AQ
← All projectsACINQ

Eclair

Scala implementation of a Lightning Network node.

BitcoinLightning NetworkNormal
Repository coverage

231 commits in the local evidence base

Every captured commit receives deterministic security triage and a separate communication-quality score. Security candidates and broader second-pass signals receive full-patch Ollama analysis.

66security candidates48second-pass queue208AI analyses
4commits · 30 days
26commits · 60 days
80commits · 180 days
161commits · 365 days
Backfill bands
Aug 5 → Feb 691 seen11 candidatesComplete
Feb 6 → Jun 660 seen5 candidatesComplete
Jun 6 → Jul 62 seen0 candidatesComplete
Jul 6 → Aug 514 seen0 candidatesComplete
Commit communication

Does the history explain itself?

Message quality measures whether a commit identifies its scope, purpose, rationale, testing, and supporting references. It does not change the security-severity score.

78/100 average clarity
143Strong · 80–100
54Adequate · 60–79
23Thin · 40–59
11Opaque · 0–39
3security candidates with opaque commit messaging
Read the scoring rubric →
Developer activity

Who is changing the project?

Public Git author strings; identities are not independently verified.

DeveloperCommitsCandidatesAnalyzedHigh riskMessage avg.
pm47451633876
Bastien Teinturier13332127581
Fabrice Drouin291424269
Thomas HUET16116075
rorp313069
Nishant Bansal212084
dependabot[bot]111081
ekzyis101058
Rusty Russell101081
Analysis record

Published AI watches

Last scanned 47 minutes ago

Informational 15 AI analysisMessage 36 · Opaque
AQ ACINQEclair BitcoinLightning Network

Back to dev (#3424)

This commit is a routine post-release housekeeping change. It bumps the software version from 0.14.6 to 0.15.0-SNAPSHOT across several build files, adds a blank release-notes template for the next version, and intentionally adds a startup …

Startup guard added to block accidental execution of development snapshotNo vulnerability fix, cryptographic change, or trust-boundary modification present
c96c3d44by Fabrice Drouin+73−57 files
No security note in commit
High 74 AI analysisMessage 53 · Thin
AQ ACINQEclair BitcoinLightning Network

Eclair v0.14.6 release (#3420)

This commit is the release packaging for Eclair v0.14.6. The release notes explicitly state it contains 'security hardening fixes' that can be exploited by malicious nodes, and thank a researcher for responsible disclosure. The actual code…

Vendor release notes explicitly label the release as containing 'security hardening fixes' exploitable by malicious nodesNew default-on configuration `require-confirmed-inputs-for-splicing` mitigates unconfirmed-input double-spend risk during splicingRelease notes credit @erickcestari for responsible disclosures
50e046efby Fabrice Drouin+28−198 files
Vendor flagged security relevance
High 72 AI analysisMessage 88 · Strong
AQ ACINQEclair BitcoinLightning Network

Splicing robustness improvements (#3417)

This commit hardens Eclair's Lightning channel 'splicing' feature against a malicious peer. Splicing lets users resize a channel by creating a new funding transaction. The patch fixes several ways an attacker could exploit unconfirmed spli…

New default-on configuration `require-confirmed-inputs-for-splicing` to prevent double-spend of unconfirmed splice inputsLimit on remote splice inputs/outputs (10) to bound CPFP costForce-close now selects a commitment whose funding tx is known to bitcoind, re-evaluated per block and splice spend events
c07cc745by pm47+518−6011 files
Vendor flagged security relevance
Moderate 64 AI analysisMessage 81 · Strong
AQ ACINQEclair BitcoinLightning Network

Flag peers that leave liquidity fees unpaid (#3416)

This commit fixes a security gap in Eclair's Lightning node software. A peer could repeatedly get free channel funding ('liquidity') by backing out of payments meant to cover the fees right before the funding transaction was signed. Previo…

Fixes a logic flaw allowing repeated unpaid liquidity feesAdds peer suspicion flagging tied to funding txidExpands state handling for asynchronous LiquidityPurchaseAborted events
c5b9afc0by pm47+192−154 files
Vendor flagged security relevance
Informational 15 AI analysisMessage 36 · Opaque
AQ ACINQEclair BitcoinLightning Network

Back to dev (#3413)

This commit is a routine post-release housekeeping change. It bumps the project version from 0.14.5 to 0.15.0-SNAPSHOT, removes published release checksums, and adds a blank release-notes template. It also adds a startup guard that refuses…

No vulnerability signals presentStartup guard added to block accidental use of development snapshot
06716fceby Fabrice Drouin+73−108 files
No security note in commit
Moderate 67 AI analysisMessage 53 · Thin
AQ ACINQEclair BitcoinLightning Network

Eclair v0.14.5 release (#3412)

This commit is the release packaging for Eclair v0.14.5. The release notes state it is a patch release containing 'security hardening fixes' that can be exploited by malicious nodes, and thank two people for responsible disclosures. The ac…

Release notes explicitly describe 'security hardening fixes' and warn that 'some of these issues can be exploited by malicious nodes'Two independent researchers are credited for responsible disclosuresRemoval of an 'unsafe startup' guard indicates the prior development snapshot was considered unsafe and this release is meant to be safe to run
01384e93by Fabrice Drouin+14−268 files
Vendor flagged security relevance
High 82 AI analysisMessage 81 · Strong
AQ ACINQEclair BitcoinLightning Network

Check remote previous txOut against the blockchain (#3411)

This commit fixes a security bug in Eclair's taproot channel splicing. When two users splice a Lightning channel, one side can describe its bitcoin inputs by sending only a small summary (the txOut) instead of the full previous transaction…

Missing cryptographic/chain validation of peer-supplied transaction dataTaproot signature commits to spent outputs, making a signed-but-unconfirmable splice possiblePotential HTLC theft via old commitment publication after splice timeout
ae0927edby pm47+111−43 files
Vendor flagged security relevance
High 78 AI analysisMessage 86 · Strong
AQ ACINQEclair BitcoinLightning Network

Reject onion per-hop lengths that overflow an `Int` (#3408)

This fix closes a denial-of-service bug in Eclair's Lightning onion routing. A remote sender could craft a malformed per-hop payload length that, when converted from a large number to a normal integer, wrapped around to a negative or tiny …

Integer overflow / truncation from Long to IntNegative length bypasses upper-bound checkException escapes Try block causing DoS
40279a1bby pm47+20−32 files
Vendor flagged security relevance
Informational 15 AI analysisMessage 36 · Opaque
AQ ACINQEclair BitcoinLightning Network

Back to dev (#3405)

This commit is a routine post-release housekeeping change. It bumps the project version from 0.14.4 to 0.15.0-SNAPSHOT, removes the published checksums for the 0.14.4 release, and adds a placeholder release-notes file for the next version.…

No security-relevant code changesAdded explicit unsafe-startup guard to prevent accidental use of development snapshotNo references to CVEs, advisories, or security issues in commit message or diff
c4910b7bby Fabrice Drouin+73−108 files
No security note in commit
High 84 AI analysisMessage 53 · Thin
AQ ACINQEclair BitcoinLightning Network

Eclair v0.14.4 release (#3403)

This commit is the official release marker for Eclair v0.14.4. The release notes included in the commit describe it as a security-hardening patch release with fixes for multiple issues, some of which can be exploited by malicious nodes. Th…

Release notes explicitly label the release as containing 'security hardening fixes' exploitable by malicious nodesHTTP API now rejects Origin-header requests to mitigate browser-based CSRF against basic-authenticated endpointsSeed file length validation added (commit a07fff5)
e1c212c4by Fabrice Drouin+90−8210 files
Vendor flagged security relevance
High 82 AI analysisMessage 93 · Strong
AQ ACINQEclair BitcoinLightning Network

Retry publishing txs evicted by unconfirmed conflicts (#3397)

This commit fixes a security bug in the Eclair Lightning node where a malicious peer could trick the node into permanently giving up on publishing its own commitment or penalty transactions. By publishing and then double-spending a conflic…

The commit message explicitly describes theft risk: "This lets them steal HTLCs by publishing their commitment later"Attack vector involves a malicious peer withholding tx_signatures and double-spending a splice inputFix changes abandonment logic for local commit anchor preconditions
21f1bc8dby pm47+100−254 files
Vendor flagged security relevance
Moderate 66 AI analysisMessage 93 · Strong
AQ ACINQEclair BitcoinLightning Network

Keep unsigned settlements when rejecting commands (#3401)

This commit fixes a bug in Eclair, a Bitcoin Lightning Network node implementation. When the node received a duplicate command to settle a payment (fulfill or fail), it would mistakenly delete the still-pending settlement from its database…

Loss of pending HTLC settlement state on disconnect/reconnectUpstream HTLC timeout risk for relayed fulfilled downstream HTLCsDuplicate/conflicting command handling caused premature DB acknowledgement
7686dfadby pm47+38−32 files
Vendor flagged security relevance
Moderate 66 AI analysisMessage 81 · Strong
AQ ACINQEclair BitcoinLightning Network

Force-close again when a splice RBF sibling confirms (#3400)

This commit fixes a bug in Eclair, a Bitcoin Lightning Network node implementation. When one node force-closed a channel because its peer never finished signing a 'splice' (a way to resize a Lightning channel on-chain), and the peer later …

Funds-locking bug in channel close logicHTLCs not enforced on-chain after confirmed double-spendIncorrect re-force-close trigger condition
9a1ecc99by pm47+59−72 files
Vendor flagged security relevance
Critical 89 AI analysisMessage 78 · Adequate
AQ ACINQEclair BitcoinLightning Network

Reject unpublishable splices (#3396)

This commit fixes a set of vulnerabilities in Eclair's Lightning channel splicing protocol that could let a malicious peer trick the victim into signing a splice transaction that can never be published on the Bitcoin network. Because the v…

Commit title and message explicitly describe preventing a malicious peer from making us sign an unpublishable splice transactionAdds validation of absolute lockTime against current block height to prevent indefinite publication delayAdds rejection of BIP 68 relative lock time on all interactive-tx inputs, including shared splice input
af994180by pm47+235−35 files
Vendor flagged security relevance
High 74 AI analysisMessage 81 · Strong
AQ ACINQEclair BitcoinLightning Network

Reject onion per-hop lengths exceeding packet (#3395)

This commit fixes a bug in how Eclair processes encrypted routing instructions (onion packets) for Lightning payments. A malicious sender could craft a packet that claimed its inner payload was longer than the packet itself. The old code e…

Unchecked length field from attacker-controlled onion packet used for slicingException thrown outside Try block, bypassing expected error handlingRelayer crash could leave HTLC un-failed
d3a146a0by pm47+16−22 files
Vendor flagged security relevance
Moderate 53 AI analysisMessage 98 · Strong
AQ ACINQEclair BitcoinLightning Network

Remove `spendfromchanneladdress` nonce after one sig (#3392)

This commit fixes a cryptographic safety issue in a manual Bitcoin/Lightning recovery tool. When a user runs the `spendfromchanneladdress` operation, the code was re-reading a secret signing nonce from a stored map after using it once. Non…

nonce reuse prevention in Schnorr-like/MuSig2 partial signature flowprivate nonce removed from in-memory store after single usemanual recovery command affected, not hot path
c89af115by pm47+1−11 file
Vendor flagged security relevance
Moderate 66 AI analysisMessage 88 · Strong
AQ ACINQEclair BitcoinLightning Network

Reject seed files with an invalid length (#3389)

This patch fixes a bug in the Eclair Bitcoin Lightning node where, if the node crashed while creating its secret seed file, it could leave an empty file behind. On the next restart, Eclair would silently use that empty seed to generate all…

Use of weak/predictable cryptographic seed for key derivationMissing input validation on security-critical seed fileNon-atomic file write creating corrupt/empty secret material
a07fff56by pm47+31−12 files
Vendor flagged security relevance
Low 25 AI analysisMessage 81 · Strong
AQ ACINQEclair BitcoinLightning Network

Upgrade postgresql client from 42.7.11 to 42.7.12 (#3330)

This commit updates the PostgreSQL database driver used by Eclair from version 42.7.11 to 42.7.12. It is a routine dependency bump by an automated tool. The commit itself does not say what bugs the new driver fixes, but small point-release…

Dependency version bump of a database driverPoint-release upgrade may include upstream security fixes, but none are named in the commitNo application code changes or direct vulnerability evidence in the diff
972dfe99by dependabot[bot]+3−12 files
No security note in commit
Low 31 AI analysisMessage 58 · Thin
AQ ACINQEclair BitcoinLightning Network

Use bitcoin-kmp 0.49 (depends on bitcoin-kmp 0.32.0 and secp256k1-kmp 0.24.0) (#3362)

This commit updates Eclair's Bitcoin library dependency from version 0.48 to 0.49, which internally uses newer versions of bitcoin-kmp and secp256k1-kmp. The code changes only replace old property accesses (like `.txid`) with new method ca…

Dependency version bump for Bitcoin and secp256k1 cryptographic librariesSource changes are API adaptations (.txid -> .getTxid), not logic changesSecurity-critical validation code is touched (PSBT/transaction integrity checks against malicious Bitcoin Core)
6162e2aaby Fabrice Drouin+22−44 files
No security note in commit
Informational 15 AI analysisMessage 86 · Strong
AQ ACINQEclair BitcoinLightning Network

Update build to improve release process (#3381)

This commit is a routine build-system update. It upgrades several Maven plugin versions, removes the git commit ID from one jar manifest field to avoid a build-time circular dependency, and adds an optional build profile for a fuzz-testing…

c3e9f5d6by Fabrice Drouin+834−105 files
No security note in commit
Repository ledger

Explore captured commits

Expand any commit for its author, full message, clarity score, changed files, triage signals, analysis, and source link.

Security candidateUpdate `bitcoin-lib` (#3213)by Bastien Teinturier · df75ed5a · Nov 12, 2025 · 2 filesMessage 43 · ThinInformational 12Details
Commit message · Bastien Teinturier

Update `bitcoin-lib` (#3213)

To add support for P2A PSBTs.

43/100 · ThinMessage clarity
✓ Descriptive subject✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference! No meaningful explanatory body
Why it was queued
signing boundarycryptography-sensitive path
AI analysis · Informational 12/100

This is a routine dependency update for Eclair, a Bitcoin Lightning node. It bumps the internal 'bitcoin-lib' library from version 0.45 to 0.45.1 and its related 'bitcoin-kmp-jvm' component from 0.28.0 to 0.28.1. The commit message says the purpose is to add support for 'P2A PSBTs' (a new Bitcoin transaction format feature). The change only updates version numbers and recorded checksums; no application code is modified in this commit. There is no mention of a security fix, bug, or vulnerability.

Security candidateUse 73 bytes der-encoded signatures in weight estimation (#3210)by Bastien Teinturier · bfe34ab1 · Nov 5, 2025 · 2 filesMessage 100 · StrongLow 35Details
Commit message · Bastien Teinturier

Use 73 bytes der-encoded signatures in weight estimation (#3210)

While 73 bytes der-encoded signatures aren't standard (they're only
possible with high-S signatures), miners could accept such signatures.

Most of our tests use 72 bytes der-encoded signatures because we will
never generate 73 bytes der-encoded signatures ourselves. But it's more
safe to use a 73 bytes signature in our weight estimation because:

- it's what the BOLTs recommend
- it's what other implementations use (e.g. LDK) which means they may
reject our interactive-tx attempts by thinking we're under-paying
fees

100/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Explains rationale or failure mode✓ Mentions testing or verification✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference✓ Names security-relevant behavior explicitly
Why it was queued
signing boundarysigning or wallet path
AI analysis · Low 35/100

This commit adjusts how Eclair estimates the 'weight' (a measure of transaction size used to calculate Bitcoin mining fees) for funding inputs in Lightning channel transactions. It increases the assumed signature size from 72 to 73 bytes, matching what the Lightning specification recommends and what other implementations like LDK use. The change is defensive: it helps prevent Eclair's interactive transaction proposals from being rejected by peers who think Eclair is under-paying fees, and it avoids edge cases where miners might accept a slightly larger signature than Eclair accounted for.

Security candidateAllow aborting liquidity purchases after signing (#3206)by Bastien Teinturier · 5e1a4882 · Nov 5, 2025 · 6 filesMessage 81 · StrongLow 47Details
Commit message · Bastien Teinturier

Allow aborting liquidity purchases after signing (#3206)

When a liquidity purchase is signed, we eagerly add it to our DB before
receiving the remote `interactive-tx` signatures. If we reach that step,
our peer should always finalize the signing steps, so we didn't bother
handling the case where they would instead send `tx_abort`. When that
happened, we kept the upstream HTLCs pending until they got close to
their expiry, at which point we failed them.

We've seen cases where seemingly non-malicious mobile wallets abort
that kind of liquidity purchases after a disconnection. It is harmful
for an honest sender to keep the HTLCs pending, so we now immediately
fail them in that case.

81/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference
Why it was queued
signing boundarysigning or wallet path
AI analysis · Low 47/100

This commit fixes a bug in Eclair, a Bitcoin Lightning Network node implementation. When a user tried to buy extra spending capacity (a 'liquidity purchase') and the remote peer backed out after the local node had already signed, Eclair kept the related incoming payments stuck in limbo until they nearly expired. The patch makes Eclair immediately fail those stuck payments when the peer aborts, which is fairer to honest senders and avoids unnecessary delays. It is a correctness/availability improvement rather than a direct theft-of-funds vulnerability.

Security candidateNits (#3203)by pm47 · 7ef3c4b2 · Oct 31, 2025 · 5 filesMessage 26 · OpaqueInformational 15Details
Commit message · pm47

Nits (#3203)

26/100 · OpaqueMessage clarity
✓ Subject identifies a change✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference! Too few words to establish purpose! No meaningful explanatory body! Opaque security-relevant change
Why it was queued
cryptography-sensitive pathparser or protocol path
AI analysis · Informational 15/100

This commit is a small cleanup pull request titled 'Nits'. It fixes a typo in documentation, corrects a log message to show the right commitment format name, changes a debug log to info level for transaction signing, adds structured logging context for authenticated peer connections, and removes an outdated ASCII diagram comment. None of these changes affect security.

Security candidateRemove support for non-anchor channels (#3173)by Bastien Teinturier · 9911cb73 · Oct 27, 2025 · 86 filesMessage 98 · StrongLow 34Details
Commit message · Bastien Teinturier

Remove support for non-anchor channels (#3173)

We remove support for `static_remotekey` channels and `default`
channels, as advertised in the v0.13 release. This lets us remove
some code related to feerate management and simplifies the test
matrix.

Node operators that still have such channels must not run this
version of `eclair`, which will otherwise fail to start.

Note that for now, we keep sending `update_fee` whenever necessary.
We could remove that now that package relay allows 1p1c packages to
propagate even when the parent is below the mempool minimum feerate,
but we defer that to a later PR for simplicity.

98/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Explains rationale or failure mode✓ Mentions testing or verification✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference
Why it was queued
cryptography-sensitive pathsigning or wallet pathauthentication pathparser or protocol path
AI analysis · Low 34/100

This commit removes support for older Lightning channel types ('static_remotekey' and 'default' channels) from the Eclair node software. It is a deliberate feature-removal change announced in the previous release. The main risk is operational: node operators who still have legacy channels and upgrade to this version will find Eclair fails to start, potentially leaving them unable to manage funds until those channels are closed with an older version. The patch also simplifies fee-rate handling because anchor-style channels handle fees differently, and it removes wallet-public-key caching code that was only needed for the obsolete channel types.

Security candidateConfigure bitcoind test instances to use bech32m addresses (#3195)by Bastien Teinturier · 9771b2d8 · Oct 24, 2025 · 7 filesMessage 100 · StrongLow 34Details
Commit message · Bastien Teinturier

Configure bitcoind test instances to use bech32m addresses (#3195)

When addres type or change type is not specified, bitcoind will
now start with addresstype=bech32m and changetype=bech32m.

We take this opportunity to fix feerate tests that failed because
of the following reasons:

- first of all, we had a bug where we didn't take into account the
anchor amount in our fee calculation, so we ended up always adding
`330 sats` to the on-chain fees we paid, which was hidden by our
tolerance interval, but started appearing with smaller p2tr inputs
- then we fix the remaining tests that need manual tweaking of the
utxos available in the test wallet, because they end up creating
transactions where we don't have a change output (and overpay fees
slightly, but not enough to make it worth adding a change output),
these tests simply needed to be tweaked to accomodate p2tr weights

Co-authored by @sstone

100/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Explains rationale or failure mode✓ Mentions testing or verification✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference
Why it was queued
signing boundary
AI analysis · Low 34/100

This commit updates Eclair's Bitcoin Core integration to use taproot (bech32m) addresses by default and fixes a fee-calculation bug where the anchor output amount was not being counted. The fee bug caused on-chain fees to be undercounted by 330 satoshis, which was previously hidden by test tolerances but surfaced when switching to smaller taproot inputs. The fix is in the ReplaceableTxFunder component, which funds transactions for force-closing Lightning channels. There is no evidence this was a remotely exploitable vulnerability; it is best characterized as a correctness/robustness fix that could lead to slightly overpaying on-chain fees.

Security candidateUpdate `bitcoin-lib` (#3193)by Bastien Teinturier · 7372a877 · Oct 24, 2025 · 2 filesMessage 58 · ThinInformational 22Details
Commit message · Bastien Teinturier

Update `bitcoin-lib` (#3193)

We update `bitcoin-lib` to v0.45, which changes our JNI bindings for
`secp256k1` and adds support for P2A outputs.

58/100 · ThinMessage clarity
✓ Descriptive subject✓ Provides an explanatory body✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference
Why it was queued
cryptography-sensitive path
AI analysis · Informational 22/100

This commit simply bumps the project's `bitcoin-lib` dependency from version 0.44 to 0.45 and updates the corresponding cryptographic library checksums. The commit message says the new version changes how the app binds to the secp256k1 library and adds support for a new Bitcoin output type called P2A. There is no code change in this repository itself, and no security fix or vulnerability is mentioned.

Security candidateUse bitcoin-lib 0.44 (#3185)by Fabrice Drouin · 32082666 · Oct 13, 2025 · 2 filesMessage 53 · ThinLow 36Details
Commit message · Fabrice Drouin

Use bitcoin-lib 0.44 (#3185)

53/100 · ThinMessage clarity
✓ Descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference! No meaningful explanatory body
Why it was queued
cryptography-sensitive path
AI analysis · Low 36/100

This commit simply updates the project's dependency on ACINQ's bitcoin-lib library from version 0.43.2 to 0.44, along with matching updates to related cryptographic libraries (secp256k1-kmp) and their checksums. The change itself is a routine version bump in the build file. There is no direct code change shown, and the commit message does not say this is a security fix. Because we have no release notes or changelog for bitcoin-lib 0.44, we cannot tell from this diff alone whether the new version fixes a security issue or introduces one. It is a dependency change that could affect how the Lightning node handles Bitcoin transactions and signatures, so it deserves review, but the diff does not prove any vulnerability.

Security candidateAdd `DATA_CLOSED` class when active channel is closed (#3170)by Bastien Teinturier · 16a309e4 · Sep 30, 2025 · 26 filesMessage 81 · StrongLow 29Details
Commit message · Bastien Teinturier

Add `DATA_CLOSED` class when active channel is closed (#3170)

We introduce a `DATA_CLOSED` class with minimal information about a
past channel that has been fully closed. This will let us deprecate
legacy channels without having backwards-compatibility issues with
very old closed channels inside our DB.

When channels have never been properly opened or used, we don't
bother storing them in our DB, as it would open the door to DoS
attacks.

We create a dedicated table to store `DATA_CLOSED`. We migrate the
existing DB and remove the foreign key constraint on `htlc_infos`.

81/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference
Why it was queued
explicit security languagesigning or wallet path
AI analysis · Low 29/100

This commit refactors how Eclair stores closed Lightning channels. Instead of keeping all closed channel data in the same table as active channels, it moves them to a dedicated table with only essential summary information. The main stated security benefit is preventing denial-of-service (DoS) attacks by not storing channels that were never properly opened or used. It also removes a database foreign-key constraint and changes the API response format for closed channels. The commit is primarily a data-model and migration change, not a fix for an active vulnerability.

Security candidateUpdate `bitcoin-lib` (#3179)by Bastien Teinturier · 2b39bf62 · Sep 30, 2025 · 20 filesMessage 58 · ThinLow 35Details
Commit message · Bastien Teinturier

Update `bitcoin-lib` (#3179)

And simplify musig2 nonce using Scala classes.

58/100 · ThinMessage clarity
✓ Descriptive subject✓ Provides an explanatory body✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference
Why it was queued
nonce handlingcryptography-sensitive pathsigning or wallet pathparser or protocol path
AI analysis · Low 35/100

This commit updates Eclair's underlying bitcoin-lib dependency from version 0.41 to 0.43.2 and adjusts Eclair's code to match the new library's API. The changes are mostly mechanical: switching how Musig2 nonces and Taproot script trees are represented, removing Kotlin-to-Scala conversion helpers, and updating Maven checksums. There is no explicit mention of a security fix in the commit message or diff, and no independent security advisory was supplied. The update could include upstream security fixes, but that is speculation based on the version bump, not direct evidence in this commit.

Security candidateKill the connection if a peer sends multiple ping requests in parallel (#3172)by pm47 · 08a1fc66 · Sep 19, 2025 · 2 filesMessage 81 · StrongModerate 64Details
Commit message · pm47

Kill the connection if a peer sends multiple ping requests in parallel (#3172)

We keep track of the number of pings that we have not yet sent a pong for. If there is more than 1, our peer is malicious and we close the connection.

81/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference
Why it was queued
cryptography-sensitive path
AI analysis · Moderate 64/100

This update makes Eclair disconnect a Lightning peer if it sends more than one ping message before getting a reply. The goal is to stop a 'ping flood' attack, where a malicious peer could overwhelm the node with many ping requests and possibly cause it to run out of memory or become unresponsive. The change is defensive and includes a test showing the connection is closed when two pings arrive back-to-back.

Security candidateCorrectly fill PSBT for taproot `interactive-tx` (#3169)by Bastien Teinturier · 76f8d53a · Sep 17, 2025 · 14 filesMessage 100 · StrongModerate 60Details
Commit message · Bastien Teinturier

Correctly fill PSBT for taproot `interactive-tx` (#3169)

When using tapoot for our inputs, our signatures will cover *all* inputs
of the transaction, even those that don't belong to us. If our peer adds
inputs, we must thus fill them in the PSBT we create, otherwise signing
will fail.

This was the reason why we were previously sharing the same dummy wallet
between Alice and Bob in our unit tests, otherwise we were seeing that
kind of failures in unit tests, but we never figured out why before.

Now that this is fixed, we can improve the unit tests by having separate
wallets for Alice and Bob, and remove the unused `NoOpOnChainWallet`.

100/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Explains rationale or failure mode✓ Mentions testing or verification✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference
Why it was queued
signing boundarycryptography-sensitive pathsigning or wallet path
AI analysis · Moderate 60/100

This commit fixes a bug in Eclair's dual-funded Lightning channel logic. When opening or splicing a channel using taproot (P2TR) inputs, each participant's wallet needs full details about every input in the transaction, not just its own. Previously, the PSBT (a data structure used to pass transaction signing information to the wallet) only included the shared splice input, but omitted the other peer's inputs. That caused the local wallet to fail when signing taproot inputs, because it couldn't compute the signature that covers all inputs. The fix adds all remote inputs to the PSBT before signing. The rest of the diff is mostly test cleanup: separate wallets for Alice and Bob and removal of an unused test helper.

Security candidateAdd high-S signature Bolt 11 test vector (#3163)by Bastien Teinturier · e8ec1489 · Sep 10, 2025 · 1 fileMessage 91 · StrongInformational 12Details
Commit message · Bastien Teinturier

Add high-S signature Bolt 11 test vector (#3163)

We must accept both high-S and low-S signatures in Bolt 11 invoices
when performing public key recovery (which matches secp256k1's
behavior).

See https://github.com/lightning/bolts/pull/1284

91/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Mentions testing or verification✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference✓ Names security-relevant behavior explicitly
Why it was queued
signing boundaryfuzzing or regression evidence
AI analysis · Informational 12/100

This commit only adds a new test case to Eclair's invoice parsing tests. It checks that a specific Bitcoin Lightning invoice with a non-standard 'high-S' signature can still be decoded and that the sender's public key is recovered correctly. There is no code change to the actual invoice handling logic.

Security candidateAllow omitting `previousTx` for taproot splices (#3143)by Bastien Teinturier · 0e0da422 · Aug 25, 2025 · 5 filesMessage 86 · StrongLow 28Details
Commit message · Bastien Teinturier

Allow omitting `previousTx` for taproot splices (#3143)

When splicing a taproot channel, both participants will provide a
signature for a segwit v1 input: this signature will cover every
spent `txOut`, including their amount and script. This ensures
that attackers cannot reuse a signature while replacing a segwit
input with a non-segwit input, which could be used to steal funds.

A side-effect of this change in signature behavior is that we don't
need to provide the entire previous transaction when both channel
participants sign a taproot input. For simplicity, we only allow
this simplification when splicing taproot channels for now. We can
also allow channel creation based on swap-in-potentiam, which also
uses musig2 and has the same non-malleability guarantee (on feature
branches for phoenix users).

86/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference✓ Names security-relevant behavior explicitly
Why it was queued
explicit security languagesigning boundaryparser or protocol path
AI analysis · Low 28/100

This commit changes how Eclair handles taproot channel splicing. Normally, when two parties build a shared Bitcoin transaction together, each must send the full previous transaction that created the coins being spent. For taproot channels, the commit allows sending only the relevant output details instead, because taproot signatures already protect against a specific malleability trick. The change is framed as a bandwidth optimization and is restricted to taproot splicing to preserve security guarantees.

Security candidateSimple taproot channels (#3103)by Fabrice Drouin · d8ce91b4 · Aug 19, 2025 · 51 filesMessage 71 · AdequateLow 32Details
Commit message · Fabrice Drouin

Simple taproot channels (#3103)

Implement simple taproot channels

We add new commitment formats and TLV extensions to include musig2 nonces. This includes a specific commitment format for phoenix
taproot channels.

The old v1 channel establishment protocol is updated to include nonces and partial signatures.

The v2 channel estalishment protocol, based on the interactive tx constuction protocol, is also updated, and the
interactive tx session now includes:
- an optional funding nonce for the shared input (i.e. the funding tx that is being spent)
- a nonce for the commit tx that is being created, and another nonce that will become the channel's "next remote nonce" once the session completes
The funding nonce is random and its lifecycle is bound to the interactive session.

Side note: the new v2 protocol is both simpler to extend and gives us support for dual-funding and splices.

Since there can be several different commitment transactions that valid at the same time while splices are pending, revoke_and_ack
and channel_restablish are extended to include a list of funding_tx_id -> nonce tuples (one for each active commitment).

channel_restablish also includes as an optional "current commit nonce": if we got disconnected while a splice was in progress
before both nodes exchanged their commit signatures: if that is the case, we need to re-send our peer's current signature
and will use this nonce to compute it.

We also update the simple close protocol to include closing nonces.

We allow upgrading channels to taproot during splices, with an optional channel_type TLV added to splice_init/splice_ack.
This is not part of the BOLT proposal, and upgrading is currently limited to phoenix taproot channels from phoenix anchor channels.

71/100 · AdequateMessage clarity
✓ Descriptive subject✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference✓ Names security-relevant behavior explicitly
Why it was queued
signing boundarynonce handlingcryptography-sensitive pathsigning or wallet pathparser or protocol path
AI analysis · Low 32/100

This is a large feature commit that adds support for a new kind of Bitcoin Lightning channel using Taproot and MuSig2 signatures. It changes how channels are opened, spliced, re-established after disconnections, and closed. The commit is primarily a protocol upgrade, not a stated security fix. However, because it touches sensitive signing logic and introduces new nonce handling, there is a moderate risk that mistakes in the new code could affect channel safety or allow a malicious peer to cause problems. The commit message does not describe this as fixing a known vulnerability.

Security candidateExtract `CommitParams` to individual commitments (#3118)by Bastien Teinturier · 49bee72f · Aug 19, 2025 · 73 filesMessage 93 · StrongLow 35Details
Commit message · Bastien Teinturier

Extract `CommitParams` to individual commitments (#3118)

We introduce a new channel codec version where:

- we extract per-commitment parameters (commitment format and params
such as `dust_limit` which we may want to dynamically update in the
future)
- we clean-up the splice iterations on the `Commitments` structure
- we remove the funding transaction from the confirmed local funding
status (once confirmed, we don't need it anymore: it is wasting DB
space for no good reason, we can get it from the blockchain)
- we add a `maxClosingFeerate_opt` to the closing state, to allow
limiting the feerate used in RBF attempts for safe transactions
- we add the commitment format to interactive-tx parameters
- we make channel type feature non permanent

We add a mechanism to prevent the node from starting-up, unless an
override is provided. This provides an opportunity to iterate on codecs
while knowing that node operators won't be affected if we make changes
that are backwards-incompatible. This is meant to be temporary.

93/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Explains rationale or failure mode✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference
Why it was queued
cryptography-sensitive pathsigning or wallet path
AI analysis · Low 35/100

This is a large internal refactoring of Eclair's Lightning channel data structures. It moves commitment-specific settings (such as dust limits and HTLC limits) from the overall channel parameters into each individual commitment, so future splices can change them. It also removes the full confirmed funding transaction from the local database record, adds a cap on closing fee rates for RBF attempts, and introduces a startup-blocking guard when the database serialization format changes. The commit is not described by the vendor as a security fix; it is a forward-looking infrastructure change with some safety mechanisms.