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High 74 Bitcoin

fix(core/ui): fix non-BMP glyph aliasing

Public commit record

What the developer wrote

Authored by Jakub Janků

80/100 · Strong
fix(core/ui): fix non-BMP glyph aliasing

get_glyph() narrowed chars with `as u16`, so a code point above U+FFFF
was drawn with the glyph of the BMP char sharing its low 16 bits (e.g.
U+10041 as 'A'). Two different strings could thus render identically
while signing different bytes. Draw such chars with the nonprintable
glyph instead.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
(cherry picked from commit f0d78f8fe65b1eac885a048b3173af1deb3a86b8)
✓ Descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Uses a recognizable type or scope✓ Provides detailed explanatory context
The short version

What changed, and why it matters

This commit fixes a display bug in Trezor hardware wallets where special Unicode characters above U+FFFF (so-called supplementary plane characters) were incorrectly drawn as completely different, ordinary characters. For example, a rare character U+10041 could appear on screen as the letter 'A'. Because the device signs the original bytes but the user sees a misleading string, an attacker could craft a transaction or message that looks legitimate to the user while actually signing something different. The fix now shows a non-printable placeholder for such characters instead of the wrong glyph.

Recommended action

Treat this as a security-relevant UI-rendering fix. Verify the patched firmware on real devices for non-BMP strings, ensure the nonprintable glyph is clearly distinguishable, and consider broader Unicode normalization/homograph defenses in signing prompts. Users should upgrade firmware once a release containing this commit is available.

Security signals we found

01

UI spoofing / homograph-style attack via glyph aliasing

02

User-visible string differs from signed bytes

03

Silent integer truncation of Unicode code point

04

Changelog explicitly labeled as .security

05

Regression test added for non-BMP aliasing

Risk score

Why this scored 74/100

Our methodology →
Potential impact 22/30
Exploitability 16/25
Stealth signal 12/15
Affected reach 10/15
Confidence 9/10
Evidence quality 5/5
Human-validated context

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