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Low 28 Bitcoin

Avoid initial commitment channel_ready retransmission while splicing

Public commit record

What the developer wrote

Authored by Wilmer Paulino

73/100 · Adequate
Avoid initial commitment channel_ready retransmission while splicing

If nodes have started a splice, this means they have both sent and
received `channel_ready` already: in that case, it's unnecessary to
retransmit `channel_ready` on reconnection.
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context
The short version

What changed, and why it matters

This commit fixes a protocol-level bug in the Lightning Dev Kit where a node could incorrectly re-send a 'channel_ready' message after reconnecting to a peer during a splice operation. Splicing only happens after both sides have already exchanged 'channel_ready', so retransmitting it again is unnecessary and could confuse the peer or violate protocol expectations. The fix adds checks to skip that retransmission when a splice is in progress or has been started.

Recommended action

Treat as a low-severity protocol correctness fix. Reviewers should verify that the two new conditions (pending_splice and splice_parent_funding_txid) fully cover all splice states where channel_ready retransmission should be suppressed, and that no other reconnection paths are affected.

Security signals we found

01

Protocol-state inconsistency: retransmitting channel_ready after both sides have already sent/received it during a splice could lead to peer confusion or state machine errors.

02

BOLT compliance: the change aligns behavior with the intended reading that retransmission is only required when no splice-related fields are present in channel_reestablish.

03

Test expectation change: splicing_tests.rs no longer forces send_channel_ready on reconnect, confirming the new behavior is intentional.

Risk score

Why this scored 28/100

Our methodology →
Potential impact 4/30
Exploitability 3/25
Stealth signal 5/15
Affected reach 5/15
Confidence 7/10
Evidence quality 4/5
Human-validated context

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