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Moderate 66 Bitcoin

prevent a password change from re-encrypting wallets whose filenames share the same prefix

Public commit record

What the developer wrote

Authored by Craig Raw

50/100 · Thin
prevent a password change from re-encrypting wallets whose filenames share the same prefix
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component! No meaningful explanatory body
The short version

What changed, and why it matters

This commit fixes a bug in Sparrow Wallet's password-change feature. Previously, when a user changed the password on a wallet file whose name was a prefix of another wallet file (for example, 'Savings' and 'Savings.old'), the underlying H2 database tool would also re-encrypt the sibling wallet file. That could corrupt or lock the sibling wallet. The fix copies the target wallet to its own temporary directory, performs the encryption change there, verifies it, and then atomically replaces the original file so no other wallet files are touched.

Recommended action

Users should upgrade to a Sparrow Wallet release containing this commit. Until then, avoid changing wallet passwords when other wallet files in the same directory share a common prefix with the target wallet name. Wallet backups should be maintained before any password change.

Security signals we found

01

Unintended re-encryption of sibling wallet files due to prefix matching in H2 ChangeFileEncryption

02

Potential wallet corruption or loss of access when changing a wallet password

03

Use of isolated temporary directory to prevent cross-wallet file operations

04

Atomic move fallback to reduce window for file corruption during replacement

05

Verification of encryption header before replacing original wallet file

06

Secure deletion of temporary wallet copy after conversion

07

Failure propagation added instead of silent swallowing of password-change errors

Risk score

Why this scored 66/100

Our methodology →
Potential impact 22/30
Exploitability 12/25
Stealth signal 10/15
Affected reach 10/15
Confidence 8/10
Evidence quality 4/5
Human-validated context

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