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Low 35 Bitcoin

improve wallet update behaviour for silent payment self-sends

Public commit record

What the developer wrote

Authored by Craig Raw

50/100 · Thin
improve wallet update behaviour for silent payment self-sends
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component! No meaningful explanatory body
The short version

What changed, and why it matters

This commit fixes how Sparrow Wallet updates its internal records when a user sends bitcoin to themselves using a 'silent payment' address. Previously, the wallet could fail to mark the coins being spent as spent, or could show an incorrect balance, because the wallet's update logic did not properly handle transactions discovered through the silent-payment channel. The patch makes the wallet consider both newly discovered silent-payment outputs and the inputs they spend in a single atomic update, and it also improves how broadcast transactions are tracked before they are sent to the network.

Recommended action

Treat this as a bug-fix commit with moderate wallet-integrity relevance. Users relying on silent payments should upgrade to a release containing this commit. Reviewers should verify that the new affectedNodes logic correctly covers all spent inputs and that the eager broadcast rollback does not introduce any race conditions with concurrent wallet refreshes.

Security signals we found

01

Incorrect wallet state update for self-spends via silent payments could leave spent TXOs unmarked (UTXO double-count / balance inflation).

02

Eager population of broadcastedTransactions with rollback on failure reduces window for inconsistent local state after broadcast failure.

03

Fee handling now falls back to cached fee when server reference lacks fee data, improving consistency of stored transaction metadata.

04

Silent payment batch processing now updates wallet transactions and marks spent-input nodes atomically.

Risk score

Why this scored 35/100

Our methodology →
Potential impact 8/30
Exploitability 5/25
Stealth signal 6/15
Affected reach 7/15
Confidence 6/10
Evidence quality 3/5
Human-validated context

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