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Moderate 59 Bitcoin

Merge PR 'Verify 64-byte transaction inclusion via coinbase-anchored Merkle depth' (#5559)

Public commit record

What the developer wrote

Authored by Matt Corallo

91/100 · Strong
Merge PR 'Verify 64-byte transaction inclusion via coinbase-anchored Merkle depth' (#5559)

from auto-pr-bot/bot/203-accept-genuine-mined-64-base-byt-41f97b into main

Reviewed-on: https://git.rust-bitcoin.org/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning/pulls/5559
Reviewed-by: Matt Corallo <matt@noreply.git.rust-bitcoin.org>
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Mentions testing or verification✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference
The short version

What changed, and why it matters

This change removes a safety check that previously threw away Bitcoin transactions whose stripped-down form is exactly 64 bytes. That check was meant to guard against a rare Merkle-tree trick, but it also accidentally discarded legitimate Lightning HTLC claim transactions of the same size, which could stop a node from learning a payment secret (preimage) needed to settle a forwarded payment. The patch now verifies those 64-byte transactions normally using the block's Merkle root, so real transactions are accepted while fake ones are still rejected.

Recommended action

Review the Merkle-proof validation paths in Electrum and Esplora clients to confirm they reject invalid 64-byte proofs, and ensure no downstream code still silently drops 64-byte transactions. Monitor for any follow-up patches that harden proof verification specifically for coinbase-anchored Merkle depths.

Security signals we found

01

Removal of a heuristic transaction-size filter (64-byte base size)

02

Reliance on Merkle-root verification against block header for inclusion proof

03

Pending changelog labels the change under '# Security' and describes a preimage-loss / HTLC settlement failure scenario

04

References the known Bitcoin Merkle-tree leaf-node weakness (bitslog 2018)

Risk score

Why this scored 59/100

Our methodology →
Potential impact 18/30
Exploitability 12/25
Stealth signal 8/15
Affected reach 10/15
Confidence 7/10
Evidence quality 4/5
Human-validated context

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