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High 80 Bitcoin

Merge pull request #11072 from SomberNight/202610_fixes

Public commit record

What the developer wrote

Authored by ghost43

58/100 · Thin
Merge pull request #11072 from SomberNight/202610_fixes

adb/txbatcher: assorted fixes
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference! No meaningful explanatory body
The short version

What changed, and why it matters

This commit hardens Electrum so that incoming transactions spending the user's own coins are checked for valid signatures before being accepted into the wallet. Previously, a malicious or buggy server could feed the wallet a transaction that appeared to spend the user's funds but had an invalid or forged signature, causing balance confusion, incorrect history, or unsafe follow-on transactions. The patch also fixes related bugs in the transaction-batching (RBF) code so the wallet does not accidentally pay outputs introduced by someone else's transaction replacement.

Recommended action

Treat this as a security-hardening fix and include it in the next release. Users running affected versions should upgrade, especially if they connect to untrusted or third-party Electrum servers. No immediate CVE is referenced in the commit; maintainers should evaluate whether prior behavior warrants a CVE and security advisory.

Security signals we found

01

New signature-verification path for transactions spending wallet UTXOs

02

InvalidTxSignature exception and rejection/removal of bad transactions

03

Held-tx mechanism defers acceptance of server-claimed mined transactions until SPV verification

04

TxBatcher no longer blindly adopts base-tx replacements containing non-batch outputs

05

Watchtower explicitly disables signature verification (no private keys)

06

Extensive new unit tests for invalid signatures, held txs, and txbatcher replacement behavior

Risk score

Why this scored 80/100

Our methodology →
Potential impact 24/30
Exploitability 18/25
Stealth signal 12/15
Affected reach 14/15
Confidence 8/10
Evidence quality 4/5
Human-validated context

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