Every captured commit receives deterministic security triage and a separate communication-quality score. Security candidates and broader second-pass signals receive full-patch Ollama analysis.
Message quality measures whether a commit identifies its scope, purpose, rationale, testing, and supporting references. It does not change the security-severity score.
This commit updates the PostgreSQL database driver used by Eclair from version 42.7.11 to 42.7.12. It is a routine dependency bump by an automated tool. The commit itself does not say what bugs the new driver fixes, but small point-release…
Dependency version bump of a database driverPoint-release upgrade may include upstream security fixes, but none are named in the commitNo application code changes or direct vulnerability evidence in the diff
This commit updates Eclair's Bitcoin library dependency from version 0.48 to 0.49, which internally uses newer versions of bitcoin-kmp and secp256k1-kmp. The code changes only replace old property accesses (like `.txid`) with new method ca…
Dependency version bump for Bitcoin and secp256k1 cryptographic librariesSource changes are API adaptations (.txid -> .getTxid), not logic changesSecurity-critical validation code is touched (PSBT/transaction integrity checks against malicious Bitcoin Core)
This commit is a routine build-system update. It upgrades several Maven plugin versions, removes the git commit ID from one jar manifest field to avoid a build-time circular dependency, and adds an optional build profile for a fuzz-testing…
This commit closes a cross-site request forgery (CSRF) hole in Eclair's admin API. Before the change, a malicious web page visited by a node operator could silently submit authenticated API requests (for example, to send funds or close Lig…
New origin-check directive rejecting all requests with an Origin headerRemoval of CORS response headers from API responsesCSRF protection described in commit message and release notes
This commit is a routine post-release housekeeping change. It bumps the project version from 0.14.3 to 0.15.0-SNAPSHOT across several build files, re-enables a Maven trusted-checksum feature used for build verification, adds a placeholder …
No security-relevant code changesNo vulnerability indicatorsNo bug fixes or patches
This commit adjusts build packaging settings to make compiled releases more reproducible across different computers. It sets consistent file permissions and line endings for packaged documentation and runtime files. There is no indication …
This is a large security patch for the Eclair Lightning node that fixes multiple ways an attacker could steal funds, burn money to miners, or lock funds forever. The fixes include: preventing force-closes with un-publishable splice transac…
Force-close uses latest publishable commitment to avoid unconfirmable splice commit txsClosing fee bounded by maxClosingFeerate when local node pays feesNew max-funding-feerate configuration caps funding/splice miner fees
This change expands when Eclair will allow password-based authentication to a Tor control port. Previously, only loopback addresses (the same machine) were considered safe enough for password auth. Now, private/site-local and link-local ne…
Relaxation of authentication-method restriction for Tor control portPassword authentication now permitted on site-local and link-local addressesOriginal code explicitly rejected password auth for non-loopback addresses
This commit is a routine post-release housekeeping change. It bumps the project version from 0.14.2 to 0.15.0-SNAPSHOT, re-enables a Maven trusted-checksum feature used for build verification, adds a placeholder release-notes file, and del…
No security-relevant code changes indicating a vulnerabilityBoot.scala startup guard prevents accidental deployment of an unsafe development snapshotMaven trusted checksum verification is re-enabled, improving supply-chain/build integrity
This commit hardens Eclair's handling of the Lightning 'splicing' feature when a peer misbehaves. Splicing lets two nodes resize an open payment channel without closing it on-chain. The patch adds extra checks so that if a peer sends unexp…
Adds commitment-index consistency checks before completing splice/RBF funding attemptsRejects forbidden update messages while remote peer is quiescingRejects commit_sig during quiescence to prevent commitment-index desync
This commit adds a safety net to the Eclair Lightning node to limit how many incoming peer connections can sit unfinished before completing the cryptographic handshake. Previously, an attacker could open many TCP connections and leave them…
Resource-exhaustion mitigation: bounds unauthenticated incoming connections to prevent memory/file-descriptor/CPU exhaustionNew kill reason TooManyPendingConnections added to PeerConnection.KillReasonNew metrics incomingconnections.pending/evicted/rejected for monitoring abuse
This commit fixes three security issues in how Eclair connects to the Tor network and stores sensitive files. First, it changes the default Tor authentication from password to safecookie, and blocks password mode when the Tor control port …
Default authentication changed from password to safecookiePassword authentication rejected for remote Tor control portsTor cookie length validated to be exactly 32 bytes
This commit fixes a bug in the Eclair Lightning node where a peer could send a message containing both a correct standard signature and an incorrect partial signature. The old code would verify the correct signature but then store the inva…
Type-confusion between IndividualSignature and PartialSignatureWithNonce in channel messagesInvalid partial signature could be stored after valid individual signature was verifiedNew signatureFor helper enforces commitment-format-aware signature selection
This change makes the Eclair Lightning node force-close a payment channel if a peer tries to add a payment whose timeout value (cltv_expiry) is 500,000,000 or higher. Such large values are invalid according to the Lightning BOLT 2 specific…
BOLT 2 compliance check added for HTLC cltv_expiry >= 500,000,000Invalid cltv_expiry now triggers local error and channel force-closeOff-by-one fix in locktime threshold interpretation (<= changed to <)
This commit adds a new optional encrypted payload to Lightning payment fulfillment messages. It is a feature implementation, not a fix for an active vulnerability. The code does introduce a safety check: if a peer sends an oversized fulfil…
New cryptographic payload handling added to payment fulfillment pathSize limits and silent truncation applied to failure packets, fulfillment payloads, and attribution dataChannel force-close triggered on oversized peer fulfillment payload
This commit fixes five low-severity security or robustness issues in the Eclair Lightning node. It removes a risky type cast that could crash the node on corrupted channel data, forces encrypted cluster communication to prevent private dat…
Unsafe type cast removed from channel codecCluster mode now requires tls-tcp transportAPI error responses no longer include exception messages
This commit fixes a bug in the Eclair Lightning node where, after a restart, the node could be tricked into keeping the wrong incoming payments alive. An attacker could reuse the same payment identifier (payment_hash) from a legitimate in-…
Fixes a logic bug that could lead to forced channel closuresAttack vector: payment_hash reuse to pin unrelated HTLCsChanges identifier from payment_hash to unique (channel_id, htlc_id)
This commit only updates user documentation. It adds warnings that the Bitcoin node (bitcoind) should run on the same machine as Eclair, and if it runs remotely, operators must use a secure encrypted tunnel. No code was changed, so this pa…
Documentation-only changeNo code, configuration, or cryptographic modificationsDescribes pre-existing deployment risk rather than a new vulnerability
This commit fixes several bugs in Eclair's 'on-the-fly funding' feature, which lets a node open a Lightning channel and pay for it using future payment fees. The bugs could allow a malicious peer to make the node pay twice, lose money on f…
Double-payment vulnerability fixed: paymentAlreadyRelayed now checks commitment transactions in addition to pending local changes, preventing relay of already-cross-signed HTLCs after restart.Loss-of-funds vulnerability fixed: funded channels with unpaid future-HTLC fees are force-closed before upstream HTLCs are failed, avoiding a race where the peer fulfills a cross-signed downstream HTLC after we failed upstream.Upstream settlement gap fixed: preimages received after HTLC expiry are now relayed upstream, preventing the node from paying downstream without being paid upstream.
This commit tightens file and folder permissions for Eclair's sensitive data. It ensures that seed files (which protect the node's identity and Lightning channel funds) and the data directory are readable only by the owner on Linux/macOS s…
Hardening of seed file permissions to owner-only read/writeHardening of datadir and chaindir permissions to owner-onlyMigration path also re-permissions copied seed files
It saves tedious double parentheses: `FeeratePerKw(FeeratePerByte(1 sat))` -> `FeeratePerByte(1 sat).perKw`.
68/100 · AdequateMessage clarity
✓ Descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides an explanatory body✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference
Why it was queued
parser or protocol pathsecond-pass: security-sensitive path
AI analysis · Informational 15/100
This commit is a pure code cleanup: it replaces nested constructor calls like FeeratePerKw(FeeratePerByte(x)) with new helper methods like x.perKw. The math and behavior are unchanged; only the syntax is shorter and more readable.
We force a re-encoding of all channel data using v5 codecs when updating eclair. This will allow us to remove support for previous codecs in a later release. If users try to directly upgrade to a release that does not contain the legacy codecs, we'll fail at start-up and tell them to first update to the release that contains this migration code as an intermediate step.
We plan to remove support for channels that aren't using anchor outputs, so we add a warning in the logs and a command to help users close such existing channels.
76/100 · AdequateMessage clarity
✓ Descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference
AI analysis · Low 29/100
This commit is a planned database migration for the Eclair Lightning node software. When users upgrade, it automatically re-encodes all stored payment-channel data to a newer internal format (v5). The change also warns users that older 'non-anchor' channels will no longer be supported in the next release and should be closed. There is no direct security vulnerability in the patch itself; it is a cleanup step to let the developers remove legacy code later.
Lower-priorityUse balance estimates from past payments in path-finding (#2308)by Thomas HUET · d4dfb864 · Sep 8, 2025 · 10 filesMessage 81 · StrongInformational 20Details
Commit message · Thomas HUET
Use balance estimates from past payments in path-finding (#2308)
We estimate the probability that a given route can relay a given payment as part of route selection. Until now this estimate was naively assuming the channel balances to be uniformly distributed. We will now use data from past payment attempts (both successes and failures) to provide a better estimate, hopefully improving route selection.
81/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference
AI analysis · Informational 20/100
This commit improves Eclair's Lightning payment routing by optionally using past payment successes and failures to estimate how much money each channel can forward, instead of assuming balances are random. It is a feature enhancement, not a security patch. There is no indication in the commit or supplied references that it fixes a vulnerability.
We previously only allowed the opener to RBF a dual-funded channel. This is not consistent with splicing, where both peers can initiate RBF. There is no technical reason to restrict the channel creation, we can allow the non-initiator to RBF if they wish to do so.
The only subtlety is in the case where there is a liquidity purchase. In that case we want the opener to be the only one allowed to RBF to guarantee that we keep the liquidity purchase (since the initiator is the only one that can purchase liquidity).
76/100 · AdequateMessage clarity
✓ Descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference
AI analysis · Low 32/100
This commit changes the Eclair Lightning node software so that either party—not just the channel opener—can propose a fee bump (RBF) during dual-funded channel creation. It also adds a guard to prevent the non-opener from overriding a liquidity purchase. The change is a feature alignment with splicing behavior, not a reported security fix, and the commit message does not describe any vulnerability.
Allow overriding `max-closing-feerate` with `forceclose` API (#3142)
We introduced a mechanism to limit the feerate used for non-urgent force-close transactions in #3097. We now provide a way to update this feerate on a per-channel basis, without restarting the eclair node, by using the `forceclose` API.
Fixes #3108.
81/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference
AI analysis · Low 26/100
This commit adds an optional API parameter to the Eclair Lightning node that lets an operator override the maximum on-chain fee rate when force-closing a channel. It is a feature enhancement, not a fix for a known vulnerability. The change gives node operators more control over how quickly force-close transactions confirm, but it does not by itself create a way for an outsider to steal funds or take over the node. The main security consideration is that a user who sets the override too high could pay unexpectedly large transaction fees during a force close.
We cannot rely on the `shortChannelId` to choose which output of the funding transaction is the channel output, because in some cases the `shortChannelId` isn't properly filled (e.g. private channels).
We instead use the commit tx input which should always be correctly set.
93/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Explains rationale or failure mode✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference
AI analysis · Low 41/100
This commit fixes a data migration bug in the Eclair Lightning node. When older channel data is upgraded to a newer storage format, the code now uses the actual commit transaction input to identify the channel's funding output, instead of relying on the shortChannelId. The old approach could pick the wrong output for private channels where the shortChannelId is not reliably set, potentially leading to incorrect channel state after an upgrade.
Lower-priorityAdd `GossipTimestampFilter` buffer during gossip queries to fix flaky tests (#3152)by Thomas HUET · 50f16cbd · Sep 4, 2025 · 1 fileMessage 100 · StrongInformational 18Details
Commit message · Thomas HUET
Add `GossipTimestampFilter` buffer during gossip queries to fix flaky tests (#3152)
In a network Alice -- Bob - Carol, we could have - Alice creates a channel update, Bob and Carol do not know it yet. - Carol syncs with Bob and sends a `GossipTimestampFilter` with the current timestamp - Bob receives the channel update from Alice but does not propagate it to Carol because it is too old for the `GossipTimestampFilter`
To prevent this from happening, we add a buffer of one minute to allow gossip to propagate.
This is unlikely to happen in real life but was making some tests flaky.
100/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Explains rationale or failure mode✓ Mentions testing or verification✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference
AI analysis · Informational 18/100
This commit tweaks how Eclair nodes request network routing gossip from peers. It subtracts one minute from the starting timestamp filter so that very recent routing announcements that haven't yet reached the peer are still forwarded. The change is described by the authors as fixing flaky tests rather than a real-world security bug, and it slightly reduces the chance of a node missing fresh channel updates during sync.
Adjust `batch_size` on `commit_sig` retransmission (#3147)
If we send a batch of `commit_sig` while our peer is sending their `splice_locked` and we disconnect before receiving `revoke_and_ack`, we will have less `commit_sig` messages to send on reconnection. But we were still sending the old `batch_size`, so our peer was expecting more `commit_sig` messages and waiting indefinitely.
This shows how hacky the `batch_size` mechanism is: fortunately, it was removed from the official splice spec and replaced by the funding txid matching the commitment, which gets rid of this edge case entirely. But for existing phoenix users, while the splice spec isn't finalized, we need to fix this scenario.
81/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference
AI analysis · Moderate 57/100
This commit fixes a Lightning Network channel bug where, after a disconnect, one side could re-send an outdated 'batch_size' value in commitment signature messages. The peer would then wait forever for extra messages that no longer exist, causing the payment channel to stall. The fix recalculates the correct batch size from the current active commitments before retransmission.
AI review queuedFix minor incompatibilities with feature branches (#3148)by Bastien Teinturier · 3d5fd334 · Sep 1, 2025 · 9 filesMessage 81 · StrongInformational 18Details
Commit message · Bastien Teinturier
Fix minor incompatibilities with feature branches (#3148)
* Fix conflict with custom TLVs for `prevtxout`
We already use TLV types 1107 and 1109 for our experimental swap-in-potentiam implementation.
* Store spent outpoints for confirmed funding txs
This can be used in feature branches to catch double-spending issues across interactive-tx sessions early in the flow.
81/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference
Why it was queued
parser or protocol pathsecond-pass: security-sensitive path
AI analysis · Informational 18/100
This is a small internal maintenance patch for the Eclair Lightning node. It changes an experimental message code number to avoid clashing with another in-development feature, and it starts recording which previous transaction inputs were spent by confirmed funding transactions. There is no direct security fix for a currently exploitable bug; it is preparation/cleanup for feature branches.
AI review queuedSplit commit nonces from funding nonce in `tx_complete` (#3145)by Bastien Teinturier · d7ee6638 · Aug 25, 2025 · 7 filesMessage 81 · StrongLow 25Details
Commit message · Bastien Teinturier
Split commit nonces from funding nonce in `tx_complete` (#3145)
The commit nonces and funding nonce provided in `tx_complete` are actually completely orthogonal:
- the commit nonces must be provided whenever the *next* commitment format is using taproot - the funding nonce must be provided whenever the *previous* commitment format is using taproot
It thus makes more sense to split them into separate TLVs.
81/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference
Why it was queued
parser or protocol pathsecond-pass: broader security terminologysecond-pass: security-sensitive path
AI analysis · Low 25/100
This commit refactors how cryptographic nonces are packaged inside a Lightning protocol message called tx_complete. Previously, two unrelated nonce types were bundled together; now they are split into separate optional data fields. The change is a protocol cleanup and does not by itself fix a known exploit, but it removes a design ambiguity that could lead to incorrect nonce handling during taproot channel funding or splicing.
Allow omitting `previousTx` for taproot splices (#3143)
When splicing a taproot channel, both participants will provide a signature for a segwit v1 input: this signature will cover every spent `txOut`, including their amount and script. This ensures that attackers cannot reuse a signature while replacing a segwit input with a non-segwit input, which could be used to steal funds.
A side-effect of this change in signature behavior is that we don't need to provide the entire previous transaction when both channel participants sign a taproot input. For simplicity, we only allow this simplification when splicing taproot channels for now. We can also allow channel creation based on swap-in-potentiam, which also uses musig2 and has the same non-malleability guarantee (on feature branches for phoenix users).
86/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference✓ Names security-relevant behavior explicitly
Why it was queued
explicit security languagesigning boundaryparser or protocol path
AI analysis · Low 28/100
This commit changes how Eclair handles taproot channel splicing. Normally, when two parties build a shared Bitcoin transaction together, each must send the full previous transaction that created the coins being spent. For taproot channels, the commit allows sending only the relevant output details instead, because taproot signatures already protect against a specific malleability trick. The change is framed as a bandwidth optimization and is restricted to taproot splicing to preserve security guarantees.
We add new commitment formats and TLV extensions to include musig2 nonces. This includes a specific commitment format for phoenix taproot channels.
The old v1 channel establishment protocol is updated to include nonces and partial signatures.
The v2 channel estalishment protocol, based on the interactive tx constuction protocol, is also updated, and the interactive tx session now includes: - an optional funding nonce for the shared input (i.e. the funding tx that is being spent) - a nonce for the commit tx that is being created, and another nonce that will become the channel's "next remote nonce" once the session completes The funding nonce is random and its lifecycle is bound to the interactive session.
Side note: the new v2 protocol is both simpler to extend and gives us support for dual-funding and splices.
Since there can be several different commitment transactions that valid at the same time while splices are pending, revoke_and_ack and channel_restablish are extended to include a list of funding_tx_id -> nonce tuples (one for each active commitment).
channel_restablish also includes as an optional "current commit nonce": if we got disconnected while a splice was in progress before both nodes exchanged their commit signatures: if that is the case, we need to re-send our peer's current signature and will use this nonce to compute it.
We also update the simple close protocol to include closing nonces.
We allow upgrading channels to taproot during splices, with an optional channel_type TLV added to splice_init/splice_ack. This is not part of the BOLT proposal, and upgrading is currently limited to phoenix taproot channels from phoenix anchor channels.
71/100 · AdequateMessage clarity
✓ Descriptive subject✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference✓ Names security-relevant behavior explicitly
Why it was queued
signing boundarynonce handlingcryptography-sensitive pathsigning or wallet pathparser or protocol path
AI analysis · Low 32/100
This is a large feature commit that adds support for a new kind of Bitcoin Lightning channel using Taproot and MuSig2 signatures. It changes how channels are opened, spliced, re-established after disconnections, and closed. The commit is primarily a protocol upgrade, not a stated security fix. However, because it touches sensitive signing logic and introduces new nonce handling, there is a moderate risk that mistakes in the new code could affect channel safety or allow a malicious peer to cause problems. The commit message does not describe this as fixing a known vulnerability.
Extract `CommitParams` to individual commitments (#3118)
We introduce a new channel codec version where:
- we extract per-commitment parameters (commitment format and params such as `dust_limit` which we may want to dynamically update in the future) - we clean-up the splice iterations on the `Commitments` structure - we remove the funding transaction from the confirmed local funding status (once confirmed, we don't need it anymore: it is wasting DB space for no good reason, we can get it from the blockchain) - we add a `maxClosingFeerate_opt` to the closing state, to allow limiting the feerate used in RBF attempts for safe transactions - we add the commitment format to interactive-tx parameters - we make channel type feature non permanent
We add a mechanism to prevent the node from starting-up, unless an override is provided. This provides an opportunity to iterate on codecs while knowing that node operators won't be affected if we make changes that are backwards-incompatible. This is meant to be temporary.
93/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Explains rationale or failure mode✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference
Why it was queued
cryptography-sensitive pathsigning or wallet path
AI analysis · Low 35/100
This is a large internal refactoring of Eclair's Lightning channel data structures. It moves commitment-specific settings (such as dust limits and HTLC limits) from the overall channel parameters into each individual commitment, so future splices can change them. It also removes the full confirmed funding transaction from the local database record, adds a cap on closing fee rates for RBF attempts, and introduces a startup-blocking guard when the database serialization format changes. The commit is not described by the vendor as a security fix; it is a forward-looking infrastructure change with some safety mechanisms.
AI review queuedOffers with currency must set amount. (#3140)by Thomas HUET · b651e5b9 · Aug 19, 2025 · 2 filesMessage 78 · AdequateLow 40Details
Commit message · Thomas HUET
Offers with currency must set amount. (#3140)
Adds check and corresponding test from lightning/bolts#1279
78/100 · AdequateMessage clarity
✓ Descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides an explanatory body✓ Mentions testing or verification✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference
Why it was queued
parser or protocol pathsecond-pass: security-sensitive path
AI analysis · Low 40/100
This commit adds a missing validation rule for a type of Bitcoin Lightning payment request called a BOLT12 offer. Previously, Eclair would accept offers that named a fiat currency (like USD) but did not include an amount. That combination is invalid according to the Lightning specification, because a currency without an amount is meaningless. The fix rejects such malformed offers and adds a test case. The main risk is that an attacker could trick a node into accepting or acting on an ambiguous offer, potentially leading to incorrect pricing, payment routing confusion, or interoperability failures with other implementations.
Lower-priorityUse actual CLTV delta for reputation (#3134)by Thomas HUET · 5703cd45 · Aug 18, 2025 · 11 filesMessage 76 · AdequateLow 41Details
Commit message · Thomas HUET
Use actual CLTV delta for reputation (#3134)
When computing reputation, instead of using a fixed multiplier for pending HTLCs, we now use the CLTV expiry of the HTLC (assuming a new block is mined every 10 minutes). The reason for the fixed multiplier was that a HTLC with the maximum CLTV delta could stay pending for several orders of magnitude longer than a regular HTLC and would have an oversized impact on the reputation. We mitigate this by increasing the expected settlement time (from a few seconds to a few minutes), using more historical data (increasing the half-life), and counting on the fact that most HTLCs will have a CLTV expiry a lot lower than the maximum.
76/100 · AdequateMessage clarity
✓ Descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference
AI analysis · Low 41/100
This commit changes how Eclair estimates the trustworthiness (reputation) of other Lightning nodes when deciding whether to forward payments. Previously, pending payments were penalized using a fixed multiplier that did not reflect how long an HTLC could actually stay locked. Now the penalty is based on the real CLTV expiry (the deadline by which the payment must settle on-chain), assuming each block takes about 10 minutes. The change also increases the half-life of reputation data from 15 to 30 days and raises the 'max-relay-duration' threshold from 12 seconds to 5 minutes. It is a defensive hardening change against channel-jamming attacks, not a fix for an active exploit or a disclosed vulnerability.
Add test vectors from https://github.com/lightning/bolts/pull/1276 and https://github.com/lightning/bolts/pull/1264
78/100 · AdequateMessage clarity
✓ Descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides an explanatory body✓ Mentions testing or verification✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference
Why it was queued
fuzzing or regression evidence
AI analysis · Informational 15/100
This commit only adds new test cases for invoice parsing. It does not change any production code, so it cannot introduce a security vulnerability or fix one. The tests verify that the software correctly handles recently published standard test vectors for Bitcoin Lightning invoices, including a valid mainnet invoice with a modern address format and an invalid offer with a malformed currency code.