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Informational 20 Monero

feat(shopinbit): add ShopInBit payment and send-from views

Public commit record

What the developer wrote

Authored by sneurlax

62/100 · Adequate
feat(shopinbit): add ShopInBit payment and send-from views
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Uses a recognizable type or scope! No meaningful explanatory body
The short version

What changed, and why it matters

This commit adds two new screens that let a user pay a ShopInBit invoice from inside the Stack Wallet app. It fetches payment details from ShopInBit, shows a QR code and address, and can start a wallet-to-address send for BTC or XMR. There is no obvious malicious code, but the new code trusts a third-party API and URIs/addresses supplied by it, and contains a small hard-coded test fallback that could send real money if the sandbox flag were misused.

Recommended action

Treat this as a feature commit that should undergo normal security review of the third-party integration. Verify that ShopInBit API responses are authenticated/validated, that URI parsing cannot be tricked into extracting an attacker-controlled address or amount, that the sandbox fallback amount cannot be reached in production, and that swallowed exceptions do not hide payment failures. No immediate incident response is indicated by the diff alone.

Security signals we found

01

New third-party integration (ShopInBit API) added to wallet payment flow

02

Payment address and amount derived from external API response and URI parsing

03

Network errors silently swallowed in `_pollPayment`, `_loadPayment`, `_refreshInvoice`, and amount parsing

04

Hard-coded fallback amount (10000 raw units) used when `ShopInBitService.instance.client.sandbox` is true

05

Direct mutation of `widget.model` state

06

No visible input validation on API-derived address/amount before passing to wallet prepareSend

Risk score

Why this scored 20/100

Our methodology →
Potential impact 4/30
Exploitability 3/25
Stealth signal 2/15
Affected reach 5/15
Confidence 4/10
Evidence quality 2/5
Human-validated context

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