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Eclair

Scala implementation of a Lightning Network node.

BitcoinLightning NetworkNormal
Repository coverage

231 commits in the local evidence base

Every captured commit receives deterministic security triage and a separate communication-quality score. Security candidates and broader second-pass signals receive full-patch Ollama analysis.

66security candidates48second-pass queue208AI analyses
4commits · 30 days
26commits · 60 days
80commits · 180 days
161commits · 365 days
Backfill bands
Aug 5 → Feb 691 seen11 candidatesComplete
Feb 6 → Jun 660 seen5 candidatesComplete
Jun 6 → Jul 62 seen0 candidatesComplete
Jul 6 → Aug 514 seen0 candidatesComplete
Commit communication

Does the history explain itself?

Message quality measures whether a commit identifies its scope, purpose, rationale, testing, and supporting references. It does not change the security-severity score.

78/100 average clarity
143Strong · 80–100
54Adequate · 60–79
23Thin · 40–59
11Opaque · 0–39
3security candidates with opaque commit messaging
Read the scoring rubric →
Developer activity

Who is changing the project?

Public Git author strings; identities are not independently verified.

DeveloperCommitsCandidatesAnalyzedHigh riskMessage avg.
pm47451633876
Bastien Teinturier13332127581
Fabrice Drouin291424269
Thomas HUET16116075
rorp313069
Nishant Bansal212084
dependabot[bot]111081
ekzyis101058
Rusty Russell101081
Analysis record

Published AI watches

Last scanned 47 minutes ago

Informational 15 AI analysisMessage 36 · Opaque
AQ ACINQEclair BitcoinLightning Network

Back to dev (#3424)

This commit is a routine post-release housekeeping change. It bumps the software version from 0.14.6 to 0.15.0-SNAPSHOT across several build files, adds a blank release-notes template for the next version, and intentionally adds a startup …

Startup guard added to block accidental execution of development snapshotNo vulnerability fix, cryptographic change, or trust-boundary modification present
c96c3d44by Fabrice Drouin+73−57 files
No security note in commit
High 74 AI analysisMessage 53 · Thin
AQ ACINQEclair BitcoinLightning Network

Eclair v0.14.6 release (#3420)

This commit is the release packaging for Eclair v0.14.6. The release notes explicitly state it contains 'security hardening fixes' that can be exploited by malicious nodes, and thank a researcher for responsible disclosure. The actual code…

Vendor release notes explicitly label the release as containing 'security hardening fixes' exploitable by malicious nodesNew default-on configuration `require-confirmed-inputs-for-splicing` mitigates unconfirmed-input double-spend risk during splicingRelease notes credit @erickcestari for responsible disclosures
50e046efby Fabrice Drouin+28−198 files
Vendor flagged security relevance
High 72 AI analysisMessage 88 · Strong
AQ ACINQEclair BitcoinLightning Network

Splicing robustness improvements (#3417)

This commit hardens Eclair's Lightning channel 'splicing' feature against a malicious peer. Splicing lets users resize a channel by creating a new funding transaction. The patch fixes several ways an attacker could exploit unconfirmed spli…

New default-on configuration `require-confirmed-inputs-for-splicing` to prevent double-spend of unconfirmed splice inputsLimit on remote splice inputs/outputs (10) to bound CPFP costForce-close now selects a commitment whose funding tx is known to bitcoind, re-evaluated per block and splice spend events
c07cc745by pm47+518−6011 files
Vendor flagged security relevance
Moderate 64 AI analysisMessage 81 · Strong
AQ ACINQEclair BitcoinLightning Network

Flag peers that leave liquidity fees unpaid (#3416)

This commit fixes a security gap in Eclair's Lightning node software. A peer could repeatedly get free channel funding ('liquidity') by backing out of payments meant to cover the fees right before the funding transaction was signed. Previo…

Fixes a logic flaw allowing repeated unpaid liquidity feesAdds peer suspicion flagging tied to funding txidExpands state handling for asynchronous LiquidityPurchaseAborted events
c5b9afc0by pm47+192−154 files
Vendor flagged security relevance
Informational 15 AI analysisMessage 36 · Opaque
AQ ACINQEclair BitcoinLightning Network

Back to dev (#3413)

This commit is a routine post-release housekeeping change. It bumps the project version from 0.14.5 to 0.15.0-SNAPSHOT, removes published release checksums, and adds a blank release-notes template. It also adds a startup guard that refuses…

No vulnerability signals presentStartup guard added to block accidental use of development snapshot
06716fceby Fabrice Drouin+73−108 files
No security note in commit
Moderate 67 AI analysisMessage 53 · Thin
AQ ACINQEclair BitcoinLightning Network

Eclair v0.14.5 release (#3412)

This commit is the release packaging for Eclair v0.14.5. The release notes state it is a patch release containing 'security hardening fixes' that can be exploited by malicious nodes, and thank two people for responsible disclosures. The ac…

Release notes explicitly describe 'security hardening fixes' and warn that 'some of these issues can be exploited by malicious nodes'Two independent researchers are credited for responsible disclosuresRemoval of an 'unsafe startup' guard indicates the prior development snapshot was considered unsafe and this release is meant to be safe to run
01384e93by Fabrice Drouin+14−268 files
Vendor flagged security relevance
High 82 AI analysisMessage 81 · Strong
AQ ACINQEclair BitcoinLightning Network

Check remote previous txOut against the blockchain (#3411)

This commit fixes a security bug in Eclair's taproot channel splicing. When two users splice a Lightning channel, one side can describe its bitcoin inputs by sending only a small summary (the txOut) instead of the full previous transaction…

Missing cryptographic/chain validation of peer-supplied transaction dataTaproot signature commits to spent outputs, making a signed-but-unconfirmable splice possiblePotential HTLC theft via old commitment publication after splice timeout
ae0927edby pm47+111−43 files
Vendor flagged security relevance
High 78 AI analysisMessage 86 · Strong
AQ ACINQEclair BitcoinLightning Network

Reject onion per-hop lengths that overflow an `Int` (#3408)

This fix closes a denial-of-service bug in Eclair's Lightning onion routing. A remote sender could craft a malformed per-hop payload length that, when converted from a large number to a normal integer, wrapped around to a negative or tiny …

Integer overflow / truncation from Long to IntNegative length bypasses upper-bound checkException escapes Try block causing DoS
40279a1bby pm47+20−32 files
Vendor flagged security relevance
Informational 15 AI analysisMessage 36 · Opaque
AQ ACINQEclair BitcoinLightning Network

Back to dev (#3405)

This commit is a routine post-release housekeeping change. It bumps the project version from 0.14.4 to 0.15.0-SNAPSHOT, removes the published checksums for the 0.14.4 release, and adds a placeholder release-notes file for the next version.…

No security-relevant code changesAdded explicit unsafe-startup guard to prevent accidental use of development snapshotNo references to CVEs, advisories, or security issues in commit message or diff
c4910b7bby Fabrice Drouin+73−108 files
No security note in commit
High 84 AI analysisMessage 53 · Thin
AQ ACINQEclair BitcoinLightning Network

Eclair v0.14.4 release (#3403)

This commit is the official release marker for Eclair v0.14.4. The release notes included in the commit describe it as a security-hardening patch release with fixes for multiple issues, some of which can be exploited by malicious nodes. Th…

Release notes explicitly label the release as containing 'security hardening fixes' exploitable by malicious nodesHTTP API now rejects Origin-header requests to mitigate browser-based CSRF against basic-authenticated endpointsSeed file length validation added (commit a07fff5)
e1c212c4by Fabrice Drouin+90−8210 files
Vendor flagged security relevance
High 82 AI analysisMessage 93 · Strong
AQ ACINQEclair BitcoinLightning Network

Retry publishing txs evicted by unconfirmed conflicts (#3397)

This commit fixes a security bug in the Eclair Lightning node where a malicious peer could trick the node into permanently giving up on publishing its own commitment or penalty transactions. By publishing and then double-spending a conflic…

The commit message explicitly describes theft risk: "This lets them steal HTLCs by publishing their commitment later"Attack vector involves a malicious peer withholding tx_signatures and double-spending a splice inputFix changes abandonment logic for local commit anchor preconditions
21f1bc8dby pm47+100−254 files
Vendor flagged security relevance
Moderate 66 AI analysisMessage 93 · Strong
AQ ACINQEclair BitcoinLightning Network

Keep unsigned settlements when rejecting commands (#3401)

This commit fixes a bug in Eclair, a Bitcoin Lightning Network node implementation. When the node received a duplicate command to settle a payment (fulfill or fail), it would mistakenly delete the still-pending settlement from its database…

Loss of pending HTLC settlement state on disconnect/reconnectUpstream HTLC timeout risk for relayed fulfilled downstream HTLCsDuplicate/conflicting command handling caused premature DB acknowledgement
7686dfadby pm47+38−32 files
Vendor flagged security relevance
Moderate 66 AI analysisMessage 81 · Strong
AQ ACINQEclair BitcoinLightning Network

Force-close again when a splice RBF sibling confirms (#3400)

This commit fixes a bug in Eclair, a Bitcoin Lightning Network node implementation. When one node force-closed a channel because its peer never finished signing a 'splice' (a way to resize a Lightning channel on-chain), and the peer later …

Funds-locking bug in channel close logicHTLCs not enforced on-chain after confirmed double-spendIncorrect re-force-close trigger condition
9a1ecc99by pm47+59−72 files
Vendor flagged security relevance
Critical 89 AI analysisMessage 78 · Adequate
AQ ACINQEclair BitcoinLightning Network

Reject unpublishable splices (#3396)

This commit fixes a set of vulnerabilities in Eclair's Lightning channel splicing protocol that could let a malicious peer trick the victim into signing a splice transaction that can never be published on the Bitcoin network. Because the v…

Commit title and message explicitly describe preventing a malicious peer from making us sign an unpublishable splice transactionAdds validation of absolute lockTime against current block height to prevent indefinite publication delayAdds rejection of BIP 68 relative lock time on all interactive-tx inputs, including shared splice input
af994180by pm47+235−35 files
Vendor flagged security relevance
High 74 AI analysisMessage 81 · Strong
AQ ACINQEclair BitcoinLightning Network

Reject onion per-hop lengths exceeding packet (#3395)

This commit fixes a bug in how Eclair processes encrypted routing instructions (onion packets) for Lightning payments. A malicious sender could craft a packet that claimed its inner payload was longer than the packet itself. The old code e…

Unchecked length field from attacker-controlled onion packet used for slicingException thrown outside Try block, bypassing expected error handlingRelayer crash could leave HTLC un-failed
d3a146a0by pm47+16−22 files
Vendor flagged security relevance
Moderate 53 AI analysisMessage 98 · Strong
AQ ACINQEclair BitcoinLightning Network

Remove `spendfromchanneladdress` nonce after one sig (#3392)

This commit fixes a cryptographic safety issue in a manual Bitcoin/Lightning recovery tool. When a user runs the `spendfromchanneladdress` operation, the code was re-reading a secret signing nonce from a stored map after using it once. Non…

nonce reuse prevention in Schnorr-like/MuSig2 partial signature flowprivate nonce removed from in-memory store after single usemanual recovery command affected, not hot path
c89af115by pm47+1−11 file
Vendor flagged security relevance
Moderate 66 AI analysisMessage 88 · Strong
AQ ACINQEclair BitcoinLightning Network

Reject seed files with an invalid length (#3389)

This patch fixes a bug in the Eclair Bitcoin Lightning node where, if the node crashed while creating its secret seed file, it could leave an empty file behind. On the next restart, Eclair would silently use that empty seed to generate all…

Use of weak/predictable cryptographic seed for key derivationMissing input validation on security-critical seed fileNon-atomic file write creating corrupt/empty secret material
a07fff56by pm47+31−12 files
Vendor flagged security relevance
Low 25 AI analysisMessage 81 · Strong
AQ ACINQEclair BitcoinLightning Network

Upgrade postgresql client from 42.7.11 to 42.7.12 (#3330)

This commit updates the PostgreSQL database driver used by Eclair from version 42.7.11 to 42.7.12. It is a routine dependency bump by an automated tool. The commit itself does not say what bugs the new driver fixes, but small point-release…

Dependency version bump of a database driverPoint-release upgrade may include upstream security fixes, but none are named in the commitNo application code changes or direct vulnerability evidence in the diff
972dfe99by dependabot[bot]+3−12 files
No security note in commit
Low 31 AI analysisMessage 58 · Thin
AQ ACINQEclair BitcoinLightning Network

Use bitcoin-kmp 0.49 (depends on bitcoin-kmp 0.32.0 and secp256k1-kmp 0.24.0) (#3362)

This commit updates Eclair's Bitcoin library dependency from version 0.48 to 0.49, which internally uses newer versions of bitcoin-kmp and secp256k1-kmp. The code changes only replace old property accesses (like `.txid`) with new method ca…

Dependency version bump for Bitcoin and secp256k1 cryptographic librariesSource changes are API adaptations (.txid -> .getTxid), not logic changesSecurity-critical validation code is touched (PSBT/transaction integrity checks against malicious Bitcoin Core)
6162e2aaby Fabrice Drouin+22−44 files
No security note in commit
Informational 15 AI analysisMessage 86 · Strong
AQ ACINQEclair BitcoinLightning Network

Update build to improve release process (#3381)

This commit is a routine build-system update. It upgrades several Maven plugin versions, removes the git commit ID from one jar manifest field to avoid a build-time circular dependency, and adds an optional build profile for a fuzz-testing…

c3e9f5d6by Fabrice Drouin+834−105 files
No security note in commit
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Lower-priorityReject incoming HTLCs with a high `cltv_expiry` (#3323)by Bastien Teinturier · 7fb94601 · Jul 8, 2026 · 4 filesMessage 93 · StrongModerate 52Details
Commit message · Bastien Teinturier

Reject incoming HTLCs with a high `cltv_expiry` (#3323)

We currently reject HTLCs with a `cltv_expiry` higher than 2 weeks in
the future when sending them (in the `sendAdd` method). That's because
they would lock up our funds for a long period of time if our peer
decided to force-close. Also, a large `cltv_expiry` makes slow jamming
easier.

We now apply the same limits to incoming HTLCs for consistency (since
they may differ by `cltv_expiry_delta`). Note that we don't do it in
the `receiveAdd` function, which would trigger a force-close. We just
accept those HTLCs and then fail them, since it is harmless to have
them only temporarily in our commitment as long as we don't relay.

93/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Explains rationale or failure mode✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference
AI analysis · Moderate 52/100

This change tightens a safety limit on the Bitcoin Lightning Network node Eclair. Previously, Eclair already refused to send outgoing payments whose refund deadline (the 'cltv_expiry') was more than about two weeks in the future, because that would lock up funds for too long and make certain spam/jamming attacks easier. Now it also rejects incoming payments with similarly distant deadlines, but it does so gracefully by accepting the payment into the channel and then immediately failing it, rather than force-closing the channel. This is a defensive hardening patch, not a fix for an active exploit, and it reduces the risk of funds being locked up or the node being used for 'slow jamming' of the network.

Security candidateUse bitcoin-lib 0.48 (#3316)by Fabrice Drouin · 743dcdd1 · Jul 8, 2026 · 4 filesMessage 53 · ThinInformational 22Details
Commit message · Fabrice Drouin

Use bitcoin-lib 0.48 (#3316)

53/100 · ThinMessage clarity
✓ Descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference! No meaningful explanatory body
Why it was queued
cryptography-sensitive pathsigning or wallet path
AI analysis · Informational 22/100

This commit updates Eclair's underlying Bitcoin library from version 0.47 to 0.48 and makes small code adjustments to match the new library's API. The changes touch how private keys are derived and how test data is converted. There is no direct evidence in the commit that this fixes a security vulnerability, but library updates can include bug fixes or improvements that affect cryptographic handling.

Security candidateRefactor attribution data (#3320)by Bastien Teinturier · 4b9ba010 · Jul 7, 2026 · 6 filesMessage 88 · StrongLow 34Details
Commit message · Bastien Teinturier

Refactor attribution data (#3320)

* Refactor attribution data

We refactor the attribution data code to make it more consistent with
the rest of the Sphinx-related code. We add comments and intermediate
variables to make it more readable. We introduce intermediate classes
to hold data and add better symmetry between the success and failure
cases.

This will make it easier to implement trampoline attribution and add
fulfillment data (https://github.com/lightning/bolts/pull/1344).

* Refactor trampoline attribution data

We correctly extract shared secrets (including trampoline shared
secrets) and detect when we're inside a blinded path to avoid
including attribution data. Note that we don't use the trampoline
shared secret yet, since full trampoline isn't implemented (see
https://github.com/ACINQ/eclair/pull/2819 for the full changes).

We add tests for attribution data with blinded paths and trampoline
payments.

88/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Descriptive subject✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Explains rationale or failure mode✓ Mentions testing or verification✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference
Why it was queued
cryptography-sensitive path
AI analysis · Low 34/100

This commit is a code refactor of how Eclair handles 'attribution data'—extra encrypted timing and accountability information attached to Lightning payment success and failure messages. It restructures the code to support future trampoline payments and blinded routes, and adds tests. The commit itself does not claim to fix a security bug; it is described as making later features easier to implement. However, the refactor changes how shared secrets are extracted and how attribution data is included or omitted for blinded and trampoline payments, which touches privacy-sensitive logic.

Lower-priorityRemove deprecated `bip125 replaceable` field in mempool transaction class (#3319)by Fabrice Drouin · cfe47a8c · Jun 17, 2026 · 2 filesMessage 81 · StrongInformational 20Details
Commit message · Fabrice Drouin

Remove deprecated `bip125 replaceable` field in mempool transaction class (#3319)

`bip125-replaceable` field in Bitcoin Core RPC had been deprecated since v29 and has now been removed.
Full RBF has been the default policy since v28.

81/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference
AI analysis · Informational 20/100

This commit removes support for a deprecated Bitcoin Core RPC field called `bip125-replaceable` from Eclair's internal mempool transaction model. Bitcoin Core stopped providing this field, so Eclair is updating its code to keep working with newer Bitcoin Core versions. It is a compatibility/maintenance change, not a fix for an active security vulnerability.

Lower-prioritySend `splice_locked` if necessary while reconnecting (#3318)by Bastien Teinturier · 7fb62fc5 · Jun 11, 2026 · 2 filesMessage 81 · StrongModerate 55Details
Commit message · Bastien Teinturier

Send `splice_locked` if necessary while reconnecting (#3318)

When we lock a commitment while reconnecting, we currently have a bug
where if we've sent our `channel_reestablish` but we haven't received
the remote `channel_reestablish`, we will not send `splice_locked`
which results in a mismatch in the expected number of `commit_sig`
messages for our peer, triggering a force-close.

We now send `splice_locked` when we are in the `SYNCING` state when
that makes sense. The logic is very similar to the `NORMAL` state,
but we don't emit events that are meant to be used when the channel
is ready to handle payments.

81/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference
AI analysis · Moderate 55/100

This commit fixes a bug in Eclair, a Bitcoin Lightning Network node implementation. During reconnection after a splice (a way to resize a payment channel), if a funding transaction became confirmed at a specific moment, the node would fail to notify its peer. That missing notification caused the peer to expect a different number of signature messages, leading both sides to force-close the channel and settle on the blockchain. The fix makes the node send the required `splice_locked` message even while it is still synchronizing with the peer. It is a bug fix, not an exploit by an attacker, but it could be triggered by normal network timing.

AI review queuedBack to dev (#3313)by Bastien Teinturier · 2dda7946 · May 21, 2026 · 8 filesMessage 36 · OpaqueInformational 15Details
Commit message · Bastien Teinturier

Back to dev (#3313)

After the 0.14.0 release.

36/100 · OpaqueMessage clarity
✓ Subject identifies a change✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference! No meaningful explanatory body
Why it was queued
second-pass: opaque commit message
AI analysis · Informational 15/100

This commit is a routine post-release housekeeping change. It bumps the software version from 0.14.0 to 0.15.0-SNAPSHOT across build files, creates a placeholder for future release notes, re-enables a Maven trusted-checksum feature used for build verification, and adds an explicit safety guard that refuses to start the node unless a special override flag is set. There is no vulnerability fix or security flaw introduced in the diff itself.

Lower-priorityEclair v0.14.0 release (#3312)by Bastien Teinturier · ec8c63b2 · May 21, 2026 · 8 filesMessage 53 · ThinInformational 15Details
Commit message · Bastien Teinturier

Eclair v0.14.0 release (#3312)

53/100 · ThinMessage clarity
✓ Descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference! No meaningful explanatory body
AI analysis · Informational 15/100

This commit is a routine version-bump release tag for Eclair v0.14.0. It updates Maven project versions from 0.14.0-SNAPSHOT to 0.14.0, removes a temporary 'unsafe startup' guard that was only meant for pre-release builds, renames the release notes file, and disables Maven's trusted-checksum post-processor for the release build. There is no security patch or vulnerability fix in this commit itself.

Lower-priorityFix Bolt12 path fee hiding (#3311)by Bastien Teinturier · 0896d03b · May 20, 2026 · 4 filesMessage 98 · StrongLow 32Details
Commit message · Bastien Teinturier

Fix Bolt12 path fee hiding (#3311)

When using blinded paths in our Bolt12 invoices, we may use a feature
where instead of making the payer pay the fees for the blinded path,
we deduce them from the amount we wish to receive (the recipient pays
for the privacy it gains from using blinded paths, instead of making
the payer pay for something that they didn't opt into). See #2993
for more details.

The constraint on path fees was wrong in some rounding cases, so we
fix that, otherwise we would unnecessarily reject some payments.
This was found by testing blinded trampoline payments.

98/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Explains rationale or failure mode✓ Mentions testing or verification✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference
AI analysis · Low 32/100

This commit fixes a rounding bug in Eclair's handling of Bolt12 (a newer Lightning Network invoice format) blinded-path fees. When a recipient hides their real node behind a private payment path, they can choose to pay those path fees themselves rather than charging the payer. The code that computed the maximum such fee used the wrong amount in some rounding cases, causing Eclair to reject valid incoming payments unnecessarily. The fix uses the larger of the invoice amount and the actual received amount when computing the fee limit, and adjusts default/test settings accordingly.

Security candidateAdd support for zero-fee commitment format (#3192)by Bastien Teinturier · 35403401 · May 20, 2026 · 42 filesMessage 100 · StrongLow 34Details
Commit message · Bastien Teinturier

Add support for zero-fee commitment format (#3192)

* Add support for zero-fee commitment format

We add support for the zero-fee commitment format specified in
https://github.com/lightning/bolts/pull/1228.

Channels using this commitment format benefit from better protection
against pinning attacks (thanks to TRUC/v3 transactions), don't need
the `update_fee` mechanism, have less dust exposure risk, and use an
overall simpler state machine.

In this commit, we simply introduce the commitment format and create
the corresponding transactions.

* Rename `ClaimRemoteDelayedOutputTx`

It isn't delayed anymore for v3 transactions. We could use static wallet
public key, but in most cases it wouldn't work and adds extra complexity
so we don't do it. We add a comment in the documentation of this class
to explain why we're always making a 2nd-stage transaction.

* Validate channel parameters

We apply slightly different validation for zero-fee commitments:

- the commit feerate must be `0 sat/byte`
- the max number of accepted HTLCs must be at most 114
- `update_fee` cannot be used

We verify those requirements during channel creation and add tests
for normal channel operation.

* Handle force-closing zero-fee channels

We add support for force-close zero-fee channels. When publishing the
local commit, this works mostly the same way as other channel types.
The only difference is that we don't even attempt to publish the commit
tx individually: we always bundle it with the anchor transaction.

When we detect the remote commit though, we're able to introduce some
new behavior:

- if we have a large enough main output, we use that to pay the fees
of the remote commit tx (unless it is already confirmed), which avoids
using a wallet input
- otherwise, we spend the anchor output, which competes with the remote
peer package

Since we're only using the anchor transaction or our main output to
spend the ephemeral anchor, we cannot publish HTLC txs until the
commit tx is confirmed. We will in the future make *all* transactions
go through the `ReplaceableTxPublisher`, and at the point we'll be able
to simplify this, but it's too early for this refactoring, so for now
we simply wait for the commit tx to be confirmed before publishing
HTLC txs.

* Don't force-close on remote `error`

When using zero-fee commitments, we don't force-close when receiving an
`error` from our peer: if they want to force-close the channel, they can
publish their commitment instead of forcing us to publish ours. It is
especially true when the commit tx doesn't pay any fees, because the
publisher will pay the entire fees for the force-close.

Note that for wallet peers, we could introduce a mechanism where they
send us their signed commit tx in the error message if they don't have
any wallet input to pay the fees, and we could be nice and publish it
while paying the fees from our main output (which isn't delayed since
it is the remote commit from our point of view).

100/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Explains rationale or failure mode✓ Mentions testing or verification✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference
Why it was queued
explicit security languagedefensive validationsigning or wallet path
AI analysis · Low 34/100

This commit adds an experimental new Lightning channel type to Eclair called 'zero-fee commitments.' It is a large feature patch implementing a draft BOLT specification (PR 1228), not a fix for a known vulnerability. The change introduces new transaction formats, validation rules, and force-close behavior. Because it is experimental, disabled by default, and extensively tested, it is unlikely to be an immediate security issue, but any large change to consensus-sensitive transaction code carries risk of subtle bugs.

Lower-priorityChange RBF feerate bump rule to match BIP125 (#3298)by Bastien Teinturier · 06538ada · May 19, 2026 · 1 fileMessage 81 · StrongLow 37Details
Commit message · Bastien Teinturier

Change RBF feerate bump rule to match BIP125 (#3298)

The 25/24 multiplicative feerate bump for `tx_init_rbf` can produce
increments too small for Bitcoin Core to relay the replacement
transaction under BIP125's minimum relay fee policy (default
`incrementalRelayFee` of 0.1 sat/vB since Bitcoin Core v30.0). Add a
minimum additive increment of 25 sat/kw alongside the existing
multiplicative rule, using whichever produces a higher feerate.

See https://github.com/lightning/bolts/pull/1327

81/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference
AI analysis · Low 37/100

This commit fixes how Eclair increases transaction fees when replacing a funding transaction via RBF (Replace-By-Fee). Previously, Eclair only required the new fee rate to be 25/24 (about 4.17%) higher than the old one. Under recent Bitcoin Core defaults, that small bump can be too low for the network to accept the replacement. The fix adds a minimum flat bump of 25 sat/kw and uses whichever is larger. This is a protocol correctness / liveness fix rather than a theft-of-funds bug, but it can prevent channel funding from getting stuck.

Lower-priorityUpdate features early on reconnection (#3310)by pm47 · 8876ef18 · May 12, 2026 · 2 filesMessage 65 · AdequateLow 34Details
Commit message · pm47

Update features early on reconnection (#3310)

Otherwise some upgrade paths may fail.

65/100 · AdequateMessage clarity
✓ Descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Explains rationale or failure mode✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference! No meaningful explanatory body
AI analysis · Low 34/100

This patch fixes the order in which Eclair updates Lightning protocol feature flags when a channel reconnects. Previously, the code built the reconnection message using stale feature information and only updated features afterward. Now features are refreshed first, so the reconnection handshake uses the correct, current capabilities. The commit message says this prevents some upgrade paths from failing. There is no direct evidence this is exploitable for theft or denial of service, but using stale feature data during a protocol handshake can cause compatibility or state-mismatch problems.

Lower-priorityFix edge case in `availableBalanceForSend/Receive` (#3308)by Bastien Teinturier · befdcd54 · May 12, 2026 · 1 fileMessage 91 · StrongLow 36Details
Commit message · Bastien Teinturier

Fix edge case in `availableBalanceForSend/Receive` (#3308)

There was a small discrepancy between `availableBalanceForSend/Receive`
and `canSendAdd/canReceiveAdd` when the sender is not paying the commit
tx fees. In `canSendAdd/canReceiveAdd`, we verify that the receiver
(who pays the commit fees) can still pay those fees after adding the
new HTLC to the commit tx. In `availableBalanceForSend/Receive`, we did
not verify that.

This only happens in very rare cases where the receiver is paying the
commit fees and is very close this its channel reserve, so it should
rarely happen in practice, but it sometimes makes our fuzz tests fail.

91/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Mentions testing or verification✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference
Why it was queued
fuzzing or regression evidence
AI analysis · Low 36/100

This patch fixes a mismatch in how Eclair calculates how much Bitcoin can be sent or received through a Lightning channel. Previously, the balance estimate could say a payment was possible, but the actual safety check would later reject it because the other party couldn't afford the on-chain transaction fees. This could cause payment attempts to fail unexpectedly, especially in edge cases where one side is nearly out of funds. It is a consistency bug rather than a direct theft-of-funds vulnerability.

Lower-priorityCompute channel keys once on on startup (#3306)by Bastien Teinturier · e1330154 · May 7, 2026 · 10 filesMessage 86 · StrongInformational 17Details
Commit message · Bastien Teinturier

Compute channel keys once on on startup (#3306)

We compute channel keys when we load and verify channels from our
database, and pass them along instead of re-computing them later
(which can be expensive when done at scale).

Implemented by @sstone, with small modifications by @t-bast.

86/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Mentions testing or verification✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference
AI analysis · Informational 17/100

This commit is a performance optimization, not a security fix. It changes Eclair so that cryptographic channel keys are computed once when channels are loaded from the database at startup, then passed around with the channel data, instead of being recomputed every time they are needed. This reduces CPU work when many channels are active. There is no indication in the commit that it fixes a vulnerability or changes security behavior.

Security candidateBump org.postgresql:postgresql version (#3305)by Bastien Teinturier · 76da19f1 · May 7, 2026 · 2 filesMessage 81 · StrongLow 36Details
Commit message · Bastien Teinturier

Bump org.postgresql:postgresql version (#3305)

This fixes a vulnerability, which doesn't apply to eclair in known
deployements, but is worth fixing in case some nodes use untrusted
database hosts which could lead to DoS attacks.

81/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference✓ Names security-relevant behavior explicitly
Why it was queued
explicit security languagecryptography-sensitive path
AI analysis · Low 36/100

This commit updates the PostgreSQL database driver used by the Eclair Lightning node software from version 42.7.8 to 42.7.11. The commit message says this fixes a vulnerability that could allow denial-of-service (DoS) attacks if a node connects to an untrusted database host. The developers state it does not affect known Eclair deployments, but they are patching it as a precaution.

Lower-priorityDocker: auto-approve apt-get install command (#3302)by pm47 · cb8f6c89 · May 7, 2026 · 1 fileMessage 73 · AdequateInformational 15Details
Commit message · pm47

Docker: auto-approve apt-get install command (#3302)

Otherwhile the build will wait for a user input and eventually fail.

73/100 · AdequateMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides an explanatory body✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference
AI analysis · Informational 15/100

This commit fixes a Docker build problem by adding the '-y' flag to an apt-get install command. Without this flag, the build would pause waiting for a human to confirm installation, causing automated builds to time out and fail. It is a build reliability fix, not a security fix.

Lower-priorityAdd previous commitments to ChannelFundingConfirmed event (#3303)by Fabrice Drouin · 66977cc6 · May 6, 2026 · 3 filesMessage 81 · StrongInformational 17Details
Commit message · Fabrice Drouin

Add previous commitments to ChannelFundingConfirmed event (#3303)

Event stream subscribers could use this field to find extra information about previous states that could have been pruned from the current commitments.

81/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference
AI analysis · Informational 17/100

This commit adds an extra data field to an internal event notification so that subscribers can see information about older channel states that may have been removed from the current state. It is a small, informational change to an event object and does not appear to fix an active security bug.

Lower-priorityAdd liquidity ads metrics (#3301)by Bastien Teinturier · 6bb7f258 · May 6, 2026 · 2 filesMessage 76 · AdequateInformational 15Details
Commit message · Bastien Teinturier

Add liquidity ads metrics (#3301)

We add metrics for liquidity ads (purchased amount and mining fee
refund).

We refactor the interactive-tx metrics to record them *after* tx
validation, instead of *before*. We also remove the input/output
count for the "shared" case, since it's always 0 or 1.

76/100 · AdequateMessage clarity
✓ Descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference
AI analysis · Informational 15/100

This commit only adds and reorganizes internal metrics (statistics counters and histograms) for monitoring liquidity advertisements and interactive Bitcoin transactions. It does not change how funds are handled, validated, or secured. The code that records metrics was moved to run after transaction validation instead of before, which is a safer ordering, but no vulnerability is being fixed.

Lower-priorityAdd metrics on interactive-tx inputs and outputs (#3300)by pm47 · 113d8fba · May 6, 2026 · 2 filesMessage 73 · AdequateInformational 15Details
Commit message · pm47

Add metrics on interactive-tx inputs and outputs (#3300)

We track:
- global input/output count by type and distribution of amounts
- per-session input/output count by type

73/100 · AdequateMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides an explanatory body✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference
AI analysis · Informational 15/100

This commit only adds new telemetry (metrics) to observe how many inputs and outputs are used in interactive Bitcoin transactions during Lightning channel funding or splicing. It records counts and amounts into monitoring histograms but does not change any transaction validation, cryptographic checks, or user-facing behavior. There is no security issue visible in the diff.

Security candidateFix flaky DER signature weight test (#3299)by Bastien Teinturier · 0f5d4b89 · May 5, 2026 · 1 fileMessage 100 · StrongInformational 15Details
Commit message · Bastien Teinturier

Fix flaky DER signature weight test (#3299)

This test was flaky because for the funding output, we provide two
signatures, which means that we need twice the slack for the variable
DER encoding length.

100/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Explains rationale or failure mode✓ Mentions testing or verification✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference✓ Names security-relevant behavior explicitly
Why it was queued
signing boundarysigning or wallet path
AI analysis · Informational 15/100

This commit only adjusts a flaky unit test that checks transaction weight estimates. It widens the allowed tolerance for variable-length ECDSA signatures when two signatures are involved instead of one. There is no change to production code, no security fix, and no vulnerability.

AI review queuedUse official feature bit for `option_simple_taproot` (#3144)by Bastien Teinturier · 872cb663 · May 5, 2026 · 14 filesMessage 81 · StrongLow 37Details
Commit message · Bastien Teinturier

Use official feature bit for `option_simple_taproot` (#3144)

Use the official feature bit and name for taproot channels and the
corresponding channel types. Activate taproot channels support by
default (without support for announcing such channels yet).

See https://github.com/lightning/bolts/pull/995

81/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference
Why it was queued
signing or wallet pathparser or protocol pathsecond-pass: security-sensitive path
AI analysis · Low 37/100

This commit updates the Eclair Lightning node software to use the official protocol feature bit and name for a new kind of Bitcoin payment channel called 'taproot channels.' It turns taproot channel support on by default, but only for private (unannounced) channels, because the public-announcement rules are not finalized. The change is mostly a rename and feature-bit swap from an earlier experimental/staging version, plus adding guards so users cannot accidentally open a public taproot channel. It is a protocol-alignment change, not a fix for an active security bug.

Security candidateAdd support for the official splicing protocol (#2887)by Bastien Teinturier · 68b0096a · Apr 30, 2026 · 24 filesMessage 93 · StrongLow 35Details
Commit message · Bastien Teinturier

Add support for the official splicing protocol (#2887)

We replace our experimental version of `splice_init`, `splice_ack` and
`splice_locked` by their official version. If our peer is using the
experimental feature bit, we convert our outgoing messages to use the
experimental encoding and incoming messages to the official messages.

We also change the TLV fields added to `tx_add_input`, `tx_signatures`
and `splice_locked` to match the spec version. We always write both the
official and experimental TLV to updated nodes (because the experimental
one is odd and will be ignored) but we drop the official TLV if our
peer is using the experimental feature, because it won't understand the
even TLV field.

We do the same thing for the `commit_sig` TLV. For peers who support the
official splicing version, we insert the `start_batch` message before
the batch of `commit_sig` messages.

This guarantees backwards-compatibility with peers who only support the
experimental feature.

We introduce a `retransmit_flags` field to `my_current_funding_locked`
and `next_funding` to ask our peer to retransmit `commitment_signed` or
`announcement_signatures` if we're expecting them. With this change, we
don't need to retransmit `splice_locked` on reconnection anymore to
trigger the exchange of `announcement_signatures`. We don't need to
retransmit it to let our peer know that we've seen enough confirmations
for the splice either, since `my_current_funding_locked` implies that.

This allows us to completely remove retransmission of `splice_locked` on
reconnection, and also get rid of the `your_last_funding_locked` TLV,
which greatly simplifies the reconnection logic. We do keep them for
backwards-compatibility with existing Phoenix users though, but we'll
be able to clean it up once they have updated.

Note that this works with taproot channels since we will simply provide
nonces in `channel_reestablish` when we need our peer to send
announcement signatures (not supported yet since taproot channels are
never announced).

We rollback using the `next_commitment_number` to let our peer know that
we haven't received their `commit_sig` and instead use the retransmit
flags added to the `next_funding` TLV, unless our peer is using the
legacy splicing protocol.

93/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Explains rationale or failure mode✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference
Why it was queued
signing boundarysigning or wallet pathauthentication pathparser or protocol path
AI analysis · Low 35/100

This commit adds official Lightning channel splicing support to Eclair and replaces an experimental protocol. It includes backwards-compatibility shims for older Phoenix wallets, changes how reconnection messages request retransmission of signatures, and renumbers some protocol feature bits. The changes are broad and touch consensus-critical wire protocol and channel state logic, so bugs could affect channel safety, but the commit itself is a feature implementation rather than a clear security fix.

Lower-priorityMore aggressive peer scorer idle channels management (#3295)by Bastien Teinturier · 6080ffb0 · Apr 29, 2026 · 8 filesMessage 81 · StrongInformational 24Details
Commit message · Bastien Teinturier

More aggressive peer scorer idle channels management (#3295)

We previously lowered fees from idle channels only if our latest update
was from more than 24 hours ago, and closed them if our latest update
was more than 5 days ago and using our minimal fees.

The issue is that our channel update may have been refreshed without
changing the relay fees, for example if our peer disconnected. We don't
track when our relay fees reached the minimum amount, so we may have
a recent channel update even though we reached our minimum relay fees
weeks ago.

We use smaller durations for those thresholds to see if that helps
reclaim liquidity more aggressively.

We also disable old peers revival by default.
This feature is useful when feerates have been high for a while and
funding was thus put on hold, but when feerates are frequently below
our feerate threshold, this is wasting liquidity. It should be enabled
after a high-fee period.

81/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference
AI analysis · Informational 24/100

This commit tweaks Eclair's automated liquidity-management logic so the node becomes more aggressive about lowering fees and closing channels that sit idle. It also turns off a feature that automatically re-funds old peers by default. The changes are operational/economic policy adjustments, not a fix for a software vulnerability that an attacker can exploit. There is a small operational risk that a node could close channels or lower fees more eagerly than before, but that is a business-logic trade-off rather than a security flaw.

Security candidateStore our closing_complete in the simple close session (#3289)by Fabrice Drouin · da7cd962 · Apr 21, 2026 · 4 filesMessage 96 · StrongLow 32Details
Commit message · Fabrice Drouin

Store our closing_complete in the simple close session (#3289)

In the simple close session, which is never persisted, we just need to remember our closing_complete and
the partial signatures it contains, instead of keeping our musig2 nonces and generating our partial signatures a second time to build the final closing tx when we receive our peer's partial signatures.
We also check our peer's partial signature and fail early if they're not valid, instead of building a fully sign
closing tx and then verify that it is correct.

96/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Mentions testing or verification✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference✓ Names security-relevant behavior explicitly
Why it was queued
signing boundarynonce handlingsigning or wallet path
AI analysis · Low 32/100

This commit changes how Eclair (a Bitcoin Lightning node) remembers its own closing signatures during a mutual channel close. Previously, the code re-generated signing nonces and re-signed closing transactions when the peer's signature arrived. Now it stores the original closing message and reuses its signatures. It also adds an early check that the peer's partial signature is valid before trying to build a final signed transaction. The change is a defensive correctness improvement rather than a clear fix for an active exploit.

Lower-priorityIncrease start-up ZMQ timeout (#3294)by Bastien Teinturier · 5c44f005 · Apr 17, 2026 · 1 fileMessage 76 · AdequateInformational 19Details
Commit message · Bastien Teinturier

Increase start-up ZMQ timeout (#3294)

We connect to bitcoind over ZMQ right after spawning all actors in the
system, which can consume a lot of our available sockets/bandwidth. We
increase the default timeout from 5 seconds to 30 seconds.

76/100 · AdequateMessage clarity
✓ Descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference
AI analysis · Informational 19/100

This commit increases the startup timeout from 5 to 30 seconds for Eclair's connections to Bitcoin's ZMQ notification service and its own TCP server port. It is a reliability/configuration fix, not a security patch. There is no indication it fixes a vulnerability or was triggered by a security report.

Lower-priorityAdd threshold for disabling `from_future_htlc` (#3293)by Bastien Teinturier · 119f8c21 · Apr 17, 2026 · 9 filesMessage 81 · StrongLow 48Details
Commit message · Bastien Teinturier

Add threshold for disabling `from_future_htlc` (#3293)

When funding a transaction using `from_future_htlc`, we are taking the
risk that the remote node doesn't fulfill the corresponding HTLCs. If
we detect that too many peers fail such HTLCs, this may indicate a bug
on the wallet side, so we automatically disable `from_future_htlc` to
limit our exposure.

We also ensure that nodes that already had one suspicious payment are
blacklisted for other payments. This issue can happen when wallet users
use multiple devices in unsupported scenarios.

81/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference
AI analysis · Low 48/100

This commit adds a safety limit to a Lightning node feature called 'from_future_htlc,' which lets peers pay channel funding fees using HTLCs that haven't arrived yet. The change makes the node track how many distinct peers look suspicious (e.g., accept funding but then reject the future HTLCs), and once a threshold is reached, it stops allowing that funding method. It also lets operators keep specific nodes blacklisted when re-enabling the feature. This is a defensive hardening patch, not a fix for an active exploit in the code itself.