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Eclair

Scala implementation of a Lightning Network node.

BitcoinLightning NetworkNormal
Repository coverage

231 commits in the local evidence base

Every captured commit receives deterministic security triage and a separate communication-quality score. Security candidates and broader second-pass signals receive full-patch Ollama analysis.

66security candidates48second-pass queue208AI analyses
4commits · 30 days
26commits · 60 days
80commits · 180 days
161commits · 365 days
Backfill bands
Aug 5 → Feb 691 seen11 candidatesComplete
Feb 6 → Jun 660 seen5 candidatesComplete
Jun 6 → Jul 62 seen0 candidatesComplete
Jul 6 → Aug 514 seen0 candidatesComplete
Commit communication

Does the history explain itself?

Message quality measures whether a commit identifies its scope, purpose, rationale, testing, and supporting references. It does not change the security-severity score.

78/100 average clarity
143Strong · 80–100
54Adequate · 60–79
23Thin · 40–59
11Opaque · 0–39
3security candidates with opaque commit messaging
Read the scoring rubric →
Developer activity

Who is changing the project?

Public Git author strings; identities are not independently verified.

DeveloperCommitsCandidatesAnalyzedHigh riskMessage avg.
pm47451633876
Bastien Teinturier13332127581
Fabrice Drouin291424269
Thomas HUET16116075
rorp313069
Nishant Bansal212084
dependabot[bot]111081
ekzyis101058
Rusty Russell101081
Analysis record

Published AI watches

Last scanned 3 minutes ago

Informational 15 AI analysisMessage 36 · Opaque
AQ ACINQEclair BitcoinLightning Network

Back to dev (#3424)

This commit is a routine post-release housekeeping change. It bumps the software version from 0.14.6 to 0.15.0-SNAPSHOT across several build files, adds a blank release-notes template for the next version, and intentionally adds a startup …

Startup guard added to block accidental execution of development snapshotNo vulnerability fix, cryptographic change, or trust-boundary modification present
c96c3d44by Fabrice Drouin+73−57 files
No security note in commit
High 74 AI analysisMessage 53 · Thin
AQ ACINQEclair BitcoinLightning Network

Eclair v0.14.6 release (#3420)

This commit is the release packaging for Eclair v0.14.6. The release notes explicitly state it contains 'security hardening fixes' that can be exploited by malicious nodes, and thank a researcher for responsible disclosure. The actual code…

Vendor release notes explicitly label the release as containing 'security hardening fixes' exploitable by malicious nodesNew default-on configuration `require-confirmed-inputs-for-splicing` mitigates unconfirmed-input double-spend risk during splicingRelease notes credit @erickcestari for responsible disclosures
50e046efby Fabrice Drouin+28−198 files
Vendor flagged security relevance
High 72 AI analysisMessage 88 · Strong
AQ ACINQEclair BitcoinLightning Network

Splicing robustness improvements (#3417)

This commit hardens Eclair's Lightning channel 'splicing' feature against a malicious peer. Splicing lets users resize a channel by creating a new funding transaction. The patch fixes several ways an attacker could exploit unconfirmed spli…

New default-on configuration `require-confirmed-inputs-for-splicing` to prevent double-spend of unconfirmed splice inputsLimit on remote splice inputs/outputs (10) to bound CPFP costForce-close now selects a commitment whose funding tx is known to bitcoind, re-evaluated per block and splice spend events
c07cc745by pm47+518−6011 files
Vendor flagged security relevance
Moderate 64 AI analysisMessage 81 · Strong
AQ ACINQEclair BitcoinLightning Network

Flag peers that leave liquidity fees unpaid (#3416)

This commit fixes a security gap in Eclair's Lightning node software. A peer could repeatedly get free channel funding ('liquidity') by backing out of payments meant to cover the fees right before the funding transaction was signed. Previo…

Fixes a logic flaw allowing repeated unpaid liquidity feesAdds peer suspicion flagging tied to funding txidExpands state handling for asynchronous LiquidityPurchaseAborted events
c5b9afc0by pm47+192−154 files
Vendor flagged security relevance
Informational 15 AI analysisMessage 36 · Opaque
AQ ACINQEclair BitcoinLightning Network

Back to dev (#3413)

This commit is a routine post-release housekeeping change. It bumps the project version from 0.14.5 to 0.15.0-SNAPSHOT, removes published release checksums, and adds a blank release-notes template. It also adds a startup guard that refuses…

No vulnerability signals presentStartup guard added to block accidental use of development snapshot
06716fceby Fabrice Drouin+73−108 files
No security note in commit
Moderate 67 AI analysisMessage 53 · Thin
AQ ACINQEclair BitcoinLightning Network

Eclair v0.14.5 release (#3412)

This commit is the release packaging for Eclair v0.14.5. The release notes state it is a patch release containing 'security hardening fixes' that can be exploited by malicious nodes, and thank two people for responsible disclosures. The ac…

Release notes explicitly describe 'security hardening fixes' and warn that 'some of these issues can be exploited by malicious nodes'Two independent researchers are credited for responsible disclosuresRemoval of an 'unsafe startup' guard indicates the prior development snapshot was considered unsafe and this release is meant to be safe to run
01384e93by Fabrice Drouin+14−268 files
Vendor flagged security relevance
High 82 AI analysisMessage 81 · Strong
AQ ACINQEclair BitcoinLightning Network

Check remote previous txOut against the blockchain (#3411)

This commit fixes a security bug in Eclair's taproot channel splicing. When two users splice a Lightning channel, one side can describe its bitcoin inputs by sending only a small summary (the txOut) instead of the full previous transaction…

Missing cryptographic/chain validation of peer-supplied transaction dataTaproot signature commits to spent outputs, making a signed-but-unconfirmable splice possiblePotential HTLC theft via old commitment publication after splice timeout
ae0927edby pm47+111−43 files
Vendor flagged security relevance
High 78 AI analysisMessage 86 · Strong
AQ ACINQEclair BitcoinLightning Network

Reject onion per-hop lengths that overflow an `Int` (#3408)

This fix closes a denial-of-service bug in Eclair's Lightning onion routing. A remote sender could craft a malformed per-hop payload length that, when converted from a large number to a normal integer, wrapped around to a negative or tiny …

Integer overflow / truncation from Long to IntNegative length bypasses upper-bound checkException escapes Try block causing DoS
40279a1bby pm47+20−32 files
Vendor flagged security relevance
Informational 15 AI analysisMessage 36 · Opaque
AQ ACINQEclair BitcoinLightning Network

Back to dev (#3405)

This commit is a routine post-release housekeeping change. It bumps the project version from 0.14.4 to 0.15.0-SNAPSHOT, removes the published checksums for the 0.14.4 release, and adds a placeholder release-notes file for the next version.…

No security-relevant code changesAdded explicit unsafe-startup guard to prevent accidental use of development snapshotNo references to CVEs, advisories, or security issues in commit message or diff
c4910b7bby Fabrice Drouin+73−108 files
No security note in commit
High 84 AI analysisMessage 53 · Thin
AQ ACINQEclair BitcoinLightning Network

Eclair v0.14.4 release (#3403)

This commit is the official release marker for Eclair v0.14.4. The release notes included in the commit describe it as a security-hardening patch release with fixes for multiple issues, some of which can be exploited by malicious nodes. Th…

Release notes explicitly label the release as containing 'security hardening fixes' exploitable by malicious nodesHTTP API now rejects Origin-header requests to mitigate browser-based CSRF against basic-authenticated endpointsSeed file length validation added (commit a07fff5)
e1c212c4by Fabrice Drouin+90−8210 files
Vendor flagged security relevance
High 82 AI analysisMessage 93 · Strong
AQ ACINQEclair BitcoinLightning Network

Retry publishing txs evicted by unconfirmed conflicts (#3397)

This commit fixes a security bug in the Eclair Lightning node where a malicious peer could trick the node into permanently giving up on publishing its own commitment or penalty transactions. By publishing and then double-spending a conflic…

The commit message explicitly describes theft risk: "This lets them steal HTLCs by publishing their commitment later"Attack vector involves a malicious peer withholding tx_signatures and double-spending a splice inputFix changes abandonment logic for local commit anchor preconditions
21f1bc8dby pm47+100−254 files
Vendor flagged security relevance
Moderate 66 AI analysisMessage 93 · Strong
AQ ACINQEclair BitcoinLightning Network

Keep unsigned settlements when rejecting commands (#3401)

This commit fixes a bug in Eclair, a Bitcoin Lightning Network node implementation. When the node received a duplicate command to settle a payment (fulfill or fail), it would mistakenly delete the still-pending settlement from its database…

Loss of pending HTLC settlement state on disconnect/reconnectUpstream HTLC timeout risk for relayed fulfilled downstream HTLCsDuplicate/conflicting command handling caused premature DB acknowledgement
7686dfadby pm47+38−32 files
Vendor flagged security relevance
Moderate 66 AI analysisMessage 81 · Strong
AQ ACINQEclair BitcoinLightning Network

Force-close again when a splice RBF sibling confirms (#3400)

This commit fixes a bug in Eclair, a Bitcoin Lightning Network node implementation. When one node force-closed a channel because its peer never finished signing a 'splice' (a way to resize a Lightning channel on-chain), and the peer later …

Funds-locking bug in channel close logicHTLCs not enforced on-chain after confirmed double-spendIncorrect re-force-close trigger condition
9a1ecc99by pm47+59−72 files
Vendor flagged security relevance
Critical 89 AI analysisMessage 78 · Adequate
AQ ACINQEclair BitcoinLightning Network

Reject unpublishable splices (#3396)

This commit fixes a set of vulnerabilities in Eclair's Lightning channel splicing protocol that could let a malicious peer trick the victim into signing a splice transaction that can never be published on the Bitcoin network. Because the v…

Commit title and message explicitly describe preventing a malicious peer from making us sign an unpublishable splice transactionAdds validation of absolute lockTime against current block height to prevent indefinite publication delayAdds rejection of BIP 68 relative lock time on all interactive-tx inputs, including shared splice input
af994180by pm47+235−35 files
Vendor flagged security relevance
High 74 AI analysisMessage 81 · Strong
AQ ACINQEclair BitcoinLightning Network

Reject onion per-hop lengths exceeding packet (#3395)

This commit fixes a bug in how Eclair processes encrypted routing instructions (onion packets) for Lightning payments. A malicious sender could craft a packet that claimed its inner payload was longer than the packet itself. The old code e…

Unchecked length field from attacker-controlled onion packet used for slicingException thrown outside Try block, bypassing expected error handlingRelayer crash could leave HTLC un-failed
d3a146a0by pm47+16−22 files
Vendor flagged security relevance
Moderate 53 AI analysisMessage 98 · Strong
AQ ACINQEclair BitcoinLightning Network

Remove `spendfromchanneladdress` nonce after one sig (#3392)

This commit fixes a cryptographic safety issue in a manual Bitcoin/Lightning recovery tool. When a user runs the `spendfromchanneladdress` operation, the code was re-reading a secret signing nonce from a stored map after using it once. Non…

nonce reuse prevention in Schnorr-like/MuSig2 partial signature flowprivate nonce removed from in-memory store after single usemanual recovery command affected, not hot path
c89af115by pm47+1−11 file
Vendor flagged security relevance
Moderate 66 AI analysisMessage 88 · Strong
AQ ACINQEclair BitcoinLightning Network

Reject seed files with an invalid length (#3389)

This patch fixes a bug in the Eclair Bitcoin Lightning node where, if the node crashed while creating its secret seed file, it could leave an empty file behind. On the next restart, Eclair would silently use that empty seed to generate all…

Use of weak/predictable cryptographic seed for key derivationMissing input validation on security-critical seed fileNon-atomic file write creating corrupt/empty secret material
a07fff56by pm47+31−12 files
Vendor flagged security relevance
Low 25 AI analysisMessage 81 · Strong
AQ ACINQEclair BitcoinLightning Network

Upgrade postgresql client from 42.7.11 to 42.7.12 (#3330)

This commit updates the PostgreSQL database driver used by Eclair from version 42.7.11 to 42.7.12. It is a routine dependency bump by an automated tool. The commit itself does not say what bugs the new driver fixes, but small point-release…

Dependency version bump of a database driverPoint-release upgrade may include upstream security fixes, but none are named in the commitNo application code changes or direct vulnerability evidence in the diff
972dfe99by dependabot[bot]+3−12 files
No security note in commit
Low 31 AI analysisMessage 58 · Thin
AQ ACINQEclair BitcoinLightning Network

Use bitcoin-kmp 0.49 (depends on bitcoin-kmp 0.32.0 and secp256k1-kmp 0.24.0) (#3362)

This commit updates Eclair's Bitcoin library dependency from version 0.48 to 0.49, which internally uses newer versions of bitcoin-kmp and secp256k1-kmp. The code changes only replace old property accesses (like `.txid`) with new method ca…

Dependency version bump for Bitcoin and secp256k1 cryptographic librariesSource changes are API adaptations (.txid -> .getTxid), not logic changesSecurity-critical validation code is touched (PSBT/transaction integrity checks against malicious Bitcoin Core)
6162e2aaby Fabrice Drouin+22−44 files
No security note in commit
Informational 15 AI analysisMessage 86 · Strong
AQ ACINQEclair BitcoinLightning Network

Update build to improve release process (#3381)

This commit is a routine build-system update. It upgrades several Maven plugin versions, removes the git commit ID from one jar manifest field to avoid a build-time circular dependency, and adds an optional build profile for a fuzz-testing…

c3e9f5d6by Fabrice Drouin+834−105 files
No security note in commit
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Explore captured commits

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AI review queuedFix flaky onion message test (#3266)by Bastien Teinturier · 1543e7ca · Mar 17, 2026 · 1 fileMessage 98 · StrongInformational 15Details
Commit message · Bastien Teinturier

Fix flaky onion message test (#3266)

The "automatically connect to known nodes" test was flaky, because there
is a race with our code that lazily removes node announcements from our
DB after channels close (in `handleChannelSpent` in `Validation.scala`).

We now explicitly wait for gossip to ensure that we cannot run into this
race condition, which should fix the flakyness during CI.

98/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Explains rationale or failure mode✓ Mentions testing or verification✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference
Why it was queued
second-pass: broader security terminology
AI analysis · Informational 15/100

This commit fixes a flaky automated test in the Eclair Lightning node software. It adds a wait step so that test nodes have time to learn about network channels before the test proceeds. There is no security issue here—only a test reliability improvement.

AI review queuedReject offers with amount set to `0` (#3265)by Bastien Teinturier · 16ebf01a · Mar 17, 2026 · 2 filesMessage 76 · AdequateLow 28Details
Commit message · Bastien Teinturier

Reject offers with amount set to `0` (#3265)

This doesn't make any sense, the field should be omitted if any amount
is acceptable: setting it to `0` is confusing.

See https://github.com/lightning/bolts/pull/1316

76/100 · AdequateMessage clarity
✓ Descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference
Why it was queued
parser or protocol pathsecond-pass: security-sensitive path
AI analysis · Low 28/100

This commit tightens validation of Lightning Network 'offers' (a way for a merchant to publish a payment request). Previously, an offer could include an amount field set to zero, which the protocol designers consider invalid and confusing. The change makes Eclair reject such offers. The main risk is that an attacker or buggy peer could send a zero-amount offer and, before this patch, Eclair might have accepted or processed it in an unintended way. The commit itself is a straightforward validation fix and does not show an active exploit.

AI review queuedRemove support for zlib encoding for channel queries (#3263)by Bastien Teinturier · eef7c326 · Mar 11, 2026 · 8 filesMessage 81 · StrongLow 28Details
Commit message · Bastien Teinturier

Remove support for zlib encoding for channel queries (#3263)

We removed support for sending compressed data when it was removed from
the spec (see https://github.com/ACINQ/eclair/pull/2244). We meant to
remove support for receiving compressed data as well as a follow-up, but
it slipped for a long time! There's no reason to keep supporting it now.

81/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference
Why it was queued
parser or protocol pathsecond-pass: security-sensitive path
AI analysis · Low 28/100

This commit removes the ability of the Eclair Lightning node to receive zlib-compressed channel-query data from peers. The Lightning protocol spec dropped zlib compression for these messages some time ago, and this change catches up by rejecting or ignoring compressed encodings. It is a hardening/cleanup change rather than a fix for an active vulnerability, though keeping a deprecated decompression path could in theory expose a node to memory or CPU issues if a peer sent malicious compressed data.

Lower-priorityPlugin validation of interactive transactions (#3258)by Bastien Teinturier · 28f3545a · Mar 3, 2026 · 5 filesMessage 81 · StrongInformational 21Details
Commit message · Bastien Teinturier

Plugin validation of interactive transactions (#3258)

We add a new `ValidateInteractiveTxPlugin` trait that can be extended
by plugins that want to perform custom validation of remote inputs and
outputs added to interactive transactions. This can be used for example
to reject transactions that send to specific addresses or use specific
UTXOs.

81/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference
Why it was queued
defensive validation
AI analysis · Informational 21/100

This commit adds a new optional plugin hook that lets Eclair node operators write custom checks for Bitcoin transactions used in Lightning channel funding or splicing. It is a defensive feature, not a vulnerability fix. The same change also improves error messages when a transaction is rejected and slightly refactors how input confirmation checks are run. There is no evidence in the commit of an active security bug being patched.

Lower-priorityAuto-refresh relay fees from conf can be disabled (#3260)by pm47 · 0a9853bf · Mar 2, 2026 · 7 filesMessage 81 · StrongInformational 18Details
Commit message · pm47

Auto-refresh relay fees from conf can be disabled (#3260)

There is a performance hit on restart if there is a large number (>100s) of channels, so it can be disabled with a new `eclair.relay.fees.reset-existing-channels` setting.

The default behavior is unchanged.

81/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference
AI analysis · Informational 18/100

This commit adds an optional setting that lets node operators disable an automatic fee refresh for existing payment channels when Eclair restarts. By default, the old behavior is preserved (fees are still refreshed). The change is framed as a performance improvement for operators with hundreds of channels, not as a security fix. There is no direct evidence in the commit that this resolves a vulnerability or that an attacker can exploit the old behavior.

AI review queuedAdd `ChannelFundingCreated` event (#3256)by Bastien Teinturier · 656e5039 · Feb 27, 2026 · 12 filesMessage 66 · AdequateInformational 20Details
Commit message · Bastien Teinturier

Add `ChannelFundingCreated` event (#3256)

We add a `ChannelFundingCreated` event that is emitted when the funding
transaction or a splice transaction has been signed and can now be
published, either by us or by our peer (depending on who funds).

This can be handy to detect peers that are using black-listed inputs and
immediately close the channel before it confirms and can be used.

66/100 · AdequateMessage clarity
✓ Descriptive subject✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference
Why it was queued
signing or wallet pathsecond-pass: security-sensitive path
AI analysis · Informational 20/100

This commit adds a new notification event called ChannelFundingCreated to the Eclair Lightning node. It tells external listeners when a channel funding or splice transaction has been signed and is ready to be published. The change is purely additive: it emits an event at existing points in the code and exposes it over the WebSocket API. It does not alter security-critical logic such as transaction signing, validation, or channel state transitions. The release notes explicitly say the event is handy for detecting peers that use black-listed inputs so operators can close the channel early, but that is a monitoring/operational use case, not a vulnerability fix.

Lower-priorityLazily load peer storage at node restart (#3257)by pm47 · 5f934ea0 · Feb 27, 2026 · 3 filesMessage 68 · AdequateInformational 18Details
Commit message · pm47

Lazily load peer storage at node restart (#3257)

This avoids a herd effect when restarting the node.

68/100 · AdequateMessage clarity
✓ Descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides an explanatory body✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference
AI analysis · Informational 18/100

This commit changes how Eclair (a Bitcoin Lightning node) loads stored peer data when the node restarts. Previously, every peer's stored data was read from the database immediately at startup. Now it is loaded only when the peer first reconnects. The stated goal is to avoid a 'herd effect'—a large burst of database reads all at once after a restart. There is no direct security vulnerability in the diff; it is a performance and reliability improvement. The change does not alter who can request data or what data is stored.

Lower-priorityDon't automatically use `scid_alias` for public channels (#3255)by Bastien Teinturier · 546028fd · Feb 27, 2026 · 3 filesMessage 81 · StrongLow 37Details
Commit message · Bastien Teinturier

Don't automatically use `scid_alias` for public channels (#3255)

In #3250 we started implicitly choosing the best channel type based on
activated features when not explicitly specified by the node operator.
However, we automatically used `scid_alias` if it was supported by both
peers, but it is only allowed for unannounced channels. We now restrict
this to follow the BOLTs.

81/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference
AI analysis · Low 37/100

This commit fixes a bug where Eclair would automatically enable a feature called `scid_alias` for public Lightning Network channels, even though the Lightning protocol rules (BOLTs) only allow that feature for unannounced (private) channels. Public channels with `scid_alias` could violate protocol rules and cause interoperability or routing problems, though it is not a direct theft-of-funds vulnerability.

Lower-priorityAdd basic CLAUDE.md (#3254)by Bastien Teinturier · d473b53a · Feb 23, 2026 · 1 fileMessage 88 · StrongInformational 15Details
Commit message · Bastien Teinturier

Add basic CLAUDE.md (#3254)

This was generated using Opus 4.6 with the `/init` command. It provides
overall context about the codebase to every Claude session, to avoid
repeating work to build that context (consume less token whenever using
Claude for a task).

88/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Explains rationale or failure mode✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference
Why it was queued
documentation-only discount
AI analysis · Informational 15/100

This commit adds a documentation file called CLAUDE.md that gives the Claude AI coding assistant general context about the Eclair Lightning Network project. It contains no code changes, no configuration changes, and nothing that affects how the software runs or processes data. It is purely informational for AI-assisted development.

AI review queuedFix flaky wallet funding tests (#3253)by Bastien Teinturier · 9709a916 · Feb 23, 2026 · 3 filesMessage 86 · StrongInformational 15Details
Commit message · Bastien Teinturier

Fix flaky wallet funding tests (#3253)

We fix a few flaky tests in our channel FSM that test scenarios where
errors are received while creating funding transactions. The issue was
that we used a dummy wallet that could complete its call before our
calls to `awaitCond(alice.stateName == WAIT_FOR_FUNDING_INTERNAL)`.

We use a new dummy on-chain wallet that never responds to transaction
funding calls to allow tests to inject failure events.

86/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Mentions testing or verification✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference
Why it was queued
signing or wallet pathsecond-pass: security-sensitive path
AI analysis · Informational 15/100

This commit only changes test code. It fixes flaky automated tests in the Eclair Lightning node by introducing a fake wallet that never completes funding transactions, so tests can reliably simulate error events during channel funding. There is no change to production code and no security vulnerability is being fixed or introduced.

Lower-priorityAdd claude files to `.gitignore` (#3252)by pm47 · 11a86046 · Feb 20, 2026 · 1 fileMessage 76 · AdequateInformational 15Details
Commit message · pm47

Add claude files to `.gitignore` (#3252)

Claude adds a `.claude` dir at the root of the project. In a sandboxing setup we may want to use other custom claude-related directories, hence the wildcard.

76/100 · AdequateMessage clarity
✓ Descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference
AI analysis · Informational 15/100

This commit simply adds a new pattern to the project's .gitignore file so that files and folders created by the Claude AI assistant are not accidentally committed to the repository. It has no security relevance to the Eclair Lightning node software itself.

Lower-prioritySelect `channel_type` for automatic channel creation (#3250)by Bastien Teinturier · 4461c040 · Feb 20, 2026 · 3 filesMessage 81 · StrongInformational 18Details
Commit message · Bastien Teinturier

Select `channel_type` for automatic channel creation (#3250)

When creating channels automatically, we don't necessarily have access
to our peer's features. It is useful to automatically select the channel
type based on local and remote features. We now allow this behavior in
the `OpenChannelInterceptor`.

Note that when we add official support for taproot channels and 0-fee
commitments, we will hard-code in `eclair` which type of channels we
think is best. If node operators want to override this order, they will
need to explicitly provide the `channel_type` parameter (which can be
done when using the API).

81/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference
AI analysis · Informational 18/100

This commit changes how Eclair selects a Lightning channel type when opening a channel automatically. Previously, the caller had to explicitly provide a channel type. Now, if no type is provided, Eclair will automatically pick a preferred type based on what both the local node and the remote peer support. If no compatible type can be found, the channel opening is rejected. This is a feature improvement, not a security fix, and the commit message does not describe it as fixing a vulnerability.

Lower-priorityFix balance fuzz tests (#3251)by Bastien Teinturier · 7c52250e · Feb 20, 2026 · 1 fileMessage 98 · StrongInformational 15Details
Commit message · Bastien Teinturier

Fix balance fuzz tests (#3251)

Those tests started randomly failing after moving to anchor outputs.
The reason is that anchor outputs have a bigger commit weight than non
anchor channels, and with our initial balance allocation we sometimes
reached a point where the *remote* had exhausted all of its balance to
pay commit fees (when the feerate was around 10 000 sat/kw), so the
*local* couldn't send HTLCs (`RemoteCannotAffordFeesForNewHtlc`). This
is an expected situation where we cannot do anything except wait for
pending HTLCs to resolve before sending other HTLCs.

We simply increase the initial balance to avoid running into this case.
We also remove the `skip` case (which wasn't working at all, we should
have used the `cancel` scalatest helper if we wanted to interrupt the
test without failing it) and allow failures during the initial HTLC
setup (which can happen if HTLCs are larger than the available balance).

98/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Explains rationale or failure mode✓ Mentions testing or verification✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference
Why it was queued
fuzzing or regression evidence
AI analysis · Informational 15/100

This commit only changes test code. It fixes flaky balance fuzz tests in Eclair by giving simulated channels more starting money so they can afford higher transaction fees under anchor outputs. There is no change to production code, no real-world security fix, and no vulnerability being patched.

Security candidate (Minor) Upgrade postgres libs (#3238)by pm47 · ea183c35 · Feb 12, 2026 · 2 filesMessage 68 · AdequateInformational 23Details
Commit message · pm47

(Minor) Upgrade postgres libs (#3238)

Upgrade the jdbc driver to the latest version.

68/100 · AdequateMessage clarity
✓ Descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides an explanatory body✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference
Why it was queued
cryptography-sensitive path
AI analysis · Informational 23/100

This commit updates the PostgreSQL JDBC driver used by the Eclair Lightning node software from version 42.6.0 to 42.7.8, and also bumps the embedded PostgreSQL test library from 2.0.1 to 2.2.0. The accompanying checksum file is updated to match the new library versions and their transitive dependencies. The commit message frames this as a routine minor library upgrade. There is no direct code change in Eclair itself, and no explicit security advisory or CVE is referenced in the commit materials.

Lower-priorityAdd type to local/remote error metrics (#3249)by pm47 · 5c5b9f90 · Feb 11, 2026 · 2 filesMessage 68 · AdequateInformational 15Details
Commit message · pm47

Add type to local/remote error metrics (#3249)

We were only splitting by origin (local/remote).

This compensates for #3236.

68/100 · AdequateMessage clarity
✓ Descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides an explanatory body✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference
AI analysis · Informational 15/100

This commit only improves monitoring/observability. It adds a new label ('error-type') to internal error-counting metrics so developers can see what kind of channel errors are happening, in addition to whether they came from the local node or a remote peer. There is no user-facing behavior change, no bug fix in business logic, and no security fix.

Lower-priorityPrioritize private channels when relaying payments (#3248)by Bastien Teinturier · aff16b26 · Feb 11, 2026 · 2 filesMessage 93 · StrongLow 32Details
Commit message · Bastien Teinturier

Prioritize private channels when relaying payments (#3248)

When relaying payments, we want to select private channels first and
keep as much liquidity available as possible in public channels, to
ensure that we don't send a `channel_update` that would otherwise
disable the public channel (and thus make the private channels also
unusable since they aren't visible by path-finding algorithms) or
limit the `htlc_maximum_msat` of this public channel (which also
indirectly applies to private channels).

We also change the order in which we select channels that have the
same visibility: we prioritize channels with smaller balances, to
ensure that we keep our larger balances for larger payments. When
balances are equal, we prioritize the largest channel, which creates
a larger inbound liquidity to allow receiving larger payments.

93/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Explains rationale or failure mode✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference
AI analysis · Low 32/100

This commit changes how Eclair lightning nodes pick which outgoing channel to use when forwarding payments. The new logic prefers private (unannounced) channels first, then smaller public channels, to avoid draining or disabling the larger public channels that other nodes rely on for routing. It is a routing-optimization and operational-hardening change rather than a fix for a known exploit. The commit message explicitly frames the change as avoiding public-channel exhaustion and disabled channel_updates, which has indirect security relevance for node availability and routing reputation.

AI review queuedImprove channel and payment events (#3246)by Bastien Teinturier · d735e0b5 · Feb 11, 2026 · 19 filesMessage 76 · AdequateInformational 19Details
Commit message · Bastien Teinturier

Improve channel and payment events (#3246)

We improve the following events:

- `TransactionPublished` includes more details about mining fees and
an optional liquidity purchase
- all channel events include the latest `channel_type`
- `PaymentRelayed` exposes the `relayFee` earned

76/100 · AdequateMessage clarity
✓ Descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference
Why it was queued
parser or protocol pathsecond-pass: security-sensitive path
AI analysis · Informational 19/100

This commit is a routine refactoring of internal event definitions in the Eclair Lightning node. It changes how channel and payment events are structured so they carry more detailed information (such as splitting mining fees into local and remote portions, adding timestamps, and exposing relay fees). There is no direct evidence in the commit that these changes fix a security vulnerability; they appear to be observability and accounting improvements.

Lower-priorityAdd event for failed payment relay (#3244)by Bastien Teinturier · 369f042d · Jan 29, 2026 · 8 filesMessage 88 · StrongInformational 20Details
Commit message · Bastien Teinturier

Add event for failed payment relay (#3244)

We add an event when a payment could not be relayed and indicates that
we may need to add liquidity towards the next node. It is really hard
to figure it out in the context of a single payment though, so this
event does not by itself mean that liquidity should be allocated. The
listeners should collect several events and regularly query the state
of existing channels with our peers, and network graph data for remote
nodes, to create good heuristics for allocating liquidity. Otherwise,
it would be trivial for malicious senders to game routing nodes into
allocating liquidity "for free" towards them, which could result in
financial loss.

88/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Explains rationale or failure mode✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference
AI analysis · Informational 20/100

This commit adds new internal event notifications when a Lightning payment cannot be relayed through a node. It is a defensive, observability-only change: it does not alter payment handling logic, but gives node operators signals they can use to decide where to allocate channel liquidity. The commit message explicitly warns that the events can be gamed by malicious senders and should not be acted on blindly.

AI review queuedInclude the `node_id` of channel peers in payment events (#3243)by Bastien Teinturier · ff7a24c5 · Jan 23, 2026 · 40 filesMessage 81 · StrongInformational 19Details
Commit message · Bastien Teinturier

Include the `node_id` of channel peers in payment events (#3243)

When scoring peers, we don't really care about individual channels but
rather about the peer itself, who is identified by its `node_id`. We
update payment events to include the `node_id` of our channel peer, to
make it easier to compute statistics about each of our peers.

We also rework the events in `PaymentEvents.scala` to be more consistent
now that we've added support for trampoline, splicing, liquidity ads and
on-the-fly funding, which are all the features we had planned that can
impact peer scoring.

Note that we don't yet update the schema of the `AuditDb`, which means
that some of the data isn't stored and is currently filled with a dummy
value. We will include *all* updates to the DB schema in a future PR and
will fix this.

81/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference
Why it was queued
second-pass: unusually broad change
AI analysis · Informational 19/100

This commit is a refactoring and observability improvement for the Eclair Lightning node. It adds the node identifier (node_id) of channel peers to various payment events and restructures how payment events are represented in code. It does not fix a security vulnerability, nor does it introduce obvious new attack surface. The database schema is intentionally not yet updated, so some stored data uses a placeholder node_id. The change touches many files but is mostly internal plumbing for metrics and audit logging.

Security candidateAdd duration information to payment events (#3241)by Bastien Teinturier · 9856db85 · Jan 20, 2026 · 32 filesMessage 81 · StrongInformational 19Details
Commit message · Bastien Teinturier

Add duration information to payment events (#3241)

We now record start and end time for payment events, and for remote
failures, which lets us easily identify slower paths and faulty nodes.
We properly track the settlement of each individual payment now.

We also clean-up field names and harmonize those events. Note that we
don't update the DB schema at that point: this will be done in another
PR that batches all DB schema changes.

81/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference
Why it was queued
cryptography-sensitive pathseed or entropy path
AI analysis · Informational 19/100

This commit is a refactoring and observability improvement for the Eclair Lightning node. It adds start/end timestamps to payment events and failures, renames some timestamp fields for consistency, and updates how payment hashes are derived from preimages. There is no direct security vulnerability visible in the diff; the changes are primarily for monitoring, metrics, and database/event-stream hygiene. A few places now use the current time instead of a previously stored request time when recording relay settlement, which is a behavioral change but not an obvious exploit.

Lower-priorityAdd test vector for Bolt12 invalid bech32 padding (#3242)by Bastien Teinturier · 632713a6 · Jan 19, 2026 · 1 fileMessage 83 · StrongInformational 12Details
Commit message · Bastien Teinturier

Add test vector for Bolt12 invalid bech32 padding (#3242)

See https://github.com/lightning/bolts/pull/1312 for more details.

83/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides an explanatory body✓ Mentions testing or verification✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference
Why it was queued
fuzzing or regression evidence
AI analysis · Informational 12/100

This commit only adds a new test case to a JSON test file. It checks that Eclair correctly rejects a specific malformed BOLT 12 offer string whose Bech32 padding bits are invalid. There is no code change, no fix, and no behavior change in the application itself.

AI review queuedMore tests for accountability (#3240)by Thomas HUET · 0214a1e7 · Jan 8, 2026 · 4 filesMessage 78 · AdequateInformational 15Details
Commit message · Thomas HUET

More tests for accountability (#3240)

These tests are also added to lightning-kmp (https://github.com/ACINQ/lightning-kmp/pull/846) to check compatibility.

78/100 · AdequateMessage clarity
✓ Descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides an explanatory body✓ Mentions testing or verification✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference
Why it was queued
parser or protocol pathsecond-pass: security-sensitive path
AI analysis · Informational 15/100

This commit only adds new test cases for an existing feature called 'accountability' in the Eclair Lightning node software. It does not change any production code, so it cannot introduce a new security vulnerability or directly fix one. The tests verify that invoice and payment onion data containing an 'UpgradeAccountability' marker are encoded and decoded correctly.

Lower-priorityUse fallback feerates on testnets (#3233)by Bastien Teinturier · 9ed0014a · Jan 8, 2026 · 2 filesMessage 88 · StrongInformational 19Details
Commit message · Bastien Teinturier

Use fallback feerates on testnets (#3233)

When using testnet3 or testnet4, Bitcoin Core may fail to estimate fees
because there isn't enough block data. We now use the configured default
feerates when that happens to make it easier to run on testnets.

We also update the default feerates to better match current values.

Fixes #3105

88/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Explains rationale or failure mode✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference
AI analysis · Informational 19/100

This change makes Eclair easier to run on Bitcoin test networks by using configured default transaction fee rates when Bitcoin Core cannot estimate fees due to limited block data. It also lowers the default fee rates to match current network conditions. This is a usability and operational improvement, not a security fix.

AI review queuedCI: fix test with latest bitcoind (#3239)by Fabrice Drouin · 3ac122b9 · Jan 8, 2026 · 1 fileMessage 98 · StrongInformational 15Details
Commit message · Fabrice Drouin

CI: fix test with latest bitcoind (#3239)

Add flag to build without multiprocess architecture which we don't use and requires and additional dependency (capnproto).

98/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Uses a recognizable type or scope✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Mentions testing or verification✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference
Why it was queued
documentation-only discountsecond-pass: broader security terminology
AI analysis · Informational 15/100

This is a routine GitHub Actions CI workflow change. It adds a build flag to disable an optional Bitcoin Core multiprocess feature that the project does not use, so that automated tests against the latest bitcoind version can compile without needing an extra dependency (capnproto). There is no change to Eclair's production code, no user-facing behavior change, and no security relevance.

AI review queuedRework channel lifecyle events (#3237)by Bastien Teinturier · 473b46d8 · Jan 7, 2026 · 20 filesMessage 88 · StrongInformational 20Details
Commit message · Bastien Teinturier

Rework channel lifecyle events (#3237)

We emit several events during the channel lifecycle, which have become
a bit of a mess over the years, especially with the addition of 0-conf,
splicing and on-the-fly funding.

We now use the following events:

- `ChannelCreated` once the funding transaction is created
- `ChannelFundingConfirmed` once the funding transaction is confirmed,
which is also emitted for splice transactions
- `ChannelReadyForPayments` once the channel is ready for payments,
after exchanging `channel_ready` for the channel creation or
`splice_locked` for splice transactions

The order between `ChannelFundingConfirmed` and `ChannelReadyForPayments`
depends on whether 0-conf is used or not.

We remove `ChannelOpened`, which was actually a subset of the existing
`ChannelReadyForPayments` event (which was added afterwards).

We add a few fields to existing channel events, which we don't yet
store in the DB to avoid modifying it, but will store later when we
modify the schema of the `AuditDb`.

We now store an entry in the `AuditDb` whenever a splice transaction
confirms, which allows tracking the full history of a channel's changes.

88/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Explains rationale or failure mode✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference
Why it was queued
second-pass: unusually broad change
AI analysis · Informational 20/100

This commit is a routine internal refactoring of Eclair's channel-lifecycle event system. It renames and splits events (for example replacing 'channel-opened' with 'channel-confirmed' and 'channel-ready') so the software can correctly track normal channels, zero-confirmation channels, and splice transactions. It also records more details in the audit database, such as the funding transaction ID for each splice. There is no direct security vulnerability in the diff; it is a maintainability and observability improvement.