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Low 29 Monero

Support multi-recipient Monero payment URIs

Public commit record

What the developer wrote

Authored by Waozi

80/100 · Strong
Support multi-recipient Monero payment URIs

Monero payment URIs can list several recipients, e.g.
`monero:A;B?tx_amount=1;2&recipient_name=x;y`. Parse these into
PaymentUriData.recipients, requiring one amount (and, when given, one
name) per address. Callers opt in with allowMultipleRecipients, so screens
that handle a single address reject these URIs rather than dropping
recipients.

Monero wallets now report supportsMultiRecipient. On their mobile and
desktop send screens, "Add recipient" or a multi-recipient URI replaces
the address field with the Recipient forms started for FROST, one per
recipient, which can be added to and removed. A multi-recipient URI
scanned or pasted into one of those forms asks before replacing all the
recipients. A multi-recipient URI rejected for its amounts clears the
previous recipient and amount, so Preview can't send them instead. The
amount field shows their total, and removing all but one recipient
returns to the normal form. The transaction has one output per
recipient, and the confirmation screen lists each recipient with its
name and amount.

The Recipient form now:
- shows the payment request's name for its address, and flags an
invalid address;
- fills in the address, amount, and name from a pasted payment request,
as it did from a scanned one;
- scans with the desktop QR code scanner on desktop;
- keeps its amount, rather than the number typed, when the display unit
changes, which otherwise read e.g. 1000 mXMR as 1000 XMR. The send
screens' amount field does the same, keeping any Xelis send all.
Recipient forms are kept per wallet, so recipients entered for one
wallet never appear in another wallet's form.

prepareSend no longer treats a multi-recipient total equal to the whole
balance as sending the whole balance, which it then rejected for
multiple recipients; the fee has to fit in the balance as for any other
amount.
✓ Descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Explains rationale or failure mode
The short version

What changed, and why it matters

This commit adds support for Monero payment URIs that contain multiple recipients, such as a single QR code or link that pays several people at once. It also fixes a related display bug where changing the currency unit (for example from XMR to milli-XMR) would misread the typed number. The changes are a feature addition with some defensive hardening, not a patch for an active security vulnerability.

Recommended action

Review the new parseUriRecipients and _parseMoneroRecipients logic for edge cases (e.g. percent-encoded semicolons, whitespace, very long lists), ensure the confirmation screen correctly handles null labels, and verify that the allowMultipleRecipients flag is consistently passed by all callers that parse payment URIs. Consider adding fuzz tests for malformed Monero URIs.

Security signals we found

01

URI parser now rejects malformed multi-recipient Monero URIs (mismatched address/amount/name counts, empty addresses, invalid amounts)

02

Multi-recipient URIs are only accepted when the caller explicitly opts in via allowMultipleRecipients, preventing silent dropping of recipients on screens that expect one address

03

Rejected multi-recipient URIs clear the prior single-recipient address and amount so Preview cannot accidentally send the old values

04

Recipient state is now keyed by walletId so cross-wallet recipient leakage is prevented

05

Amount field now preserves the canonical Amount value when the display unit changes, fixing a prior misinterpretation bug (e.g. 1000 mXMR read as 1000 XMR)

06

prepareSend no longer treats a multi-recipient total equal to the whole balance as a sweep/send-all, avoiding an incorrect rejection path

07

Recipient form now flags invalid addresses and shows payment-request labels

Risk score

Why this scored 29/100

Our methodology →
Potential impact 5/30
Exploitability 3/25
Stealth signal 4/15
Affected reach 6/15
Confidence 7/10
Evidence quality 4/5
Human-validated context

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