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Eclair

Scala implementation of a Lightning Network node.

BitcoinLightning NetworkNormal
Repository coverage

231 commits in the local evidence base

Every captured commit receives deterministic security triage and a separate communication-quality score. Security candidates and broader second-pass signals receive full-patch Ollama analysis.

66security candidates48second-pass queue208AI analyses
4commits · 30 days
26commits · 60 days
80commits · 180 days
161commits · 365 days
Backfill bands
Aug 5 → Feb 691 seen11 candidatesComplete
Feb 6 → Jun 660 seen5 candidatesComplete
Jun 6 → Jul 62 seen0 candidatesComplete
Jul 6 → Aug 514 seen0 candidatesComplete
Commit communication

Does the history explain itself?

Message quality measures whether a commit identifies its scope, purpose, rationale, testing, and supporting references. It does not change the security-severity score.

78/100 average clarity
143Strong · 80–100
54Adequate · 60–79
23Thin · 40–59
11Opaque · 0–39
3security candidates with opaque commit messaging
Read the scoring rubric →
Developer activity

Who is changing the project?

Public Git author strings; identities are not independently verified.

DeveloperCommitsCandidatesAnalyzedHigh riskMessage avg.
pm47451633876
Bastien Teinturier13332127581
Fabrice Drouin291424269
Thomas HUET16116075
rorp313069
Nishant Bansal212084
dependabot[bot]111081
ekzyis101058
Rusty Russell101081
Analysis record

Published AI watches

Last scanned 35 minutes ago

Informational 15 AI analysisMessage 36 · Opaque
AQ ACINQEclair BitcoinLightning Network

Back to dev (#3424)

This commit is a routine post-release housekeeping change. It bumps the software version from 0.14.6 to 0.15.0-SNAPSHOT across several build files, adds a blank release-notes template for the next version, and intentionally adds a startup …

Startup guard added to block accidental execution of development snapshotNo vulnerability fix, cryptographic change, or trust-boundary modification present
c96c3d44by Fabrice Drouin+73−57 files
No security note in commit
High 74 AI analysisMessage 53 · Thin
AQ ACINQEclair BitcoinLightning Network

Eclair v0.14.6 release (#3420)

This commit is the release packaging for Eclair v0.14.6. The release notes explicitly state it contains 'security hardening fixes' that can be exploited by malicious nodes, and thank a researcher for responsible disclosure. The actual code…

Vendor release notes explicitly label the release as containing 'security hardening fixes' exploitable by malicious nodesNew default-on configuration `require-confirmed-inputs-for-splicing` mitigates unconfirmed-input double-spend risk during splicingRelease notes credit @erickcestari for responsible disclosures
50e046efby Fabrice Drouin+28−198 files
Vendor flagged security relevance
High 72 AI analysisMessage 88 · Strong
AQ ACINQEclair BitcoinLightning Network

Splicing robustness improvements (#3417)

This commit hardens Eclair's Lightning channel 'splicing' feature against a malicious peer. Splicing lets users resize a channel by creating a new funding transaction. The patch fixes several ways an attacker could exploit unconfirmed spli…

New default-on configuration `require-confirmed-inputs-for-splicing` to prevent double-spend of unconfirmed splice inputsLimit on remote splice inputs/outputs (10) to bound CPFP costForce-close now selects a commitment whose funding tx is known to bitcoind, re-evaluated per block and splice spend events
c07cc745by pm47+518−6011 files
Vendor flagged security relevance
Moderate 64 AI analysisMessage 81 · Strong
AQ ACINQEclair BitcoinLightning Network

Flag peers that leave liquidity fees unpaid (#3416)

This commit fixes a security gap in Eclair's Lightning node software. A peer could repeatedly get free channel funding ('liquidity') by backing out of payments meant to cover the fees right before the funding transaction was signed. Previo…

Fixes a logic flaw allowing repeated unpaid liquidity feesAdds peer suspicion flagging tied to funding txidExpands state handling for asynchronous LiquidityPurchaseAborted events
c5b9afc0by pm47+192−154 files
Vendor flagged security relevance
Informational 15 AI analysisMessage 36 · Opaque
AQ ACINQEclair BitcoinLightning Network

Back to dev (#3413)

This commit is a routine post-release housekeeping change. It bumps the project version from 0.14.5 to 0.15.0-SNAPSHOT, removes published release checksums, and adds a blank release-notes template. It also adds a startup guard that refuses…

No vulnerability signals presentStartup guard added to block accidental use of development snapshot
06716fceby Fabrice Drouin+73−108 files
No security note in commit
Moderate 67 AI analysisMessage 53 · Thin
AQ ACINQEclair BitcoinLightning Network

Eclair v0.14.5 release (#3412)

This commit is the release packaging for Eclair v0.14.5. The release notes state it is a patch release containing 'security hardening fixes' that can be exploited by malicious nodes, and thank two people for responsible disclosures. The ac…

Release notes explicitly describe 'security hardening fixes' and warn that 'some of these issues can be exploited by malicious nodes'Two independent researchers are credited for responsible disclosuresRemoval of an 'unsafe startup' guard indicates the prior development snapshot was considered unsafe and this release is meant to be safe to run
01384e93by Fabrice Drouin+14−268 files
Vendor flagged security relevance
High 82 AI analysisMessage 81 · Strong
AQ ACINQEclair BitcoinLightning Network

Check remote previous txOut against the blockchain (#3411)

This commit fixes a security bug in Eclair's taproot channel splicing. When two users splice a Lightning channel, one side can describe its bitcoin inputs by sending only a small summary (the txOut) instead of the full previous transaction…

Missing cryptographic/chain validation of peer-supplied transaction dataTaproot signature commits to spent outputs, making a signed-but-unconfirmable splice possiblePotential HTLC theft via old commitment publication after splice timeout
ae0927edby pm47+111−43 files
Vendor flagged security relevance
High 78 AI analysisMessage 86 · Strong
AQ ACINQEclair BitcoinLightning Network

Reject onion per-hop lengths that overflow an `Int` (#3408)

This fix closes a denial-of-service bug in Eclair's Lightning onion routing. A remote sender could craft a malformed per-hop payload length that, when converted from a large number to a normal integer, wrapped around to a negative or tiny …

Integer overflow / truncation from Long to IntNegative length bypasses upper-bound checkException escapes Try block causing DoS
40279a1bby pm47+20−32 files
Vendor flagged security relevance
Informational 15 AI analysisMessage 36 · Opaque
AQ ACINQEclair BitcoinLightning Network

Back to dev (#3405)

This commit is a routine post-release housekeeping change. It bumps the project version from 0.14.4 to 0.15.0-SNAPSHOT, removes the published checksums for the 0.14.4 release, and adds a placeholder release-notes file for the next version.…

No security-relevant code changesAdded explicit unsafe-startup guard to prevent accidental use of development snapshotNo references to CVEs, advisories, or security issues in commit message or diff
c4910b7bby Fabrice Drouin+73−108 files
No security note in commit
High 84 AI analysisMessage 53 · Thin
AQ ACINQEclair BitcoinLightning Network

Eclair v0.14.4 release (#3403)

This commit is the official release marker for Eclair v0.14.4. The release notes included in the commit describe it as a security-hardening patch release with fixes for multiple issues, some of which can be exploited by malicious nodes. Th…

Release notes explicitly label the release as containing 'security hardening fixes' exploitable by malicious nodesHTTP API now rejects Origin-header requests to mitigate browser-based CSRF against basic-authenticated endpointsSeed file length validation added (commit a07fff5)
e1c212c4by Fabrice Drouin+90−8210 files
Vendor flagged security relevance
High 82 AI analysisMessage 93 · Strong
AQ ACINQEclair BitcoinLightning Network

Retry publishing txs evicted by unconfirmed conflicts (#3397)

This commit fixes a security bug in the Eclair Lightning node where a malicious peer could trick the node into permanently giving up on publishing its own commitment or penalty transactions. By publishing and then double-spending a conflic…

The commit message explicitly describes theft risk: "This lets them steal HTLCs by publishing their commitment later"Attack vector involves a malicious peer withholding tx_signatures and double-spending a splice inputFix changes abandonment logic for local commit anchor preconditions
21f1bc8dby pm47+100−254 files
Vendor flagged security relevance
Moderate 66 AI analysisMessage 93 · Strong
AQ ACINQEclair BitcoinLightning Network

Keep unsigned settlements when rejecting commands (#3401)

This commit fixes a bug in Eclair, a Bitcoin Lightning Network node implementation. When the node received a duplicate command to settle a payment (fulfill or fail), it would mistakenly delete the still-pending settlement from its database…

Loss of pending HTLC settlement state on disconnect/reconnectUpstream HTLC timeout risk for relayed fulfilled downstream HTLCsDuplicate/conflicting command handling caused premature DB acknowledgement
7686dfadby pm47+38−32 files
Vendor flagged security relevance
Moderate 66 AI analysisMessage 81 · Strong
AQ ACINQEclair BitcoinLightning Network

Force-close again when a splice RBF sibling confirms (#3400)

This commit fixes a bug in Eclair, a Bitcoin Lightning Network node implementation. When one node force-closed a channel because its peer never finished signing a 'splice' (a way to resize a Lightning channel on-chain), and the peer later …

Funds-locking bug in channel close logicHTLCs not enforced on-chain after confirmed double-spendIncorrect re-force-close trigger condition
9a1ecc99by pm47+59−72 files
Vendor flagged security relevance
Critical 89 AI analysisMessage 78 · Adequate
AQ ACINQEclair BitcoinLightning Network

Reject unpublishable splices (#3396)

This commit fixes a set of vulnerabilities in Eclair's Lightning channel splicing protocol that could let a malicious peer trick the victim into signing a splice transaction that can never be published on the Bitcoin network. Because the v…

Commit title and message explicitly describe preventing a malicious peer from making us sign an unpublishable splice transactionAdds validation of absolute lockTime against current block height to prevent indefinite publication delayAdds rejection of BIP 68 relative lock time on all interactive-tx inputs, including shared splice input
af994180by pm47+235−35 files
Vendor flagged security relevance
High 74 AI analysisMessage 81 · Strong
AQ ACINQEclair BitcoinLightning Network

Reject onion per-hop lengths exceeding packet (#3395)

This commit fixes a bug in how Eclair processes encrypted routing instructions (onion packets) for Lightning payments. A malicious sender could craft a packet that claimed its inner payload was longer than the packet itself. The old code e…

Unchecked length field from attacker-controlled onion packet used for slicingException thrown outside Try block, bypassing expected error handlingRelayer crash could leave HTLC un-failed
d3a146a0by pm47+16−22 files
Vendor flagged security relevance
Moderate 53 AI analysisMessage 98 · Strong
AQ ACINQEclair BitcoinLightning Network

Remove `spendfromchanneladdress` nonce after one sig (#3392)

This commit fixes a cryptographic safety issue in a manual Bitcoin/Lightning recovery tool. When a user runs the `spendfromchanneladdress` operation, the code was re-reading a secret signing nonce from a stored map after using it once. Non…

nonce reuse prevention in Schnorr-like/MuSig2 partial signature flowprivate nonce removed from in-memory store after single usemanual recovery command affected, not hot path
c89af115by pm47+1−11 file
Vendor flagged security relevance
Moderate 66 AI analysisMessage 88 · Strong
AQ ACINQEclair BitcoinLightning Network

Reject seed files with an invalid length (#3389)

This patch fixes a bug in the Eclair Bitcoin Lightning node where, if the node crashed while creating its secret seed file, it could leave an empty file behind. On the next restart, Eclair would silently use that empty seed to generate all…

Use of weak/predictable cryptographic seed for key derivationMissing input validation on security-critical seed fileNon-atomic file write creating corrupt/empty secret material
a07fff56by pm47+31−12 files
Vendor flagged security relevance
Low 25 AI analysisMessage 81 · Strong
AQ ACINQEclair BitcoinLightning Network

Upgrade postgresql client from 42.7.11 to 42.7.12 (#3330)

This commit updates the PostgreSQL database driver used by Eclair from version 42.7.11 to 42.7.12. It is a routine dependency bump by an automated tool. The commit itself does not say what bugs the new driver fixes, but small point-release…

Dependency version bump of a database driverPoint-release upgrade may include upstream security fixes, but none are named in the commitNo application code changes or direct vulnerability evidence in the diff
972dfe99by dependabot[bot]+3−12 files
No security note in commit
Low 31 AI analysisMessage 58 · Thin
AQ ACINQEclair BitcoinLightning Network

Use bitcoin-kmp 0.49 (depends on bitcoin-kmp 0.32.0 and secp256k1-kmp 0.24.0) (#3362)

This commit updates Eclair's Bitcoin library dependency from version 0.48 to 0.49, which internally uses newer versions of bitcoin-kmp and secp256k1-kmp. The code changes only replace old property accesses (like `.txid`) with new method ca…

Dependency version bump for Bitcoin and secp256k1 cryptographic librariesSource changes are API adaptations (.txid -> .getTxid), not logic changesSecurity-critical validation code is touched (PSBT/transaction integrity checks against malicious Bitcoin Core)
6162e2aaby Fabrice Drouin+22−44 files
No security note in commit
Informational 15 AI analysisMessage 86 · Strong
AQ ACINQEclair BitcoinLightning Network

Update build to improve release process (#3381)

This commit is a routine build-system update. It upgrades several Maven plugin versions, removes the git commit ID from one jar manifest field to avoid a build-time circular dependency, and adds an optional build profile for a fuzz-testing…

c3e9f5d6by Fabrice Drouin+834−105 files
No security note in commit
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Lower-priorityBound feerate of remote rbf when we contribute (#3388)by pm47 · 746fcb11 · Oct 2, 2026 · 7 filesMessage 81 · StrongTriage 0Details
Commit message · pm47

Bound feerate of remote rbf when we contribute (#3388)

When our peer initiated an RBF of a dual-funded open or a splice, we kept our previous contribution and funded it from our wallet at their feerate, with no upper bound and no fee budget. A malicious peer could make us pay mining fees at an arbitrary feerate for our inputs, while contributing nothing.

We now reject such RBF attempts when their feerate is above the maximum funding feerate we recommend to our peer, unless they purchase liquidity (in which case they pay the mining fees for our inputs) or we don't contribute to the transaction.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

81/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference
Security candidateUpgrade postgresql client from 42.7.11 to 42.7.12 (#3330)by dependabot[bot] · 972dfe99 · Sep 23, 2026 · 2 filesMessage 81 · StrongLow 25Details
Commit message · dependabot[bot]

Upgrade postgresql client from 42.7.11 to 42.7.12 (#3330)

Bumps [org.postgresql:postgresql](https://github.com/pgjdbc/pgjdbc) from 42.7.11 to 42.7.12.
- [Release notes](https://github.com/pgjdbc/pgjdbc/releases)
- [Changelog](https://github.com/pgjdbc/pgjdbc/blob/master/CHANGELOG.md)
- [Commits](https://github.com/pgjdbc/pgjdbc/compare/REL42.7.11...REL42.7.12)

---

Signed-off-by: dependabot[bot] <support@github.com>
Co-authored-by: dependabot[bot] <49699333+dependabot[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: pm47 <pm.padiou@gmail.com>

81/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference
Why it was queued
cryptography-sensitive pathautomated dependency-update discount
AI analysis · Low 25/100

This commit updates the PostgreSQL database driver used by Eclair from version 42.7.11 to 42.7.12. It is a routine dependency bump by an automated tool. The commit itself does not say what bugs the new driver fixes, but small point-release driver updates often include security fixes. Without a vendor statement linking this specific upgrade to a known vulnerability, we cannot confirm it fixes a security issue, but it is prudent maintenance.

Lower-priorityFix flaky tests caused by port allocation race (#3384)by Fabrice Drouin · 259ea647 · Sep 23, 2026 · 3 filesMessage 100 · StrongTriage 0Details
Commit message · Fabrice Drouin

Fix flaky tests caused by port allocation race (#3384)

`TestUtils.availablePort` opened a `ServerSocket` on port 0, read the
port it was given and closed the socket before returning the number:
nothing was ever reserved, so the OS was free to hand the same port to
the next caller. The `synchronized` block only serialized the calls.

This is a significant source of CI flakiness: suites run in parallel and
13 of them mix in `BitcoindService`, which reserves 4 ports each (p2p,
RPC, ZMQ block, ZMQ tx) when the suite is instantiated but only binds
them later, when bitcoind starts. Whichever suite lost the race failed
with a bind error, unrelated to what it was testing.

We now remember every port we hand out, which makes duplicates within a
JVM impossible. We also allocate below the ephemeral port range: ports
in that range could otherwise be taken by one of the many outgoing
connections tests open (e.g. to bitcoind's RPC endpoint) while the port
was reserved but not yet bound.

Reproduced with 12 threads allocating 4 ports each: 17.5% of rounds
produced a duplicate port before this change, 0% after.

The ports in `integration/bitcoin.conf` are now named placeholders. The
previous chained `.replace("28333", ...)` was order-dependent and only
safe as long as the allocated ports couldn't collide with the literals
it was substituting.

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

100/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Explains rationale or failure mode✓ Mentions testing or verification✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference
Security candidateUse bitcoin-kmp 0.49 (depends on bitcoin-kmp 0.32.0 and secp256k1-kmp 0.24.0) (#3362)by Fabrice Drouin · 6162e2aa · Sep 22, 2026 · 4 filesMessage 58 · ThinLow 31Details
Commit message · Fabrice Drouin

Use bitcoin-kmp 0.49 (depends on bitcoin-kmp 0.32.0 and secp256k1-kmp 0.24.0) (#3362)

58/100 · ThinMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference! No meaningful explanatory body
Why it was queued
cryptography-sensitive path
AI analysis · Low 31/100

This commit updates Eclair's Bitcoin library dependency from version 0.48 to 0.49, which internally uses newer versions of bitcoin-kmp and secp256k1-kmp. The code changes only replace old property accesses (like `.txid`) with new method calls (like `.getTxid`) to match the updated library's API. There is no explicit security fix described in the commit, and no verified external references are provided. The change could include bug fixes or security improvements in the upstream cryptographic libraries, but the commit itself does not disclose any specific vulnerability.

Security candidateUpdate build to improve release process (#3381)by Fabrice Drouin · c3e9f5d6 · Sep 17, 2026 · 5 filesMessage 86 · StrongInformational 15Details
Commit message · Fabrice Drouin

Update build to improve release process (#3381)

* Update maven plugins

* Don't store commit id in eclair-core jar manifest

It creates a chicken-and-egg problem if you want to commit the checksum of eclair-core.jar to .mvn/checksums/checksums-workspace.sha256.

* Add maven profile for eclair-fuzz

To build eclair-fuzz, use the with-eclair-fuzz profile with -Pwith-eclair-fuzz

86/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Mentions testing or verification✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference
Why it was queued
fuzzing or regression evidencecryptography-sensitive path
AI analysis · Informational 15/100

This commit is a routine build-system update. It upgrades several Maven plugin versions, removes the git commit ID from one jar manifest field to avoid a build-time circular dependency, and adds an optional build profile for a fuzz-testing module. There are no code changes that affect how the software runs or how users interact with it.

Security candidateReject API access from browsers (#3380)by pm47 · 27438b75 · Sep 15, 2026 · 6 filesMessage 81 · StrongHigh 79Details
Commit message · pm47

Reject API access from browsers (#3380)

Any request carrying an `Origin` header is now rejected with 403 before the inner route runs: browsers set it on every cross-site request and every non-GET/HEAD request, while `curl` and `eclair-cli` never do. Checking presence rather than value also covers `Origin: null` and DNS rebinding.

This is a defence against browser CSRF, not an authentication mechanism — `Origin` is trivially omitted by a non-browser client, and the API should still never be exposed beyond loopback.

Breaking change: the API can no longer be called from a web browser, even same-origin; anyone serving a web front-end against it now needs their own back-end in front.

Fixes project-loupe/audit-eclair#223, and by construction any other CSRF report against an individual endpoint.

81/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference✓ Names security-relevant behavior explicitly
Why it was queued
access control
AI analysis · High 79/100

This commit closes a cross-site request forgery (CSRF) hole in Eclair's admin API. Before the change, a malicious web page visited by a node operator could silently submit authenticated API requests (for example, to send funds or close Lightning channels) because browsers reuse cached HTTP basic-auth credentials. The patch now rejects any API request that carries an Origin header, which browsers set automatically while command-line tools do not. It also removes CORS headers that wrongly advertised cross-origin access. This is a hardening/breaking-change fix, not a full authentication replacement, and the API should still only be reachable on the local machine.

AI review queuedBack to dev (#3379)by Fabrice Drouin · bafcf3b6 · Sep 14, 2026 · 8 filesMessage 36 · OpaqueInformational 15Details
Commit message · Fabrice Drouin

Back to dev (#3379)

After the v0.14.3 release.

36/100 · OpaqueMessage clarity
✓ Subject identifies a change✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference! No meaningful explanatory body
Why it was queued
second-pass: opaque commit message
AI analysis · Informational 15/100

This commit is a routine post-release housekeeping change. It bumps the project version from 0.14.3 to 0.15.0-SNAPSHOT across several build files, re-enables a Maven trusted-checksum feature used for build verification, adds a placeholder release-notes document, and deliberately prevents accidental startup of the new development snapshot by throwing an error unless a special override flag is set. There is no security vulnerability in this commit.

Lower-priorityEclair v0.14.3 release (#3377)by Fabrice Drouin · 1de8b2df · Sep 14, 2026 · 8 filesMessage 53 · ThinTriage 0Details
Commit message · Fabrice Drouin

Eclair v0.14.3 release (#3377)

53/100 · ThinMessage clarity
✓ Descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference! No meaningful explanatory body
Security candidateImprove the deterministic build (#3378)by pm47 · eb7cb009 · Sep 14, 2026 · 2 filesMessage 76 · AdequateInformational 15Details
Commit message · pm47

Improve the deterministic build (#3378)

Explicitly specify file permissions and line endings so it is easier to end up with the same binaries in various set ups.

76/100 · AdequateMessage clarity
✓ Descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference
Why it was queued
credential or privilege state
AI analysis · Informational 15/100

This commit adjusts build packaging settings to make compiled releases more reproducible across different computers. It sets consistent file permissions and line endings for packaged documentation and runtime files. There is no indication this fixes a security vulnerability or introduces one.

Security candidateMore AI fixes and defense-in-depth (#3376)by pm47 · 4111ad86 · Sep 14, 2026 · 35 filesMessage 91 · StrongCritical 89Details
Commit message · pm47

More AI fixes and defense-in-depth (#3376)

* loupe: add min-to-self-delay check

See: https://github.com/project-loupe/audit-eclair/issues/205

* loupe: use distinct nonces for initial commitments

See https://github.com/project-loupe/audit-eclair/issues/83

* loupe: check signed psbt

See https://github.com/project-loupe/audit-eclair/issues/44

* loupe: prevent overflow on relay-fee calculation

See https://github.com/project-loupe/audit-eclair/issues/31

* Validate relay parameters before on-the-fly funding

When relaying a blinded payment to a wallet node we don't have a channel
with, we cannot validate the relay parameters against a channel_update,
so we skipped that validation entirely before attempting on-the-fly
funding. A malicious wallet node could thus create a blinded path with
a null cltv_expiry_delta for our node, and we would fund a channel and
relay an HTLC that expires at the same block as the upstream HTLC. That
HTLC could then be fulfilled on-chain by the wallet node while the
upstream HTLC times out, making us lose the HTLC amount.

We now validate the relay parameters against the ones the channel we
would create would use (our expiry delta, htlc minimum and our default
relay fees) and fail early instead of funding a
channel for a payment we would have rejected anyway.

See: https://github.com/project-loupe/audit-eclair/issues/162

* Force-close with a publishable commitment

When we sign a splice transaction first (which always happens when we
don't contribute any input) and our peer withholds their tx_signatures,
we cannot publish that splice transaction. Our latest commitment builds
on it, so its commit tx cannot confirm unless our peer publishes the
splice transaction. We still force-closed with that commitment, and the
publisher then retried forever waiting for the parent.

A malicious peer could exploit this to lock our funds indefinitely, or
worse, to steal pending HTLCs: they wait for the upstream HTLC to time
out, then publish the previous commitment and claim the HTLC with its
preimage, since we were unable to time it out on-chain.

When force-closing, we now skip commitments whose funding transaction
hasn't been fully signed and use the latest one that can confirm. The
commitments themselves are left untouched: the closing state now
resolves the commitment matching each published commit txid (ours or
our peer's) wherever it needs commitment-specific data (HTLC signatures,
keys, format), including when restoring after a restart and when
reporting the closed channel. Revoked and future commit txs cannot be
matched and keep using the latest commitment, as before. If our peer
later publishes that splice transaction and it confirms, our commit tx
is double-spent and we force-close again with the latest commitment.

* Bound closing fees proposed by our peer

When we pay the closing fees and our peer sends a closing_signed with a
fee outside of our fee range, we try to converge towards their fee, for
compatibility with implementations that ignore fee ranges. But nothing
bounded that fee: a malicious peer could propose a fee larger than our
balance, we would drop our output and sign a closing transaction that
sends our whole balance to miners, in a single round-trip.

We now refuse fees that exceed what our maximum closing feerate allows
when we pay the fees, and reply with a warning: our peer must propose a
reasonable fee, or we can force-close.

See: https://github.com/project-loupe/audit-eclair/issues/63

* Extract preimage from taproot HTLC-success with annex

When our peer publishes their commit tx and claims an HTLC with an
HTLC-success transaction, we extract the preimage from its witness to
relay it upstream. For taproot channels, we only handled the witness
without an annex, whereas we already handled both cases for
Claim-HTLC-success transactions. If an HTLC-success transaction with an
annex was confirmed, we would fail to extract the preimage and treat
the HTLC as timed out, failing it upstream even though it was fulfilled
downstream.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* Use pending signed commitment in canSendFee

When checking that we can afford a new feerate, we were using the spec
of the remote commitment we last received a revocation for, ignoring
the changes we had already signed in a pending commit_sig. Every other
balance check uses the pending commitment when there is one. We could
thus send an update_fee that our peer cannot accept, since they check
it against the commitment we signed, which would make them force-close.

* Bound hidden blinded path fees per payment part

When we hide part of the blinded path fees from the payer, we accept
HTLCs whose amount is smaller than the onion amount by at most those
fees. That bound was computed on the whole invoice amount for every
HTLC, so a payer splitting the payment in several parts could underpay
us by the proportional fee on each part.

The hidden fees are paid on each part, so we now compute the bound on
the part's onion amount. We add a small tolerance since LDK doesn't use
the BOLT 4 formula to compute amt_to_forward inside blinded paths and
rounds down the fee it pays as a sender, which can leave parts short by
a few msat.

* Only accept derivation paths tracked by our wallet

When using the eclair signer, Bitcoin Core only holds a watch-only
wallet built from our BIP84 and BIP86 account xpubs. We verified that
addresses and change outputs it provides belong to us by re-deriving
the public key along the derivation path it gives us, but we accepted
any path. Since Bitcoin Core knows our account xpubs, a malicious node
could provide addresses for deeper or non-standard branches: we would
consider them ours and use them for channel closing scripts, splice
outputs and change, but our wallet would never track them and we would
be unable to find those funds.

We now only accept paths of the form purpose'/coin_type'/account'/{0,1}/i
matching the descriptors we import, with the purpose matching the
address type.

* Check mining fees of wallet-funded interactive txs

When funding an interactive transaction (dual funding or splice), we
let bitcoind select wallet inputs and add a change output. We verified
that the funding output and our outputs were preserved, but never that
the resulting mining fee was sane: interactive-tx validation only
enforces a lower bound on the feerate, and splices don't provide a fee
budget. A malicious bitcoind could thus select inputs worth much more
than needed and skip the change output: all checks would pass and the
difference would be paid to miners once we sign.

We now verify that the mining fee we pay stays close to the target
feerate before announcing our inputs to our peer, like we already do
for single-funded channels.

* Add max-funding-feerate configuration parameter

The feerate we use for funding and splice transactions comes from our
fee estimator, which relies on external data. Nothing bounded that
feerate, so inaccurate or malicious data could make us pay arbitrarily
high mining fees on every channel open or splice. Closing transactions
were already protected by max-closing-feerate.

We add a max-funding-feerate parameter (50 sat/byte by default) that
caps the feerate we use for funding and splice transactions. Operators
can RBF their transactions or increase this value and restart their
node if their transactions don't confirm when the mempool is congested.

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>

91/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Mentions testing or verification✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference✓ Names security-relevant behavior explicitly
Why it was queued
explicit security languagesigning boundarymemory safetydefensive validationcryptography-sensitive pathsigning or wallet path
AI analysis · Critical 89/100

This is a large security patch for the Eclair Lightning node that fixes multiple ways an attacker could steal funds, burn money to miners, or lock funds forever. The fixes include: preventing force-closes with un-publishable splice transactions; capping funding/closing miner fees; validating relay fees before opening channels on-the-fly; stopping overflow in fee math; rejecting fake Bitcoin Core change addresses; checking signed PSBTs haven't been altered; extracting payment secrets from newer taproot transactions; and ensuring distinct cryptographic nonces are used when signing commitments.

AI review queuedTor: allow password auth on private networks (#3375)by pm47 · 8b58405d · Sep 14, 2026 · 1 fileMessage 78 · AdequateLow 38Details
Commit message · pm47

Tor: allow password auth on private networks (#3375)

This is a follow-up to #3354: we allow using a password on private networks. It is useful in cluster deployments.

78/100 · AdequateMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides an explanatory body✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference✓ Names security-relevant behavior explicitly
Why it was queued
parser or protocol pathsecond-pass: broader security terminologysecond-pass: security-sensitive path
AI analysis · Low 38/100

This change expands when Eclair will allow password-based authentication to a Tor control port. Previously, only loopback addresses (the same machine) were considered safe enough for password auth. Now, private/site-local and link-local networks are also treated as local, so password auth is permitted there too. This is intentional for cluster deployments, but it slightly relaxes a security boundary around how Eclair talks to Tor.

Lower-priorityOptional setting to dip into trampoline relay fees (#3372)by Bastien Teinturier · dd6587dc · Sep 11, 2026 · 9 filesMessage 81 · StrongTriage 0Details
Commit message · Bastien Teinturier

Optional setting to dip into trampoline relay fees (#3372)

Many service providers (lightning nodes that provide services to mobile wallets that support it) get paid by adding a fee to the routing hints of the end user's invoices: this lets them be paid a fee that may be larger than their usual relay fees when wallet users receive payments.

We set a floor for trampoline fees that may be different from our local channel fees when trampoline payments contain a routing hint.

81/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference
Lower-priorityImprovements in `PeerScorer` (#3365)by pm47 · 232f721b · Aug 28, 2026 · 2 filesMessage 66 · AdequateTriage 0Details
Commit message · pm47

Improvements in `PeerScorer` (#3365)

This is mainly consistency improvements in logging.

Also made min/max proportional relay fee reconfigurable while the node is running.

66/100 · AdequateMessage clarity
✓ Descriptive subject✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference
AI review queuedBack to dev (#3371)by Bastien Teinturier · 39c5cb27 · Aug 26, 2026 · 8 filesMessage 36 · OpaqueInformational 15Details
Commit message · Bastien Teinturier

Back to dev (#3371)

After the v0.14.2 release.

36/100 · OpaqueMessage clarity
✓ Subject identifies a change✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference! No meaningful explanatory body
Why it was queued
second-pass: opaque commit message
AI analysis · Informational 15/100

This commit is a routine post-release housekeeping change. It bumps the project version from 0.14.2 to 0.15.0-SNAPSHOT, re-enables a Maven trusted-checksum feature used for build verification, adds a placeholder release-notes file, and deliberately prevents the new development snapshot from starting in production by throwing an error unless a special override flag is set. There is no security vulnerability here; the change is a safety guard, not a flaw.

Lower-priorityEclair v0.14.2 release (#3370)by Bastien Teinturier · 3dd8d2d9 · Aug 26, 2026 · 8 filesMessage 53 · ThinTriage 0Details
Commit message · Bastien Teinturier

Eclair v0.14.2 release (#3370)

53/100 · ThinMessage clarity
✓ Descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference! No meaningful explanatory body
Security candidateMore robust splicing edge cases (#3366)by Bastien Teinturier · 59772fe1 · Aug 26, 2026 · 11 filesMessage 81 · StrongHigh 70Details
Commit message · Bastien Teinturier

More robust splicing edge cases (#3366)

We apply some defense-in-depth to better handle edge cases during
splicing where a remote peer doesn't follow the BOLTs. This also
includes more thorough pattern-matching, which protects against
future refactoring or new features from inadvertently introducing
a vulnerability related to splicing.

Co-authored-by: Fabrice Drouin <sstone@users.noreply.github.com>

81/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference✓ Names security-relevant behavior explicitly
Why it was queued
explicit security language
AI analysis · High 70/100

This commit hardens Eclair's handling of the Lightning 'splicing' feature when a peer misbehaves. Splicing lets two nodes resize an open payment channel without closing it on-chain. The patch adds extra checks so that if a peer sends unexpected messages during the splice—especially messages that would shift the channel's commitment index—it disconnects or force-closes instead of applying them. Applying such messages could let a malicious peer trick the node into revoking a commitment number that a new splice commitment is still using, potentially putting funds at risk. The commit also fixes a batching bug so that a single commit_sig is delivered as a single message, not as a one-message batch that could trigger an unnecessary force-close.

Security candidateAdd optional rate-limit on incoming pre-auth connections (#3356)by Bastien Teinturier · a2fe6c74 · Aug 26, 2026 · 11 filesMessage 86 · StrongModerate 54Details
Commit message · Bastien Teinturier

Add optional rate-limit on incoming pre-auth connections (#3356)

Peers that open a connection but never complete the BOLT 8 handshake
consume resources on our node (memory, file descriptors and CPU).

We now bound how many of those we're willing to keep around, with an
eviction mechanism that lets honest peers eventually get connected.

Note that this only affects incoming connections: outgoing connections
are not rate-limited, which means that peers with whom we have channels
cannot be negatively affected by this mechanism since we'll actively
reconnect to them.

This isn't a foolproof DDoS protection at all however: attackers that
spam connection attempts can still severely delay or prevent honest
new peers from connecting. It should be coupled with a DDoS protection
layer at the cloud provider layer, where it is easier to do correctly
and more efficient.

86/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference✓ Names security-relevant behavior explicitly
Why it was queued
explicit security language
AI analysis · Moderate 54/100

This commit adds a safety net to the Eclair Lightning node to limit how many incoming peer connections can sit unfinished before completing the cryptographic handshake. Previously, an attacker could open many TCP connections and leave them hanging, consuming memory, file descriptors, and CPU. The change caps those pending connections, evicts the oldest ones after a short grace period, and briefly pauses accepting new connections when the cap is hit. It also fixes a related bug where authenticated-but-never-initialized connections could stay open forever.

Security candidateFix a batch of Tor-related issues (#3354)by Bastien Teinturier · 3d092da8 · Aug 26, 2026 · 7 filesMessage 98 · StrongModerate 67Details
Commit message · Bastien Teinturier

Fix a batch of Tor-related issues (#3354)

* Verify that Tor cookie is 32-bytes

In order to be valid, a Tor cookie must be exactly 32 bytes.
We verify that and fail otherwise.

* Use Tor safe-cookie mode by default

And fail if password mode is used but the host is remote.

* Fix race condition in file permissions

There was a race condition in file permissions that allowed attackers
on the machine to read secrets, because we started by creating the
secret and only after that we set the file permissions.

We now reverse that flow: we create an empty file with the right
permissions and then write the secret to it.

This applies to our seed files and to tor private keys.

98/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Explains rationale or failure mode✓ Mentions testing or verification✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference
Why it was queued
explicit security languagesecret or key materialcredential or privilege stateparser or protocol path
AI analysis · Moderate 67/100

This commit fixes three security issues in how Eclair connects to the Tor network and stores sensitive files. First, it changes the default Tor authentication from password to safecookie, and blocks password mode when the Tor control port is on a remote machine, because password mode sends secrets in cleartext and cannot prove the server is really Tor. Second, it checks that Tor's authentication cookie is exactly 32 bytes. Third, it fixes a race condition where secret files (seed files and Tor private keys) were created with loose permissions before being locked down, which could let other users on the same machine read them; now the file is created with strict permissions first, then the secret is written.

Security candidateReject messages that include the wrong type of signatures (#3368)by Fabrice Drouin · 1fc3dd7c · Aug 26, 2026 · 16 filesMessage 86 · StrongModerate 60Details
Commit message · Fabrice Drouin

Reject messages that include the wrong type of signatures (#3368)

Signatures can either be standard signatures, for non-taproot channels, or partial signatures for taproot channels.
Here we reject messages that include signatures that don't match the channel commitment format.
This will fix an error where, for non-taproot channels, when our peer sends a message that contains a valid "single"
signature and an invalid "partial" signature, we would check the correct "single" signature, but store the invalid "partial" signature.

86/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference✓ Names security-relevant behavior explicitly
Why it was queued
signing boundarysigning or wallet pathparser or protocol path
AI analysis · Moderate 60/100

This commit fixes a bug in the Eclair Lightning node where a peer could send a message containing both a correct standard signature and an incorrect partial signature. The old code would verify the correct signature but then store the invalid partial signature for later use. The fix makes Eclair reject messages that include the wrong kind of signature for the channel type, so non-taproot channels ignore partial signatures and taproot channels require partial signatures.

AI review queuedForce-close on invalid HTLC `cltv_expiry` (#3367)by Bastien Teinturier · b7ebefdb · Aug 26, 2026 · 5 filesMessage 88 · StrongModerate 60Details
Commit message · Bastien Teinturier

Force-close on invalid HTLC `cltv_expiry` (#3367)

Bolt 2 specifies that if tje sending node sets `cltv_expiry` to greater
or equal to 500000000, we should send a warning and close the connection
or send an error and fail the channel. We never implemented that, which
was fine because we already rejected large `cltv_expiry` before that
threshold (without force-closing), but it's better to explicitly force
close if our peer is sending such invalid values.

88/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Explains rationale or failure mode✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference
Why it was queued
signing or wallet pathsecond-pass: security-sensitive path
AI analysis · Moderate 60/100

This change makes the Eclair Lightning node force-close a payment channel if a peer tries to add a payment whose timeout value (cltv_expiry) is 500,000,000 or higher. Such large values are invalid according to the Lightning BOLT 2 specification because they would be interpreted as a Unix timestamp rather than a Bitcoin block height, which could confuse the node and lead to incorrect fund-locking behavior. Previously Eclair rejected these values without force-closing; now it explicitly closes the channel as the spec recommends.

Lower-priorityEmit `ChannelPersisted` event at channel creation (#3361)by pm47 · 14d40937 · Aug 25, 2026 · 3 filesMessage 81 · StrongTriage 0Details
Commit message · pm47

Emit `ChannelPersisted` event at channel creation (#3361)

Since #3337 we are calling directly `db.addChannel` for the initial storage in db. But the `storing()` method that we were previously using also emitted a `ChannelPersisted`.

This caused the `BalanceActor` to not be aware of the newly created channel and resulted in a temporary balance glitch.

Found by Claude.

81/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference
Lower-priority(Minor) Fix flaky test in `WaitForAcceptChannelStateSpec` (#3364)by pm47 · 23316e4e · Aug 25, 2026 · 1 fileMessage 68 · AdequateTriage 0Details
Commit message · pm47

(Minor) Fix flaky test in `WaitForAcceptChannelStateSpec` (#3364)

68/100 · AdequateMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Mentions testing or verification✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference! No meaningful explanatory body
Lower-priority(Minor) Update claude gitignore files (#3363)by pm47 · 141269f5 · Aug 25, 2026 · 1 fileMessage 53 · ThinTriage 0Details
Commit message · pm47

(Minor) Update claude gitignore files (#3363)

53/100 · ThinMessage clarity
✓ Descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference! No meaningful explanatory body
Lower-priorityForce-close channels that our peer claims are late without proving it (#3360)by pm47 · 5b765e02 · Aug 21, 2026 · 7 filesMessage 93 · StrongTriage 0Details
Commit message · pm47

Force-close channels that our peer claims are late without proving it (#3360)

When our peer claims, in their `channel_reestablish` message, that we're late but don't prove it, we force-close the channel instead of transitioning to `WAIT_FOR_REMOTE_PUBLISH_FUTURE_COMMITMENT`.

There is a special case where we are late but safe because they don't have our revocation secret: we use the commitment point from their `channel_reestablish` message to spend their commit tx if they publish it, as we would in `WAIT_FOR_REMOTE_PUBLISH_FUTURE_COMMITMENT`.

---------

Co-authored-by: Fabrice Drouin <sstone@users.noreply.github.com>

93/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Explains rationale or failure mode✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference
Lower-priorityAdd support for `option_onion_messages_only_channels` (#3342)by Bastien Teinturier · b3586905 · Aug 21, 2026 · 9 filesMessage 81 · StrongTriage 0Details
Commit message · Bastien Teinturier

Add support for `option_onion_messages_only_channels` (#3342)

We now configure our onion message relay policy based on features that
we activate (either `option_onion_messages_only_channels` when relaying
only from peers with whom we have a channel or `option_onion_messages`
when relaying from all peers). In all cases, we still apply rate limits.

Fixes #3335

81/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference