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Moderate 50 Bitcoin

peer: close late connections after disconnect

Public commit record

What the developer wrote

Authored by Boris Nagaev

78/100 · Adequate
peer: close late connections after disconnect

In this commit, we serialize connection association with peer
disconnection. Previously, Disconnect could run before
AssociateConnection, close quit without a socket, and leave a later
connection published with no remaining path that could close it.

We now close connections handed to a peer that is already disconnecting,
and publish the connected flag only after the socket and connection time
are initialized. The tests pin both call orderings and race the
transitions to verify the socket closes exactly once.
✓ Descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Mentions testing or verification
The short version

What changed, and why it matters

This commit fixes a race condition in btcd's peer networking code. If a peer was told to disconnect before a network socket had been attached, the socket could later be attached but never closed, leaking the connection. The fix adds a lock so that attaching a socket and disconnecting cannot happen at the same time, and any socket attached after a disconnect is started gets closed immediately instead of being left open.

Recommended action

Treat as a reliability/resource-exhaustion fix. Review whether leaked connections could accumulate under high churn or adversarial connection timing; deploy the patch in nodes experiencing connection growth. No immediate remote exploit path is evident from the diff alone.

Security signals we found

01

Connection leak / resource exhaustion due to missing close path

02

Race condition between connection association and disconnection

03

Atomic flag published before connection state is fully initialized

04

Defensive fix with concurrency tests added

Risk score

Why this scored 50/100

Our methodology →
Potential impact 14/30
Exploitability 8/25
Stealth signal 9/15
Affected reach 8/15
Confidence 7/10
Evidence quality 4/5
Human-validated context

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