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Informational 12 Bitcoin

common_qt: move submarine swap support code from qt gui to common_qt as SubmarineSwapMixin

Public commit record

What the developer wrote

Authored by Sander van Grieken

73/100 · Adequate
common_qt: move submarine swap support code from qt gui to common_qt as SubmarineSwapMixin

This covers the functionality for swap use during payments (so, change-to-ln and
submarine-payments) present in gui/qt/confirm_tx_dialog, not the 'standalone' swap.

This is in preparation for adding the same functionality to qml.

- move swap support code from TxEditor to SubmarineSwapMixin
- don't require wallet instance at construction, allow late setting of wallet

swaps: add initialize/destroy methods to SwapServerTransport, to simplify consumer side, adds
a done callback so the transport can be used once ready or failure can be handled.
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context
The short version

What changed, and why it matters

This commit is a straightforward internal code refactor. It moves the user-interface code that handles 'submarine swaps' (a way to exchange on-chain Bitcoin for Lightning funds, or vice versa) out of the Qt desktop dialog and into a shared module so it can later be reused by the QML mobile-style interface. It also adds explicit initialize/destroy lifecycle methods to the swap server connection class. There is no indication this change fixes a security bug or introduces a new vulnerability.

Recommended action

No security action required. Treat as normal code-quality review.

Security signals we found

01

No security-relevant keywords in commit title or message

02

No changes to cryptographic primitives, wallet signing, or network protocol parsing

03

Refactor only: code moved between files with equivalent control flow

04

No new dependencies or external interfaces introduced

05

No vendor disclosure or advisory references present

Risk score

Why this scored 12/100

Our methodology →
Potential impact 0/30
Exploitability 0/25
Stealth signal 0/15
Affected reach 0/15
Confidence 8/10
Evidence quality 4/5
Human-validated context

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