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Low 31 Bitcoin

Pass the initial counterparty commit tx to `ChannelMonitor::new`

Public commit record

What the developer wrote

Authored by Matt Corallo

83/100 · Strong
Pass the initial counterparty commit tx to `ChannelMonitor::new`

For some time now we've required the initial counterparty
commitment tx to be provided to `ChannelMonitor`s immediately. With
a recent change we started panic'ing if we failed to do so before
serializing a `ChannelMonitor`, which broke a `--cfg` flag test.

Here we fix this by requiring the initial commitment transaction by
API in `ChannelMonitor::new`.
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Mentions testing or verification
The short version

What changed, and why it matters

This commit fixes an internal consistency problem in how a new Lightning channel's first monitoring data is built. Previously, the code created a ChannelMonitor first and then separately supplied the counterparty's initial commitment transaction. A recent change made the monitor panic if it was saved to disk before that transaction was supplied. The fix requires the transaction to be passed directly into ChannelMonitor::new, eliminating a window where the monitor could be incomplete. It is a robustness/API-cleanup fix rather than an externally exploitable vulnerability.

Recommended action

No urgent security action required. Treat as a normal code-quality/robustness improvement. Review related tests and any downstream code that constructs ChannelMonitor directly to ensure the new required parameter is supplied.

Security signals we found

01

Eliminates a window where ChannelMonitor could be serialized without the required initial counterparty commitment transaction

02

Recent code change introduced a panic on serialization when the transaction was missing

03

Moves a required initialization step from a separate call into the constructor, enforcing it by API

Risk score

Why this scored 31/100

Our methodology →
Potential impact 8/30
Exploitability 3/25
Stealth signal 4/15
Affected reach 5/15
Confidence 7/10
Evidence quality 4/5
Human-validated context

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