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btcd

Alternative full-node Bitcoin implementation written in Go.

BitcoinNode implementationsNormal
Repository coverage

198 commits in the local evidence base

Every captured commit receives deterministic security triage and a separate communication-quality score. Security candidates and broader second-pass signals receive full-patch Ollama analysis.

43security candidates20second-pass queue37AI analyses
31commits · 30 days
65commits · 60 days
177commits · 180 days
198commits · 365 days
Backfill bands
Aug 5 → Feb 621 seen1 candidatesComplete
Feb 6 → Jun 6112 seen7 candidatesComplete
Jun 6 → Jul 634 seen13 candidatesComplete
Jul 6 → Aug 530 seen7 candidatesComplete
Commit communication

Does the history explain itself?

Message quality measures whether a commit identifies its scope, purpose, rationale, testing, and supporting references. It does not change the security-severity score.

68/100 average clarity
61Strong · 80–100
75Adequate · 60–79
57Thin · 40–59
5Opaque · 0–39
Read the scoring rubric →
Developer activity

Who is changing the project?

Public Git author strings; identities are not independently verified.

DeveloperCommitsCandidatesAnalyzedHigh riskMessage avg.
Lrifton92433186
Erick Cestari811177
Boris Nagaev461514060
Olaoluwa Osuntokun56119073
Oliver Gugger1344047
MPins332079
Drake Thomsen221091
Eric Grill311086
Julio Cesar111045
Jacob Schuler110088
Kim111045
Calvin Kim4300072
Analysis record

Published AI watches

Last scanned 43 minutes ago

Informational 12 AI analysisMessage 83 · Strong
BT btcsuitebtcd BitcoinNode implementations

rpcclient: harden DisableAuth transport tests

This commit only changes tests and clarifies a public comment. It does not alter the actual authentication behavior of the btcd RPC client. The code already only suppresses the internally generated Basic auth header when DisableAuth is tru…

No functional code change; only tests and commentsComment clarification that DisableAuth only suppresses generated Basic auth, not caller-provided Authorization headersTests now cover WebSocket handshake, cookie bypass, and caller-provided headers
52d2fadeby Olaoluwa Osuntokun+186−1272 files
No security note in commit
Informational 15 AI analysisMessage 96 · Strong
BT btcsuitebtcd BitcoinNode implementations

rpcclient: add tests for DisableAuth header behavior

This commit only adds new unit tests for an existing feature. It does not change any production code, so it cannot introduce a security vulnerability or fix one directly. The tests verify that an existing option called DisableAuth correctl…

9b849c17by Drake Thomsen+109−01 file
No security note in commit
Low 48 AI analysisMessage 78 · Adequate
BT btcsuitebtcd BitcoinNode implementations

v2transport: restore responder handshake progress

This commit fixes a deadlock risk in btcd's new Bitcoin v2 transport handshake. Previously, the responder waited until it had received the initiator's full 64-byte key before doing any work, which could cause both sides to sit waiting for …

BIP324 handshake deadlock avoidanceCPU admission lease split to prevent resource exhaustion / lock holding across network I/OResponder now sends key material before full initiator key is received
09717871by Olaoluwa Osuntokun+231−862 files
No security note in commit
Low 41 AI analysisMessage 78 · Adequate
BT btcsuitebtcd BitcoinNode implementations

psbt: decode base64 packets incrementally

This commit changes how btcd reads base64-encoded PSBT (Partially Signed Bitcoin Transaction) data. Previously, the code read the entire base64 input into memory before decoding, and it wrongly applied the Bitcoin P2P wire message size lim…

Removes an incorrect size bound that caused base64 PSBT parsing to reject valid large packets (denial-of-service / interoperability issue)Switches from full in-memory base64 decode to incremental streaming, reducing peak memory for large base64 PSBTsRetains strict base64 alphabet checks and rejects trailing data after the PSBT packet
e333817dby Olaoluwa Osuntokun+129−602 files
No security note in commit
Moderate 60 AI analysisMessage 68 · Adequate
BT btcsuitebtcd BitcoinNode implementations

psbt: reject nil taproot pointer fields

This commit fixes a class of crash bugs in btcd's PSBT (Partially Signed Bitcoin Transaction) handling for Taproot transactions. Previously, if certain Taproot-related lists contained a nil (empty) entry, the code would panic when trying t…

nil-pointer dereference / panic prevention in Taproot PSBT finalizernil-pointer dereference / panic prevention in PSBT serializationinput validation added before sort.Slice and pointer dereference
1ead5ba3by Olaoluwa Osuntokun+171−165 files
Vendor flagged security relevance
Moderate 64 AI analysisMessage 73 · Adequate
BT btcsuitebtcd BitcoinNode implementations

psbt: avoid blocking reads and unbounded allocations in NewFromRawBytes

This commit fixes two problems in the way btcd reads Partially Signed Bitcoin Transactions (PSBTs). First, the parser could hang forever when reading from a network connection or pipe because it tried to read one extra byte to check for le…

Denial-of-service via blocking read on open stream (potential infinite hang)Denial-of-service via unbounded memory allocation on base64 input before validationStrict parsing hardening for PSBT base64 decoding
2ddf73f3by Olaoluwa Osuntokun+87−283 files
Vendor flagged security relevance
Moderate 58 AI analysisMessage 45 · Thin
BT btcsuitebtcd BitcoinNode implementations

psbt: reject trailing final witness data

This change tightens how a Bitcoin PSBT library extracts final witness data when turning a partially-signed transaction into a finished transaction. Previously, extra bytes after the declared witness stack were silently ignored. Now the li…

strict parsing of serialized witness datarejection of trailing bytes in PSBT final script witnesspotential malleability / ambiguity reduction in PSBT extraction
468853e4by Boris Nagaev+13−91 file
No security note in commit
Low 38 AI analysisMessage 55 · Thin
BT btcsuitebtcd BitcoinNode implementations

psbt: test final witness trailing data rejection

This commit adds a new test to the btcd PSBT (Partially Signed Bitcoin Transaction) library. The test checks that when extracting a final Bitcoin transaction from a PSBT, the library rejects a final witness value that has extra trailing by…

Strict parsing of final witness data to reject malformed/trailing bytesPrevents creation of transactions with non-standard witness encodingTest-only commit implies behavior enforcement elsewhere in the codebase
c87168ebby Boris Nagaev+26−01 file
No security note in commit
Moderate 64 AI analysisMessage 88 · Strong
BT btcsuitebtcd BitcoinNode implementations

btcec/schnorr: reject s >= group order in ParseSignature

This commit fixes a bug in how btcd parses Schnorr (BIP-340) digital signatures. The code was supposed to reject signatures whose 's' number was larger than the allowed group order, but instead it silently wrapped the value around (modulo …

BIP-340 signature parsing non-compliancesilent modulo reduction of s componentsignature malleability risk from non-canonical encodings
83d081a5by Lrifton92+42−12 files
Vendor flagged security relevance
Low 25 AI analysisMessage 80 · Strong
BT btcsuitebtcd BitcoinNode implementations

psbt: compact witness utxo scripts after parsing

This commit fixes a memory-usage issue, not a security vulnerability. When reading PSBT data, the code was keeping a pointer to a large 4 MiB internal memory block even for tiny scripts. The patch copies the small script into its own compa…

memory retention reductionno input validation changeno cryptographic change
b0ab66feby Boris Nagaev+10−12 files
No security note in commit
Informational 12 AI analysisMessage 55 · Thin
BT btcsuitebtcd BitcoinNode implementations

psbt: test trailing packet data rejection

This commit only adds a new test case. It does not change any production code. The test checks that the PSBT parser rejects files that have extra bytes after a valid PSBT packet. Because no code behavior is changed, this commit by itself d…

Test-only commitNo production code changesTests input-validation behavior (trailing data rejection)
0a1300ddby Boris Nagaev+16−01 file
No security note in commit
Low 46 AI analysisMessage 45 · Thin
BT btcsuitebtcd BitcoinNode implementations

psbt: decode base64 packets strictly

This change tightens how base64-encoded PSBT (Partially Signed Bitcoin Transaction) data is decoded. Previously, the decoder could silently ignore extra whitespace or unexpected characters in the base64 stream. Now it rejects anything that…

Strict input validation added for base64 decodingRejection of whitespace/newlines inside base64 payloadUse of strict base64 decoder to enforce RFC4648 padding rules
70e8ceb9by Boris Nagaev+28−51 file
No security note in commit
Informational 12 AI analysisMessage 60 · Adequate
BT btcsuitebtcd BitcoinNode implementations

musig2: test partial signature short reads

This commit only adds a new unit test that checks whether the MuSig2 partial signature decoder correctly rejects empty or too-short inputs. It does not change any production code, so by itself it cannot introduce or fix a security vulnerab…

4a7a9feaby Boris Nagaev+21−01 file
No security note in commit
Informational 12 AI analysisMessage 55 · Thin
BT btcsuitebtcd BitcoinNode implementations

psbt: test witness utxo txout strict parsing

This commit only adds new test code for the PSBT (Partially Signed Bitcoin Transaction) package. It does not change any production code. The tests verify that WitnessUtxo fields are parsed strictly and correctly, including rejecting extra …

Strict parsing tests for WitnessUtxo transaction outputsRejection of trailing data after serialized txOutCorrect handling of multi-byte CompactSize script lengths
40ad9117by Boris Nagaev+79−01 file
No security note in commit
Informational 12 AI analysisMessage 55 · Thin
BT btcsuitebtcd BitcoinNode implementations

psbt: add strict tx value regression test

This commit only adds a new test file. It does not change any production code. The test checks that the PSBT parser rejects transaction fields that have extra trailing bytes. Because no actual parser logic is modified, this commit by itsel…

Regression test added for strict parsing of transaction-valued PSBT fieldsNo production code changes
0293b6e0by Boris Nagaev+117−01 file
No security note in commit
Low 28 AI analysisMessage 55 · Thin
BT btcsuitebtcd BitcoinNode implementations

psbt: test strict base64 packet decoding

This commit only adds new test code to check that the PSBT (Partially Signed Bitcoin Transaction) parser rejects malformed base64 input such as whitespace, bad padding, or extra bytes. It does not change the actual parser logic. The tests …

strict base64 decoding validationPSBT packet format hardeningrejection of non-canonical base64 input
0a33cceaby Boris Nagaev+56−01 file
No security note in commit
Low 49 AI analysisMessage 45 · Thin
BT btcsuitebtcd BitcoinNode implementations

psbt: reject trailing packet data

This change makes the PSBT (Partially Signed Bitcoin Transaction) parser reject files or data that have extra bytes after the end of a valid PSBT. Previously, extra trailing data was silently ignored, which could let an attacker hide malic…

Parser no longer ignores trailing bytesCould prevent smuggling of extra data inside PSBT containersCould prevent canonicalization attacks where different byte sequences parse to the same structure
d1de2bc3by Boris Nagaev+4−01 file
No security note in commit
Low 48 AI analysisMessage 50 · Thin
BT btcsuitebtcd BitcoinNode implementations

musig2: return partial signature read errors

This commit fixes a bug in the MuSig2 multi-signature code where reading a partial signature from an input stream could fail silently. Previously, if the stream ended early or had a read error, the function would return 'no error' as if th…

Silent failure in cryptographic decode pathPartial signature scalar left uninitialized on read errorMuSig2 signing correctness dependency
63bc064dby Boris Nagaev+1−11 file
No security note in commit
Low 46 AI analysisMessage 45 · Thin
BT btcsuitebtcd BitcoinNode implementations

psbt: parse witness utxo txouts strictly

This commit tightens how a Bitcoin-related library reads transaction outputs stored inside PSBT (Partially Signed Bitcoin Transaction) data. Previously, the code read the output value and script in a loose, hand-rolled way that ignored ext…

Strict canonical parsing of serialized transaction outputsRemoval of hand-rolled length handling that ignored script length byteAddition of full-consumption check on parsed witness UTXO data
b4c5cf16by Boris Nagaev+11−91 file
No security note in commit
Low 36 AI analysisMessage 45 · Thin
BT btcsuitebtcd BitcoinNode implementations

psbt: add reader exhaustion helper

This commit adds a new helper function to the PSBT (Partially Signed Bitcoin Transaction) package that checks whether a data reader still has leftover bytes after parsing. Leftover bytes could mean a malformed or malicious PSBT file was no…

New validation helper for trailing/leftover data in a binary parserLocated in PSBT parsing utilities, an area where malformed input handling mattersNo caller added in this commit, so defensive effect is not yet active
da5792a8by Boris Nagaev+25−01 file
No security note in commit
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Lower-priorityserver: centralize inbound handshake admissionby Boris Nagaev · 6c056ec4 · Jul 18, 2026 · 12 filesMessage 68 · AdequateTriage 0Details
Commit message · Boris Nagaev

server: centralize inbound handshake admission

In this commit, we introduce a server-wide admission policy for
incomplete inbound handshakes and the CPU-bound portion of v2 responder
setup. Source accounting uses normalized IPv4 and IPv6 prefixes, while
global, per-source, and concurrent v2 budgets remain independent and
bounded.

Peer construction passes the policy through a small interface only for
inbound v2 responders. Handshake slots release on verack or disconnect,
and the connection manager reserves MaxPeers capacity for automatic
outbound peers.

68/100 · AdequateMessage clarity
✓ Descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context
Security candidatepsbt: avoid blocking reads and unbounded allocations in NewFromRawBytesby Olaoluwa Osuntokun · 2ddf73f3 · Jul 14, 2026 · 3 filesMessage 73 · AdequateModerate 64Details
Commit message · Olaoluwa Osuntokun

psbt: avoid blocking reads and unbounded allocations in NewFromRawBytes

In this commit, we address two issues with the strict parsing recently
added to NewFromRawBytes.

First, the trailing data check probed the caller supplied reader with a
blocking one byte read. A reader without a Len method (net.Conn,
io.Pipe) that stays open after delivering a complete packet would hang
the parser forever. We now only enforce the check when the reader can
report its remaining length without an additional read, which covers
in-memory readers along with the decoded base64 path. Plain streams are
left positioned directly after the packet, and the reader contract is
now documented on NewFromRawBytes.

Second, the base64 path read the entire input into memory before any
validation ran, so a very large input could force an arbitrarily large
allocation before the first validity check. We now bound the read to
wire.MaxMessagePayload expanded by the base64 encoding overhead.

Along the way, we simplify assertFullyConsumed down to the bytes.Reader
case that all remaining callers use.

73/100 · AdequateMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context
Why it was queued
signing boundarysigning or wallet path
AI analysis · Moderate 64/100

This commit fixes two problems in the way btcd reads Partially Signed Bitcoin Transactions (PSBTs). First, the parser could hang forever when reading from a network connection or pipe because it tried to read one extra byte to check for leftover data. Second, when given a base64-encoded PSBT, it would read the entire input into memory before checking whether it was valid, so a maliciously huge input could force the program to allocate enormous amounts of RAM. The patch limits how much base64 data is read and only checks for trailing bytes when the reader can safely report its remaining length.

AI review queuedblockchain: tolerate trailing bytes when loading stored blocksby Olaoluwa Osuntokun · a3bed5e3 · Jul 14, 2026 · 2 filesMessage 73 · AdequateTriage 8Details
Commit message · Olaoluwa Osuntokun

blockchain: tolerate trailing bytes when loading stored blocks

In this commit, we relax the strict block deserialization introduced as
part of the trailing byte hardening. Databases written by older
versions of btcd may have persisted blocks with trailing bytes, so
refusing to load them would prevent a node from ever starting (or
serving such a block) after an upgrade, with no recovery path short of
a full resync.

We instead introduce a new dbBlockFromBytes helper, used by both
initChainState and dbFetchBlockByNode, that deserializes the block
leniently: any trailing bytes are logged, ignored, and excluded from
the serialization cached on the returned block, so downstream consumers
of the raw bytes never observe them.

73/100 · AdequateMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context
Why it was queued
defensive validationsecond-pass: broader security terminology
Security candidatepsbt: reject trailing final witness databy Boris Nagaev · 468853e4 · Jul 8, 2026 · 1 fileMessage 45 · ThinModerate 58Details
Commit message · Boris Nagaev

psbt: reject trailing final witness data

45/100 · ThinMessage clarity
✓ Descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component! No meaningful explanatory body
Why it was queued
signing boundarysigning or wallet path
AI analysis · Moderate 58/100

This change tightens how a Bitcoin PSBT library extracts final witness data when turning a partially-signed transaction into a finished transaction. Previously, extra bytes after the declared witness stack were silently ignored. Now the library rejects such packets. That prevents malformed or crafted PSBTs from sneaking hidden data into the witness field, which could in some scenarios alter transaction behavior or be used to confuse downstream tools.

Security candidatepsbt: test final witness trailing data rejectionby Boris Nagaev · c87168eb · Jul 8, 2026 · 1 fileMessage 55 · ThinLow 38Details
Commit message · Boris Nagaev

psbt: test final witness trailing data rejection

55/100 · ThinMessage clarity
✓ Descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Mentions testing or verification! No meaningful explanatory body
Why it was queued
signing boundarysigning or wallet path
AI analysis · Low 38/100

This commit adds a new test to the btcd PSBT (Partially Signed Bitcoin Transaction) library. The test checks that when extracting a final Bitcoin transaction from a PSBT, the library rejects a final witness value that has extra trailing bytes after a valid witness stack. Previously, this trailing data might have been silently accepted, which could lead to non-standard or invalid transactions being produced. The commit itself only adds a test, not a fix, so it implies a prior or pending code change that enforces this rejection.

Security candidatebtcec/schnorr: reject s >= group order in ParseSignatureby Lrifton92 · 83d081a5 · Jul 7, 2026 · 2 filesMessage 88 · StrongModerate 64Details
Commit message · Lrifton92

btcec/schnorr: reject s >= group order in ParseSignature

ParseSignature documents that it enforces the BIP-340 requirement that
the s component lie in the range [0, n-1], and the r component is
already checked against the field prime accordingly. However, the
overflow return value of s.SetByteSlice was discarded, so an s value
greater than or equal to the group order n was silently reduced modulo
n and accepted instead of being rejected.

This restores parity with the reference implementation in
decred/dcrd/dcrec/secp256k1/schnorr (of which this code is a port) and
with Bitcoin Core, both of which reject such encodings at parse time.
The ErrSigSTooBig error kind is already defined in the imported schnorr
package but was previously unused here.

A regression test covering the s == n and s > n encodings is added; it
fails before this change (the signatures are silently accepted) and
passes after.

Signed-off-by: Lrifton92 <Lrifton92@users.noreply.github.com>

88/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Mentions testing or verification✓ Names security-relevant behavior explicitly
Why it was queued
signing boundarymemory safetyfuzzing or regression evidencesigning or wallet path
AI analysis · Moderate 64/100

This commit fixes a bug in how btcd parses Schnorr (BIP-340) digital signatures. The code was supposed to reject signatures whose 's' number was larger than the allowed group order, but instead it silently wrapped the value around (modulo reduction) and accepted it. This could let invalid signatures pass validation, potentially allowing signature malleability or unexpected behavior in systems relying on strict BIP-340 compliance. The fix checks the overflow flag and now rejects such signatures with the already-defined ErrSigSTooBig error.

Lower-prioritynetsync: avoid clock tick race in sync state testby Boris Nagaev · 0860e42d · Jul 2, 2026 · 1 fileMessage 78 · AdequateTriage 0Details
Commit message · Boris Nagaev

netsync: avoid clock tick race in sync state test

TestSyncStateMachine checked that handleHeadersMsg advanced
lastProgressTime by comparing it against the timestamp written by
startSync. Those two writes can happen within the same clock tick, so
the handler can update the field while time.After still reports false.

Reset lastProgressTime to the zero value before delivering headers and
assert that the handler writes a non-zero value. This keeps the test
focused on the behavior under test without depending on adjacent
time.Now calls producing distinct timestamps.

78/100 · AdequateMessage clarity
✓ Descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Mentions testing or verification
Security candidatepsbt: compact witness utxo scripts after parsingby Boris Nagaev · b0ab66fe · Jul 2, 2026 · 2 filesMessage 80 · StrongLow 25Details
Commit message · Boris Nagaev

psbt: compact witness utxo scripts after parsing

wire.ReadTxOut returns PkScript slices backed by its internal 4 MiB
script slab. PSBT inputs keep parsed WitnessUtxo values, so small
scripts could otherwise keep the whole slab live.

Copy the script before storing the TxOut and assert the parsed witness
script has compact capacity.

80/100 · StrongMessage clarity
✓ Descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Explains rationale or failure mode
Why it was queued
signing boundarysigning or wallet path
AI analysis · Low 25/100

This commit fixes a memory-usage issue, not a security vulnerability. When reading PSBT data, the code was keeping a pointer to a large 4 MiB internal memory block even for tiny scripts. The patch copies the small script into its own compact memory slice so the large block can be released. It does not fix a bug that lets an attacker steal funds, crash the program, or bypass validation.

Lower-priorityrpc: test mempool accept trailing byte rejectionby Boris Nagaev · f3ec349a · Jun 26, 2026 · 1 fileMessage 55 · ThinTriage 0Details
Commit message · Boris Nagaev

rpc: test mempool accept trailing byte rejection

55/100 · ThinMessage clarity
✓ Descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Mentions testing or verification! No meaningful explanatory body
Security candidatepsbt: decode base64 packets strictlyby Boris Nagaev · 70e8ceb9 · Jun 26, 2026 · 1 fileMessage 45 · ThinLow 46Details
Commit message · Boris Nagaev

psbt: decode base64 packets strictly

45/100 · ThinMessage clarity
✓ Descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component! No meaningful explanatory body
Why it was queued
signing boundarysigning or wallet path
AI analysis · Low 46/100

This change tightens how base64-encoded PSBT (Partially Signed Bitcoin Transaction) data is decoded. Previously, the decoder could silently ignore extra whitespace or unexpected characters in the base64 stream. Now it rejects anything that isn't strict, clean base64. This is a defensive hardening fix: it prevents malformed or cleverly padded base64 inputs from being accepted, which could in theory be used to sneak invalid data past validation or cause inconsistent parsing between different PSBT implementations.

Security candidatepsbt: add strict tx value regression testby Boris Nagaev · 0293b6e0 · Jun 26, 2026 · 1 fileMessage 55 · ThinInformational 12Details
Commit message · Boris Nagaev

psbt: add strict tx value regression test

55/100 · ThinMessage clarity
✓ Descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Mentions testing or verification! No meaningful explanatory body
Why it was queued
signing boundaryfuzzing or regression evidencesigning or wallet path
AI analysis · Informational 12/100

This commit only adds a new test file. It does not change any production code. The test checks that the PSBT parser rejects transaction fields that have extra trailing bytes. Because no actual parser logic is modified, this commit by itself does not fix or introduce a security issue.

Lower-prioritybtcutil: test byte constructors reject trailing databy Boris Nagaev · e72a65de · Jun 26, 2026 · 2 filesMessage 60 · AdequateTriage 0Details
Commit message · Boris Nagaev

btcutil: test byte constructors reject trailing data

60/100 · AdequateMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Mentions testing or verification! No meaningful explanatory body
Security candidatepsbt: reject trailing packet databy Boris Nagaev · d1de2bc3 · Jun 26, 2026 · 1 fileMessage 45 · ThinLow 49Details
Commit message · Boris Nagaev

psbt: reject trailing packet data

45/100 · ThinMessage clarity
✓ Descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component! No meaningful explanatory body
Why it was queued
signing boundarysigning or wallet path
AI analysis · Low 49/100

This change makes the PSBT (Partially Signed Bitcoin Transaction) parser reject files or data that have extra bytes after the end of a valid PSBT. Previously, extra trailing data was silently ignored, which could let an attacker hide malicious content inside what looks like a legitimate PSBT, or cause two different byte strings to be treated as the same PSBT. The patch is only four lines and adds a check that the input is fully consumed after parsing.

Lower-priorityrpc: decode block proposals strictlyby Boris Nagaev · 7840b814 · Jun 26, 2026 · 1 fileMessage 45 · ThinTriage 0Details
Commit message · Boris Nagaev

rpc: decode block proposals strictly

45/100 · ThinMessage clarity
✓ Descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component! No meaningful explanatory body
Lower-prioritymulti: use local submodules in rootby Boris Nagaev · 81b07f66 · Jun 26, 2026 · 1 fileMessage 45 · ThinTriage 0Details
Commit message · Boris Nagaev

multi: use local submodules in root

45/100 · ThinMessage clarity
✓ Descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component! No meaningful explanatory body
Security candidatepsbt: test strict base64 packet decodingby Boris Nagaev · 0a33ccea · Jun 26, 2026 · 1 fileMessage 55 · ThinLow 28Details
Commit message · Boris Nagaev

psbt: test strict base64 packet decoding

55/100 · ThinMessage clarity
✓ Descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Mentions testing or verification! No meaningful explanatory body
Why it was queued
signing boundarysigning or wallet path
AI analysis · Low 28/100

This commit only adds new test code to check that the PSBT (Partially Signed Bitcoin Transaction) parser rejects malformed base64 input such as whitespace, bad padding, or extra bytes. It does not change the actual parser logic. The tests confirm existing strict behavior, so this is a defensive hardening test rather than a fix for a known active vulnerability.

Security candidatepsbt: test trailing packet data rejectionby Boris Nagaev · 0a1300dd · Jun 26, 2026 · 1 fileMessage 55 · ThinInformational 12Details
Commit message · Boris Nagaev

psbt: test trailing packet data rejection

55/100 · ThinMessage clarity
✓ Descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Mentions testing or verification! No meaningful explanatory body
Why it was queued
signing boundarysigning or wallet path
AI analysis · Informational 12/100

This commit only adds a new test case. It does not change any production code. The test checks that the PSBT parser rejects files that have extra bytes after a valid PSBT packet. Because no code behavior is changed, this commit by itself does not fix or introduce a security issue.

Security candidatemusig2: test partial signature short readsby Boris Nagaev · 4a7a9fea · Jun 26, 2026 · 1 fileMessage 60 · AdequateInformational 12Details
Commit message · Boris Nagaev

musig2: test partial signature short reads

60/100 · AdequateMessage clarity
✓ Descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Mentions testing or verification✓ Names security-relevant behavior explicitly! No meaningful explanatory body
Why it was queued
signing boundarysigning or wallet path
AI analysis · Informational 12/100

This commit only adds a new unit test that checks whether the MuSig2 partial signature decoder correctly rejects empty or too-short inputs. It does not change any production code, so by itself it cannot introduce or fix a security vulnerability. The test may be a regression test for an already-fixed bug, or simply defensive coverage, but the diff provides no evidence of a prior security issue.

Lower-prioritywire: test v2 message trailing payload rejectionby Boris Nagaev · 42077fdb · Jun 26, 2026 · 1 fileMessage 55 · ThinTriage 0Details
Commit message · Boris Nagaev

wire: test v2 message trailing payload rejection

55/100 · ThinMessage clarity
✓ Descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Mentions testing or verification! No meaningful explanatory body
Security candidatepsbt: reject trailing data in tx valuesby Boris Nagaev · f945179f · Jun 26, 2026 · 3 filesMessage 45 · ThinModerate 51Details
Commit message · Boris Nagaev

psbt: reject trailing data in tx values

45/100 · ThinMessage clarity
✓ Descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component! No meaningful explanatory body
Why it was queued
signing boundarysigning or wallet path
AI analysis · Moderate 51/100

This change tightens how PSBT (Partially Signed Bitcoin Transaction) files are read. Previously, transaction-valued fields could contain extra bytes after the valid transaction data; now the parser rejects such trailing data. This prevents a malformed or crafted PSBT from sneaking in unused bytes that might confuse downstream tools or alter how the PSBT is interpreted.

Lower-priorityrpc: test submitblock trailing byte rejectionby Boris Nagaev · 676f61b9 · Jun 26, 2026 · 1 fileMessage 55 · ThinTriage 0Details
Commit message · Boris Nagaev

rpc: test submitblock trailing byte rejection

55/100 · ThinMessage clarity
✓ Descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Mentions testing or verification! No meaningful explanatory body
Security candidatepsbt: add reader exhaustion helperby Boris Nagaev · da5792a8 · Jun 26, 2026 · 1 fileMessage 45 · ThinLow 36Details
Commit message · Boris Nagaev

psbt: add reader exhaustion helper

45/100 · ThinMessage clarity
✓ Descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component! No meaningful explanatory body
Why it was queued
signing boundarysigning or wallet path
AI analysis · Low 36/100

This commit adds a new helper function to the PSBT (Partially Signed Bitcoin Transaction) package that checks whether a data reader still has leftover bytes after parsing. Leftover bytes could mean a malformed or malicious PSBT file was not fully processed. The helper lets the library reject such inputs. However, the commit only adds the helper; it does not yet wire it into any actual parsing path, so by itself it does not fix any vulnerability.

Lower-priorityrpc: test decoderawtransaction trailing byte rejectionby Boris Nagaev · 40aca93c · Jun 26, 2026 · 1 fileMessage 60 · AdequateTriage 0Details
Commit message · Boris Nagaev

rpc: test decoderawtransaction trailing byte rejection

60/100 · AdequateMessage clarity
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Mentions testing or verification! No meaningful explanatory body
Security candidatepsbt: test witness utxo txout strict parsingby Boris Nagaev · 40ad9117 · Jun 26, 2026 · 1 fileMessage 55 · ThinInformational 12Details
Commit message · Boris Nagaev

psbt: test witness utxo txout strict parsing

55/100 · ThinMessage clarity
✓ Descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Mentions testing or verification! No meaningful explanatory body
Why it was queued
signing boundarysigning or wallet path
AI analysis · Informational 12/100

This commit only adds new test code for the PSBT (Partially Signed Bitcoin Transaction) package. It does not change any production code. The tests verify that WitnessUtxo fields are parsed strictly and correctly, including rejecting extra trailing bytes and handling multi-byte script lengths. There is no direct security fix here, but the tests appear to be added in support of an existing or upcoming strict-parsing behavior.

Security candidatepsbt: parse witness utxo txouts strictlyby Boris Nagaev · b4c5cf16 · Jun 26, 2026 · 1 fileMessage 45 · ThinLow 46Details
Commit message · Boris Nagaev

psbt: parse witness utxo txouts strictly

45/100 · ThinMessage clarity
✓ Descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component! No meaningful explanatory body
Why it was queued
signing boundarysigning or wallet path
AI analysis · Low 46/100

This commit tightens how a Bitcoin-related library reads transaction outputs stored inside PSBT (Partially Signed Bitcoin Transaction) data. Previously, the code read the output value and script in a loose, hand-rolled way that ignored extra trailing bytes and misinterpreted the script length byte. The change now uses the project's standard parser and insists every byte is consumed. That removes a class of parsing inconsistencies that could, in theory, let a malformed PSBT slip past validation or be interpreted differently by different software.