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Boris Nagaev

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76 commits3 monitored projects16 candidates1 high-risk analyses
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Moderate 50 AI analysisMessage 78 · Adequate
BT btcsuitebtcd BitcoinNode implementations

peer: close late connections after disconnect

This commit fixes a race condition in btcd's peer networking code. If a peer was told to disconnect before a network socket had been attached, the socket could later be attached but never closed, leaking the connection. The fix adds a lock…

Connection leak / resource exhaustion due to missing close pathRace condition between connection association and disconnectionAtomic flag published before connection state is fully initialized
617ebe2bby Boris Nagaev+111−72 files
No security note in commit
Moderate 61 AI analysisMessage 68 · Adequate
BT btcsuitebtcd BitcoinNode implementations

server: centralize inbound handshake admission

This commit adds a new inbound connection rate-limiting and admission-control system to btcd. It is designed to reduce the risk of denial-of-service attacks where an attacker opens many incomplete handshake connections or forces the server…

New DoS-mitigation admission control for inbound handshakesPer-source-prefix limits on incomplete handshakesRate and concurrency limits on CPU-bound v2 responder handshake cryptography
6c056ec4by Boris Nagaev+1001−1812 files
No security note in commit
Low 38 AI analysisMessage 58 · Thin
BT btcsuitebtcd BitcoinNode implementations

v2transport: refactor responder setup

This commit refactors how btcd handles incoming Bitcoin v2 transport handshakes. It adds a new admission-control hook so a responder can decide whether to spend CPU on a v2 handshake only after it has seen enough bytes to confirm the peer …

Adds CPU admission control for responder v2 handshake to bound expensive cryptographyEnsures v1 fallback and incomplete candidates do not trigger key generation or admission consumptionPropagates handshake write failures instead of silently dropping them
6cad3935by Boris Nagaev+494−1022 files
No security note in commit
Informational 12 AI analysisMessage 78 · Adequate
BT btcsuitebtcd BitcoinNode implementations

connmgr: bound accepted inbound connections

This commit adds a new optional feature to btcd's connection manager that lets operators set a maximum number of simultaneous inbound connections. It is a defensive hardening change, not a fix for an active vulnerability. The default behav…

New optional inbound connection limit (resource-exhaustion hardening)Slot released exactly once via sync.Once to prevent double-release or leakRejected connections closed before OnAccept callback to limit work done on excess peers
ad8d94e6by Boris Nagaev+291−74 files
No security note in commit
Moderate 58 AI analysisMessage 45 · Thin
BT btcsuitebtcd BitcoinNode implementations

psbt: reject trailing final witness data

This change tightens how a Bitcoin PSBT library extracts final witness data when turning a partially-signed transaction into a finished transaction. Previously, extra bytes after the declared witness stack were silently ignored. Now the li…

strict parsing of serialized witness datarejection of trailing bytes in PSBT final script witnesspotential malleability / ambiguity reduction in PSBT extraction
468853e4by Boris Nagaev+13−91 file
No security note in commit
Low 38 AI analysisMessage 55 · Thin
BT btcsuitebtcd BitcoinNode implementations

psbt: test final witness trailing data rejection

This commit adds a new test to the btcd PSBT (Partially Signed Bitcoin Transaction) library. The test checks that when extracting a final Bitcoin transaction from a PSBT, the library rejects a final witness value that has extra trailing by…

Strict parsing of final witness data to reject malformed/trailing bytesPrevents creation of transactions with non-standard witness encodingTest-only commit implies behavior enforcement elsewhere in the codebase
c87168ebby Boris Nagaev+26−01 file
No security note in commit
Low 25 AI analysisMessage 80 · Strong
BT btcsuitebtcd BitcoinNode implementations

psbt: compact witness utxo scripts after parsing

This commit fixes a memory-usage issue, not a security vulnerability. When reading PSBT data, the code was keeping a pointer to a large 4 MiB internal memory block even for tiny scripts. The patch copies the small script into its own compa…

memory retention reductionno input validation changeno cryptographic change
b0ab66feby Boris Nagaev+10−12 files
No security note in commit
Informational 18 AI analysisMessage 55 · Thin
BT btcsuitebtcd BitcoinNode implementations

rpc: test block proposal trailing byte rejection

This commit only adds a new test to btcd. The test checks that a specific Bitcoin RPC command, used when miners propose new blocks, correctly rejects block data that has extra junk bytes tacked onto the end. The commit itself does not chan…

Trailing-byte deserialization test for block proposal RPCDefensive assertion that malformed input returns ErrRPCDeserialization rather than reaching chain statePattern consistent with prior tests for sendrawtransaction and decoderawtransaction trailing-byte rejection
ac17d232by Boris Nagaev+33−01 file
No security note in commit
Low 44 AI analysisMessage 45 · Thin
BT btcsuitebtcd BitcoinNode implementations

blockchain: load database blocks strictly

This commit changes how btcd reads blocks from its internal database when starting up. Previously it used a loose block parser (wire.MsgBlock.Deserialize) that could accept data with extra trailing bytes. Now it uses btcutil.NewBlockFromBy…

Stricter deserialization of attacker-influenced/local database contentRemoval of lenient block parsing during chain initializationPotential mitigation against stored-data tampering or corruption being silently accepted
29cfb6ecby Boris Nagaev+3−41 file
No security note in commit
Low 46 AI analysisMessage 45 · Thin
BT btcsuitebtcd BitcoinNode implementations

psbt: parse witness utxo txouts strictly

This commit tightens how a Bitcoin-related library reads transaction outputs stored inside PSBT (Partially Signed Bitcoin Transaction) data. Previously, the code read the output value and script in a loose, hand-rolled way that ignored ext…

Strict canonical parsing of serialized transaction outputsRemoval of hand-rolled length handling that ignored script length byteAddition of full-consumption check on parsed witness UTXO data
b4c5cf16by Boris Nagaev+11−91 file
No security note in commit
Low 48 AI analysisMessage 50 · Thin
BT btcsuitebtcd BitcoinNode implementations

musig2: return partial signature read errors

This commit fixes a bug in the MuSig2 multi-signature code where reading a partial signature from an input stream could fail silently. Previously, if the stream ended early or had a read error, the function would return 'no error' as if th…

Silent failure in cryptographic decode pathPartial signature scalar left uninitialized on read errorMuSig2 signing correctness dependency
63bc064dby Boris Nagaev+1−11 file
No security note in commit
Informational 12 AI analysisMessage 55 · Thin
BT btcsuitebtcd BitcoinNode implementations

psbt: test trailing packet data rejection

This commit only adds a new test case. It does not change any production code. The test checks that the PSBT parser rejects files that have extra bytes after a valid PSBT packet. Because no code behavior is changed, this commit by itself d…

Test-only commitNo production code changesTests input-validation behavior (trailing data rejection)
0a1300ddby Boris Nagaev+16−01 file
No security note in commit
Low 45 AI analysisMessage 45 · Thin
BT btcsuitebtcd BitcoinNode implementations

rpc: decode block proposals strictly

This commit changes how submitted block proposals are decoded in the Bitcoin RPC server. It switches from a loose block parser to a stricter one that validates the block more thoroughly before accepting it. The likely goal is to prevent ma…

Stricter input validation on externally supplied block dataChange from manual deserialization to higher-level validated helperPotential mitigation of malformed block proposal handling
7840b814by Boris Nagaev+2−31 file
No security note in commit
Informational 12 AI analysisMessage 60 · Adequate
BT btcsuitebtcd BitcoinNode implementations

musig2: test partial signature short reads

This commit only adds a new unit test that checks whether the MuSig2 partial signature decoder correctly rejects empty or too-short inputs. It does not change any production code, so by itself it cannot introduce or fix a security vulnerab…

4a7a9feaby Boris Nagaev+21−01 file
No security note in commit
Informational 17 AI analysisMessage 55 · Thin
BT btcsuitebtcd BitcoinNode implementations

rpc: test mempool accept trailing byte rejection

This commit only adds a new unit test. It checks that the Bitcoin RPC command testmempoolaccept correctly rejects a transaction hex string that has extra trailing bytes. There is no code fix or behavior change in the main program—just a te…

Test verifies deserialization strictness for testmempoolaccept RPC inputTrailing-byte rejection is a common input-validation hardening measureNo production code change; signal strength is low
f3ec349aby Boris Nagaev+19−01 file
No security note in commit
Low 45 AI analysisMessage 45 · Thin
BT btcsuitebtcd BitcoinNode implementations

rpc: decode raw transaction RPC input strictly

This commit changes how the 'decoderawtransaction' RPC command reads raw transaction bytes. Previously it used a looser deserialization method that could accept data beyond the end of the transaction. Now it uses a stricter parser that rej…

Stricter input validation on an RPC endpointReplacement of permissive deserialization with exact-length parsingPotential for transaction malleability / ambiguity if trailing bytes were previously ignored
0d7259eeby Boris Nagaev+4−41 file
No security note in commit
Low 49 AI analysisMessage 45 · Thin
BT btcsuitebtcd BitcoinNode implementations

rpc: decode sent raw transactions strictly

This commit changes how raw transactions submitted to the Bitcoin node via RPC are decoded. It switches from a lenient decoder to a stricter one that validates the transaction more thoroughly before accepting it. The likely effect is to pr…

Stricter deserialization of user-supplied raw transaction dataChange in RPC input validation path (sendrawtransaction)Potential denial-of-service or mempool corruption risk from malformed transactions mitigated
59db8355by Boris Nagaev+1−31 file
No security note in commit
Informational 12 AI analysisMessage 55 · Thin
BT btcsuitebtcd BitcoinNode implementations

psbt: test witness utxo txout strict parsing

This commit only adds new test code for the PSBT (Partially Signed Bitcoin Transaction) package. It does not change any production code. The tests verify that WitnessUtxo fields are parsed strictly and correctly, including rejecting extra …

Strict parsing tests for WitnessUtxo transaction outputsRejection of trailing data after serialized txOutCorrect handling of multi-byte CompactSize script lengths
40ad9117by Boris Nagaev+79−01 file
No security note in commit
Low 49 AI analysisMessage 45 · Thin
BT btcsuitebtcd BitcoinNode implementations

wire: reject trailing v2 message payload data

This commit adds a check in btcd's Bitcoin network message parser to reject v2 protocol messages that contain leftover, unread data after the expected payload has been decoded. Previously, extra bytes at the end of a message payload were s…

Strict input validation added to network protocol parserRejection of trailing bytes prevents parsing ambiguityPotential P2P protocol malleability vector addressed
03aeb81aby Boris Nagaev+6−01 file
No security note in commit
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