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Eclair

Scala implementation of a Lightning Network node.

BitcoinLightning NetworkNormal
Repository coverage

231 commits in the local evidence base

Every captured commit receives deterministic security triage and a separate communication-quality score. Security candidates and broader second-pass signals receive full-patch Ollama analysis.

66security candidates48second-pass queue208AI analyses
4commits · 30 days
26commits · 60 days
80commits · 180 days
161commits · 365 days
Backfill bands
Aug 5 → Feb 691 seen11 candidatesComplete
Feb 6 → Jun 660 seen5 candidatesComplete
Jun 6 → Jul 62 seen0 candidatesComplete
Jul 6 → Aug 514 seen0 candidatesComplete
Commit communication

Does the history explain itself?

Message quality measures whether a commit identifies its scope, purpose, rationale, testing, and supporting references. It does not change the security-severity score.

78/100 average clarity
143Strong · 80–100
54Adequate · 60–79
23Thin · 40–59
11Opaque · 0–39
3security candidates with opaque commit messaging
Read the scoring rubric →
Developer activity

Who is changing the project?

Public Git author strings; identities are not independently verified.

DeveloperCommitsCandidatesAnalyzedHigh riskMessage avg.
pm47451633876
Bastien Teinturier13332127581
Fabrice Drouin291424269
Thomas HUET16116075
rorp313069
Nishant Bansal212084
dependabot[bot]111081
ekzyis101058
Rusty Russell101081
Analysis record

Published AI watches

Last scanned 43 minutes ago

Informational 15 AI analysisMessage 36 · Opaque
AQ ACINQEclair BitcoinLightning Network

Back to dev (#3424)

This commit is a routine post-release housekeeping change. It bumps the software version from 0.14.6 to 0.15.0-SNAPSHOT across several build files, adds a blank release-notes template for the next version, and intentionally adds a startup …

Startup guard added to block accidental execution of development snapshotNo vulnerability fix, cryptographic change, or trust-boundary modification present
c96c3d44by Fabrice Drouin+73−57 files
No security note in commit
High 74 AI analysisMessage 53 · Thin
AQ ACINQEclair BitcoinLightning Network

Eclair v0.14.6 release (#3420)

This commit is the release packaging for Eclair v0.14.6. The release notes explicitly state it contains 'security hardening fixes' that can be exploited by malicious nodes, and thank a researcher for responsible disclosure. The actual code…

Vendor release notes explicitly label the release as containing 'security hardening fixes' exploitable by malicious nodesNew default-on configuration `require-confirmed-inputs-for-splicing` mitigates unconfirmed-input double-spend risk during splicingRelease notes credit @erickcestari for responsible disclosures
50e046efby Fabrice Drouin+28−198 files
Vendor flagged security relevance
High 72 AI analysisMessage 88 · Strong
AQ ACINQEclair BitcoinLightning Network

Splicing robustness improvements (#3417)

This commit hardens Eclair's Lightning channel 'splicing' feature against a malicious peer. Splicing lets users resize a channel by creating a new funding transaction. The patch fixes several ways an attacker could exploit unconfirmed spli…

New default-on configuration `require-confirmed-inputs-for-splicing` to prevent double-spend of unconfirmed splice inputsLimit on remote splice inputs/outputs (10) to bound CPFP costForce-close now selects a commitment whose funding tx is known to bitcoind, re-evaluated per block and splice spend events
c07cc745by pm47+518−6011 files
Vendor flagged security relevance
Moderate 64 AI analysisMessage 81 · Strong
AQ ACINQEclair BitcoinLightning Network

Flag peers that leave liquidity fees unpaid (#3416)

This commit fixes a security gap in Eclair's Lightning node software. A peer could repeatedly get free channel funding ('liquidity') by backing out of payments meant to cover the fees right before the funding transaction was signed. Previo…

Fixes a logic flaw allowing repeated unpaid liquidity feesAdds peer suspicion flagging tied to funding txidExpands state handling for asynchronous LiquidityPurchaseAborted events
c5b9afc0by pm47+192−154 files
Vendor flagged security relevance
Informational 15 AI analysisMessage 36 · Opaque
AQ ACINQEclair BitcoinLightning Network

Back to dev (#3413)

This commit is a routine post-release housekeeping change. It bumps the project version from 0.14.5 to 0.15.0-SNAPSHOT, removes published release checksums, and adds a blank release-notes template. It also adds a startup guard that refuses…

No vulnerability signals presentStartup guard added to block accidental use of development snapshot
06716fceby Fabrice Drouin+73−108 files
No security note in commit
Moderate 67 AI analysisMessage 53 · Thin
AQ ACINQEclair BitcoinLightning Network

Eclair v0.14.5 release (#3412)

This commit is the release packaging for Eclair v0.14.5. The release notes state it is a patch release containing 'security hardening fixes' that can be exploited by malicious nodes, and thank two people for responsible disclosures. The ac…

Release notes explicitly describe 'security hardening fixes' and warn that 'some of these issues can be exploited by malicious nodes'Two independent researchers are credited for responsible disclosuresRemoval of an 'unsafe startup' guard indicates the prior development snapshot was considered unsafe and this release is meant to be safe to run
01384e93by Fabrice Drouin+14−268 files
Vendor flagged security relevance
High 82 AI analysisMessage 81 · Strong
AQ ACINQEclair BitcoinLightning Network

Check remote previous txOut against the blockchain (#3411)

This commit fixes a security bug in Eclair's taproot channel splicing. When two users splice a Lightning channel, one side can describe its bitcoin inputs by sending only a small summary (the txOut) instead of the full previous transaction…

Missing cryptographic/chain validation of peer-supplied transaction dataTaproot signature commits to spent outputs, making a signed-but-unconfirmable splice possiblePotential HTLC theft via old commitment publication after splice timeout
ae0927edby pm47+111−43 files
Vendor flagged security relevance
High 78 AI analysisMessage 86 · Strong
AQ ACINQEclair BitcoinLightning Network

Reject onion per-hop lengths that overflow an `Int` (#3408)

This fix closes a denial-of-service bug in Eclair's Lightning onion routing. A remote sender could craft a malformed per-hop payload length that, when converted from a large number to a normal integer, wrapped around to a negative or tiny …

Integer overflow / truncation from Long to IntNegative length bypasses upper-bound checkException escapes Try block causing DoS
40279a1bby pm47+20−32 files
Vendor flagged security relevance
Informational 15 AI analysisMessage 36 · Opaque
AQ ACINQEclair BitcoinLightning Network

Back to dev (#3405)

This commit is a routine post-release housekeeping change. It bumps the project version from 0.14.4 to 0.15.0-SNAPSHOT, removes the published checksums for the 0.14.4 release, and adds a placeholder release-notes file for the next version.…

No security-relevant code changesAdded explicit unsafe-startup guard to prevent accidental use of development snapshotNo references to CVEs, advisories, or security issues in commit message or diff
c4910b7bby Fabrice Drouin+73−108 files
No security note in commit
High 84 AI analysisMessage 53 · Thin
AQ ACINQEclair BitcoinLightning Network

Eclair v0.14.4 release (#3403)

This commit is the official release marker for Eclair v0.14.4. The release notes included in the commit describe it as a security-hardening patch release with fixes for multiple issues, some of which can be exploited by malicious nodes. Th…

Release notes explicitly label the release as containing 'security hardening fixes' exploitable by malicious nodesHTTP API now rejects Origin-header requests to mitigate browser-based CSRF against basic-authenticated endpointsSeed file length validation added (commit a07fff5)
e1c212c4by Fabrice Drouin+90−8210 files
Vendor flagged security relevance
High 82 AI analysisMessage 93 · Strong
AQ ACINQEclair BitcoinLightning Network

Retry publishing txs evicted by unconfirmed conflicts (#3397)

This commit fixes a security bug in the Eclair Lightning node where a malicious peer could trick the node into permanently giving up on publishing its own commitment or penalty transactions. By publishing and then double-spending a conflic…

The commit message explicitly describes theft risk: "This lets them steal HTLCs by publishing their commitment later"Attack vector involves a malicious peer withholding tx_signatures and double-spending a splice inputFix changes abandonment logic for local commit anchor preconditions
21f1bc8dby pm47+100−254 files
Vendor flagged security relevance
Moderate 66 AI analysisMessage 93 · Strong
AQ ACINQEclair BitcoinLightning Network

Keep unsigned settlements when rejecting commands (#3401)

This commit fixes a bug in Eclair, a Bitcoin Lightning Network node implementation. When the node received a duplicate command to settle a payment (fulfill or fail), it would mistakenly delete the still-pending settlement from its database…

Loss of pending HTLC settlement state on disconnect/reconnectUpstream HTLC timeout risk for relayed fulfilled downstream HTLCsDuplicate/conflicting command handling caused premature DB acknowledgement
7686dfadby pm47+38−32 files
Vendor flagged security relevance
Moderate 66 AI analysisMessage 81 · Strong
AQ ACINQEclair BitcoinLightning Network

Force-close again when a splice RBF sibling confirms (#3400)

This commit fixes a bug in Eclair, a Bitcoin Lightning Network node implementation. When one node force-closed a channel because its peer never finished signing a 'splice' (a way to resize a Lightning channel on-chain), and the peer later …

Funds-locking bug in channel close logicHTLCs not enforced on-chain after confirmed double-spendIncorrect re-force-close trigger condition
9a1ecc99by pm47+59−72 files
Vendor flagged security relevance
Critical 89 AI analysisMessage 78 · Adequate
AQ ACINQEclair BitcoinLightning Network

Reject unpublishable splices (#3396)

This commit fixes a set of vulnerabilities in Eclair's Lightning channel splicing protocol that could let a malicious peer trick the victim into signing a splice transaction that can never be published on the Bitcoin network. Because the v…

Commit title and message explicitly describe preventing a malicious peer from making us sign an unpublishable splice transactionAdds validation of absolute lockTime against current block height to prevent indefinite publication delayAdds rejection of BIP 68 relative lock time on all interactive-tx inputs, including shared splice input
af994180by pm47+235−35 files
Vendor flagged security relevance
High 74 AI analysisMessage 81 · Strong
AQ ACINQEclair BitcoinLightning Network

Reject onion per-hop lengths exceeding packet (#3395)

This commit fixes a bug in how Eclair processes encrypted routing instructions (onion packets) for Lightning payments. A malicious sender could craft a packet that claimed its inner payload was longer than the packet itself. The old code e…

Unchecked length field from attacker-controlled onion packet used for slicingException thrown outside Try block, bypassing expected error handlingRelayer crash could leave HTLC un-failed
d3a146a0by pm47+16−22 files
Vendor flagged security relevance
Moderate 53 AI analysisMessage 98 · Strong
AQ ACINQEclair BitcoinLightning Network

Remove `spendfromchanneladdress` nonce after one sig (#3392)

This commit fixes a cryptographic safety issue in a manual Bitcoin/Lightning recovery tool. When a user runs the `spendfromchanneladdress` operation, the code was re-reading a secret signing nonce from a stored map after using it once. Non…

nonce reuse prevention in Schnorr-like/MuSig2 partial signature flowprivate nonce removed from in-memory store after single usemanual recovery command affected, not hot path
c89af115by pm47+1−11 file
Vendor flagged security relevance
Moderate 66 AI analysisMessage 88 · Strong
AQ ACINQEclair BitcoinLightning Network

Reject seed files with an invalid length (#3389)

This patch fixes a bug in the Eclair Bitcoin Lightning node where, if the node crashed while creating its secret seed file, it could leave an empty file behind. On the next restart, Eclair would silently use that empty seed to generate all…

Use of weak/predictable cryptographic seed for key derivationMissing input validation on security-critical seed fileNon-atomic file write creating corrupt/empty secret material
a07fff56by pm47+31−12 files
Vendor flagged security relevance
Low 25 AI analysisMessage 81 · Strong
AQ ACINQEclair BitcoinLightning Network

Upgrade postgresql client from 42.7.11 to 42.7.12 (#3330)

This commit updates the PostgreSQL database driver used by Eclair from version 42.7.11 to 42.7.12. It is a routine dependency bump by an automated tool. The commit itself does not say what bugs the new driver fixes, but small point-release…

Dependency version bump of a database driverPoint-release upgrade may include upstream security fixes, but none are named in the commitNo application code changes or direct vulnerability evidence in the diff
972dfe99by dependabot[bot]+3−12 files
No security note in commit
Low 31 AI analysisMessage 58 · Thin
AQ ACINQEclair BitcoinLightning Network

Use bitcoin-kmp 0.49 (depends on bitcoin-kmp 0.32.0 and secp256k1-kmp 0.24.0) (#3362)

This commit updates Eclair's Bitcoin library dependency from version 0.48 to 0.49, which internally uses newer versions of bitcoin-kmp and secp256k1-kmp. The code changes only replace old property accesses (like `.txid`) with new method ca…

Dependency version bump for Bitcoin and secp256k1 cryptographic librariesSource changes are API adaptations (.txid -> .getTxid), not logic changesSecurity-critical validation code is touched (PSBT/transaction integrity checks against malicious Bitcoin Core)
6162e2aaby Fabrice Drouin+22−44 files
No security note in commit
Informational 15 AI analysisMessage 86 · Strong
AQ ACINQEclair BitcoinLightning Network

Update build to improve release process (#3381)

This commit is a routine build-system update. It upgrades several Maven plugin versions, removes the git commit ID from one jar manifest field to avoid a build-time circular dependency, and adds an optional build profile for a fuzz-testing…

c3e9f5d6by Fabrice Drouin+834−105 files
No security note in commit
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AI review queuedBack to dev (#3371)by Bastien Teinturier · 39c5cb27 · Aug 26, 2026 · 8 filesMessage 36 · OpaqueInformational 15Details
Commit message · Bastien Teinturier

Back to dev (#3371)

After the v0.14.2 release.

36/100 · OpaqueMessage clarity
✓ Subject identifies a change✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference! No meaningful explanatory body
Why it was queued
second-pass: opaque commit message
AI analysis · Informational 15/100

This commit is a routine post-release housekeeping change. It bumps the project version from 0.14.2 to 0.15.0-SNAPSHOT, re-enables a Maven trusted-checksum feature used for build verification, adds a placeholder release-notes file, and deliberately prevents the new development snapshot from starting in production by throwing an error unless a special override flag is set. There is no security vulnerability here; the change is a safety guard, not a flaw.

Security candidateMore robust splicing edge cases (#3366)by Bastien Teinturier · 59772fe1 · Aug 26, 2026 · 11 filesMessage 81 · StrongHigh 70Details
Commit message · Bastien Teinturier

More robust splicing edge cases (#3366)

We apply some defense-in-depth to better handle edge cases during
splicing where a remote peer doesn't follow the BOLTs. This also
includes more thorough pattern-matching, which protects against
future refactoring or new features from inadvertently introducing
a vulnerability related to splicing.

Co-authored-by: Fabrice Drouin <sstone@users.noreply.github.com>

81/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference✓ Names security-relevant behavior explicitly
Why it was queued
explicit security language
AI analysis · High 70/100

This commit hardens Eclair's handling of the Lightning 'splicing' feature when a peer misbehaves. Splicing lets two nodes resize an open payment channel without closing it on-chain. The patch adds extra checks so that if a peer sends unexpected messages during the splice—especially messages that would shift the channel's commitment index—it disconnects or force-closes instead of applying them. Applying such messages could let a malicious peer trick the node into revoking a commitment number that a new splice commitment is still using, potentially putting funds at risk. The commit also fixes a batching bug so that a single commit_sig is delivered as a single message, not as a one-message batch that could trigger an unnecessary force-close.

Security candidateAdd optional rate-limit on incoming pre-auth connections (#3356)by Bastien Teinturier · a2fe6c74 · Aug 26, 2026 · 11 filesMessage 86 · StrongModerate 54Details
Commit message · Bastien Teinturier

Add optional rate-limit on incoming pre-auth connections (#3356)

Peers that open a connection but never complete the BOLT 8 handshake
consume resources on our node (memory, file descriptors and CPU).

We now bound how many of those we're willing to keep around, with an
eviction mechanism that lets honest peers eventually get connected.

Note that this only affects incoming connections: outgoing connections
are not rate-limited, which means that peers with whom we have channels
cannot be negatively affected by this mechanism since we'll actively
reconnect to them.

This isn't a foolproof DDoS protection at all however: attackers that
spam connection attempts can still severely delay or prevent honest
new peers from connecting. It should be coupled with a DDoS protection
layer at the cloud provider layer, where it is easier to do correctly
and more efficient.

86/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference✓ Names security-relevant behavior explicitly
Why it was queued
explicit security language
AI analysis · Moderate 54/100

This commit adds a safety net to the Eclair Lightning node to limit how many incoming peer connections can sit unfinished before completing the cryptographic handshake. Previously, an attacker could open many TCP connections and leave them hanging, consuming memory, file descriptors, and CPU. The change caps those pending connections, evicts the oldest ones after a short grace period, and briefly pauses accepting new connections when the cap is hit. It also fixes a related bug where authenticated-but-never-initialized connections could stay open forever.

Security candidateFix a batch of Tor-related issues (#3354)by Bastien Teinturier · 3d092da8 · Aug 26, 2026 · 7 filesMessage 98 · StrongModerate 67Details
Commit message · Bastien Teinturier

Fix a batch of Tor-related issues (#3354)

* Verify that Tor cookie is 32-bytes

In order to be valid, a Tor cookie must be exactly 32 bytes.
We verify that and fail otherwise.

* Use Tor safe-cookie mode by default

And fail if password mode is used but the host is remote.

* Fix race condition in file permissions

There was a race condition in file permissions that allowed attackers
on the machine to read secrets, because we started by creating the
secret and only after that we set the file permissions.

We now reverse that flow: we create an empty file with the right
permissions and then write the secret to it.

This applies to our seed files and to tor private keys.

98/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Explains rationale or failure mode✓ Mentions testing or verification✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference
Why it was queued
explicit security languagesecret or key materialcredential or privilege stateparser or protocol path
AI analysis · Moderate 67/100

This commit fixes three security issues in how Eclair connects to the Tor network and stores sensitive files. First, it changes the default Tor authentication from password to safecookie, and blocks password mode when the Tor control port is on a remote machine, because password mode sends secrets in cleartext and cannot prove the server is really Tor. Second, it checks that Tor's authentication cookie is exactly 32 bytes. Third, it fixes a race condition where secret files (seed files and Tor private keys) were created with loose permissions before being locked down, which could let other users on the same machine read them; now the file is created with strict permissions first, then the secret is written.

Security candidateReject messages that include the wrong type of signatures (#3368)by Fabrice Drouin · 1fc3dd7c · Aug 26, 2026 · 16 filesMessage 86 · StrongModerate 60Details
Commit message · Fabrice Drouin

Reject messages that include the wrong type of signatures (#3368)

Signatures can either be standard signatures, for non-taproot channels, or partial signatures for taproot channels.
Here we reject messages that include signatures that don't match the channel commitment format.
This will fix an error where, for non-taproot channels, when our peer sends a message that contains a valid "single"
signature and an invalid "partial" signature, we would check the correct "single" signature, but store the invalid "partial" signature.

86/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference✓ Names security-relevant behavior explicitly
Why it was queued
signing boundarysigning or wallet pathparser or protocol path
AI analysis · Moderate 60/100

This commit fixes a bug in the Eclair Lightning node where a peer could send a message containing both a correct standard signature and an incorrect partial signature. The old code would verify the correct signature but then store the invalid partial signature for later use. The fix makes Eclair reject messages that include the wrong kind of signature for the channel type, so non-taproot channels ignore partial signatures and taproot channels require partial signatures.

AI review queuedForce-close on invalid HTLC `cltv_expiry` (#3367)by Bastien Teinturier · b7ebefdb · Aug 26, 2026 · 5 filesMessage 88 · StrongModerate 60Details
Commit message · Bastien Teinturier

Force-close on invalid HTLC `cltv_expiry` (#3367)

Bolt 2 specifies that if tje sending node sets `cltv_expiry` to greater
or equal to 500000000, we should send a warning and close the connection
or send an error and fail the channel. We never implemented that, which
was fine because we already rejected large `cltv_expiry` before that
threshold (without force-closing), but it's better to explicitly force
close if our peer is sending such invalid values.

88/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Explains rationale or failure mode✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference
Why it was queued
signing or wallet pathsecond-pass: security-sensitive path
AI analysis · Moderate 60/100

This change makes the Eclair Lightning node force-close a payment channel if a peer tries to add a payment whose timeout value (cltv_expiry) is 500,000,000 or higher. Such large values are invalid according to the Lightning BOLT 2 specification because they would be interpreted as a Unix timestamp rather than a Bitcoin block height, which could confuse the node and lead to incorrect fund-locking behavior. Previously Eclair rejected these values without force-closing; now it explicitly closes the channel as the spec recommends.

Security candidateAdd support for fulfillment payload (#3321)by Bastien Teinturier · 1819a5e8 · Aug 21, 2026 · 44 filesMessage 88 · StrongLow 37Details
Commit message · Bastien Teinturier

Add support for fulfillment payload (#3321)

This adds support for including a payload in `update_fulfill_htlc` that
the recipient encrypts for the payer. This can be useful to transmit
data atomically with the fulfillment of a payment. The main challenge
is that intermediate nodes may drop or tamper with this fulfillment
payload, which is why we include it in the HMACs of the attribution
data, which lets senders detect which pair of nodes may be malicious.

We limit error packets and fulfillment payloads to 32kB to leave room
for future TLVs. We silently truncate payloads that are larger, which
ensures that the messages we create are always compliant. We truncate
attribution data that doesn't have the expected length as well.

See https://github.com/lightning/bolts/pull/1344

88/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Explains rationale or failure mode✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference
Why it was queued
cryptography-sensitive pathparser or protocol path
AI analysis · Low 37/100

This commit adds a new optional encrypted payload to Lightning payment fulfillment messages. It is a feature implementation, not a fix for an active vulnerability. The code does introduce a safety check: if a peer sends an oversized fulfillment payload, the node force-closes the channel after first relaying the payment preimage upstream so funds are not lost. The main risk is that any bugs in the new encryption, wrapping, or truncation logic could affect payment settlement or channel stability, but the commit itself is defensive and follows a proposed Lightning specification.

AI review queuedFix a batch of low-severity issues (#3355)by Bastien Teinturier · 06e0ff71 · Aug 19, 2026 · 9 filesMessage 88 · StrongModerate 52Details
Commit message · Bastien Teinturier

Fix a batch of low-severity issues (#3355)

* Remove explicit cast in channel codec

We used an explicit cast in our channel codec: this is safe for data
that we created ourselves, but would throw an exception if our data is
corrupted. It's trivial to be safe by removing the cast.

* Require `tls-tcp` when using cluster mode

We require that encryption is used between the front and backend nodes
in cluster mode, otherwise private data would be exposed. This protects
node from messing up their deployment configuration without realizing
it.

* Remove exception details from failed RPCs

We don't return the exception message anymore for failed RPC calls, to
avoid potentially leaking private information. This guarantees that only
the node operator, with access to the logs, can see why RPC calls fail.

* Don't decode unknown onion message TLVs

We don't support any TLV for onion messages yet. Since onion messages
can be spammy, we don't need to waste any ressources trying to decode
unknown TLVs that we'll throw away anyway.

* Limit the number of onion messages self-hops

We only include ourselves multiple times in an onion message path when
using dummy hops. If we're included too many times in a path, that's
most likely a remote node messing with us: we just drop the message.

88/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Explains rationale or failure mode✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference
Why it was queued
parser or protocol pathsecond-pass: broader security terminologysecond-pass: security-sensitive path
AI analysis · Moderate 52/100

This commit fixes five low-severity security or robustness issues in the Eclair Lightning node. It removes a risky type cast that could crash the node on corrupted channel data, forces encrypted cluster communication to prevent private data exposure, stops API error messages from leaking internal details, and makes onion message handling more resistant to spam by ignoring unknown data fields and limiting how many times a node can be inserted into a message path.

Security candidateExplicitly match on-the-fly HTLCs after a restart (#3357)by Bastien Teinturier · aa321d69 · Aug 19, 2026 · 3 filesMessage 93 · StrongHigh 72Details
Commit message · Bastien Teinturier

Explicitly match on-the-fly HTLCs after a restart (#3357)

When we restart our node, we look at HTLCs that have been received but
not relayed yet: they must be failed back, otherwise we would let them
in the incoming channel until their timeout is reached, which would
force our peer to force-close.

There is an exception for HTLCs that are paying for an on-the-fly funded
channel: we will explicitly retry relaying those HTLCs, even after a
restart, because that's how we get paid for the funding fees. We were
only matching them by `payment_hash`, which wasn't precise enough: an
attacker could initiate an on-the-fly channel and then send unrelated
HTLCs that use the same `payment_hash`, just to mess up with us and get
some of our channels force-closed.

We already have the detailed information about on-the-fly HTLCs in our
DB, so we now use that to match HTLCs on the corresponding `channel_id`
and `htlc_id`, which guarantees uniqueness.

93/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Explains rationale or failure mode✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference
Why it was queued
explicit security language
AI analysis · High 72/100

This commit fixes a bug in the Eclair Lightning node where, after a restart, the node could be tricked into keeping the wrong incoming payments alive. An attacker could reuse the same payment identifier (payment_hash) from a legitimate in-flight channel funding request on unrelated payments. Because the old code matched only by payment_hash, those unrelated payments would be treated as part of the funding flow and not failed back. If left unresolved until their deadline, this could force the node to force-close its channels, costing money and disrupting service. The fix matches by the exact channel and HTLC identifier instead, which is unique.

Security candidateBetter documentation for remote `bitcoind` (#3359)by Bastien Teinturier · 24229589 · Aug 19, 2026 · 2 filesMessage 86 · StrongInformational 15Details
Commit message · Bastien Teinturier

Better documentation for remote `bitcoind` (#3359)

Our documentation didn't make it clear enough that `bitcoind` should
ideally run on the same machine as `eclair`. If that's not possible,
since `bitcoind` doesn't provide support for TLS for its RPC and ZMQ
endpoints, the node operator MUST setup a secure tunnel (providing
encryption and authentication) between `eclair` and `bitcoind`. If
that isn't provided, a network attacker may drop or alter messages
between `eclair` and `bitcoind`, which can lead to a loss of funds.

86/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference✓ Names security-relevant behavior explicitly
Why it was queued
explicit security languageaccess controldocumentation-only discount
AI analysis · Informational 15/100

This commit only updates user documentation. It adds warnings that the Bitcoin node (bitcoind) should run on the same machine as Eclair, and if it runs remotely, operators must use a secure encrypted tunnel. No code was changed, so this patch does not by itself fix or introduce a security flaw.

Security candidateFix several on-the-fly-funding bugs (#3351)by Bastien Teinturier · 48ff28ab · Aug 13, 2026 · 7 filesMessage 98 · StrongHigh 78Details
Commit message · Bastien Teinturier

Fix several on-the-fly-funding bugs (#3351)

* Handle on-the-fly on-chain downstream failure post-restart

When restarting our node, we have a custom hook to avoid failing HTLCs
downstream when they're used with on-the-fly funding, because we want
to retry relaying those HTLCs. That doesn't apply to on-chain failures
though, because at that point the downstream channel has been closed.

* Don't relay on-the-fly HTLCs twice after restart

Before relaying on-the-fly HTLCs, we verify that they aren't already
being relayed. We only look at the pending changes, because once the
HTLCs are relayed we change their in-memory state in the Peer actor.

But if we restart after cross-signing on-the-fly HTLCs, we previously
would relay them again, thus paying the downstream user twice. We now
also look at the commitment transactions to avoid that.

* Force-close unpaid on-the-fly channels

When we fund an on-the-fly channel for which fees must be paid in the
follow-up HTLCs, our peer may act maliciously and ignore those HTLCs
when we relay them after funding the channel. We've already funded
the channel so it's too late to recover the on-chain fees we've paid,
so we previously just failed back the corresponding upstream HTLCs and
gave up on relaying them to the funded channel.

However, the HTLCs may already be cross-signed and pending on the funded
channel, which means that our peer could fulfill it and get paid while
we have failed the corresponding upstream HTLCs. In that case, we lose
funds. We can only fail the upstream HTLCs if we're sure that we haven't
relayed them yet,

Since obtaining this state is asynchronous and complex, we now opt-in to
a safer approach: we force-close the channel, check its commitments, and
only fail the upstream HTLCs that weren't relayed. If they have been
relayed, they will automatically be failed back when our HTLC-timeout
transaction confirms.

* Reject on-the-fly payment for batch of `payment_hashes`

While the protocol supports batching `payment_hashes`, we currently only
use it for one `payment_hash` at a time. It's thus safer to restrict it
to this to prevent potential abuse. We also explicitly reject the case
where an attacker tries to insert the same `payment_hash` twice to mess
up our state.

* Correctly relay preimages upstream after timeout

If we receive the preimage for an on-the-fly payment *after* the HTLC
has timed out, we still need to relay that preimage upstream, otherwise
we've paid downstream without being paid upstream.

98/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Explains rationale or failure mode✓ Mentions testing or verification✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference
Why it was queued
explicit security languagesigning boundarysigning or wallet path
AI analysis · High 78/100

This commit fixes several bugs in Eclair's 'on-the-fly funding' feature, which lets a node open a Lightning channel and pay for it using future payment fees. The bugs could allow a malicious peer to make the node pay twice, lose money on force-closed channels, or fail to collect incoming payments after timeouts. The patch adds checks to prevent double-relaying payments, force-closes channels when fees are unpaid, and ensures preimages are still forwarded upstream even after an HTLC timeout.

Security candidateHarden permissions of seeds and datadir (#3340)by rorp · 17edd765 · Aug 13, 2026 · 4 filesMessage 53 · ThinModerate 62Details
Commit message · rorp

Harden permissions of seeds and datadir (#3340)

53/100 · ThinMessage clarity
✓ Descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference! No meaningful explanatory body
Why it was queued
defensive validationcredential or privilege statecryptography-sensitive path
AI analysis · Moderate 62/100

This commit tightens file and folder permissions for Eclair's sensitive data. It ensures that seed files (which protect the node's identity and Lightning channel funds) and the data directory are readable only by the owner on Linux/macOS systems. Previously, these files could inherit looser default permissions, potentially allowing other local users on the same machine to read secrets and steal funds. Windows is unaffected because it uses a different permission model.

Security candidateSeveral improvements suggested by Loupe (#3348)by Bastien Teinturier · fa10b0e0 · Aug 13, 2026 · 16 filesMessage 88 · StrongModerate 64Details
Commit message · Bastien Teinturier

Several improvements suggested by Loupe (#3348)

* Remove transport keys from DEBUG logs

While `DEBUG` logs shouldn't be activated on mainnet, it is dangerous
that they expose key material. We remove those logs.

* Remove onion shared secrets from unparsable failure logs

When receiving a failure that we couldn't parse, we added the shared
secrets in the logs to help us troubleshoot (because we've seen that
error frequently on our node). It didn't let us figure out the issue,
which most likely comes from a buggy intermediate or final node. We
now remove those secrets from the logs for safety.

* Make incoming connection tracker idempotent

If we receive multiple times a request to track a given node, we ignore
the redundant ones.

* More robust network DB clean-up on restart

On restart, we remove `channel_update`s that we cannot decode from our
network DB. The way the code was written could be an issue depending
on the postgres driver, because it potentially interleaved SELECT and
DELETE clauses. It apparently doesn't matter for our current version
of the postgres driver, but it's more future-proof to explicitly split
the SELECTs from the DELETEs.

* Check wake-up config before trying message wake-up

We didn't check the wake-up config parameter when relaying onion
messages, which wasted resources by creating actors that would be
useless.

* Include wallet node_id encoding when resolving blinded paths

When resolving the introduction point of a blinded path and checking
whether one of the nodes is ourselves, we must check that with all
potential encodings, including the wallet-reserved one.

* Don't include extraneous HTLCs in trampolinefee calculation

When relaying a trampoline payment, we must ensure that we don't include
extraneous payments (that are rejected), otherwise we will use a very
large route fee budget.

* Correctly clean up MPP payment-initiator state

When directly crafting MPP payments using the `sendtoroute` API, we
use the child payment ID as tracking key in the `PaymentInitiator`
internal state. If the payment fails, the `PaymentFailed` event will
correctly use that ID, so the state will be cleaned up. But if the
payment succeeds, the `PaymentSent` event uses the *parent* payment ID
so the state wasn't correctly cleaned up. We now clean up the child
state as well.

* Explicitly handle empty payment types

We've recently improved our liquidity ads codec, but we weren't
properly handling the case where no payment types are provided
(even though this will likely be rejected by remote nodes).

88/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Explains rationale or failure mode✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference
Why it was queued
cryptography-sensitive pathparser or protocol path
AI analysis · Moderate 64/100

This commit is a bundled maintenance patch for the Eclair Lightning node. It removes sensitive cryptographic keys and shared secrets from debug/error logs, fixes a bug where rejected payments could still be counted when calculating trampoline routing fees, prevents state leaks in manually crafted multi-part payments, makes incoming-connection tracking idempotent, avoids unnecessary peer wake-up attempts, handles an edge case in liquidity-ads encoding, separates database SELECT and DELETE operations for safety, and correctly recognizes wallet-encoded node IDs when resolving blinded payment paths. Several of these changes have clear security relevance, particularly the logging cleanup and the trampoline-fee fix, but they are defensive hardening and bug fixes rather than a single critical vulnerability.

Security candidateMultiple bug fixes found by AI scanning (#3346)by Bastien Teinturier · 0c4ddc4d · Aug 12, 2026 · 5 filesMessage 88 · StrongHigh 74Details
Commit message · Bastien Teinturier

Multiple bug fixes found by AI scanning (#3346)

* Fix 0-fee commitments fee bumping with remote-main

When using 0-fee commitments, if our peer publishes their commitment
and our main output is large enough, we don't need to use a wallet
input to pay RBF fees, we can directly do it using our main output.

However, we didn't take into account the whole package weight when
doing so: this means that there was a balance range where we would
not correctly bump the commit tx to the target feerate.

* Retry transaction publishing on unclassified failures

We classify bitcoind publish failures by substring-matching the RPC
error message. Any rejection that doesn't match any of the RPC error
messages that we know would previously not be retried.

This was dangerous, as it could cause us to abandon a time-sensitive
transaction, which could cause loss of funds. We now eagerly retry
when we cannot classify the RPC publish failure.

* Fix `channel_ready` using invalid musig2 nonce if RBF

We must use `commitments1` instead of `d.commitments` when creating our
`channel_ready` message to ensure that we use the correct musig2 nonce
for taproot channels. Otherwise, if we have multiple RBF attempts and
the ony confirming is *not* the latest one, we will use the wrong nonce.

* Fix out-of-bound array access in payment FSM

Remote failures can be manipulated to trigger an out-of-bound array
access which crashes the payment lifecycle actor.

88/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Explains rationale or failure mode✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference
Why it was queued
nonce handling
AI analysis · High 74/100

This commit fixes four separate bugs in the Eclair Lightning node, all reported as found by AI scanning. Two of the bugs can cause loss of funds: one miscalculates transaction fees when bumping a channel close, and another could abandon time-sensitive transactions on unrecognized Bitcoin RPC errors. A third bug could use the wrong cryptographic nonce after a channel funding RBF, and a fourth could crash the payment actor via a maliciously crafted remote failure message. The commit is a straightforward set of fixes, but it is partial in the sense that it does not include broader hardening beyond the specific bugs identified.

AI review queuedImprove liquidity ads codec performance (#3344)by Bastien Teinturier · b6b89e02 · Aug 12, 2026 · 4 filesMessage 76 · AdequateModerate 50Details
Commit message · Bastien Teinturier

Improve liquidity ads codec performance (#3344)

* Improve liquidity ads codec

We improve the performance of the liquidity ads codec by ignoring
unknown payment types, and simply checking whether the payment types
we support are activated or not.

* Reject node_announcement with invalid liquidity TLV

If the liquidity ads TLVs is present but with empty fields, we fail to
correctly re-encode it. We must reject it immediately instead.

76/100 · AdequateMessage clarity
✓ Descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference
Why it was queued
parser or protocol pathsecond-pass: security-sensitive path
AI analysis · Moderate 50/100

This commit fixes a bug in how Eclair handles 'liquidity ads' data embedded in Lightning node announcements. Previously, if a peer broadcast a node_announcement containing a liquidity-ads field with empty funding rates or empty payment types, the node could not re-encode the message correctly, which could cause it to relay or store invalid gossip. The patch now rejects such malformed announcements immediately. It also improves codec performance by storing the raw payment-type bitfield instead of eagerly decoding unknown payment types.

Security candidateCorrectly handle unknown flags in `channel_update` (#3341)by Bastien Teinturier · 54912ef2 · Aug 6, 2026 · 10 filesMessage 98 · StrongModerate 64Details
Commit message · Bastien Teinturier

Correctly handle unknown flags in `channel_update` (#3341)

We previously ignored unknown `channel_flags` and `message_flags` in
the channel updates we received at decoding time, which means we would
always replace them by `0` when re-encoding the channel update before
forwarding it. If a flag that we don't understand was set to `1`, the
signature becomes invalid.

In order to be future-proof, we must preserve the values of unknown
flags during a codec round-trip: this way old eclair nodes will still
correctly relay future channel updates that contain flags that haven't
yet been specified.

98/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Explains rationale or failure mode✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference✓ Names security-relevant behavior explicitly
Why it was queued
signing boundaryparser or protocol path
AI analysis · Moderate 64/100

This commit fixes a bug in how Eclair handled unknown flag bits in Lightning 'channel_update' messages. Previously, the software silently cleared any flag bits it did not recognize when re-encoding a message before forwarding it. Because those flag bits are part of the signed data, clearing them made the digital signature invalid. The fix now preserves all unknown flag bits through a decode-encode round trip, so older Eclair nodes can still correctly relay future channel updates that use newly defined flags.

AI review queuedBack to dev (#3339)by Bastien Teinturier · ee7d9f6d · Jul 29, 2026 · 8 filesMessage 36 · OpaqueInformational 15Details
Commit message · Bastien Teinturier

Back to dev (#3339)

After the v0.14.1 release.

36/100 · OpaqueMessage clarity
✓ Subject identifies a change✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference! No meaningful explanatory body
Why it was queued
second-pass: opaque commit message
AI analysis · Informational 15/100

This commit is a routine post-release housekeeping change. It bumps the project version from 0.14.1 to 0.15.0-SNAPSHOT, re-enables a Maven trusted-checksum feature used for build verification, adds a placeholder release-notes file, and includes a safety guard that refuses to start the development snapshot unless a special override flag is set. There is no security vulnerability in the diff itself; the startup guard is an intentional protective measure, not an exploit.

Lower-priorityEclair v0.14.1 release (#3338)by Bastien Teinturier · d769db07 · Jul 29, 2026 · 9 filesMessage 53 · ThinLow 45Details
Commit message · Bastien Teinturier

Eclair v0.14.1 release (#3338)

53/100 · ThinMessage clarity
✓ Descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference! No meaningful explanatory body
AI analysis · Low 45/100

This commit is the packaging of Eclair v0.14.1. It mostly changes version numbers and release notes, plus two operational tweaks: it turns off Maven's trusted-checksum post-processor and removes a startup guard that previously refused to run. The release notes describe the release as a routine patch with bug fixes and performance improvements, but also mention a Bolt12 fee-discount feature that was disabled because it could put nodes 'at risk' if used with custom plugins. No CVE or independent security report is referenced in the materials.

Lower-priorityDisable Bolt12 recipient path fee discount (#3332)by Bastien Teinturier · 3397b1a6 · Jul 28, 2026 · 3 filesMessage 81 · StrongModerate 60Details
Commit message · Bastien Teinturier

Disable Bolt12 recipient path fee discount (#3332)

In https://github.com/ACINQ/eclair/pull/2993, we introduced a mechanism
in the default Bolt12 offer handler to let the recipient pay the fees of
the blinded paths they include in their Bolt12 invoices, instead of the
payer having to pay fees for privacy chosen by the recipient (when the
recipient decides to use a "real" blinded path with external nodes they
don't control).

This wasn't correctly taking MPP into account: payers could split the
payment in many tiny parts such that each part used the whole path fee
discount. As a result, the payer would have still paid the whole amount
but most of it would be collected by intermediate nodes inside the path
instead of the recipient, which isn't the goal.

We're thus disabling this feature: we'll need a cleaner protocol to
correctly account for MPP with base fees. Bolt12 isn't used yet by
merchants so it's fine: we'll wait for recipients to adopt it before
deciding how we introduce a blinded path fee discount feature (if this
is something that users request). Note that we also recommend users
to implement their own offer handler to customize their blinded paths,
if they care about privacy, instead of using the default handler which
is mostly there as a reference.

81/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference
AI analysis · Moderate 60/100

This commit removes a fee-discount feature for a new kind of Lightning payment (Bolt12 offers). The old feature let the seller pay routing fees for the hidden 'blinded' path they chose for privacy. But when a payer split a payment into many tiny pieces, each piece could claim the full discount, so most of the money would go to routing fees instead of the seller. The patch disables the discount to stop that abuse. It is a defensive fix, not an active exploit being patched in deployed code, because Bolt12 merchant use is still rare.

AI review queuedPrevent `channel_id` collisions (#3337)by Bastien Teinturier · 45ea9fbf · Jul 28, 2026 · 19 filesMessage 78 · AdequateModerate 60Details
Commit message · Bastien Teinturier

Prevent `channel_id` collisions (#3337)

* Reject channel if initial DB write fails

If the first DB write of a channel fails, we want to abort the channel
immediately, otherwise our state may be unusable. If for some reason
we already have a channel (for example because of a partial restore
from a DB backup), we want to avoid overwriting this state as well.

* Add global `channel_id`s collision resistance

We add a global, concurrent map that keeps track of every temporary
and final `channel_id` being used. We always add to this map before
creating channel actors or transitioning to a final `channel_id`
(and thus before storing channel data in the DB).

We only remove from that map when a channel actor dies: no other
channel can be associated with the corresponding temporary or
final `channel_id` since the channel was created after registering
the IDs.

78/100 · AdequateMessage clarity
✓ Descriptive subject✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Explains rationale or failure mode✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference
Why it was queued
signing or wallet pathsecond-pass: security-sensitive path
AI analysis · Moderate 60/100

This commit hardens the Eclair Lightning node against two related problems when opening payment channels: it prevents the same channel ID from being reused by two different channels at the same time, and it aborts channel creation if the very first database write fails (for example because a channel with that ID already exists from a backup). Before this change, a colliding or partially-restored channel ID could cause one channel's state to overwrite another's, potentially leading to loss of funds or an inconsistent node state.

Lower-priorityApply RBF limits to remote closing transactions (#3331)by Bastien Teinturier · 687485fc · Jul 28, 2026 · 3 filesMessage 93 · StrongModerate 52Details
Commit message · Bastien Teinturier

Apply RBF limits to remote closing transactions (#3331)

* Apply RBF limits to remote closing transactions

When using `option_simple_close`, we didn't apply explicit rate-limits
to remote closing transactions, apart from the fact that the feerate
must be higher for each attempt.

There is no good reason to make a large number of RBF attempts when
closing a channel cooperatively, so we apply the same rate-limits we
use for funding.

* Bound the number of local closing transactions

We apply the BOLTs recommendation for the maximum number of closing
transactions we create when using the legacy closing protocol (not
`option_simple_close`). We previously restricted remote closing
transactions, but we now also apply it to our local transactions.

* Apply the maximum attempts limit to splice RBF

We previously only applied the rate-limit (X attempts every Y blocks)
but we didn't apply the maximum attempts limit. The risk is that we may
end up with a splice that is stuck unconfirmed, but will eventually
confirm, unless the peer is malicious and the feerate was very badly
estimated (in which case they would have found a way to prevent the
splice from confirming anyway).

93/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Explains rationale or failure mode✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference
AI analysis · Moderate 52/100

This commit adds rate limits and maximum attempt caps for Replace-By-Fee (RBF) closing transactions in the Eclair Lightning node. Previously, a peer could repeatedly propose new closing transactions without strict limits, which could waste computing resources, storage, and network bandwidth. The change also applies the same limits to local and splice RBF attempts, aligning with Lightning protocol recommendations and reducing the risk of abuse or accidental resource exhaustion.

Lower-priorityReject `start_batch` with size <= 1 (#3333)by Bastien Teinturier · e4e1a19d · Jul 28, 2026 · 2 filesMessage 76 · AdequateLow 25Details
Commit message · Bastien Teinturier

Reject `start_batch` with size <= 1 (#3333)

Bolt2 specifies that a receiving node:

```
If batch_size is not strictly greater than 1:
- MUST ignore the start_batch message.
- SHOULD send a warning.
```

76/100 · AdequateMessage clarity
✓ Descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference
AI analysis · Low 25/100

This commit tightens validation of a Lightning network peer message called start_batch. Previously, the software only rejected batch sizes larger than 20. Now it also rejects batch sizes of 0 or 1, which the protocol specification says must be ignored with a warning. The change is a standards-compliance fix; it does not by itself look like a critical vulnerability, but it removes a case where a peer could request a meaningless batch and the node would accept it.

Lower-priorityDon't store duplicate settlement messages (#3336)by Bastien Teinturier · 3eebbe96 · Jul 28, 2026 · 2 filesMessage 88 · StrongModerate 60Details
Commit message · Bastien Teinturier

Don't store duplicate settlement messages (#3336)

If our peer is buggy, or if we have a bug in our message queue, we may
receive duplicate settlement messages for pending HTLCs. It is fine to
handle them and relay the settlement downstream (instead of immediately
force-closing), but we shouldn't store the duplicate settlement in the
remote changes, otherwise it will trigger a force-close when exchanging
`commit_sig`.

88/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Explains rationale or failure mode✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference
AI analysis · Moderate 60/100

This patch fixes a bug in Eclair's Lightning payment channel code. If a buggy peer (or internal message queue bug) sent the same HTLC settlement message twice, Eclair would store the duplicate in its list of pending remote changes. Later, when signing the next commitment, that duplicate would be treated as a conflicting update and trigger an unnecessary force-close of the channel. The fix ignores duplicate settlement messages instead of storing them again, while still allowing the first one to be relayed downstream. It also still force-closes if a conflicting (different) settlement arrives for the same HTLC.

AI review queuedAccept Bolt12 invoices with reply path (#3325)by Bastien Teinturier · 79519244 · Jul 27, 2026 · 2 filesMessage 76 · AdequateLow 30Details
Commit message · Bastien Teinturier

Accept Bolt12 invoices with reply path (#3325)

We previously rejected Bolt12 invoices when a reply path was provided
in the onion message. This wasn't in the spec, and it could make sense
to provide a specific reply path with an invoice in case the payer
considers the invoice invalid and wants to send back an invoice_error
to inform the recipient.

This created compatibility issues with LDK.

Fixes #3322

76/100 · AdequateMessage clarity
✓ Descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference
Why it was queued
parser or protocol pathsecond-pass: security-sensitive path
AI analysis · Low 30/100

This commit loosens Eclair's validation of BOLT12 invoice onion messages so that invoices may now include a reply path. Previously, Eclair rejected invoices that carried a reply path, which caused compatibility problems with LDK nodes. The change is framed as an interoperability fix, not a security fix, and it tightens some related validation rules at the same time.

Security candidateIgnore repeated invalid `tx_signatures` (#3328)by Bastien Teinturier · 823341e6 · Jul 17, 2026 · 2 filesMessage 88 · StrongLow 47Details
Commit message · Bastien Teinturier

Ignore repeated invalid `tx_signatures` (#3328)

When our peer sends us an invalid `tx_signatures`, we processed it and
ignored the failure when we've already sent our own `tx_signatures`,
because the transaction may be broadcast and may confirm anyway.

We now stop processing those invalid `tx_signatures` repeatedly: if our
peer sends us more than 3 invalid `tx_signatures` for a given funding
transaction, they're definitely buggy so we'll just wait for the
transaction to confirm without trying to obtain the fully signed one
locally.

We also now avoid unnecessary DB writes on `shutdown`.
We don't need to write to the DB every time we receive `shutdown` from
our peer, since the BOLTs require `shutdown` to be retransmitted on
reconnection.

88/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Explains rationale or failure mode✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference
Why it was queued
signing boundary
AI analysis · Low 47/100

This update changes how the Eclair Lightning node handles repeated bad 'tx_signatures' messages from a peer during dual-funded channel opens and splices. Previously, every bad signature was processed and logged, which could waste CPU and disk writes and might be abused to keep a node busy. Now, after three bad signatures for the same funding transaction, the node stops processing them and just waits for the on-chain confirmation. The patch also removes unnecessary database writes when receiving repeated 'shutdown' messages. The commit message frames this as a robustness improvement against buggy or malicious peers, not as a critical vulnerability fix.