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rust-lightning

Composable Rust libraries for building Lightning wallets, nodes, and services.

BitcoinCryptographic librariesLightning NetworkNormal
Repository coverage

1924 commits in the local evidence base

Every captured commit receives deterministic security triage and a separate communication-quality score. Security candidates and broader second-pass signals receive full-patch Ollama analysis.

300security candidates261second-pass queue1606AI analyses
174commits · 30 days
261commits · 60 days
636commits · 180 days
1314commits · 365 days
Backfill bands
Aug 5 → Feb 6819 seen18 candidatesComplete
Feb 6 → Jun 6468 seen16 candidatesComplete
Jun 6 → Jul 6128 seen8 candidatesComplete
Jul 6 → Aug 561 seen3 candidatesComplete
Commit communication

Does the history explain itself?

Message quality measures whether a commit identifies its scope, purpose, rationale, testing, and supporting references. It does not change the security-severity score.

71/100 average clarity
704Strong · 80–100
856Adequate · 60–79
302Thin · 40–59
62Opaque · 0–39
3security candidates with opaque commit messaging
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Developer activity

Who is changing the project?

Public Git author strings; identities are not independently verified.

DeveloperCommitsCandidatesAnalyzedHigh riskMessage avg.
Matt Corallo58679418876
Elias Rohrer15415153667
auto-pr-bot571823287
Jeffrey Czyz19645182169
Wilmer Paulino15945155169
Valentine Wallace15715145169
Leo Nash11613116162
Vincenzo Palazzo11311183
Joost Jager16324162069
elnosh401434059
shaavan22622069
wpaulino2059082
Analysis record

Published AI watches

Last scanned 34 minutes ago

Informational 15 AI analysisMessage 81 · Strong
LDK Lightning Dev Kitrust-lightning BitcoinCryptographic librariesLightning Network

Correct FeeEstimator docs on the 253 sat/kW lower bound

This is a documentation-only edit. It corrects a misleading comment in the code that wrongly claimed all fee estimates returned to LDK are forced to be at least 253 satoshis per 1000 weight units. The new comment clarifies that this minimu…

ea2051feby auto-pr-bot+9−31 file
No security note in commit
Moderate 54 AI analysisMessage 81 · Strong
LDK Lightning Dev Kitrust-lightning BitcoinCryptographic librariesLightning Network

Merge PR 'Track splice confirmation while awaiting tx_signatures' (#5570)

This change fixes a bug in Lightning Dev Kit's splicing logic. During a splice, one side can broadcast the new funding transaction as soon as it has the other side's signatures. Previously, if that transaction confirmed on-chain before the…

State-machine inconsistency in channel funding lifecycleMissing chain-source watch for in-flight splice funding transactionPotential failure to send splice_locked after splice confirms during signature exchange
ca778e61by Matt Corallo+245−32 files
No security note in commit
Moderate 63 AI analysisMessage 81 · Strong
LDK Lightning Dev Kitrust-lightning BitcoinCryptographic librariesLightning Network

Merge PR 'Account for current HTLC fees in dust exposure' (#5690)

This change fixes how Lightning nodes calculate the financial risk from tiny ('dust') HTLCs when the current on-chain fee rate is higher than the node's own local fee estimate. Previously, the code only considered a buffered fee rate when …

Incorrect fee exposure accounting for dust HTLCsPotential to accept HTLCs whose commitment/HTLC-success fees exceed their value under current feerateEconomic griefing / forced-channel-closure cost manipulation
cc798f60by Matt Corallo+108−382 files
No security note in commit
Informational 15 AI analysisMessage 91 · Strong
LDK Lightning Dev Kitrust-lightning BitcoinCryptographic librariesLightning Network

Merge PR 'Replace cloned array literal with slice::from_ref in reload test' (#5689)

This is a one-line code cleanup in a test file. It replaces a cloned array literal with a slice reference to silence a Rust compiler lint. There is no change to production code, no security fix, and no functional behavior change.

03ca832fby Matt Corallo+1−11 file
No security note in commit
Informational 15 AI analysisMessage 91 · Strong
LDK Lightning Dev Kitrust-lightning BitcoinCryptographic librariesLightning Network

Replace cloned array literal with slice::from_ref in reload test

This is a one-line change in a test file to satisfy a Rust linter warning. It replaces a needless clone of a funding transaction with a reference-based slice construction. There is no functional change, no user-facing behavior change, and …

93e0129cby auto-pr-bot+1−11 file
No security note in commit
Informational 12 AI analysisMessage 91 · Strong
LDK Lightning Dev Kitrust-lightning BitcoinCryptographic librariesLightning Network

Merge PR 'Fix CI: rebuild test coin-selection impl and rework reused-ID balance test' (#5684)

This commit is a test-only fix for a broken continuous integration (CI) build. It updates a test mock to match a new function signature and rewrites an existing test to use three nodes instead of two so the test scenario remains valid unde…

17bac68aby Matt Corallo+26−202 files
No security note in commit
Moderate 68 AI analysisMessage 81 · Strong
LDK Lightning Dev Kitrust-lightning BitcoinCryptographic librariesLightning Network

Merge PR 'Guard pending closing signatures before channel_ready' (#5681)

This change fixes a Lightning channel bug where a malicious peer could renegotiate the closing transaction fee while the local node was still waiting for its own signer to produce the final signature. If allowed, the local node might combi…

State-machine guard expansion to prevent fee renegotiation while a closing signature is pendingRisk of combining mismatched signatures across different closing feesRegression test demonstrates malicious peer renegotiation attempt and expected warning rejection
a01273a2by Matt Corallo+169−21 file
No security note in commit
Low 48 AI analysisMessage 81 · Strong
LDK Lightning Dev Kitrust-lightning BitcoinCryptographic librariesLightning Network

Merge PR 'Release wallet UTXOs when FundingBuilder rejects a coin selection' (#5634)

This change fixes a wallet bug in rust-lightning where a UTXO could be selected for a Lightning funding transaction, then rejected because its previous transaction was too large to fit in a Lightning peer message. Previously, that rejectio…

API change to CoinSelectionSource::select_confirmed_utxos adding max_input_prevtx_serialized_lenWalletSync filters UTXOs by prevtx serialized length before selectionFundingBuilder enforces Lightning tx_add_input message-size limit at selection time
56054190by Matt Corallo+148−155 files
No security note in commit
Low 48 AI analysisMessage 81 · Strong
LDK Lightning Dev Kitrust-lightning BitcoinCryptographic librariesLightning Network

Refuse to pay BOLT 12 invoices with records above experimental range

This commit hardens LDK's BOLT 12 payment logic so it refuses to pay invoices containing very large unknown record types (4 billion and up). These records are legal under the Lightning spec, but LDK doesn't understand them, so the change t…

Defensive refusal to pay invoices with unknown high-numbered TLV recordsReuses existing UnknownRequiredFeatures failure path instead of adding a new oneAdds explicit checks before payment state insertion and route construction
2970372fby auto-pr-bot+106−177 files
No security note in commit
Moderate 64 AI analysisMessage 81 · Strong
LDK Lightning Dev Kitrust-lightning BitcoinCryptographic librariesLightning Network

Read invoice TLV records above the experimental range

This commit fixes a backward-compatibility bug in LDK's BOLT 12 invoice parser. A previous change had capped the range of 'experimental' TLV record types at 4 billion, but the Lightning spec imposes no upper bound. As a result, invoices cr…

Backward-compatibility regression in deserialization of persisted channel monitorsDenial-of-service via unreadable monitor blocking all channel monitoringSpec compliance fix: TLV record types have no upper bound
9e28db58by auto-pr-bot+133−84 files
No security note in commit
High 74 AI analysisMessage 81 · Strong
LDK Lightning Dev Kitrust-lightning BitcoinCryptographic librariesLightning Network

Merge PR 'Refuse to sign messages that collide with gossip serializations' (#5677)

This change fixes a security issue where a signed text message could be crafted so that its prefixed form looks exactly like a Lightning 'node_announcement' gossip message. Because both use the same double-SHA256 hash and the same signing …

Signature replay / message confusion between signed messages and gossip announcementsForged `node_announcement` signatures via chosen-prefix message constructionNew validation rejects prefixed messages that deserialize as `UnsignedNodeAnnouncement`
ec40e097by Matt Corallo+74−148 files
Vendor flagged security relevance
Low 37 AI analysisMessage 81 · Strong
LDK Lightning Dev Kitrust-lightning BitcoinCryptographic librariesLightning Network

Merge PR 'Retry a single HTLC before abandoning an unfundable batch' (#5406)

This change fixes a corner case in how the Lightning node tries to claim multiple pending HTLCs (small Bitcoin payments locked in a channel) when the wallet cannot fund a single large batch transaction. Previously, if the multi-HTLC batch …

Funds-recovery robustness improvement: prevents premature abandonment of a single unbatched HTLCChange in error-handling arithmetic from checked_sub/saturating_sub with max(1)New unit tests covering both failed and successful singleton HTLC funding paths
643e8684by wpaulino+119−21 file
No security note in commit
Moderate 54 AI analysisMessage 81 · Strong
LDK Lightning Dev Kitrust-lightning BitcoinCryptographic librariesLightning Network

Merge PR 'Refuse to persist fresh monitors that alias archived monitors' (#5645)

This change prevents a Lightning node from accidentally overwriting an archived copy of a channel's security monitor with a brand-new one that happens to use the same identifier. In the old code, if a new channel reused the same identifier…

Data-loss prevention: stops archived ChannelMonitor from being overwritten by a later channel with the same keySafety guard added to both sync and async persistence pathsPersistence refusal surfaces as InProgress/UnrecoverableError rather than silent overwrite
3c606c11by Matt Corallo+298−332 files
No security note in commit
Moderate 52 AI analysisMessage 86 · Strong
LDK Lightning Dev Kitrust-lightning BitcoinCryptographic librariesLightning Network

Merge PR 'Handle fee multiplication overflow when merging MPP paths' (#5288)

This change fixes a place in the Lightning payment routing code where adding up fees could overflow the maximum number a computer can store in a 64-bit integer. Previously, the code assumed this could never happen and would crash (panic) i…

Integer overflow in fee computationPreviously unreachable!() panic path reachableMPP path merge could trigger overflow
25f8a740by Matt Corallo+42−171 file
No security note in commit
Low 43 AI analysisMessage 81 · Strong
LDK Lightning Dev Kitrust-lightning BitcoinCryptographic librariesLightning Network

Merge PR 'Resume channels stuck awaiting a completed monitor persistence on reload' (#5610)

This commit fixes a bug where a Lightning node could get stuck after restarting. If the node crashed or restarted while it was still saving the initial channel monitor to disk, and that save later finished in another process, the restarted…

Fixes a state-machine stall on node reload that could leave channels non-functionalRemoves an overstrict assertion that would panic on a legitimate post-reload stateAdds explicit detection of monitor persistence completed in a prior process
11815ed1by Matt Corallo+334−74 files
No security note in commit
Informational 15 AI analysisMessage 81 · Strong
LDK Lightning Dev Kitrust-lightning BitcoinCryptographic librariesLightning Network

Merge PR 'Correct KeysManager docs on spliced channels' remote_key derivation' (#5609)

This change only updates documentation and code comments in the Lightning Dev Kit library. It clarifies that a particular key-derivation setting is fixed when a channel is first opened and is not changed by splicing. No code behavior was a…

83a4d243by Matt Corallo+17−91 file
No security note in commit
Informational 15 AI analysisMessage 81 · Strong
LDK Lightning Dev Kitrust-lightning BitcoinCryptographic librariesLightning Network

Merge PR 'Fix DelayedPaymentKey/HtlcKey from_basepoint docs and document justice tx witness script' (#5596)

This commit only changes documentation comments in two source files. It corrects the wording of how certain public keys are derived in the Lightning protocol and adds details about which witness script a signer must use when creating justi…

Documentation-only changeClarifies key derivation semantics for Lightning commitment transactionsClarifies justice transaction witness script requirements for signers
2f832195by Matt Corallo+44−62 files
No security note in commit
Informational 19 AI analysisMessage 81 · Strong
LDK Lightning Dev Kitrust-lightning BitcoinCryptographic librariesLightning Network

Merge PR 'Document that TokioSpawner requires all of LDK in a tokio context' (#5621)

This change only adds documentation comments to a Rust struct. It does not modify any executable code, so it cannot by itself introduce or fix a security vulnerability. The new text warns developers that using TokioSpawner incorrectly can …

Documentation-only changeNo code logic modifiedNo unsafe blocks added
6e555fa2by Matt Corallo+11−01 file
No security note in commit
High 70 AI analysisMessage 91 · Strong
LDK Lightning Dev Kitrust-lightning BitcoinCryptographic librariesLightning Network

Merge PR 'Make custom signers verify holder commitment sigs synchronously' (#5616)

This commit hardens how Lightning Dev Kit handles custom signing modules. Previously, LDK relied on each custom signer to check that the other party's signatures on a holder commitment transaction were valid. The change adds a ready-made v…

New synchronous signature-verification helper for holder commitment transactionsTrait documentation now mandates verification before Ok(()) because LDK acts immediatelyInMemorySigner now validates that holder funding key belongs to signer before signature checks
0e3b6d33by Matt Corallo+324−954 files
Vendor flagged security relevance
Moderate 64 AI analysisMessage 81 · Strong
LDK Lightning Dev Kitrust-lightning BitcoinCryptographic librariesLightning Network

Merge PR 'Refuse channel_ready while the initial funding_signed is pending' (#5612)

This update fixes a corner case in the Lightning Dev Kit where a node could get confused if it received a 'channel_ready' message while still waiting for its own signer to produce the first commitment signature. The patch makes the node re…

State-machine confusion between funding_signed and channel_ready in async signer flowPremature channel_ready could advance counterparty_next_commitment_point before initial commitment is signedPatch closes channel rather than allowing inconsistent commitment state
d68d2235by Matt Corallo+101−12 files
No security note in commit
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Lower-priorityln/test: add tests for mpp accumulation of trampoline forwardsby Carla Kirk-Cohen · b90152b0 · Jul 2, 2026 · 3 filesMessage 60 · AdequateInformational 13Details
Commit message · Carla Kirk-Cohen

ln/test: add tests for mpp accumulation of trampoline forwards

60/100 · AdequateMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Mentions testing or verification! No meaningful explanatory body
AI analysis · Informational 13/100

This commit only adds new unit tests for an existing trampoline forwarding feature in a Lightning network implementation. It does not change production behavior, fix a bug, or alter security logic. The tests exercise validation rules that already exist in the code, such as checking fees, timeouts, and payment secrets for multi-part trampoline payments.

Lower-priorityln/test: add test coverage for MPP trampolineby Carla Kirk-Cohen · b975ff31 · Jul 2, 2026 · 1 fileMessage 55 · ThinInformational 15Details
Commit message · Carla Kirk-Cohen

ln/test: add test coverage for MPP trampoline

55/100 · ThinMessage clarity
✓ Descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Mentions testing or verification! No meaningful explanatory body
AI analysis · Informational 15/100

This commit only adds new test code for multi-path trampoline payments in the Lightning Dev Kit. It does not change any production logic, so it cannot introduce a security vulnerability on its own.

Lower-priorityln/tests: return BlindedPaymentPath from trampoline helperby Carla Kirk-Cohen · 19eefdef · Jul 2, 2026 · 2 filesMessage 75 · AdequateInformational 15Details
Commit message · Carla Kirk-Cohen

ln/tests: return BlindedPaymentPath from trampoline helper

Now that PaymentParameters are required, surface path along with blinded
tail for use in tests.

75/100 · AdequateMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides an explanatory body✓ Mentions testing or verification
AI analysis · Informational 15/100

This commit is a test-only refactor. It changes a helper function used in Lightning Dev Kit's internal tests so that it returns both a blinded payment tail and the full blinded payment path. This lets tests register the path in payment parameters, matching a recent requirement in the codebase. There is no change to production code, user-facing behavior, or security-sensitive logic.

Lower-priorityln: process added trampoline htlcs with CLTV validation in testsby Carla Kirk-Cohen · 4329fe92 · Jul 2, 2026 · 2 filesMessage 95 · StrongInformational 23Details
Commit message · Carla Kirk-Cohen

ln: process added trampoline htlcs with CLTV validation in tests

We can't perform proper validation because we don't know the outgoing
channel id until we forward the HTLC, so we just perform a basic CLTV
check.

We don't yet have proper handling of trampoline forwards on restart, so
we only enable this in our tests.

95/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Explains rationale or failure mode✓ Mentions testing or verification
AI analysis · Informational 23/100

This commit changes how the Lightning node handles a special kind of forwarded payment called a 'trampoline' payment. Previously, trampoline forwards were always rejected. Now, in test builds only, the code allows them through after checking basic fee and timeout (CLTV) rules. The commit also removes one test that expected trampoline forwards to be rejected. This is a development/testing change, not a fix for an active security flaw, and production behavior still rejects these forwards.

Lower-priorityln: handle DecodedOnionFailure for local trampoline failuresby Carla Kirk-Cohen · 4f2429ea · Jul 2, 2026 · 1 fileMessage 95 · StrongLow 26Details
Commit message · Carla Kirk-Cohen

ln: handle DecodedOnionFailure for local trampoline failures

While proper error handling will be added in a followup, we add the
bare minimum required here for testing.

Note that we intentionally keep the behavior of not setting
`payment_failed_permanently` for local failures because we can possibly
retry it because we're the sender as a trampoline forwarder.

For example, a local ChannelClosed error is considered to be permanent,
but we can still retry along another channel.

95/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Explains rationale or failure mode✓ Mentions testing or verification
AI analysis · Low 26/100

This commit fixes a code path in the Lightning Dev Kit where a specific kind of local payment failure (called a 'TrampolineForward' failure) was not being handled. Previously, the code only expected failures from regular outbound routes and would panic with 'unreachable!' if a trampoline forward failure occurred. The change adds handling for that case, returning a decoded failure with no specific short channel ID. It is described by the author as a minimal fix for testing, with fuller error handling planned later.

Lower-priorityln: double encrypt errors received from downstream failuresby Carla Kirk-Cohen · c6adebfd · Jul 2, 2026 · 1 fileMessage 95 · StrongLow 34Details
Commit message · Carla Kirk-Cohen

ln: double encrypt errors received from downstream failures

If we're a trampoline node and received an error from downstream that
we can't fully decrypt, we want to double-wrap it for the original
sender. Previously not implemented because we'd only focused on
receives, where there's no possibility of a downstream error.

While proper error handling will be added in a followup, we add the
bare minimum required here for testing.

95/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Explains rationale or failure mode✓ Mentions testing or verification
AI analysis · Low 34/100

This commit adds missing encryption wrapping for error messages in the Lightning Dev Kit when acting as a 'trampoline' forwarding node. Previously, if a downstream node returned an error that the trampoline could not fully decrypt, the error would not be properly re-wrapped for the original sender. The change ensures the error is encrypted with both the trampoline's own shared secret and the incoming shared secret, so it can travel back to the payer correctly. The commit message explicitly says this is the 'bare minimum' and that proper error handling will follow later.

Security candidateln: add trampoline mpp accumulation with rejection on completionby Carla Kirk-Cohen · 1afd35e6 · Jul 2, 2026 · 2 filesMessage 100 · StrongLow 25Details
Commit message · Carla Kirk-Cohen

ln: add trampoline mpp accumulation with rejection on completion

Add our MPP accumulation logic for trampoline payments, but reject
them when they fully arrive. This allows us to test parts of our
trampoline flow without fully implementing outbound dispatch.

This commit keeps the same first_claimable_htlc debug_assert behavior
as MPP claims, asserting that we do not fail our
check_claimable_incoming_htlc merge for the first HTLC that we add to a
set. This assert can only be hit if our first part exceeds the
`MAX_VALUE_MSAT`, which should not be hit because we check individual
amounts elsewhere in the codebase (the check exists to check that
multiple parts combined don't hit this overflow).

100/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Explains rationale or failure mode✓ Mentions testing or verification✓ Names security-relevant behavior explicitly
Why it was queued
memory safety
AI analysis · Low 25/100

This commit adds partial support in the Lightning Dev Kit node software for receiving and temporarily holding multi-part trampoline payments, then deliberately rejects them once all parts arrive because full outbound forwarding is not yet implemented. It is a development/testing step for the trampoline routing feature, not a finished payment path. The code includes safety checks and debug assertions to catch inconsistent payment data, and it explicitly fails unsupported forwards rather than silently mishandling them.

Lower-priorityMake SpliceFundingFailed::contribution non-optionalby Wilmer Paulino · 13b19c86 · Jul 2, 2026 · 2 filesMessage 73 · AdequateInformational 13Details
Commit message · Wilmer Paulino

Make SpliceFundingFailed::contribution non-optional

`SpliceFundingFailed` is only constructed from a concrete
`FundingContribution`, so store it directly.
`Event::SpliceNegotiationFailed::contribution` still needs to be
optional as it could be read from a prior version that did not store
contribution data.

73/100 · AdequateMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context
AI analysis · Informational 13/100

This commit is a small internal cleanup in the Lightning Dev Kit code. It removes an unnecessary 'Option' wrapper from a data field called `contribution` inside `SpliceFundingFailed`, because that field is always created from a real value. The public `Event::SpliceNegotiationFailed::contribution` field remains optional for backward compatibility with older stored data. There is no security fix here.

Lower-priorityCheck channel is live while handling counterparty tx_init_rbfby Wilmer Paulino · 43c0fc71 · Jul 2, 2026 · 1 fileMessage 73 · AdequateLow 44Details
Commit message · Wilmer Paulino

Check channel is live while handling counterparty tx_init_rbf

This mirrors what we do for counterparty `splice_init` messages, making
sure we don't accept RBFs once a channel has requested shutdown.

73/100 · AdequateMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context
AI analysis · Low 44/100

This commit adds a safety check in the Lightning Dev Kit's code that handles a message called tx_init_rbf, which is used to propose bumping the fee on a channel's on-chain transaction. Before this change, the code did not verify that the channel was still 'live' (active and not shutting down). The fix rejects RBF requests once a channel has requested shutdown, matching an existing safeguard already in place for splice_init messages. The change prevents a counterparty from initiating fee-bump negotiations after shutdown has begun, which could otherwise lead to protocol confusion or inconsistent channel state.

Lower-priorityPrefer tx_abort over disconnection for splice negotiation errorsby Wilmer Paulino · a5d59927 · Jul 2, 2026 · 4 filesMessage 85 · StrongLow 37Details
Commit message · Wilmer Paulino

Prefer tx_abort over disconnection for splice negotiation errors

We keep some `WarnAndDisconnect` cases as mandated by the spec, but
otherwise prefer sending `tx_abort` to terminate quiescence and avoid
reconnection loops.

85/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Explains rationale or failure mode
AI analysis · Low 37/100

This commit changes how the Lightning Dev Kit node responds to mistakes or disagreements during splicing (a way to resize a payment channel). Instead of immediately disconnecting from the peer in many cases, it now sends a 'tx_abort' message. This keeps the connection alive, avoids endless reconnect-and-fail loops, and makes the process more robust. It is a protocol-robustness improvement rather than a fix for a critical vulnerability.

Lower-priorityPrefer tx_abort over disconnection for inability to RBFby Wilmer Paulino · ff3d3886 · Jul 2, 2026 · 3 filesMessage 65 · AdequateLow 37Details
Commit message · Wilmer Paulino

Prefer tx_abort over disconnection for inability to RBF

Send `tx_abort` to terminate quiescence and avoid reconnection loops.

65/100 · AdequateMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides an explanatory body
AI analysis · Low 37/100

This change makes a Lightning node send a 'tx_abort' message instead of disconnecting from a peer when an RBF (fee-bump) request cannot be honored during a splice. The goal is to avoid unnecessary reconnections and keep the channel usable. It is a protocol-robustness improvement rather than a fix for a critical vulnerability.

Lower-priorityAllow invalid contribution error upon quiescenceby Wilmer Paulino · 68c1f21a · Jul 2, 2026 · 1 fileMessage 68 · AdequateInformational 19Details
Commit message · Wilmer Paulino

Allow invalid contribution error upon quiescence

While a contribution may be valid at the time the splice is requested,
quiescence still needs to happen, which can affect the balances of the
channel as it fully settles all pending state. After doing so, it's
possible that the contribution is no longer valid. Since quiescence
itself doesn't have a terminal message, we see a `WarnAndDisconnect`
event happen.

68/100 · AdequateMessage clarity
✓ Descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context
AI analysis · Informational 19/100

This commit updates a fuzz test (a randomized testing harness) to accept one additional warning message when the test framework expects a peer disconnection. The new message, 'contribution no longer valid at quiescence,' is treated as a normal, non-fatal outcome of the splicing/RBF protocol when channel balances settle before the splice proceeds. It is a test-only change and does not alter production code behavior.

Lower-priorityAlways emit SpliceNegotiationFailed when contributingby Wilmer Paulino · 367c657a · Jul 2, 2026 · 2 filesMessage 73 · AdequateLow 32Details
Commit message · Wilmer Paulino

Always emit SpliceNegotiationFailed when contributing

Previously, this could result in an acceptor not receiving a
`Event::SpliceNegotiationFailed` for a splice in which they reused the
same contribution (except for the feerate change). Our API should
guarantee that users should always see `SpliceNegotiated` and
`SpliceNegotiationFailed` events for splices that they contribute to.

73/100 · AdequateMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context
AI analysis · Low 32/100

This patch fixes a bug in Lightning Dev Kit's splicing feature where a channel participant (the 'acceptor') could fail to receive a notification when a splice negotiation they contributed to fell through. Without that notification, the user's wallet software would not know it could safely unlock and reuse the funds it had set aside for the splice. The fix ensures both sides always get a SpliceNegotiationFailed event when a splice they contributed to fails, even if their exact same inputs/outputs were reused from a previous round.

AI review queuedOnly emit Event::SpliceNegotiated when contributingby Wilmer Paulino · 2334a200 · Jul 2, 2026 · 5 filesMessage 73 · AdequateInformational 19Details
Commit message · Wilmer Paulino

Only emit Event::SpliceNegotiated when contributing

There's no need to inform users of negotiated splices when they're not
contributing as it just produces noise. Once they do start contributing,
they cannot stop, so we always emit the event going forward. Note that
we still emit `Event::ChannelReady` with the new locked funding outpoint
for each locked splice, so users can still learn that a splice occurred
that way.

73/100 · AdequateMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context
Why it was queued
signing or wallet pathsecond-pass: security-sensitive path
AI analysis · Informational 19/100

This commit changes when users of the Lightning Dev Kit library are notified about a 'splice'—a way to resize a Lightning channel's on-chain funding. Previously both sides got an event when a splice was negotiated. Now only the side that actually added or removed money (a 'local contribution') gets the event. The other side still learns about the locked splice later through a different event. This is a user-interface cleanup, not a security fix, and does not change how funds are protected.

Lower-priorityln: add awaiting_trampoline_forwards to accumulate inbound MPPby Carla Kirk-Cohen · bfb4acb8 · Jul 2, 2026 · 1 fileMessage 95 · StrongLow 30Details
Commit message · Carla Kirk-Cohen

ln: add awaiting_trampoline_forwards to accumulate inbound MPP

When we are a trampoline router, we need to accumulate incoming HTLCs
(if MPP is used) before forwarding the trampoline-routed outgoing
HTLC(s). This commit adds a new map in channel manager, and mimics the
handling done for claimable_payments.

We will rely on our pending_outbound_payments (which will contain a
payment for trampoline forwards) for completing MPP claims,
not want to surface `PaymentClaimable` events for trampoline,
so do not need to have pending_claiming_payments like we have for MPP
receives.

This map is not persisted, as we're currently working on refactoring
restart logic to depend on channel monitors. We should not use this
accumulation map in production yet, as we can hit a force close if:
- We are used as a trampoline, despite not supporting the feature
- A trampoline MPP part arrives and is committed to the inbound channel
and added to `awaiting_trampoline_forwards`
- We restart and the MPP part is not re-added to
`awaiting_trampoline_forwards`

In this scenario, we will not hit our MPP timeout logic for this HTLC
because we have "forgotten" about it. It will be up to our counterparty
to force close the channel on us, because we're not failing it back
after we hit MPP timeout. Likewise, even if other MPP parts arrive,
we won't consider the inbound accumulation to be complete so we'll fail
them back but forget about the HTLC that came before the restart.

We currently reject trampoline HTLCs earlier in the lifecycle, so we
are not at risk of producing a state that could trigger such a force
close. In the commits that follow, we'll allow forwarding of
trampoline HTLC for tests so that we can start to cover this code.

95/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Explains rationale or failure mode✓ Mentions testing or verification
AI analysis · Low 30/100

This commit adds a new internal bookkeeping map for a not-yet-enabled feature called trampoline routing. The commit itself is defensive: it documents that the new map is intentionally not saved to disk and warns that using it in production could cause a channel force-close after a restart. Because the feature is currently rejected earlier in the code path, the commit says the risky state cannot be reached today. It is best read as a work-in-progress foundation rather than an active vulnerability.

Lower-priorityln: use outer onion values for trampoline NextPacketDetailsby Carla Kirk-Cohen · 52f2394a · Jul 2, 2026 · 1 fileMessage 85 · StrongModerate 60Details
Commit message · Carla Kirk-Cohen

ln: use outer onion values for trampoline NextPacketDetails

When we receive trampoline payments, we first want to validate the
values in our outer onion to ensure that we've been given the amount/
expiry that the sender was intending us to receive to make sure that
forwarding nodes haven't sent us less than they should.

85/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Explains rationale or failure mode
Why it was queued
defensive validation
AI analysis · Moderate 60/100

This change fixes how trampoline-style Lightning payments decide how much money and when (time lock) to forward to the next hop. Previously the code used values from the inner trampoline onion, which could differ from what the forwarding node actually received in the outer onion. Now it uses the outer onion values, so a forwarding node cannot silently pay the next hop less than it should while still satisfying the inner trampoline instructions. This prevents a potential fee/amount mismatch in multi-hop trampoline routing.

Lower-priorityln: store next trampoline amount and cltv in PendingHTLCRoutingby Carla Kirk-Cohen · e14a28dd · Jul 2, 2026 · 2 filesMessage 73 · AdequateLow 29Details
Commit message · Carla Kirk-Cohen

ln: store next trampoline amount and cltv in PendingHTLCRouting

When we're forwarding a trampoline payment, we need to remember the
amount and CLTV that the next trampoline is expecting.

73/100 · AdequateMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context
AI analysis · Low 29/100

This commit changes how Lightning trampoline payments are tracked internally. It stores the amount and expiry time that the next trampoline hop expects, so the node remembers them when forwarding a payment. The change looks like a correctness fix for trampoline routing rather than a typical security bug, but without the surrounding code it is hard to tell whether the missing fields previously caused fee or expiry mismatches that could be exploited.

Lower-priorityln: use outer onion values in PendingHTLCInfo for trampolineby Carla Kirk-Cohen · c58d1d83 · Jul 2, 2026 · 1 fileMessage 85 · StrongModerate 59Details
Commit message · Carla Kirk-Cohen

ln: use outer onion values in PendingHTLCInfo for trampoline

When we are a trampoline node receiving an incoming HTLC, we need access
to our outer onion's amount_to_forward to check that we have been
forwarded the correct amount. We can't use the amount in the inner
onion, because that contains our fee budget - somebody could forward us
less than we were intended to receive, and provided it is within the
trampoline fee budget we wouldn't know.

In this commit we set our outer onion values in PendingHTLCInfo to
perform this validation properly. In the commit that follows, we'll
start tracking our expected trampoline values in trampoline-specific
routing info.

85/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Explains rationale or failure mode
AI analysis · Moderate 59/100

This commit fixes a bug in how trampoline routing nodes validate incoming Lightning payments. Previously, the node used values from the inner (trampoline) onion, which included the fee budget, to check whether it received the correct amount. A malicious or buggy upstream node could forward less money than intended, and as long as the shortfall stayed within the fee budget, the trampoline node would not detect it. The patch makes the node use the outer onion's stated amount instead, so it can verify it actually received what it was supposed to before forwarding.

Lower-priorityln: store incoming mpp data in PendingHTLCRoutingby Carla Kirk-Cohen · a1260ed1 · Jul 2, 2026 · 2 filesMessage 68 · AdequateLow 25Details
Commit message · Carla Kirk-Cohen

ln: store incoming mpp data in PendingHTLCRouting

When we receive a trampoline forward, we need to wait for MPP parts to
arrive at our node before we can forward the outgoing payment onwards.
This commit threads this information through to our pending htlc struct
which we'll use to validate the parts we receive.

68/100 · AdequateMessage clarity
✓ Descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context
Why it was queued
defensive validation
AI analysis · Low 25/100

This commit is a small code change that stores extra multi-path payment (MPP) information when a trampoline forward is received. It appears to be a preparatory step for validating incoming payment parts before forwarding them onward. There is no direct evidence in the commit that this fixes an active security vulnerability; it reads more like internal plumbing for an unfinished feature.

Lower-priorityln: use total_msat to calculate the amount for our next trampolineby Carla Kirk-Cohen · 3e162db9 · Jul 2, 2026 · 1 fileMessage 85 · StrongModerate 59Details
Commit message · Carla Kirk-Cohen

ln: use total_msat to calculate the amount for our next trampoline

For regular blinded forwards, it's okay to use the amount in our
update_add_htlc to calculate the amount that we need to foward onwards
because we're only expecting on HTLC in and one HTLC out.

For blinded trampoline forwards, it's possible that we have multiple
incoming HTLCs that need to accumulate at our node that make our total
incoming amount from which we'll calculate the amount that we need to
forward onwards to the next trampoline. This commit updates our next
trampoline amount calculation to use the total intended incoming amount
for the payment so we can correctly calculate our next trampoline's
amount.

`decode_incoming_update_add_htlc_onion` is left unchanged because
the call to `check_blinded` will be removed in upcoming commits.

85/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Explains rationale or failure mode
AI analysis · Moderate 59/100

This commit fixes a bug in how the Lightning Dev Kit calculates the amount to forward when acting as a trampoline node for blinded multi-path payments. Previously, the code used the amount from a single incoming payment packet, which could be too small when several partial payments are meant to combine. The fix uses the intended total payment amount instead, preventing the node from rejecting or misrouting trampoline forwards that arrive in multiple pieces.

Security candidateln: remove incoming trampoline secret from HTLCSourceby Carla Kirk-Cohen · 816b866d · Jul 2, 2026 · 1 fileMessage 85 · StrongInformational 23Details
Commit message · Carla Kirk-Cohen

ln: remove incoming trampoline secret from HTLCSource

We don't need to track a single trampoline secret in our HTLCSource
because this is already tracked in each of our previous hops contained
in the source. This field was unnecessarily added under the belief that
each inner trampoline onion we receive for inbound MPP trampoline would
have the same session key.

It can be removed with breaking changes to persistence because we
currently refuse to decode trampoline forwards, and will not read
HTLCSource::Trampoline to prevent downgrades.

85/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Explains rationale or failure mode
Why it was queued
update trust
AI analysis · Informational 23/100

This commit removes a redundant 32-byte shared secret field from an internal data structure used when forwarding trampoline payments in the Lightning Dev Kit. The developers realized the secret was already stored inside each previous hop's data, so keeping a single copy at the top level was unnecessary. The change also updates serialization so older saved state cannot be cleanly loaded, but the code currently refuses to decode trampoline forwards anyway, so that downgrade risk is intentional and noted.

Lower-priorityln/refactor: use amount_msat and counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat varsby Carla Kirk-Cohen · 53ce5590 · Jul 2, 2026 · 1 fileMessage 50 · ThinInformational 15Details
Commit message · Carla Kirk-Cohen

ln/refactor: use amount_msat and counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat vars

Followup from prefactor PR.

50/100 · ThinMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component! No meaningful explanatory body
AI analysis · Informational 15/100

This is a small code cleanup that replaces two computed expressions with variables already available in scope. It does not change behavior, fix a bug, or address any security issue.

AI review queuedFix Joost's Forgejo usernameby Elias Rohrer · ade3b6bd · Jul 2, 2026 · 1 fileMessage 68 · AdequateInformational 15Details
Commit message · Elias Rohrer

Fix Joost's Forgejo username

Use the account name present on this Forgejo instance so Joost stays
in the reviewer rotation.

Co-Authored-By: HAL 9000

68/100 · AdequateMessage clarity
✓ Descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context
Why it was queued
signing or wallet pathsecond-pass: security-sensitive path
AI analysis · Informational 15/100

This commit simply corrects a username in an automated reviewer assignment workflow. It changes one reviewer handle from 'joost_spiral' to 'joostjager' so the right person stays in the rotation. There is no security issue here.

Security candidateUse Forgejo OIDC for review requestsby Elias Rohrer · 57c84bca · Jul 2, 2026 · 1 fileMessage 73 · AdequateInformational 19Details
Commit message · Elias Rohrer

Use Forgejo OIDC for review requests

Request a local Authorized Integration JWT in the reviewer workflow.

Use bearer authorization for the reviewer request API call.

This avoids a long-lived user token.

The workflow still gets the missing reviewer-request capability.

Co-Authored-By: HAL 9000

73/100 · AdequateMessage clarity
✓ Descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Names security-relevant behavior explicitly
Why it was queued
access controlsigning or wallet path
AI analysis · Informational 19/100

This commit changes the project's automated reviewer-assignment workflow to stop using a long-lived secret token and instead request a short-lived authentication token from the Forgejo CI service. This is a security-hardening improvement: it reduces the risk that a stolen or leaked long-lived token could be misused. There is no indication of an active vulnerability being fixed, and the change itself does not introduce obvious new weaknesses.

Lower-priorityUpdate upstream CHANGELOG with latest 0.1/0.2 releasesby Matt Corallo · d2b3a786 · Jul 2, 2026 · 1 fileMessage 50 · ThinInformational 15Details
Commit message · Matt Corallo

Update upstream CHANGELOG with latest 0.1/0.2 releases

50/100 · ThinMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component! No meaningful explanatory body
Why it was queued
documentation-only discount
AI analysis · Informational 15/100

This commit only updates the CHANGELOG.md file to add release notes for versions 0.2.4, 0.1.11, 0.2.3, and 0.1.10. It does not change any source code, build scripts, tests, or configuration. The changelog text describes security fixes that were already made in earlier commits, but this documentation-only commit itself does not introduce or fix any vulnerability.