AI-generated analysisPublished automatically and not human-verified. Validated context appears in community notes below.
← Watch feed
Moderate 62 Monero

Merge pull request #1498 from cypherstack/pr1479/fix

Public commit record

What the developer wrote

Authored by Julian

58/100 · Thin
Merge pull request #1498 from cypherstack/pr1479/fix

fix merge order screwup
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference! No meaningful explanatory body
The short version

What changed, and why it matters

This commit fixes a privacy bug in Stack Wallet's Ethereum support. Previously, if a user turned Tor on or off while the wallet was still using an already-created network connection, later Ethereum traffic could accidentally use the wrong route—potentially sending sensitive RPC requests outside Tor after the user enabled it, or through Tor after the user disabled it. The patch wraps each Ethereum connection in a guard that refuses to send any further request if the Tor setting has changed since the connection was created, forcing the next operation to build a fresh connection under the current preference. It also adds tests proving the behavior.

Recommended action

Review whether other wallets or long-lived HTTP/WebSocket clients in the codebase reuse clients across Tor preference changes and apply a similar guard. Confirm the fix is included in the next release and consider disclosing the privacy issue to users who relied on Tor for Ethereum transactions.

Security signals we found

01

Tor proxy preference could change while a long-lived Web3Client was reused, causing subsequent RPCs to use the wrong transport

02

New _TorPreferenceClient guard throws StateError if the current Tor preference differs from the one used to build the client

03

Tests assert that no request is sent after a Tor toggle and that unchanged preferences continue to work

04

The guard prevents accidental clearnet leakage when Tor is enabled mid-operation and prevents accidental Tor routing when Tor is disabled mid-operation

Risk score

Why this scored 62/100

Our methodology →
Potential impact 18/30
Exploitability 12/25
Stealth signal 10/15
Affected reach 10/15
Confidence 8/10
Evidence quality 4/5
Human-validated context

Community notes

Notes can correct, qualify, or add evidence to the AI analysis. Every note shown here has been validated by a human moderator.

No validated notes yet.

The AI analysis stands alone for now. Submit a note if you can add evidence or important context.