COLDCARD firmware

This update fixes how the COLDCARD hardware wallet's random-number generator (RNG) handles rare hardware faults. Previously, the device could silently continue using weak or repeated random numbers if the RNG reported a seed error. Now it detects those error flags, tries a safe recovery a few times, and if the problem persists it stops with an error instead of producing bad randomness. Two keyboard drivers were also updated so a temporary RNG failure does not lock the user out before login.

This commit changes how the COLDCARD hardware wallet's random-number generator (RNG) recovers from a rare 'seed error' condition. The manufacturer is now following an STMicroelectronics guideline to throw away the first 12 random numbers after clearing the error, because those values could be left over from before the error and might be predictable. Random numbers are critical for creating private keys and transaction signatures, so using weak or stale randomness could in theory weaken security. The patch is defensive and does not by itself prove an attack exists.

This commit only adds explanatory comments to two source files about why the COLDCARD firmware ignores certain hardware random-number-generator clock-error flags. It does not change any code behavior. The comments cite ST documentation saying these clock errors do not affect the quality of random numbers and that a dead clock is still caught by a data-ready timeout. There is no security-relevant code change.

This commit fixes a critical random-number bug in COLDCARD hardware wallets. The device was accidentally using a weak, software-based fallback random generator instead of its secure hardware one when creating Bitcoin seed phrases. Because the fallback generator had very little real randomness, attackers who captured a public transaction or signature could potentially figure out the wallet's private keys and steal funds. The patch forces the build to use the hardware random source and adds a build-time check to make sure the weak fallback is never linked in again. Coinkite issued an emergency hotfix and warned users to move funds from wallets created with affected firmware.

This commit adds a 330-character limit to BIP-322 proof-of-reserve messages on the COLDCARD hardware wallet. Without the limit, an attacker could craft a very long message that might be used to mislead the user, overflow display buffers, or cause other unexpected behavior during signing. The change rejects oversized or empty messages before the user is asked to sign.

This commit adds a new feature to the COLDCARD hardware wallet that lets users apply the text of a Secure Note or the value of a Secure Note password as their BIP-39 wallet passphrase. It also tightens how printable ASCII is checked in a few places. The change is user-facing and requires physical interaction, so it does not look like a remote exploit. However, because passphrases control which wallet is derived, any bug in how note text is sanitized or applied could cause a user to load an unexpected wallet or expose a note's contents as a passphrase.

This commit fixes a bug in the COLDCARD Q1 hardware wallet where displaying certain QR codes containing non-English or special characters could cause the device to crash with an assertion failure. The fix ensures text is converted to UTF-8 bytes before calculating QR code sizes, preventing a mismatch between expected and actual data length. There is no direct evidence this bug is exploitable for malicious purposes.

This commit fixes a bug in the COLDCARD hardware wallet that prevented it from correctly signing Bitcoin transactions that spend from 'pay-to-public-key' (P2PK) outputs. P2PK is an older, uncommon output type where coins are locked directly to a public key rather than to a Bitcoin address. The bug meant P2PK signing was broken entirely, and the device could not handle both compressed (33-byte) and uncompressed (65-byte) public key forms. The fix updates the firmware to recognize both key lengths, compare them correctly against derived keys, and produce the right transaction signature format. It also adds tests that exercise real P2PK spends against Bitcoin Core.

This commit upgrades the COLDCARD firmware's WIF Store feature so that individual private keys imported as WIF can sign transactions even when the PSBT file lacks the usual BIP-32 key-path metadata. It adds address/scriptPubKey auto-detection, descriptor export, and Electrum-style watch-only wallet support. The change is primarily a feature enhancement, but it touches sensitive signing paths and removes a previous safety assertion that required key paths to be at least depth 8, which slightly weakens one guardrail.

This commit updates COLDCARD's BIP-322 (Bitcoin message signing / proof-of-reserves) implementation to match the finalized BIP-322 specification. The main user-visible change is that the message to be signed must now be embedded directly in the PSBT file under a new standard field, instead of being imported separately by the user. The device verifies that the embedded message matches the on-screen message before signing. The change also adds HSM policy checks so BIP-322 signing is governed by message-signing rules, and it prevents BIP-322 PSBTs from being finalized into broadcastable transactions. There is no obvious vulnerability introduced; it is primarily a standards-compliance and safety hardening patch.

This commit is purely a documentation update. It adds missing entries to the docs index, updates outdated examples and menu trees, fixes a broken filename reference in a code comment, and corrects factual details (such as supported models and key storage page numbers) to match the current firmware. There are no code behavior changes that would affect security.

This is a large bundle of bug fixes for the COLDCARD hardware wallet firmware. Most changes fix user-interface crashes ('yikes'), incorrect error messages, or policy edge cases rather than a single critical vulnerability. The most security-relevant fixes are: (1) disabling NFC and Virtual Disk before entering HSM mode to reduce the attack surface of the locked-down operating mode; (2) preventing a trick/bypass PIN that has no secrets from completing a Single-Signer Spending Policy unlock; (3) stopping OP_RETURN and non-standard scripts from being hidden or mis-displayed during transaction approval; (4) rejecting malformed JSON/QR message-signing requests and control characters that could be used to trick the user; and (5) preventing duplicate multisig wallets with reordered keys from being imported as if they were only a rename. The commit also adds many regression tests for these behaviors.

This commit changes how number-entry prompts behave across the COLDCARD wallet interface. Previously, many prompts did not allow the user to cancel, so pressing the cancel button could be misread as entering '0' and the operation would continue. Now, canceling is explicitly allowed and the code checks for it, returning the user to the previous screen instead of proceeding with a default value. This is a user-experience and safety improvement rather than a remote-exploitable bug, but it prevents accidental or coerced confirmations in security-sensitive flows like exporting xpubs, creating multisig wallets, and signing messages.

This commit fixes a bug where a special security feature called 'Delta Mode Trick PIN' was not being restored when a user restored their Coldcard wallet from a backup. A Trick PIN is a decoy PIN that can do things like show a fake wallet or wipe the device. Delta Mode is a type of Trick PIN that must be very similar to the real PIN. Because of the bug, after restoring from backup, this protection would silently disappear, leaving users who relied on it less protected than they expected. The fix changes the backup-restore code so Delta Mode Trick PINs are correctly recreated, and adds an automated test to check this.

This commit adds a new pre-built bootloader release (version 3.3.0) for the COLDCARD Mk4 hardware wallet. It consists of binary firmware files and a hash manifest, plus a disassembly listing. There is no source code change, no vulnerability description, and no indication of a security fix or bug. It appears to be a routine release artifact drop.

This commit adds support for a new COLDCARD hardware revision, the Mk5. It is a routine product-enablement patch: it teaches the firmware, bootloader, build system, simulator, and signing tools to recognize and run on Mk5 devices. There is no indication of a security vulnerability being fixed or introduced; the changes are about hardware detection, display initialization, graphics, and test coverage.

This commit adds a new 'WIF Store' feature to the COLDCARD firmware. It lets users import external Bitcoin private keys (in WIF format) and use them to sign PSBT transactions and messages, alongside the device's normal seed-derived keys. The change is a deliberate new feature, not a hidden bug, but it touches sensitive code paths: private key storage, PSBT signing, address ownership checks, and message signing. There is no vendor statement in the commit or supplied references calling this a security fix or vulnerability.

This commit fixes a small user-interface bug in the COLDCARD hardware wallet. Previously, after signing a transaction that was not yet finalized, the device still offered a menu option to display a QR code of the transaction ID (TXID). Because the transaction ID can only be reliably computed once the transaction is finalized, offering the QR code earlier could mislead the user or show invalid/incomplete data. The fix hides that QR-code option unless the transaction is finalized. There is no direct evidence of funds being stolen or a remote attack.

This commit only changes user-facing text labels in the COLDCARD firmware. It expands the abbreviation 'MSG' to 'Message' on screens that have enough space, and updates the corresponding automated tests to match the new wording. There is no change to security logic, cryptography, or how data is handled.

This commit adds support for BIP-322 Proof of Reserves signing on COLDCARD hardware wallets. It lets users prove they control certain Bitcoin addresses by signing a special non-spending transaction, without actually moving funds. The change also allows transaction version 0 only for these proof-of-reserve transactions, and blocks it for normal payments to prevent potential misuse.

This commit adds a new user-facing verification step for BIP-322 'Proof of Reserves' messages on the COLDCARD hardware wallet. Before signing a proof-of-reserves transaction, the device now asks the user to import or type the original human-readable message, checks that it matches the cryptographic hash embedded in the transaction, and shows it on screen for approval. This is a security-hardening feature: it closes a gap where the user might otherwise sign a proof without seeing what message they are actually attesting to. The commit itself is defensive and does not appear to introduce an obvious vulnerability, but it is a partial implementation (marked with TODOs) and the change is large enough that bugs in the new input paths could affect signing safety.

This commit makes a small user-interface change in the COLDCARD firmware for BIP-322 proof-of-reserves signing. When the user chooses to type in the human-readable message manually, pressing Cancel on the empty text-entry screen now returns to the signing flow instead of aborting the entire operation. The change is accompanied by new tests that verify the device rejects empty or wrong messages with clear failure screens. There is no direct evidence in the commit that this fixes an exploitable security vulnerability; it appears to be a usability improvement to prevent accidental cancellation.

This commit only adds a single line to a test file. It checks that when a user adds a BIP-39 passphrase to create a temporary seed, the COLDCARD device displays the passphrase back to the user on screen. This is a test-only change and does not modify the firmware itself. It is not a security fix or vulnerability.

This change makes the COLDCARD hardware wallet display the user's BIP-39 passphrase on the device's own screen after it is applied. This is a deliberate UX change, not a hidden bug. It could slightly increase the risk that someone physically near the device (or a camera) sees the passphrase, but it only appears after the user has already entered it and only on the local screen. The commit does not introduce a remote or software vulnerability.

This commit adds a small user-interface convenience to the COLDCARD transaction explorer: users can now press the '2' key to jump directly to a specific input or output index, instead of paging through items one screen at a time. It also fixes a minor edge case where pressing the left/back key from the first page could produce a negative starting index. There is no security-relevant change here.