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Low 32 Bitcoin

Allow non-initiator RBF for dual funding (#3021)

Public commit record

What the developer wrote

Authored by Bastien Teinturier

76/100 · Adequate
Allow non-initiator RBF for dual funding (#3021)

We previously only allowed the opener to RBF a dual-funded channel.
This is not consistent with splicing, where both peers can initiate
RBF. There is no technical reason to restrict the channel creation,
we can allow the non-initiator to RBF if they wish to do so.

The only subtlety is in the case where there is a liquidity purchase.
In that case we want the opener to be the only one allowed to RBF to
guarantee that we keep the liquidity purchase (since the initiator is
the only one that can purchase liquidity).
✓ Descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference
The short version

What changed, and why it matters

This commit changes the Eclair Lightning node software so that either party—not just the channel opener—can propose a fee bump (RBF) during dual-funded channel creation. It also adds a guard to prevent the non-opener from overriding a liquidity purchase. The change is a feature alignment with splicing behavior, not a reported security fix, and the commit message does not describe any vulnerability.

Recommended action

Review as a normal feature change. Verify that the new liquidity-purchase guard and isInitiator flag handling correctly prevent loss of liquidity purchase metadata and do not introduce state inconsistencies during concurrent RBF attempts. No immediate security response is indicated by the supplied materials.

Security signals we found

01

Access-control change: broadens who can initiate RBF

02

New guard added to protect liquidity purchase state across RBF

03

No mention of CVE, vulnerability, or security bug in commit or supplied references

04

Test coverage added for non-initiator RBF and liquidity-purchase rejection

Risk score

Why this scored 32/100

Our methodology →
Potential impact 5/30
Exploitability 5/25
Stealth signal 5/15
Affected reach 5/15
Confidence 8/10
Evidence quality 4/5
Human-validated context

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