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Low 31 Monero

Merge pull request #1456 from cypherstack/feat/openalias

Public commit record

What the developer wrote

Authored by Julian

58/100 · Thin
Merge pull request #1456 from cypherstack/feat/openalias

Add OpenAlias for Monero sends
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference! No meaningful explanatory body
The short version

What changed, and why it matters

This commit adds OpenAlias support for Monero sends in Stack Wallet. OpenAlias lets users type a human-readable alias (like alice@example.com) instead of a long crypto address; the wallet then looks up the corresponding Monero address via DNS. The change introduces a new lookup service, wires it into the mobile and desktop send flows, and shows the resolved alias on the confirmation screen. It also adds many tests. There is no direct evidence in the commit of a security vulnerability, but any DNS-based alias system introduces new trust and privacy considerations.

Recommended action

Reviewers should verify that cs_openalias and its transitive dependencies (dnssec_resolver, doh_transport, openalias) correctly enforce DNSSEC and do not allow downgrade or clearnet fallback. Confirm that resolved addresses cannot be substituted after preview but before signing, and that the cached resolution TTL cannot be exploited to replay an outdated address. Consider auditing how the app handles a malicious or compromised resolver, and ensure the UI clearly distinguishes an OpenAlias-resolved send from a direct-address send.

Security signals we found

01

New network dependency: DNS/OpenAlias lookups can leak recipient alias and resolver metadata to DNS/DoH servers and the network path

02

Tor routing is enforced when Tor is enabled, with no clearnet fallback, reducing network-level exposure

03

Incognito mode blocks lookups entirely, preventing accidental network leakage

04

Resolved address is validated by the coin's validateAddress before being used in transaction construction

05

Alias is displayed on the confirmation screen so the user can verify what was resolved

06

DNSSEC validation is delegated to the cs_openalias/dnssec_resolver packages; commit does not show implementation details

07

Potential for DNS spoofing or malicious OpenAlias records if DNSSEC validation is incomplete or bypassed

08

No evidence in the diff of input sanitization beyond existing address validation and the package's own alias parsing

Risk score

Why this scored 31/100

Our methodology →
Potential impact 5/30
Exploitability 5/25
Stealth signal 5/15
Affected reach 5/15
Confidence 7/10
Evidence quality 4/5
Human-validated context

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