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Moderate 55 Bitcoin

Merge PR 'Keep a zero-conf splice locked when its funding is unconfirmed' (#5505)

Public commit record

What the developer wrote

Authored by Matt Corallo

81/100 · Strong
Merge PR 'Keep a zero-conf splice locked when its funding is unconfirmed' (#5505)

from jkczyz/2026-10-0conf-splice-unconfirm-panic into main

Reviewed-on: https://git.rust-bitcoin.org/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning/pulls/5505
Reviewed-by: Matt Corallo <matt@noreply.git.rust-bitcoin.org>
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference
The short version

What changed, and why it matters

This patch fixes a logic bug in how the Lightning node handles zero-confirmation splice transactions when they are temporarily kicked out of the blockchain by a reorganization. Previously, the code would incorrectly clear the 'splice_locked' state for a zero-conf splice when its funding transaction became unconfirmed, which could cause the node to resend splice_locked messages or panic. The fix keeps zero-conf splices locked even if the funding transaction is unconfirmed, matching the behavior of zero-conf channels. The commit title and test comments explicitly describe this as preventing a panic and incorrect re-signaling.

Recommended action

Treat as a security-relevant bug fix and include in release notes. Users running nodes that support zero-conf channels and splicing should upgrade. Review related splice_locked retransmission logic for similar minimum_depth assumptions.

Security signals we found

01

State-machine inconsistency in splice locking during reorg

02

Potential panic on zero-conf splice unconfirmation (per commit/test description)

03

Incorrect retransmission of splice_locked after reorg

04

Race between funding confirmation status and splice promotion

05

Regression test added for the fixed behavior

Risk score

Why this scored 55/100

Our methodology →
Potential impact 18/30
Exploitability 10/25
Stealth signal 8/15
Affected reach 7/15
Confidence 8/10
Evidence quality 4/5
Human-validated context

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