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Low 37 Bitcoin

fix(core): support change outputs ADA payment_req

Public commit record

What the developer wrote

Authored by obrusvit

72/100 · Adequate
fix(core): support change outputs ADA payment_req

- only ORDINARY_SIGNER is supported for payment requests
✓ Descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Uses a recognizable type or scope✓ Provides an explanatory body
The short version

What changed, and why it matters

This update changes how Trezor handles Cardano (ADA) payment requests when a transaction includes both a recipient payment and a change output returning funds to the user's own wallet. Previously, any transaction with more than one output was rejected when a payment request was used, which prevented normal 'send payment and get change back' transactions. The fix allows one change output plus one recipient output, while still blocking risky cases such as multiple recipients, tokens on the recipient output, Plutus scripts, or payment requests in non-ordinary signing modes. It is a feature expansion with added safety checks, not a clear-cut security bug fix, but it touches code that protects users from signing unintended payments.

Recommended action

Review the updated payment-request flow in ordinary_signer.py and signer.py to confirm that change outputs cannot be mistaken for recipient outputs and that the new failure cases are enforced in all code paths. Run the updated Cardano SLIP-24 test fixtures and UI tests before release.

Security signals we found

01

Payment-request verification moved from per-output validation to post-output processing, ensuring all outputs are checked before the user confirms

02

New explicit rejection paths: only-change output, multiple recipients, tokens/datum on recipient, Plutus signing mode

03

Change output address is derived from device keychain rather than trusting an external address

04

Payment request confirmation is shown only after signature verification succeeds

05

No CVE, advisory, or independent researcher attribution present in commit materials

Risk score

Why this scored 37/100

Our methodology →
Potential impact 8/30
Exploitability 6/25
Stealth signal 5/15
Affected reach 7/15
Confidence 7/10
Evidence quality 4/5
Human-validated context

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