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Core Lightning

Modular C implementation of the Lightning Network protocol and node stack.

BitcoinLightning NetworkNormal
Repository coverage

1853 commits in the local evidence base

Every captured commit receives deterministic security triage and a separate communication-quality score. Security candidates and broader second-pass signals receive full-patch Ollama analysis.

158security candidates263second-pass queue197AI analyses
146commits · 30 days
225commits · 60 days
803commits · 180 days
1849commits · 365 days
Backfill bands
Aug 5 → Feb 61049 seen37 candidatesComplete
Feb 6 → Jun 6579 seen10 candidatesComplete
Jun 6 → Jul 678 seen1 candidatesComplete
Jul 6 → Aug 5147 seen16 candidatesComplete
Commit communication

Does the history explain itself?

Message quality measures whether a commit identifies its scope, purpose, rationale, testing, and supporting references. It does not change the security-severity score.

70/100 average clarity
430Strong · 80–100
1163Adequate · 60–79
231Thin · 40–59
29Opaque · 0–39
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Developer activity

Who is changing the project?

Public Git author strings; identities are not independently verified.

DeveloperCommitsCandidatesAnalyzedHigh riskMessage avg.
Rusty Russell9587395072
Sangbida Chaudhuri1463139066
Dusty Daemon771313066
ShahanaFarooqui931010063
daywalker908957062
Níckolas Goline4057076
Lagrang37644069
Christian Decker3645072
Vincenzo Palazzo833080
Chandra Pratap5624082
ekzyis222063
Peter Neuroth9711070
Analysis record

Published AI watches

Last scanned 48 minutes ago

Informational 17 AI analysisMessage 73 · Adequate
EP Elements ProjectCore Lightning BitcoinLightning Network

lightningd: internal cleanups since all non-command JSON IDs are strings.

This is a routine internal cleanup commit in Core Lightning. It removes an unused helper function and simplifies how JSON-RPC request IDs are stored and formatted, since the project now always uses string IDs for non-command JSON traffic. …

No security-relevant keywords in commit title or messageNo CVE, advisory, or bug reference presentChanges are refactor/cleanup in nature
a70ae963by Rusty Russell+25−378 files
No security note in commit
Informational 23 AI analysisMessage 65 · Adequate
EP Elements ProjectCore Lightning BitcoinLightning Network

downgrade: we need to remove "impressions" from askrene datastore when downgrading to v26.06.

This is a database downgrade helper fix, not a live network vulnerability. Core Lightning's downgrade tool previously failed to strip out new 'channel impression' records when rolling a database back to version v26.06. The patch teaches th…

Database downgrade path could leave incompatible records in older schemaOffline tool only; no remote or on-chain triggerFix prevents potential node startup failure after version rollback
4d926285by Rusty Russell+43−111 file
No security note in commit
Low 31 AI analysisMessage 68 · Adequate
EP Elements ProjectCore Lightning BitcoinLightning Network

downgrade tool: fix invalid memory bug

This commit fixes a typo in a database downgrade helper tool. The bug caused the tool to pass a negative number (turned into a huge positive size) when copying data, which led to an out-of-memory (OOM) error. The fix swaps two variable nam…

Integer underflow / negative-to-size_t wrap leading to excessive allocationOut-of-memory crash in maintenance toolMemory corruption potential if allocation somehow succeeded
42995326by Lagrang3+8−81 file
No security note in commit
Informational 16 AI analysisMessage 90 · Strong
EP Elements ProjectCore Lightning BitcoinLightning Network

add a test for downgrading askrene datastore

This commit adds a regression test for Core Lightning's database downgrade path. It ensures that when a user downgrades from an upcoming v26.09 release to an older version (v26.06), the new 'impressions' data added by the askrene routing s…

Database downgrade path for new askrene schema (impressions table)Regression test only; no production code changeNo input validation, cryptography, network, or authorization changes
1818553eby Lagrang3+156−13 files
No security note in commit
Low 25 AI analysisMessage 65 · Adequate
EP Elements ProjectCore Lightning BitcoinLightning Network

lightning-hsmtool: Fix getsecret does not show mnemonic after typing passphrase

This is a bug fix in a command-line helper tool used by Core Lightning node operators. The `getsecret` command was accidentally refusing to show the wallet recovery words (mnemonic) when the wallet was protected by a passphrase. After the …

Functional bug in secret-recovery pathError path blocked legitimate mnemonic recoveryNo input validation, memory-safety, or cryptographic change
8480f6c2by ekzyis+1−21 file
No security note in commit
Informational 12 AI analysisMessage 60 · Adequate
EP Elements ProjectCore Lightning BitcoinLightning Network

tests: add regression test for hsmtool commands with passphrase

This commit only adds and updates a regression test in the project's test suite. It checks that the hsmtool utility correctly handles both empty and non-empty passphrases when working with BIP39 mnemonic-based wallet secrets. There is no c…

Regression test added for passphrase handling in hsmtoolNo production code changes observedTest-only change to tests/test_wallet.py
8c42be35by ekzyis+47−201 file
No security note in commit
Low 33 AI analysisMessage 76 · Adequate
EP Elements ProjectCore Lightning BitcoinLightning Network

wally: update libwally to v1.5.6

This commit updates the bundled libwally library to version 1.5.6. The practical effect is that calling the JSON-RPC `signpsbt` command on a PSBT that is already signed now succeeds as a harmless no-op, instead of returning an error on Bit…

Dependency update to incorporate upstream bug fixBehavior change from error to no-op on re-signing signed PSBTsTaproot keypath handling change in upstream cryptographic library
37526ca4by daywalker90+7−82 files
No security note in commit
Low 31 AI analysisMessage 85 · Strong
EP Elements ProjectCore Lightning BitcoinLightning Network

wallet: make datastore helpers self-wrap a wallet transaction

This change fixes a crash bug in Core Lightning's wallet datastore helpers. Previously, four datastore functions required the caller to already be inside a database transaction, and would fatally crash if called outside one. The patch make…

Fixes fatal assertion/crash in database statement preparationResolves transaction-context mismatch in wallet datastore helperswatchman plugin persistence path was affected
ae1a3347by Sangbida Chaudhuri+23−11 file
No security note in commit
Informational 24 AI analysisMessage 73 · Adequate
EP Elements ProjectCore Lightning BitcoinLightning Network

wallet: handle bwatch wallet/utxo spend notifications

This commit adds the missing bookkeeping that runs when Core Lightning's own on-chain wallet spends a UTXO. It makes the node mark the UTXO as spent, record the spending transaction, and log a withdrawal coin movement. It also handles bloc…

Missing spend tracking for wallet-owned UTXOs could lead to stale UTXO state or incorrect coin-movement accountingReorg handling clears spendheight, preventing a spent output from becoming permanently unspendable in the wallet's viewDefensive log_broken calls on unexpected missing UTXO or malformed watch suffix
4ba051caby Sangbida Chaudhuri+149−03 files
No security note in commit
Moderate 54 AI analysisMessage 73 · Adequate
EP Elements ProjectCore Lightning BitcoinLightning Network

wallet: handle reorgs for our_outputs/our_txs by hand

This commit fixes how Core Lightning's wallet records handle blockchain reorganizations (reorgs) for two newer database tables, our_outputs and our_txs. Previously, these tables were not properly updated when blocks were removed or rolled …

Incorrect state persistence across blockchain reorgsMissing reorg handling for wallet tables without foreign-key cascadePotential stale spend/confirmation metadata in our_outputs/our_txs
bcdea215by Sangbida Chaudhuri+40−01 file
No security note in commit
Low 34 AI analysisMessage 68 · Adequate
EP Elements ProjectCore Lightning BitcoinLightning Network

wallet: read UTXO state from our_outputs

This commit switches Core Lightning's wallet code to read UTXO (unspent transaction output) data from a new database table called our_outputs instead of the older outputs table. It also deletes several old helper functions and updates test…

Large internal data-model migration with reader/writer split between old and new tablesDual-write mirroring to legacy outputs table for downgrade compatibilityDeletion of legacy UTXO reading helpers
0a10e74eby Sangbida Chaudhuri+433−5772 files
No security note in commit
Informational 15 AI analysisMessage 73 · Adequate
EP Elements ProjectCore Lightning BitcoinLightning Network

wallet: rename b32script to scriptpubkey in PSBT change paths

This commit is a simple variable rename inside a Bitcoin/Lightning wallet file. The old name 'b32script' suggested all change addresses were bech32 format, but the project now uses a newer address type (p2tr) by default. The developer rena…

b8a60579by Sangbida Chaudhuri+12−141 file
No security note in commit
Informational 15 AI analysisMessage 83 · Strong
EP Elements ProjectCore Lightning BitcoinLightning Network

tests: update test_wallet.py raw-SQL queries for our_outputs

This commit only updates internal test code to query a new database table (our_outputs) instead of an old one (outputs). It does not change the actual wallet or node software that users run, so it cannot directly affect security.

d14ee378by Sangbida Chaudhuri+31−281 file
No security note in commit
Low 44 AI analysisMessage 78 · Adequate
EP Elements ProjectCore Lightning BitcoinLightning Network

wallet: register scriptpubkey watches at startup

This change makes Core Lightning register long-lasting 'watches' for all wallet deposit addresses when the node starts up, so the new bwatch plugin can spot incoming payments from the first block it scans. It also removes a now-redundant p…

Change is part of an experimental chain-watcher (bwatch) featureAdds startup registration of scriptPubKey watches for all derived wallet keysRemoves a redundant unconfirmed-change watch, relying on the new blanket coverage
4a951d65by Sangbida Chaudhuri+89−114 files
No security note in commit
Low 29 AI analysisMessage 73 · Adequate
EP Elements ProjectCore Lightning BitcoinLightning Network

wallet: dual-write chaintopology UTXO changes into our_outputs

This is a database refactoring commit in Core Lightning. It makes the wallet write UTXO (unspent transaction output) state to a new table called our_outputs in addition to the legacy outputs table, while reads still use the old table. The …

Database schema migration with dual-write mirror patternNo security claim in commit title or messageNo CVE, advisory, or researcher attribution in commit metadata
824e8195by Sangbida Chaudhuri+118−162 files
No security note in commit
Low 32 AI analysisMessage 68 · Adequate
EP Elements ProjectCore Lightning BitcoinLightning Network

wallet: record bwatch-discovered wallet outputs

This commit adds new wallet bookkeeping code for Core Lightning. It records Bitcoin deposits found by a new chain-watcher ('bwatch') into database tables and handles blockchain reorganizations by demoting transactions back to unconfirmed r…

New database write paths for wallet UTXOs and transactionsReorg revert logic demotes rather than deletes rows to preserve metadataOwner-string constructors added to avoid silent unwatch failures from format mismatches
bc021011by Sangbida Chaudhuri+543−07 files
No security note in commit
Low 32 AI analysisMessage 73 · Adequate
EP Elements ProjectCore Lightning BitcoinLightning Network

wallet: route transaction reads/writes through our_txs

This commit changes how Core Lightning stores and reads wallet-related transactions. It moves most reads to a new table called our_txs while still keeping the old transactions table updated for compatibility. The main concern is that the c…

Dual-write consistency risk between our_txs and legacy transactions tableNew anti-downgrade logic for confirmed transactions in our_txsRemoval of legacy NULL handling for unconfirmed transactions
2c1ab4d0by Sangbida Chaudhuri+89−642 files
No security note in commit
Informational 18 AI analysisMessage 73 · Adequate
EP Elements ProjectCore Lightning BitcoinLightning Network

wallet: add our_outputs + our_txs schema migrations

This commit only adds two new empty database tables (our_outputs and our_txs) to Core Lightning's wallet. It is a preparatory schema change for a future feature; no code reads from or writes to these tables yet, and no existing behavior is…

Schema-only migration with no runtime codeNew tables are not yet populated or queried by any code pathDesign note: sentinel 0 replaces NULL for blockheight/txindex/reserved_til, which could reduce NULL-handling bugs in future code
ea4d1fcaby Sangbida Chaudhuri+38−01 file
No security note in commit
Low 28 AI analysisMessage 70 · Adequate
EP Elements ProjectCore Lightning BitcoinLightning Network

wallet: add migrate_backfill_bwatch_tables

This commit adds a database migration that copies existing wallet data into new tables used by an upcoming 'bwatch' wallet component. It is a data backfill, not a code fix for an active vulnerability. The main risk is that if the migration…

Database migration touching wallet UTXO and transaction tablesPotential for data inconsistency if mapping logic is wrongON CONFLICT DO NOTHING prevents overwrite but could hide duplicate-key anomalies
2e23893bby Sangbida Chaudhuri+513−04 files
No security note in commit
Low 27 AI analysisMessage 73 · Adequate
EP Elements ProjectCore Lightning BitcoinLightning Network

wallet: mirror bwatch writes into legacy outputs table

This change is a behind-the-scenes bookkeeping patch for Core Lightning's wallet database. The project is moving to a new table (`our_outputs`) for tracking spendable coins, but older versions of the software still read from the old table …

Race-condition guard for foreign-key-backed confirmation_height and spend_height when bwatch is ahead of chaintopologyTemporary mirroring to keep legacy outputs table consistent with new our_outputs tableON CONFLICT DO NOTHING used for legacy insert to avoid duplicate-key failures
bba68e0aby Sangbida Chaudhuri+101−62 files
No security note in commit
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Security candidatetools: Read the correct default-key from gpgconfby ShahanaFarooqui · ea2f7607 · Oct 20, 2025 · 1 fileMessage 80 · StrongInformational 18Details
Commit message · ShahanaFarooqui

tools: Read the correct default-key from gpgconf

Workflow error `gpg: using "4129A994AA7E9852" is thrown due to incorrect gpg parsing. Update the awk parsing logic to properly locate and extract the key fingerprint within the gpgconf --list-options output structure, ensuring automated signing uses the correct key.

Changelog-None.

80/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Explains rationale or failure mode
Why it was queued
signing boundary
AI analysis · Informational 18/100

This is a one-line fix in the release build script. It changes how the script tells GnuPG which key to use when signing release checksum files. Previously the key fingerprint was accidentally passed as a filename argument to gpg, which caused a harmless workflow error and could have led to the wrong key being used for signing. The fix moves the fingerprint to the proper --default-key option so signing uses the intended key.

Security candidatepytest: fix flakes in feerates.by Rusty Russell · 992771bb · Oct 13, 2025 · 1 fileMessage 83 · StrongInformational 13Details
Commit message · Rusty Russell

pytest: fix flakes in feerates.

Sometimes we get a shorter signature than expected, and we're supposed
to disable the feerate tests in that case. But we didn't catch all the
cases where we make signatures.

```
2025-10-13T02:36:24.1901527Z ____________________________ test_peer_anchor_push _____________________________
2025-10-13T02:36:24.1902251Z [gw5] linux -- Python 3.10.18 /home/runner/work/lightning/lightning/.venv/bin/python
2025-10-13T02:36:24.1902731Z
2025-10-13T02:36:24.1903045Z node_factory = <pyln.testing.utils.NodeFactory object at 0x7f17fdffd6f0>
2025-10-13T02:36:24.1903740Z bitcoind = <pyln.testing.utils.BitcoinD object at 0x7f17fdffe830>
2025-10-13T02:36:24.1904495Z executor = <concurrent.futures.thread.ThreadPoolExecutor object at 0x7f17fdffcbb0>
2025-10-13T02:36:24.1906158Z chainparams = {'bip173_prefix': 'bcrt', 'chain_hash': '06226e46111a0b59caaf126043eb5bbf28c34f3a5e332a1fc7b2b73cf188910f', 'elements': False, 'example_addr': 'bcrt1qeyyk6sl5pr49ycpqyckvmttus5ttj25pd0zpvg', ...}
2025-10-13T02:36:24.1907285Z
2025-10-13T02:36:24.1907600Z @unittest.skipIf(TEST_NETWORK != 'regtest', 'elementsd anchors not supportd')
2025-10-13T02:36:24.1908344Z def test_peer_anchor_push(node_factory, bitcoind, executor, chainparams):
2025-10-13T02:36:24.1909033Z """Test that we use anchor on peer's commit to CPFP tx"""
2025-10-13T02:36:24.1909853Z l1, l2, l3 = node_factory.line_graph(3, opts=[{},
2025-10-13T02:36:24.1910334Z {'min-emergency-msat': 546000,
2025-10-13T02:36:24.1910825Z 'dev-warn-on-overgrind': None,
2025-10-13T02:36:24.1911313Z 'broken_log': 'overgrind: short signature length'},
2025-10-13T02:36:24.1911662Z {'disconnect': ['-WIRE_UPDATE_FULFILL_HTLC'],
2025-10-13T02:36:24.1911976Z 'dev-warn-on-overgrind': None,
2025-10-13T02:36:24.1912304Z 'broken_log': 'overgrind: short signature length'}],
2025-10-13T02:36:24.1912790Z wait_for_announce=True)
2025-10-13T02:36:24.1913041Z
2025-10-13T02:36:24.1913305Z # We splinter l2's funds so it's forced to use more than one UTXO to push.
2025-10-13T02:36:24.1914043Z fundsats = int(Millisatoshi(only_one(l2.rpc.listfunds()['outputs'])['amount_msat']).to_satoshi())
2025-10-13T02:36:24.1914443Z OUTPUT_SAT = 10000
2025-10-13T02:36:24.1914647Z NUM_OUTPUTS = 10
2025-10-13T02:36:24.1914903Z psbt = l2.rpc.fundpsbt("all", "1000perkw", 1000)['psbt']
2025-10-13T02:36:24.1915520Z # Pay 5k sats in fees.
2025-10-13T02:36:24.1916329Z psbt = l2.rpc.addpsbtoutput(fundsats - OUTPUT_SAT * NUM_OUTPUTS - 5000, psbt, destination=l3.rpc.newaddr()['bech32'])['psbt']
2025-10-13T02:36:24.1917156Z for _ in range(NUM_OUTPUTS):
2025-10-13T02:36:24.1917638Z psbt = l2.rpc.addpsbtoutput(OUTPUT_SAT, psbt)['psbt']
2025-10-13T02:36:24.1918194Z l2.rpc.sendpsbt(l2.rpc.signpsbt(psbt)['signed_psbt'])
2025-10-13T02:36:24.1918731Z bitcoind.generate_block(1, wait_for_mempool=1)
2025-10-13T02:36:24.1919232Z sync_blockheight(bitcoind, [l1, l2])
2025-10-13T02:36:24.1919634Z
2025-10-13T02:36:24.1919847Z # Make sure all amounts are below OUTPUT_SAT sats!
2025-10-13T02:36:24.1920318Z assert [x for x in l2.rpc.listfunds()['outputs'] if x['amount_msat'] > Millisatoshi(str(OUTPUT_SAT) + "sat")] == []
2025-10-13T02:36:24.1920735Z
2025-10-13T02:36:24.1920957Z # Get HTLC stuck, so l2 has reason to push commitment tx.
2025-10-13T02:36:24.1921244Z amt = 100_000_000
2025-10-13T02:36:24.1921517Z sticky_inv = l3.rpc.invoice(amt, 'sticky', 'sticky')
2025-10-13T02:36:24.1921842Z route = l1.rpc.getroute(l3.info['id'], amt, 1)['route']
2025-10-13T02:36:24.1922277Z l1.rpc.sendpay(route, sticky_inv['payment_hash'], payment_secret=sticky_inv['payment_secret'])
2025-10-13T02:36:24.1922751Z l3.daemon.wait_for_log('dev_disconnect: -WIRE_UPDATE_FULFILL_HTLC')
2025-10-13T02:36:24.1923060Z
2025-10-13T02:36:24.1923241Z # Make sure HTLC expiry is what we expect!
2025-10-13T02:36:24.1923637Z l2.daemon.wait_for_log('Adding HTLC 0 amount=100000000msat cltv=119 gave CHANNEL_ERR_ADD_OK')
2025-10-13T02:36:24.1923998Z
2025-10-13T02:36:24.1924229Z # l3 drops to chain, but make sure it doesn't CPFP its own anchor.
2025-10-13T02:36:24.1924685Z wait_for(lambda: only_one(l3.rpc.listpeerchannels(l2.info['id'])['channels'])['htlcs'] != [])
2025-10-13T02:36:24.1925688Z closetx = l3.rpc.dev_sign_last_tx(l2.info['id'])['tx']
2025-10-13T02:36:24.1926132Z l3.stop()
2025-10-13T02:36:24.1926337Z # We don't care about l1 any more, either
2025-10-13T02:36:24.1926579Z l1.stop()
2025-10-13T02:36:24.1926739Z
2025-10-13T02:36:24.1926941Z # We put l3's tx in the mempool, but won't mine it.
2025-10-13T02:36:24.1927316Z bitcoind.rpc.sendrawtransaction(closetx)
2025-10-13T02:36:24.1927754Z
2025-10-13T02:36:24.1928139Z # We aim for feerate ~3750, so this won't mine l3's unilateral close.
2025-10-13T02:36:24.1928991Z # HTLC's going to time out at block 120 (we give one block grace)
2025-10-13T02:36:24.1929527Z for block in range(110, 120):
2025-10-13T02:36:24.1929989Z bitcoind.generate_block(1, needfeerate=5000)
2025-10-13T02:36:24.1930510Z assert bitcoind.rpc.getblockcount() == block
2025-10-13T02:36:24.1931014Z sync_blockheight(bitcoind, [l2])
2025-10-13T02:36:24.1931715Z assert only_one(l2.rpc.listpeerchannels(l3.info['id'])['channels'])['state'] == 'CHANNELD_NORMAL'
2025-10-13T02:36:24.1932368Z
2025-10-13T02:36:24.1932642Z # Drops to chain
2025-10-13T02:36:24.1933030Z bitcoind.generate_block(1, needfeerate=5000)
2025-10-13T02:36:24.1933824Z wait_for(lambda: only_one(l2.rpc.listpeerchannels(l3.info['id'])['channels'])['state'] == 'AWAITING_UNILATERAL')
2025-10-13T02:36:24.1934522Z
2025-10-13T02:36:24.1935254Z # But, l3's tx already there, and identical feerate will not RBF.
2025-10-13T02:36:24.1935839Z l2.daemon.wait_for_log("rejecting replacement")
2025-10-13T02:36:24.1936357Z wait_for(lambda: len(bitcoind.rpc.getrawmempool()) == 2)
2025-10-13T02:36:24.1936801Z
2025-10-13T02:36:24.1937127Z # As blocks pass, we will use anchor to boost l3's tx.
2025-10-13T02:36:24.1937666Z for block, feerate in zip(range(120, 124), (12000, 13000, 14000, 15000)):
2025-10-13T02:36:24.1938560Z l2.daemon.wait_for_log(fr"Worth fee [0-9]*sat for remote commit tx to get 100000000msat at block 125 \(\+{125 - block}\) at feerate {feerate}perkw")
2025-10-13T02:36:24.1939369Z l2.daemon.wait_for_log("sendrawtx exit 0")
2025-10-13T02:36:24.1939902Z # Check feerate for entire package (commitment tx + anchor) is ~ correct
2025-10-13T02:36:24.1940473Z details = bitcoind.rpc.getrawmempool(True).values()
2025-10-13T02:36:24.1940920Z print(f"mempool = {details}")
2025-10-13T02:36:24.1941347Z total_weight = sum([d['weight'] for d in details])
2025-10-13T02:36:24.1941903Z total_fees = sum([float(d['fees']['base']) * 100_000_000 for d in details])
2025-10-13T02:36:24.1942467Z total_feerate_perkw = total_fees / total_weight * 1000
2025-10-13T02:36:24.1942972Z > check_feerate([l3, l2], total_feerate_perkw, feerate)
2025-10-13T02:36:24.1943279Z
2025-10-13T02:36:24.1943411Z tests/test_closing.py:4064:
2025-10-13T02:36:24.1943813Z _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
2025-10-13T02:36:24.1944170Z
2025-10-13T02:36:24.1944685Z nodes = [<fixtures.LightningNode object at 0x7f17fdf684f0>, <fixtures.LightningNode object at 0x7f17fdf6af50>]
2025-10-13T02:36:24.1945708Z actual_feerate = 13005.66942869603, expected_feerate = 13000
2025-10-13T02:36:24.1946091Z
2025-10-13T02:36:24.1946247Z def check_feerate(nodes, actual_feerate, expected_feerate):
2025-10-13T02:36:24.1946558Z # Feerate can't be lower.
2025-10-13T02:36:24.1946870Z assert actual_feerate > expected_feerate - 2
2025-10-13T02:36:24.1947365Z if actual_feerate >= expected_feerate + 2:
2025-10-13T02:36:24.1947830Z if any([did_short_sig(n) for n in nodes]):
2025-10-13T02:36:24.1948239Z return
2025-10-13T02:36:24.1948589Z # Use assert as it shows the actual values on failure
2025-10-13T02:36:24.1949043Z > assert actual_feerate < expected_feerate + 2
2025-10-13T02:36:24.1949489Z E AssertionError
2025-10-13T02:36:24.1949704Z
```

Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>

83/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Mentions testing or verification✓ Names security-relevant behavior explicitly
Why it was queued
signing boundary
AI analysis · Informational 13/100

This change only adds extra test-only logging to catch abnormally short cryptographic signatures during automated testing. It does not alter how signatures are created, verified, or used in real transactions, so it is not a security fix and does not affect normal users.

Security candidatebump minimum python to 3.9.2 and downgrade coincurveby Alex Myers · 8a0e473e · Oct 10, 2025 · 3 filesMessage 91 · StrongInformational 19Details
Commit message · Alex Myers

bump minimum python to 3.9.2 and downgrade coincurve

This allows compatibility with python 3.14.0 which coincurve 21.0.0 did
not support. The next coincurve release should restore compatibility.

Fixes: #8591

Changelog-changed: pyln-testing requires python>=3.9.2

91/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Mentions testing or verification✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference
Why it was queued
update trust
AI analysis · Informational 19/100

This commit adjusts Python package versions so the project's testing tools install correctly on the newly released Python 3.14. It lowers the required 'coincurve' library from version 21.0.0 to 20.0.0 and raises the minimum Python version from 3.9 to 3.9.2. The change is framed by the developer as a compatibility fix, not a security fix. There is no direct evidence in the commit that it repairs a vulnerability.

Security candidatedualopend: handle ANNOUNCEMENT_SIGNATURES from peer.by Rusty Russell · 89bce951 · Oct 1, 2025 · 3 filesMessage 81 · StrongLow 34Details
Commit message · Rusty Russell

dualopend: handle ANNOUNCEMENT_SIGNATURES from peer.

This can happen if we haven't transitioned to channeld yet, but logic is simply to hand
it to lightningd, exactly as channeld does.

```
2025-09-30T03:04:57.8951627Z lightningd-1 2025-09-30T02:59:14.150Z DEBUG 022d223620a359a47ff7f7ac447c85c46c923da53389221a0054c11c1e3ca31d59-dualopend-chan#1: peer_out WIRE_WARNING
2025-09-30T03:04:57.8952126Z lightningd-1 2025-09-30T02:59:14.150Z **BROKEN** 022d223620a359a47ff7f7ac447c85c46c923da53389221a0054c11c1e3ca31d59-dualopend-chan#1: Unexpected message WIRE_ANNOUNCEMENT_SIGNATURES
2025-09-30T03:04:57.8952521Z lightningd-1 2025-09-30T02:59:14.150Z INFO 022d223620a359a47ff7f7ac447c85c46c923da53389221a0054c11c1e3ca31d59-dualopend-chan#1: Peer connection lost
2025-09-30T03:04:57.8953124Z lightningd-1 2025-09-30T02:59:14.150Z INFO 022d223620a359a47ff7f7ac447c85c46c923da53389221a0054c11c1e3ca31d59-chan#1: Peer transient failure in DUALOPEND_AWAITING_LOCKIN: dualopend: Owning subdaemon dualopend died (62208)
```

Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>

81/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference
Why it was queued
signing boundary
AI analysis · Low 34/100

This patch fixes a bug where Core Lightning's dual-funding channel opener (dualopend) would crash with a 'BROKEN' error if a peer sent ANNOUNCEMENT_SIGNATURES messages before the channel had fully transitioned to the normal channel daemon. The fix simply forwards those messages to the main lightningd process, just as the regular channel daemon already does. Without the patch, a peer could cause transient connection failures and daemon restarts during channel setup.

Security candidateRefactor Dockerfile, Add TODOsby Claudio Raimondi · 13c5db51 · Sep 28, 2025 · 40 filesMessage 76 · AdequateInformational 17Details
Commit message · Claudio Raimondi

Refactor Dockerfile, Add TODOs

all these changelogs only apply to the Docker image.

Changelog-Added: added verification of GPG keys for the bitcoin and litecoin tarballs.
Changelog-Fixed: fixed compilation on all target architectures; each had their own bugs (poetry, missing packages...).
Changelog-Fixed: fixed cargo cross compilation. it was mistakenly using QEMU before.
Changelog-Fixed: fixed CPU compatibility bug described in issue 8456
Changelog-Changed: improve build time by 8.8x
Changelog-Changed: improve image size by 2.07x

more detailed changelog can be found on the PR: https://github.com/ElementsProject/lightning/pull/8429

76/100 · AdequateMessage clarity
✓ Descriptive subject✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Mentions testing or verification✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference
Why it was queued
defensive validationauthentication path
AI analysis · Informational 17/100

This commit is a large refactor of the Docker build files for Core Lightning. It mainly improves how Docker images are built, adds verification of downloaded Bitcoin and Litecoin binaries using GPG signatures, fixes cross-compilation issues, and updates build documentation. There is no obvious security vulnerability introduced by the changes; in fact, adding GPG verification is a security improvement. However, the commit removes the use of `tini` as the container init process and switches the entrypoint directly to a shell script, which is a minor operational change. The commit does not appear to fix or introduce a serious security bug in the Core Lightning software itself.

Security candidatefuzz-tests: fix overflow of u32 in `fuzz-close-tx`by Chandra Pratap · 20e252b5 · Sep 15, 2025 · 1 fileMessage 88 · StrongInformational 18Details
Commit message · Chandra Pratap

fuzz-tests: fix overflow of u32 in `fuzz-close-tx`

Changelog-None: The value WALLY_SATOSHI_PER_BTC * WALLY_BTC_MAX
is equal to 2.1e15, which is much higher than the maximum capacity
of a u32, which is 4.29e9.

Hence, use a u64 to store this value instead.

88/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Mentions testing or verification✓ Names security-relevant behavior explicitly
Why it was queued
memory safetyfuzzing or regression evidence
AI analysis · Informational 18/100

This commit fixes a variable type bug in a fuzz test, not in the main Core Lightning software. A fuzz test is an automated testing tool that feeds random data to a program to find crashes. The bug was that a calculation used a 32-bit integer (u32) to hold a value far larger than it can represent, causing an overflow. The fix changes the variable type to a 64-bit integer (u64). Because this is only in a test file, it does not directly affect real Lightning nodes or user funds.

Security candidatedoc: rc1 build-release instructions.by Rusty Russell · f920c1e7 · Sep 10, 2025 · 1 fileMessage 68 · AdequateInformational 15Details
Commit message · Rusty Russell

doc: rc1 build-release instructions.

Signing `--without-zip` will not work. You will end up with a empty SHA256SUMS file.

Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>

68/100 · AdequateMessage clarity
✓ Descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context
Why it was queued
signing boundarydocumentation-only discount
AI analysis · Informational 15/100

This is a one-line documentation fix in the release checklist. It removes the `--without-zip` flag from an example command because using that flag would produce an empty SHA256SUMS file. There is no code change and no security vulnerability.

Security candidatecontrib: add Madeline's signing key.by Rusty Russell · bc753a2f · Sep 2, 2025 · 1 fileMessage 60 · AdequateInformational 15Details
Commit message · Rusty Russell

contrib: add Madeline's signing key.

Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>

60/100 · AdequateMessage clarity
✓ Descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides an explanatory body
Why it was queued
signing boundarydocumentation-only discount
AI analysis · Informational 15/100

This commit simply adds a new PGP public key file for a person named Madeline to the project's contributor key directory. It is a routine administrative change with no code modifications and no direct security impact.

Security candidatepytest: test coinmoves in the case of unexpected fulfill.by Rusty Russell · 397fdd9e · Aug 19, 2025 · 1 fileMessage 88 · StrongInformational 15Details
Commit message · Rusty Russell

pytest: test coinmoves in the case of unexpected fulfill.

This happens if l1 doesn't get a signature, so it doesn't consider
the fulfill complete, but l2 does (and thus credits l1).

This is a trivial test, but will matter should we later correctly
account for channelmoves when onchain: in that case it will actually
hard to tell, in general, what HTLC(s) were fulfilled.

Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>

88/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Mentions testing or verification✓ Names security-relevant behavior explicitly
Why it was queued
signing boundary
AI analysis · Informational 15/100

This commit only adds a new test case to the project's test suite. It simulates a scenario where one side of a Lightning payment channel believes an HTLC was fulfilled while the other side does not, then verifies that the internal accounting records (called 'coinmoves') are produced correctly. There is no change to production code, no fix, and no vulnerability being patched.

Security candidatecommon: set errno=0 before calling strto{l,ul,ull}by Matt Whitlock · ea2feccb · Aug 15, 2025 · 3 filesMessage 78 · AdequateLow 35Details
Commit message · Matt Whitlock

common: set errno=0 before calling strto{l,ul,ull}

The strto{l,ul,ull} functions do not set errno upon a successful return, so a
successful return from a maximally valued input could be misinterpreted as an
overflow error if errno happened already to be set to ERANGE before the call.
To guard against this edge case, always set errno to zero before calling these
functions if checking errno afterward.

Changelog-None

78/100 · AdequateMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Names security-relevant behavior explicitly
Why it was queued
memory safety
AI analysis · Low 35/100

This commit fixes a subtle programming bug in how Core Lightning converts text strings to numbers. Functions like strtoull only set an error flag (errno) when a value is too large, but they leave it unchanged on success. If some earlier code had already set that flag to 'overflow,' a later successful conversion of the largest possible number could be wrongly rejected as an overflow. The patch clears the error flag before each conversion so the check afterward is reliable. The practical security impact is limited because the bug only triggers when a prior operation happens to leave that specific error flag set, and the affected conversions are mostly for amounts, route hints, and JSON parsing rather than cryptographic checks.

Security candidatelightningd: fix race with crossover pings.by Rusty Russell · 5f544038 · Aug 14, 2025 · 8 filesMessage 68 · AdequateLow 37Details
Commit message · Rusty Russell

lightningd: fix race with crossover pings.

We cannot use subd_req() here: replies will come out of order, and the
we should not simply assign the reponses in FIFO order.

Changelog-Fixed: lightningd: don't get confused with parallel ping commands.
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>

68/100 · AdequateMessage clarity
✓ Descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context
Why it was queued
authentication path
AI analysis · Low 37/100

This commit fixes a bug in Core Lightning's handling of multiple ping commands sent at the same time. Previously, if two ping commands were issued in parallel, the replies could arrive out of order and be matched to the wrong command, potentially causing incorrect responses or confusion in the node. The fix adds a unique request ID to each ping so replies can be correctly paired with their original commands.

Security candidatesplice: Add `start_batch` and an internal wire typeby Dusty Daemon · 07f4bc39 · Aug 14, 2025 · 11 filesMessage 73 · AdequateInformational 23Details
Commit message · Dusty Daemon

splice: Add `start_batch` and an internal wire type

We add `start_batch` to match t-bast’s splicing spec and we add a new internal wire type `WIRE_PROTOCOL_BATCH_ELEMENT` using the type number 0

Changelog-Added: support for `start_batch`

73/100 · AdequateMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context
Why it was queued
boot or update path
AI analysis · Informational 23/100

This commit adds support for two new Lightning protocol messages used in splicing: `start_batch` and an internal-only `protocol_batch_element`. The code mostly ignores or routes these messages; it does not appear to fix a security bug. The change is a feature addition matching a draft specification, with no clear security relevance in the diff itself.

Security candidatesplice: Remove `batch_size` from `commitment_signed`by Dusty Daemon · e755be0c · Aug 14, 2025 · 4 filesMessage 73 · AdequateLow 31Details
Commit message · Dusty Daemon

splice: Remove `batch_size` from `commitment_signed`

The new spec sends `batch_size` in `start_batch` and removes it from `commitment_signed` so we need to stop processing it in `commitment_signed`.

Since the tlv is now reduced to one element and that automagically turns it into a direct use TLV so we have to update the code everywhere it is referenced.

73/100 · AdequateMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context
Why it was queued
boot or update path
AI analysis · Low 31/100

This commit updates Core Lightning's implementation of the Lightning Network splicing protocol to match a newer version of the specification. It removes a 'batch_size' field from the 'commitment_signed' message and moves that information to a different message ('start_batch'). The code changes are mostly mechanical: updating data structures, removing checks that used batch_size, and adjusting how messages are parsed and compared. There is no direct evidence in the commit or supplied references that this fixes a security vulnerability; it appears to be a protocol compatibility/spec-compliance update.

Security candidatesplice: Sign shared output earlyby Dusty Daemon · e3e08135 · Aug 13, 2025 · 1 fileMessage 68 · AdequateLow 31Details
Commit message · Dusty Daemon

splice: Sign shared output early

When doing a multi channel splice, we need to break the deadlock by signing the shared output early (even though it is not sent to the peer until later).

68/100 · AdequateMessage clarity
✓ Descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context
Why it was queued
signing boundary
AI analysis · Low 31/100

This change adjusts how Core Lightning handles 'splicing' (a way to resize a Lightning channel's on-chain funding). When a user splices multiple channels at the same time, the software now signs a shared piece of the transaction earlier than before, so it can build a complete signatures message for all peers. The commit describes this as fixing a deadlock, not as a security vulnerability. There is no direct evidence in the commit or supplied references that this is exploitable by an attacker.

Security candidatesplice: Even if the psbt’s “match” the sig data may varyby Dusty Daemon · 122dae10 · Aug 13, 2025 · 1 fileMessage 78 · AdequateModerate 52Details
Commit message · Dusty Daemon

splice: Even if the psbt’s “match” the sig data may vary

Since the signature data may vary, we must copy the new psbt into splicing->current_psbt.

This never occured during normal operation, but when doing a cross splice there may be vital signature(s) in the psbt that came from another splice that get dropped without this step.

78/100 · AdequateMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Names security-relevant behavior explicitly
Why it was queued
signing boundary
AI analysis · Moderate 52/100

This change fixes a bug in Core Lightning's channel-splicing code. During a splice, two versions of a Bitcoin transaction structure (a PSBT) might look identical in their main transaction data but differ in their attached signatures. Previously, the code would skip copying the new PSBT if the main transaction hadn't changed, which could discard signatures from a related splice. The fix always copies the latest PSBT so signatures are preserved. The commit describes this as a bug that could affect 'cross splice' scenarios, but it does not label it as a security vulnerability.

Security candidatesplice: Change abort rules to sent sigsby Dusty Daemon · dd1e183b · Aug 13, 2025 · 1 fileMessage 68 · AdequateLow 43Details
Commit message · Dusty Daemon

splice: Change abort rules to sent sigs

Previous behavior was to fail on abort when we have signatures in the inflight — change this behavior to fail on abort if we have sent our peer our signatures.

68/100 · AdequateMessage clarity
✓ Descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context
Why it was queued
signing boundary
AI analysis · Low 43/100

This commit tightens the conditions under which Core Lightning's channel daemon will abort a splice operation. Previously, the daemon treated a splice as unabortable if any signatures existed in the 'inflight' (pending) channel state. Now it only blocks abort if this specific node has actually sent its signatures to the peer. The change is one line and appears aimed at preventing a node from backing out of a splice after it has already committed to it cryptographically, which could otherwise let a malicious or buggy peer exploit inconsistent state.

Security candidatesplice: Add field to DB to track if we’ve sent sigsby Dusty Daemon · a8ff8ce7 · Aug 13, 2025 · 12 filesMessage 78 · AdequateInformational 24Details
Commit message · Dusty Daemon

splice: Add field to DB to track if we’ve sent sigs

We used to use a check on the active psbt to see if our splice signature was in it — but now we need to generate the signature early.

So we have to add a field tracking if we’ve sent it and add it to the database, wire protocols, and inflight objects.

78/100 · AdequateMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Names security-relevant behavior explicitly
Why it was queued
signing boundarysigning or wallet path
AI analysis · Informational 24/100

This commit adds a new bookkeeping flag, 'i_sent_sigs', to track whether a splice signature has already been sent. It changes how the node decides that question: previously it inspected the active PSBT, but now it records the fact explicitly in memory, wire messages, and the wallet database. The change is described as a refactor to support generating splice signatures earlier. There is no direct evidence in the commit of a security vulnerability, but any mismatch in this flag could in principle cause a node to send signatures twice, omit them, or resume a splice incorrectly after a restart.

Security candidatesplice: Fix cross-channel splicesby Dusty Daemon · 2e660d9f · Aug 13, 2025 · 1 fileMessage 68 · AdequateLow 41Details
Commit message · Dusty Daemon

splice: Fix cross-channel splices

When doing a cross channel splice, inputs move from having no SIGHASH to having SIGHASH_ALL assigned.

This causes psbt_get_changeset to flag the input as having changed, as the sighash value is compared.

This causes the second channel splice to `tx_remove_input` the input as it doesn’t match anymore, breaking the splice.

We fix this by removing the sighash value from input comparisions.

68/100 · AdequateMessage clarity
✓ Descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context
Why it was queued
signing boundarysigning or wallet path
AI analysis · Low 41/100

This commit fixes a bug in Core Lightning's splicing feature where a transaction input could be incorrectly removed during a 'cross-channel splice' because the software compared a newly-added signature hash flag. The fix tells the comparison logic to ignore the signature-hash value so the input is not treated as changed and wrongly dropped. It is a functional bug fix rather than an obvious security vulnerability, but it could cause a splice to fail or funds to be handled incorrectly.

Security candidatepsbt: don’t accumlate 0 lenth widtness databy Dusty Daemon · a5a71f3b · Aug 13, 2025 · 1 fileMessage 45 · ThinLow 32Details
Commit message · Dusty Daemon

psbt: don’t accumlate 0 lenth widtness data

45/100 · ThinMessage clarity
✓ Descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component! No meaningful explanatory body
Why it was queued
signing boundarysigning or wallet path
AI analysis · Low 32/100

This commit fixes a small bug in how Core Lightning builds Bitcoin witness data from a PSBT. Previously, when a witness item had a declared length of zero, the code would still try to copy data from a pointer that could be NULL. The fix skips the copy when the length is zero and adds an assertion that the pointer is valid when length is non-zero. This is a defensive correctness fix; it likely prevents a potential NULL-pointer read or undefined behavior rather than an obvious remote exploit.

Security candidatesplice: Add details to log messageby Dusty Daemon · 87ae3559 · Aug 13, 2025 · 1 fileMessage 65 · AdequateInformational 16Details
Commit message · Dusty Daemon

splice: Add details to log message

Make the failure reason more clear by adding more information to the signature failure message.

65/100 · AdequateMessage clarity
✓ Descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides an explanatory body✓ Names security-relevant behavior explicitly
Why it was queued
signing boundary
AI analysis · Informational 16/100

This change only improves an error message shown when a splicing (channel funding update) negotiation fails because the remote peer did not send enough signatures. It adds a count of how many remote inputs need signatures and how many signature bundles were actually received. There is no code behavior change that fixes or introduces a vulnerability; it is purely a diagnostic/logging improvement.

Security candidateplugin: Allow json_object and json_group_array functions in sql pluginby ShahanaFarooqui · d5c73185 · Aug 13, 2025 · 1 fileMessage 78 · AdequateInformational 18Details
Commit message · ShahanaFarooqui

plugin: Allow json_object and json_group_array functions in sql plugin

Changelog-Added: Plugins: `sql` also supports functions `json_object(key1, value1, ...)` to construct JSON objects and `json_group_array(value)` to aggregate rows into JSON array.

Security Considerations
- No new SQL injection risks: Functions only process explicitly provided column values (no arbitrary string parsing).
- Explicit column requirements: Wildcards (*) are not supported, all fields must be named (e.g., json_object('peer_id', id)).
- Permission-bound data access: Functions adhere to the same table/row permissions as the underlying query.

Performance Impact
- Optimized native execution: Leverages SQLite’s built-in JSON1 extension (when available) for efficiency.
- Moderate CPU overhead: Complex nesting may impact performance on large datasets but still faster than application-layer JSON conversion.

78/100 · AdequateMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Names security-relevant behavior explicitly
Why it was queued
credential or privilege state
AI analysis · Informational 18/100

This commit adds two SQLite JSON helper functions, json_object and json_group_array, to the list of functions allowed by Core Lightning's SQL plugin. The change is a small whitelist expansion in the plugin's query authorization code. The commit message explicitly states this does not introduce new SQL injection risks and that the functions follow existing table and row permissions. There is no direct evidence in the commit of a security vulnerability.

Security candidatesqlite3: consistently comment where we want to upgrade.by Rusty Russell · e051ba6b · Aug 11, 2025 · 3 filesMessage 78 · AdequateInformational 15Details
Commit message · Rusty Russell

sqlite3: consistently comment where we want to upgrade.

Now you can grep for 'sqlite3 version' and see where we would like
to update.

Debian 11 (Bullseye) and Ubuntu 20.04 (Focal) ship with SQLite 3.31.1.
RHEL 9 ships with 3.34.1. Fedora 38+ uses SQLite 3.40+.

Unfortunately, RHEL8 ships with 3.26.0, and is still on maintenance Support
(security fixes, no new features): runs until May 31, 2029.

Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>

78/100 · AdequateMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Names security-relevant behavior explicitly
Why it was queued
explicit security languagesigning or wallet path
AI analysis · Informational 15/100

This commit only adds and rewords comments in the source code to make it easier to find places where the project would like to require a newer SQLite version in the future. It does not change any actual behavior, fix any bug, or alter any security-related logic.