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High 75 Bitcoin

fix(solana): never hide account self-assignment

Public commit record

What the developer wrote

Authored by Jakub Janků

100/100 · Strong
fix(solana): never hide account self-assignment

- Assign hid both the assigned account and the new owner when they
equal the signer, so a self-assignment showed no instruction screen
at all and could be appended to an otherwise visible transfer.

- The owner is a program ID, not an authority. Assigning a wallet to
its own non-executable address permanently locks its lamports: only
the current owner program can debit lamports or change the owner.
- https://solana.com/docs/core/accounts#key-facts
- https://github.com/anza-xyz/agave/blob/8acf2b352b9768b2b96f283400d8b9393c6c6e40/transaction-context/src/instruction_accounts.rs#L91-L103

- Always show both fields for consistency with "Assign With Seed".

(cherry picked from commit 2894b1ec7a20e51614eaa79881a39f37a0b33c75)
✓ Descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Uses a recognizable type or scope✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Explains rationale or failure mode✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference
The short version

What changed, and why it matters

This fix prevents a Trezor hardware wallet from silently approving a specific Solana 'Assign' instruction. Previously, when a user assigned their own account as the new owner program, both key details were hidden from the device screen, so the instruction produced no visible prompt at all. An attacker could tack this silent self-assignment onto an otherwise normal-looking transfer, tricking the user into signing a transaction that permanently locks their Solana account's funds. The patch now always displays both the account being assigned and the new owner program.

Recommended action

Users should upgrade to firmware containing this commit. Developers should review other Solana instructions for similar default_value_to_hide patterns that could hide entire screens when values match the signer, and ensure every instruction renders at least one confirmation screen.

Security signals we found

01

UI field suppression caused an entire instruction screen to disappear when values equal the signer

02

Silent instruction could be appended to a visible transfer in the same transaction

03

Self-assignment to a non-executable owner program permanently locks lamports per Solana account rules

04

Vendor-authored changelog fragment labels the change as a security fix

05

Patch is a cherry-pick, indicating backport of a security-relevant fix

Risk score

Why this scored 75/100

Our methodology →
Potential impact 22/30
Exploitability 18/25
Stealth signal 13/15
Affected reach 10/15
Confidence 8/10
Evidence quality 4/5
Human-validated context

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