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Low 44 Bitcoin

bip38: fail if aes fails

Public commit record

What the developer wrote

Authored by Jon Griffiths

38/100 · Opaque
bip38: fail if aes fails
✓ Subject identifies a change✓ Names a concrete action or component! No meaningful explanatory body
The short version

What changed, and why it matters

This commit fixes a programming oversight in the BIP38 encrypted-key code. Previously, the AES encryption/decryption helper functions ignored any error returned by the underlying AES routine. If AES failed for some reason, the code would continue and produce or accept potentially invalid encrypted private-key data. The change makes the helpers return the AES status and makes the callers abort the operation if AES fails, preventing use of corrupted or incorrect key material.

Recommended action

Review whether any other cryptographic helpers in the codebase ignore `wally_aes` or similar primitive return values. Consider adding regression tests that simulate AES failure to verify the new error paths are exercised. No immediate emergency response is indicated, but the fix should be included in the next release.

Security signals we found

01

Unchecked return value from cryptographic primitive (wally_aes) fixed

02

AES failure during BIP38 encryption/decryption could previously produce or accept malformed key material

03

Error propagation added to both encryption and decryption paths

Risk score

Why this scored 44/100

Our methodology →
Potential impact 12/30
Exploitability 8/25
Stealth signal 7/15
Affected reach 6/15
Confidence 7/10
Evidence quality 4/5
Human-validated context

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