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Low 41 Bitcoin

feat(core): introduce external app orchestration

Public commit record

What the developer wrote

Authored by cepetr

72/100 · Adequate
feat(core): introduce external app orchestration

Co-authored-by: Lukas Bielesch <bielesch.lukas@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: matejcik <ja@matejcik.cz>

[no changelog]
✓ Descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Uses a recognizable type or scope✓ Provides an explanatory body
The short version

What changed, and why it matters

This commit adds the first version of a new feature that lets a Trezor device load and run small external applications sent from a connected computer. It introduces new message types, a loading protocol, and a place to store app-related data. The actual execution part is only a stub that returns 'Not implemented', so this commit is mostly scaffolding. Because it deals with loading and running external code, it is security-sensitive, but the current code does not appear to be an active vulnerability on its own.

Recommended action

Treat this as a security-relevant feature addition that needs careful review once the native verification and IPC runtime are included. Specifically: ensure the fingerprint check is enforced in release builds, validate the root packet timestamp/state update against downgrade/replay attacks, bound chunk sizes and counts, and require user confirmation before loading or running external apps. Review the final run.py implementation and any sandboxing around ExtAppMessage when it lands.

Security signals we found

01

New wire protocol for loading and invoking external code on the device

02

Host-supplied header, proof, root packet, and data chunks are passed into native app image creation/verification functions not shown in this diff

03

Fingerprint check is gated by `if __debug__`, meaning it is disabled in release builds

04

Root packet update uses host-provided timestamp and state serialization without visible replay/rollback protections in this diff

05

ExtAppMessage/Response creates a generic IPC-style channel into an external app with arbitrary bytes

06

run.py is currently a stub, so the execution surface is not yet active

07

Large generated protobuf surface increases parsing/serialization attack surface

Risk score

Why this scored 41/100

Our methodology →
Potential impact 12/30
Exploitability 8/25
Stealth signal 6/15
Affected reach 7/15
Confidence 5/10
Evidence quality 3/5
Human-validated context

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