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Low 40 Bitcoin

feat(core): reject chacha20poly1305 data after a partial block

Public commit record

What the developer wrote

Authored by Andrew Kozlik

85/100 · Strong
feat(core): reject chacha20poly1305 data after a partial block

Add a LAST state to the ChaCha20Poly1305 context, which is set by encrypt()
and decrypt() when the input is a partial block. Any further calls to
encrypt() or decrypt() raise RuntimeError in the LAST state.

[no changelog]
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Uses a recognizable type or scope✓ Provides detailed explanatory context
The short version

What changed, and why it matters

This commit tightens the rules for a cryptographic helper (ChaCha20-Poly1305) inside Trezor hardware wallets. Previously, after you fed it a partial block of data, you could keep calling encrypt/decrypt with more data. Now the code enters a 'LAST' state after any partial block and refuses further encrypt/decrypt calls, only allowing the final finish call. This is a defensive correctness fix that prevents misuse of the cipher's streaming API, which could otherwise lead to nonce reuse or authentication failures. There is no claim in the commit that an actual exploit exists, and no CVE or vendor security advisory is supplied.

Recommended action

Treat as a defensive hardening patch. Review callers of the ChaCha20Poly1305 binding to confirm they already pass full blocks except for the final call, and ensure the change does not break legitimate streaming use cases. No urgent incident response is indicated by the commit materials alone.

Security signals we found

01

State-machine hardening of AEAD streaming API

02

Prevention of additional data after a partial ChaCha20-Poly1305 block

03

Potential misuse class: nonce reuse or tag computation over non-contiguous plaintext if caller splits data incorrectly

04

No changelog entry, suggesting routine hardening rather than advertised security fix

Risk score

Why this scored 40/100

Our methodology →
Potential impact 12/30
Exploitability 8/25
Stealth signal 5/15
Affected reach 6/15
Confidence 6/10
Evidence quality 3/5
Human-validated context

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