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Low 41 Bitcoin

Merge PR 'Give keyed-anchor commitments a chance to confirm when funding fails' (#5089)

Public commit record

What the developer wrote

Authored by wpaulino

81/100 · Strong
Merge PR 'Give keyed-anchor commitments a chance to confirm when funding fails' (#5089)

from 2026-10-keyed-anchor-commits-can-confirm into main

Reviewed-on: https://git.rust-bitcoin.org/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning/pulls/5089
Reviewed-by: wpaulino <wpaulino@noreply.git.rust-bitcoin.org>
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference
The short version

What changed, and why it matters

This change improves how the Lightning node handles a failed funding attempt for a 'bump' transaction used to speed up a channel close. Previously, if funding the child transaction failed, the pre-signed commitment transaction might never be broadcast, potentially leaving funds stuck. Now, for certain modern channel types (keyed-anchor commitments), the node will still broadcast the pre-signed commitment transaction using its own existing fee, giving it a chance to confirm and recover funds. This is a robustness fix rather than a traditional vulnerability patch.

Recommended action

Review and merge if not already merged; this is a defensive robustness improvement. Users running nodes with keyed-anchor channels benefit from improved fund-recovery behavior when coin selection fails during a force-close. No immediate emergency action is indicated by the diff alone.

Security signals we found

01

Funds recovery / liveness improvement for failed coin-selection paths

02

Broadcast of pre-signed commitment on funding failure

03

Differentiated handling between keyed-anchor and zero-fee anchor commitments

04

No cryptographic, signature, or authorization changes

Risk score

Why this scored 41/100

Our methodology →
Potential impact 12/30
Exploitability 5/25
Stealth signal 6/15
Affected reach 8/15
Confidence 7/10
Evidence quality 3/5
Human-validated context

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