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Low 38 Bitcoin

feat(ethereum): parsing dynamic values in calldata

Public commit record

What the developer wrote

Authored by Ioan Bizău

77/100 · Adequate
feat(ethereum): parsing dynamic values in calldata

* extend calldata parsing to support strings, structs, arrays and more

[no changelog]
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Uses a recognizable type or scope✓ Provides an explanatory body
The short version

What changed, and why it matters

This commit is a feature expansion for Trezor's Ethereum 'clear signing' system, which decodes smart-contract call data so users see human-readable details instead of raw hex. It adds support for dynamic Solidity types such as strings, byte arrays, structs, and arrays. The change is large and refactors how transaction data is parsed and presented. It does not appear to be a disclosed security fix, but because it handles untrusted transaction data, any parsing bugs could in principle let a malformed transaction bypass warnings or crash the device. The diff itself shows explicit bounds checks and validation, which is a positive sign, but the new code paths are complex and have not been externally audited in the provided materials.

Recommended action

Treat this as a high-complexity feature change rather than a confirmed vulnerability. Review the new ABI parser for memory safety and correctness on malformed calldata, especially dynamic offsets, nested arrays, and struct handling. Run fuzzing against the parser with crafted transaction data. Verify that any parser exception reliably falls back to blind-signing confirmation or aborts, and does not silently truncate or mis-display fields. No immediate patch is indicated by the supplied materials.

Security signals we found

01

Large refactor of untrusted input parser for Ethereum transaction calldata

02

New dynamic type parsing (strings, bytes, arrays, structs) increases attack surface

03

Explicit bounds checks and padding validation added for dynamic values

04

Malformed calldata now raises InvalidFunctionCall/OutOfBounds and aborts clear-signing path

05

No vendor security disclosure or advisory referenced in commit or supplied materials

06

No independent researcher attribution in commit or supplied materials

Risk score

Why this scored 38/100

Our methodology →
Potential impact 8/30
Exploitability 7/25
Stealth signal 6/15
Affected reach 8/15
Confidence 6/10
Evidence quality 3/5
Human-validated context

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