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Informational 20 Bitcoin

Add `counterparty_node_id` to `TransactionType` variants

Public commit record

What the developer wrote

Authored by Elias Rohrer

73/100 · Adequate
Add `counterparty_node_id` to `TransactionType` variants

This adds `counterparty_node_id` tracking to all `TransactionType`
variants, enabling downstream users to identify the channel counterparty
associated with each broadcast transaction.

For single-channel variants (`CooperativeClose`, `UnilateralClose`,
`AnchorBump`, `Claim`, `Splice`), the counterparty is stored directly.

For multi-channel variants (`Funding`, `Sweep`), the type now uses
`Vec<(PublicKey, ChannelId)>` to pair each channel with its counterparty.

The `OnchainTxHandler` now stores `counterparty_node_id` and provides a
`set_counterparty_node_id` method for initialization during
deserialization of older data.

Co-Authored-By: HAL 9000
Signed-off-by: Elias Rohrer <dev@tnull.de>
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context
The short version

What changed, and why it matters

This commit is a straightforward observability and metadata improvement: it adds the channel counterparty's node ID to every variant of the TransactionType enum used when LDK broadcasts on-chain transactions. It does not change transaction logic, signatures, fee calculations, or who can broadcast what. Downstream users (such as custom transaction broadcasters or monitoring tools) now get extra context about which peer is involved in each transaction. The change includes a backward-compatibility shim that fills in a dummy counterparty ID when loading older serialized data and then overwrites it once the real value is read.

Recommended action

No security action required. Reviewers may want to confirm downstream consumers of TransactionType handle the new enum shape and that the dummy-key deserialization fallback is always overwritten before any broadcast occurs.

Security signals we found

01

Public API change to TransactionType enum (adds counterparty_node_id to all variants)

02

Deserialization fallback uses a dummy public key for counterparty_node_id until ChannelMonitor supplies the real one

03

No change to transaction validity, signature checks, fee logic, or authorization

04

No memory-safety, cryptographic, or consensus-sensitive code modified

Risk score

Why this scored 20/100

Our methodology →
Potential impact 2/30
Exploitability 0/25
Stealth signal 0/15
Affected reach 5/15
Confidence 9/10
Evidence quality 4/5
Human-validated context

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