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Only emit Event::SpliceNegotiated when contributing
Public commit record
73/100 · Adequate
What the developer wrote
Authored by Wilmer Paulino
Only emit Event::SpliceNegotiated when contributing
There's no need to inform users of negotiated splices when they're not
contributing as it just produces noise. Once they do start contributing,
they cannot stop, so we always emit the event going forward. Note that
we still emit `Event::ChannelReady` with the new locked funding outpoint
for each locked splice, so users can still learn that a splice occurred
that way.
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context
What changed, and why it matters
This commit changes when users of the Lightning Dev Kit library are notified about a 'splice'—a way to resize a Lightning channel's on-chain funding. Previously both sides got an event when a splice was negotiated. Now only the side that actually added or removed money (a 'local contribution') gets the event. The other side still learns about the locked splice later through a different event. This is a user-interface cleanup, not a security fix, and does not change how funds are protected.
Recommended action
No security action required. Developers integrating LDK should review their event handling to ensure they do not rely on `Event::SpliceNegotiated` for non-contributing splices; use `Event::ChannelReady` if notification for all locked splices is needed.
Security signals we found
01
Behavioral change in event emission only; no cryptographic or consensus logic modified
02
No change to transaction validation, signature checks, or fund handling
03
Commit message explicitly describes change as reducing noise, not fixing a vulnerability
04
Tests updated to match new expected event behavior
Evidence from the diff
The patch adds a has_local_contribution flag to SpliceFundingNegotiated and only emits Event::SpliceNegotiated when that flag is true. It derives the flag from the interactive transaction signing session. Tests are updated to assert that the non-contributing peer’s pending event queue is empty after splice negotiation. The commit message frames this as reducing event noise, and an alternative notification path (Event::ChannelReady) remains available.
Changed components
lightning/src/events/mod.rslightning/src/ln/channel.rslightning/src/ln/channelmanager.rslightning/src/ln/async_signer_tests.rslightning/src/ln/splicing_tests.rsInspect captured patch +113 / −91
diff --git a/lightning/src/events/mod.rs b/lightning/src/events/mod.rs
index ec0ad6c..2e56d35 100644
--- a/lightning/src/events/mod.rs
+++ b/lightning/src/events/mod.rs
@@ -1647,8 +1647,12 @@ pub enum Event {
/// [`ChainMonitor::get_claimable_balances`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor::get_claimable_balances
last_local_balance_msat: Option<u64>,
},
- /// Used to indicate that a splice for the given `channel_id` has been negotiated and its
- /// funding transaction has been broadcast.
+ /// Used to indicate that a splice for the given `channel_id` has been negotiated, its
+ /// funding transaction has been broadcast, and local inputs or outputs were contributed to
+ /// it.
+ ///
+ /// This event is not emitted if the counterparty negotiated a splice without using a local
+ /// contribution.
///
/// The splice is then considered pending until both parties have seen enough confirmations to
/// consider the funding locked. Once this occurs, an [`Event::ChannelReady`] will be emitted.
@@ -1679,9 +1683,9 @@ pub enum Event {
},
/// Used to indicate that a splice negotiation round for the given `channel_id` has failed.
///
- /// Each splice attempt (initial or RBF) resolves to either [`Event::SpliceNegotiated`] on
- /// success or this event on failure. Prior successfully negotiated splice transactions are
- /// unaffected.
+ /// Each splice attempt (initial or RBF) resolves to this event on failure. On success,
+ /// [`Event::SpliceNegotiated`] is emitted if the negotiated transaction includes local
+ /// inputs or outputs. Prior successfully negotiated splice transactions are unaffected.
///
/// Any UTXOs contributed to the failed round that are not committed to a prior negotiated
/// splice transaction will be returned via a preceding [`Event::DiscardFunding`].
diff --git a/lightning/src/ln/async_signer_tests.rs b/lightning/src/ln/async_signer_tests.rs
index f36c197..f60e63a 100644
--- a/lightning/src/ln/async_signer_tests.rs
+++ b/lightning/src/ln/async_signer_tests.rs
@@ -1853,7 +1853,7 @@ fn test_async_splice_initial_commit_sig() {
acceptor.node.handle_tx_signatures(initiator_node_id, &tx_signatures);
let _ = get_event!(initiator, Event::SpliceNegotiated);
- let _ = get_event!(acceptor, Event::SpliceNegotiated);
+ assert!(acceptor.node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
}
#[test]
@@ -1945,7 +1945,7 @@ fn test_async_splice_initial_commit_sig_waits_for_monitor_before_tx_signatures()
acceptor.node.handle_tx_signatures(initiator_node_id, &tx_signatures);
let _ = get_event!(initiator, Event::SpliceNegotiated);
- let _ = get_event!(acceptor, Event::SpliceNegotiated);
+ assert!(acceptor.node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
}
#[test]
@@ -2022,5 +2022,5 @@ fn test_async_splice_shared_input_signature_released_on_unblock() {
acceptor.node.handle_tx_signatures(initiator_node_id, &tx_signatures);
let _ = get_event!(initiator, Event::SpliceNegotiated);
- let _ = get_event!(acceptor, Event::SpliceNegotiated);
+ assert!(acceptor.node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
}
diff --git a/lightning/src/ln/channel.rs b/lightning/src/ln/channel.rs
index 51a6795..9fab47f 100644
--- a/lightning/src/ln/channel.rs
+++ b/lightning/src/ln/channel.rs
@@ -7185,6 +7185,9 @@ pub struct SpliceFundingNegotiated {
/// The outpoint of the channel's splice funding transaction.
pub funding_txo: bitcoin::OutPoint,
+ /// Whether the holder contributed local inputs or outputs to the negotiated splice.
+ pub has_local_contribution: bool,
+
/// The features that this channel will operate with.
pub channel_type: ChannelTypeFeatures,
@@ -9559,11 +9562,18 @@ where
funding.get_funding_txo().expect("funding outpoint should be set");
let channel_type = funding.get_channel_type().clone();
let funding_redeem_script = funding.get_funding_redeemscript();
+ let has_local_contribution = self
+ .context
+ .interactive_tx_signing_session
+ .as_ref()
+ .map(|signing_session| signing_session.has_local_contribution())
+ .unwrap_or(false);
pending_splice.negotiated_candidates.push(funding);
let splice_negotiated = SpliceFundingNegotiated {
funding_txo: funding_txo.into_bitcoin_outpoint(),
+ has_local_contribution,
channel_type,
funding_redeem_script,
};
diff --git a/lightning/src/ln/channelmanager.rs b/lightning/src/ln/channelmanager.rs
index e333529..2667d5f 100644
--- a/lightning/src/ln/channelmanager.rs
+++ b/lightning/src/ln/channelmanager.rs
@@ -6783,8 +6783,9 @@ impl<
///
/// Calling this method will commence the process of creating a new funding transaction for the
/// channel. Once the funding transaction has been constructed, an [`Event::SpliceNegotiated`]
- /// will be emitted. At this point, any inputs contributed to the splice can only be re-spent
- /// if an [`Event::DiscardFunding`] is seen.
+ /// will be emitted if the negotiated transaction includes local inputs or outputs. At this
+ /// point, any inputs contributed to the splice can only be re-spent if an
+ /// [`Event::DiscardFunding`] is seen.
///
/// If any failures occur while negotiating the funding transaction, an
/// [`Event::SpliceNegotiationFailed`] will be emitted. Any contributed inputs no longer used
@@ -7007,18 +7008,20 @@ impl<
);
}
if let Some(splice_negotiated) = splice_negotiated {
- self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push_back((
- events::Event::SpliceNegotiated {
- channel_id: *channel_id,
- counterparty_node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
- user_channel_id: chan.context().get_user_id(),
- new_funding_txo: splice_negotiated.funding_txo,
- channel_type: splice_negotiated.channel_type,
- new_funding_redeem_script: splice_negotiated
- .funding_redeem_script,
- },
- None,
- ));
+ if splice_negotiated.has_local_contribution {
+ self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push_back((
+ events::Event::SpliceNegotiated {
+ channel_id: *channel_id,
+ counterparty_node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
+ user_channel_id: chan.context().get_user_id(),
+ new_funding_txo: splice_negotiated.funding_txo,
+ channel_type: splice_negotiated.channel_type,
+ new_funding_redeem_script: splice_negotiated
+ .funding_redeem_script,
+ },
+ None,
+ ));
+ }
}
if chan.context().is_connected() {
@@ -11201,17 +11204,19 @@ This indicates a bug inside LDK. Please report this error at https://github.com/
.as_mut()
.and_then(|v| v.splice_negotiated.take())
{
- pending_events.push_back((
- events::Event::SpliceNegotiated {
- channel_id: channel.context.channel_id(),
- counterparty_node_id,
- user_channel_id: channel.context.get_user_id(),
- new_funding_txo: splice_negotiated.funding_txo,
- channel_type: splice_negotiated.channel_type,
- new_funding_redeem_script: splice_negotiated.funding_redeem_script,
- },
- None,
- ));
+ if splice_negotiated.has_local_contribution {
+ pending_events.push_back((
+ events::Event::SpliceNegotiated {
+ channel_id: channel.context.channel_id(),
+ counterparty_node_id,
+ user_channel_id: channel.context.get_user_id(),
+ new_funding_txo: splice_negotiated.funding_txo,
+ channel_type: splice_negotiated.channel_type,
+ new_funding_redeem_script: splice_negotiated.funding_redeem_script,
+ },
+ None,
+ ));
+ }
}
}
@@ -12286,18 +12291,20 @@ This indicates a bug inside LDK. Please report this error at https://github.com/
// which also terminates quiescence.
let needs_holding_cell_release = splice_negotiated.is_some();
if let Some(splice_negotiated) = splice_negotiated {
- self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push_back((
- events::Event::SpliceNegotiated {
- channel_id: msg.channel_id,
- counterparty_node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
- user_channel_id: chan.context.get_user_id(),
- new_funding_txo: splice_negotiated.funding_txo,
- channel_type: splice_negotiated.channel_type,
- new_funding_redeem_script: splice_negotiated
- .funding_redeem_script,
- },
- None,
- ));
+ if splice_negotiated.has_local_contribution {
+ self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push_back((
+ events::Event::SpliceNegotiated {
+ channel_id: msg.channel_id,
+ counterparty_node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
+ user_channel_id: chan.context.get_user_id(),
+ new_funding_txo: splice_negotiated.funding_txo,
+ channel_type: splice_negotiated.channel_type,
+ new_funding_redeem_script: splice_negotiated
+ .funding_redeem_script,
+ },
+ None,
+ ));
+ }
}
let holding_cell_res = if needs_holding_cell_release {
self.check_free_peer_holding_cells(peer_state)
@@ -14148,17 +14155,20 @@ This indicates a bug inside LDK. Please report this error at https://github.com/
.and_then(|funding_tx_signed| funding_tx_signed.splice_negotiated.take())
{
*needs_holding_cell_release = true;
- self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push_back((
- events::Event::SpliceNegotiated {
- channel_id,
- counterparty_node_id: node_id,
- user_channel_id: funded_chan.context.get_user_id(),
- new_funding_txo: splice_negotiated.funding_txo,
- channel_type: splice_negotiated.channel_type,
- new_funding_redeem_script: splice_negotiated.funding_redeem_script,
- },
- None,
- ));
+ if splice_negotiated.has_local_contribution {
+ self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push_back((
+ events::Event::SpliceNegotiated {
+ channel_id,
+ counterparty_node_id: node_id,
+ user_channel_id: funded_chan.context.get_user_id(),
+ new_funding_txo: splice_negotiated.funding_txo,
+ channel_type: splice_negotiated.channel_type,
+ new_funding_redeem_script: splice_negotiated
+ .funding_redeem_script,
+ },
+ None,
+ ));
+ }
}
if let Some(broadcast_tx) = msgs.signed_closing_tx {
log_info!(logger, "Broadcasting closing tx {}", log_tx!(broadcast_tx));
diff --git a/lightning/src/ln/splicing_tests.rs b/lightning/src/ln/splicing_tests.rs
index 5fff8dc..b8a6e2b 100644
--- a/lightning/src/ln/splicing_tests.rs
+++ b/lightning/src/ln/splicing_tests.rs
@@ -703,7 +703,6 @@ pub fn splice_channel<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd>(
initiator: &'a Node<'b, 'c, 'd>, acceptor: &'a Node<'b, 'c, 'd>, channel_id: ChannelId,
funding_contribution: FundingContribution,
) -> (Transaction, ScriptBuf) {
- let node_id_initiator = initiator.node.get_our_node_id();
let node_id_acceptor = acceptor.node.get_our_node_id();
let new_funding_script = complete_splice_handshake(initiator, acceptor);
@@ -719,7 +718,7 @@ pub fn splice_channel<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd>(
assert!(splice_locked.is_none());
expect_splice_pending_event(initiator, &node_id_acceptor);
- expect_splice_pending_event(acceptor, &node_id_initiator);
+ assert!(acceptor.node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
(splice_tx, new_funding_script)
}
@@ -1750,7 +1749,7 @@ fn fails_initiating_concurrent_splices(reconnect: bool) {
assert!(splice_locked.is_none());
expect_splice_pending_event(&nodes[0], &node_1_id);
- expect_splice_pending_event(&nodes[1], &node_0_id);
+ assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
// Now that the splice is pending, another splice may be initiated.
assert!(nodes[0].node.splice_channel(&channel_id, &node_1_id).is_ok());
@@ -2024,7 +2023,7 @@ fn do_test_splice_tiebreak(
assert!(splice_locked.is_none());
expect_splice_pending_event(&nodes[0], &node_id_1);
- expect_splice_pending_event(&nodes[1], &node_id_0);
+ assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &tx);
mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &tx);
@@ -2071,7 +2070,7 @@ fn do_test_splice_tiebreak(
assert!(splice_locked.is_none());
expect_splice_pending_event(&nodes[1], &node_id_0);
- expect_splice_pending_event(&nodes[0], &node_id_1);
+ assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &new_splice_tx);
mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &new_splice_tx);
@@ -2537,7 +2536,7 @@ fn do_test_splice_reestablish(reload: bool, async_monitor_update: bool) {
reconnect_nodes!(|reconnect_args: &mut ReconnectArgs| {
reconnect_args.send_interactive_tx_sigs = (false, true);
});
- expect_splice_pending_event(&nodes[1], &node_id_0);
+ assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
// Reestablish the channel again to make sure node 0 doesn't retransmit `tx_signatures`
// unnecessarily as it was delivered in the previous reestablishment.
@@ -2931,7 +2930,7 @@ fn test_splice_reestablish_waits_for_holder_tx_signatures_before_commitment_sign
nodes[1].node.handle_tx_signatures(node_id_0, &initiator_tx_signatures);
expect_splice_pending_event(&nodes[0], &node_id_1);
- expect_splice_pending_event(&nodes[1], &node_id_0);
+ assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
}
#[test]
@@ -3035,7 +3034,7 @@ fn test_splice_reestablish_sends_commitment_signed_before_tx_signatures() {
nodes[1].node.handle_tx_signatures(node_id_0, &initiator_tx_signatures);
expect_splice_pending_event(&nodes[0], &node_id_1);
- expect_splice_pending_event(&nodes[1], &node_id_0);
+ assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
}
#[test]
@@ -4024,7 +4023,7 @@ fn acceptor_can_cancel_queued_funding_contributed_during_counterparty_splice() {
let (splice_tx, splice_locked) = sign_interactive_funding_tx(initiator, acceptor, false, None);
assert!(splice_locked.is_none());
expect_splice_pending_event(initiator, &node_id_acceptor);
- expect_splice_pending_event(acceptor, &node_id_initiator);
+ assert!(acceptor.node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
mine_transaction(initiator, &splice_tx);
mine_transaction(acceptor, &splice_tx);
@@ -4495,7 +4494,7 @@ fn free_holding_cell_on_tx_signatures_quiescence_exit() {
}
expect_splice_pending_event(initiator, &node_id_acceptor);
- expect_splice_pending_event(acceptor, &node_id_initiator);
+ assert!(acceptor.node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
}
#[test]
@@ -4975,7 +4974,7 @@ fn test_splice_buffer_commitment_signed_until_funding_tx_signed() {
}
expect_splice_pending_event(&nodes[0], &node_id_1);
- expect_splice_pending_event(&nodes[1], &node_id_0);
+ assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
// Both nodes should broadcast the splice transaction.
let splice_tx = {
@@ -5217,7 +5216,7 @@ fn do_splice_waits_for_initial_commitment_monitor_update_before_releasing_tx_sig
expect_splice_pending_event(&nodes[0], &node_id_1);
if !complete_update_while_disconnected {
- expect_splice_pending_event(&nodes[1], &node_id_0);
+ assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
}
}
@@ -6140,7 +6139,7 @@ fn test_splice_rbf_acceptor_basic() {
let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
- let node_id_0 = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
+ let _node_id_0 = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
let node_id_1 = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
let initial_channel_value_sat = 100_000;
@@ -6189,7 +6188,7 @@ fn test_splice_rbf_acceptor_basic() {
assert!(splice_locked.is_none());
expect_splice_pending_event(&nodes[0], &node_id_1);
- expect_splice_pending_event(&nodes[1], &node_id_0);
+ assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
// Step 11: Mine, lock, and verify DiscardFunding for the replaced splice candidate.
let result = lock_rbf_splice_after_blocks(
@@ -6221,7 +6220,7 @@ fn test_splice_rbf_discard_unique_contribution() {
let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
- let node_id_0 = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
+ let _node_id_0 = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
let node_id_1 = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
let initial_channel_value_sat = 100_000;
@@ -6290,7 +6289,7 @@ fn test_splice_rbf_discard_unique_contribution() {
assert!(splice_locked.is_none());
expect_splice_pending_event(&nodes[0], &node_id_1);
- expect_splice_pending_event(&nodes[1], &node_id_0);
+ assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
let result = lock_rbf_splice_after_blocks(
&nodes[0],
@@ -6322,7 +6321,7 @@ fn test_splice_rbf_at_high_feerate() {
let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
- let node_id_0 = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
+ let _node_id_0 = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
let node_id_1 = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
let initial_channel_value_sat = 100_000;
@@ -6357,7 +6356,7 @@ fn test_splice_rbf_at_high_feerate() {
);
assert!(splice_locked.is_none());
expect_splice_pending_event(&nodes[0], &node_id_1);
- expect_splice_pending_event(&nodes[1], &node_id_0);
+ assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
// Step 3: RBF again using the template's min_rbf_feerate. The counterparty must accept it.
provide_utxo_reserves(&nodes, 2, added_value * 2);
@@ -6378,7 +6377,7 @@ fn test_splice_rbf_at_high_feerate() {
sign_interactive_funding_tx(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], false, Some(rbf_tx_1.compute_txid()));
assert!(splice_locked.is_none());
expect_splice_pending_event(&nodes[0], &node_id_1);
- expect_splice_pending_event(&nodes[1], &node_id_0);
+ assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
}
#[test]
@@ -6579,7 +6578,7 @@ fn test_splice_rbf_insufficient_feerate_high() {
sign_interactive_funding_tx(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], false, Some(splice_tx.compute_txid()));
assert!(splice_locked.is_none());
expect_splice_pending_event(&nodes[0], &node_id_1);
- expect_splice_pending_event(&nodes[1], &node_id_0);
+ assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
// prev=1000: flat increment gives 1000+25=1025, 25/24 rule gives 1000*25/24=1041.
// Feerate 1025 satisfies the flat increment but not 25/24 — rejected.
@@ -7291,7 +7290,7 @@ pub fn do_test_splice_rbf_tiebreak(
assert!(splice_locked.is_none());
expect_splice_pending_event(&nodes[0], &node_id_1);
- expect_splice_pending_event(&nodes[1], &node_id_0);
+ assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
// Mine, lock, and verify DiscardFunding for the replaced splice candidate.
// Node 1's QuiescentAction was preserved, so after splice_locked it re-initiates
@@ -7354,7 +7353,7 @@ pub fn do_test_splice_rbf_tiebreak(
assert!(splice_locked.is_none());
expect_splice_pending_event(&nodes[1], &node_id_0);
- expect_splice_pending_event(&nodes[0], &node_id_1);
+ assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
// Mine and lock.
mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &new_splice_tx);
@@ -7853,7 +7852,7 @@ fn test_splice_rbf_sequential() {
let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
- let node_id_0 = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
+ let _node_id_0 = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
let node_id_1 = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
let initial_channel_value_sat = 100_000;
@@ -7891,7 +7890,7 @@ fn test_splice_rbf_sequential() {
sign_interactive_funding_tx(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], false, Some(splice_tx_0.compute_txid()));
assert!(splice_locked.is_none());
expect_splice_pending_event(&nodes[0], &node_id_1);
- expect_splice_pending_event(&nodes[1], &node_id_0);
+ assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
// --- Round 2: RBF #2 at feerate 303. ---
provide_utxo_reserves(&nodes, 2, added_value * 2);
@@ -7912,7 +7911,7 @@ fn test_splice_rbf_sequential() {
sign_interactive_funding_tx(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], false, Some(splice_tx_1.compute_txid()));
assert!(splice_locked.is_none());
expect_splice_pending_event(&nodes[0], &node_id_1);
- expect_splice_pending_event(&nodes[1], &node_id_0);
+ assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
// --- Mine and lock the final RBF, verifying DiscardFunding for both replaced candidates. ---
let splice_tx_0_txid = splice_tx_0.compute_txid();
@@ -7938,7 +7937,7 @@ fn test_splice_rbf_amends_prior_net_positive_contribution_request() {
let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
- let node_id_0 = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
+ let _node_id_0 = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
let node_id_1 = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
let (_, _, channel_id, _) =
@@ -7981,7 +7980,7 @@ fn test_splice_rbf_amends_prior_net_positive_contribution_request() {
sign_interactive_funding_tx(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], false, Some(replaced_txid));
assert!(splice_locked.is_none());
expect_splice_pending_event(&nodes[0], &node_id_1);
- expect_splice_pending_event(&nodes[1], &node_id_0);
+ assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
tx
};
@@ -8070,7 +8069,7 @@ fn test_splice_rbf_amends_prior_net_negative_contribution_request() {
let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
- let node_id_0 = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
+ let _node_id_0 = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
let node_id_1 = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
let (_, _, channel_id, _) =
@@ -8115,7 +8114,7 @@ fn test_splice_rbf_amends_prior_net_negative_contribution_request() {
sign_interactive_funding_tx(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], false, Some(replaced_txid));
assert!(splice_locked.is_none());
expect_splice_pending_event(&nodes[0], &node_id_1);
- expect_splice_pending_event(&nodes[1], &node_id_0);
+ assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
tx
};
@@ -9161,7 +9160,7 @@ fn test_splice_rbf_rejects_low_feerate_after_several_attempts() {
);
assert!(splice_locked.is_none());
expect_splice_pending_event(&nodes[0], &node_id_1);
- expect_splice_pending_event(&nodes[1], &node_id_0);
+ assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
prev_feerate = feerate;
prev_splice_tx = rbf_tx;
}
@@ -9193,7 +9192,7 @@ fn test_splice_rbf_rejects_own_low_feerate_after_several_attempts() {
let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
- let node_id_0 = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
+ let _node_id_0 = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
let node_id_1 = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
let initial_channel_value_sat = 100_000;
@@ -9236,7 +9235,7 @@ fn test_splice_rbf_rejects_own_low_feerate_after_several_attempts() {
);
assert!(splice_locked.is_none());
expect_splice_pending_event(&nodes[0], &node_id_1);
- expect_splice_pending_event(&nodes[1], &node_id_0);
+ assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
prev_feerate = feerate;
prev_splice_tx = rbf_tx;
}
@@ -9306,10 +9305,10 @@ fn test_no_disconnect_after_splice_completes() {
let (_, splice_locked) = sign_interactive_funding_tx(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], false, None);
assert!(splice_locked.is_none());
- let node_id_0 = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
+ let _node_id_0 = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
let node_id_1 = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
expect_splice_pending_event(&nodes[0], &node_id_1);
- expect_splice_pending_event(&nodes[1], &node_id_0);
+ assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
// Fire enough ticks to trigger a disconnect if the timer wasn't properly cleared.
for _ in 0..DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS {
@@ -10448,7 +10447,6 @@ fn test_async_splice_receives_tx_signatures_while_unrelated_monitor_update_pendi
// monitor update. B's `tx_signatures` was already released, so there's no message to send and
// we should expect the splice negotiation to complete.
acceptor.node.handle_tx_signatures(initiator_node_id, &delayed_initiator_tx_signatures);
- expect_splice_pending_event(acceptor, &initiator_node_id);
// Finally, drive the state machines to completion.
acceptor.chain_monitor.complete_sole_pending_chan_update(&channel_id);
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Our methodology →Why this scored 19/100
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