not proceed until the signer responded. The change keeps the two most recent revoked proof points cached locally so the common case no longer needs to wait for the signer. It only defers to the signer asynchronously in the rare 'stale state' case, where the peer claims our node is behind. That stale case either proves data loss (causing a protective panic) or proves the peer is lying (causing a force-close). The commit is a defensive hardening/feature change, not a fix for an active exploit.