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Low 35 Bitcoin

Merge PR 'Allow filtered block rescans at the current tip' (#4847)

Public commit record

What the developer wrote

Authored by Matt Corallo

81/100 · Strong
Merge PR 'Allow filtered block rescans at the current tip' (#4847)

from 2026-08-block-replay into main

Reviewed-on: https://git.rust-bitcoin.org/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning/pulls/4847
Reviewed-by: jkczyz <jkczyz@noreply.git.rust-bitcoin.org>
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference
The short version

What changed, and why it matters

This commit changes how the Lightning Dev Kit (LDK) node software handles receiving the same block twice through its filtered-block interface. Previously, calling filtered_block_connected with the current tip again would trigger an assertion failure and crash the node. The patch allows this 'rescan' case, treating it as a replay rather than a new block, so the node no longer panics. This is a robustness improvement for clients that use compact block filters or other filtered-block delivery paths, but it is not a cryptographic or funds-theft vulnerability.

Recommended action

Treat as a hardening/robustness fix. Users running LDK-based nodes that consume compact block filters or other filtered-block sources should update to avoid crashes from block replays. No immediate emergency response is warranted because the issue is a local crash (DoS) rather than loss of funds, and the commit already contains tests.

Security signals we found

01

Assertion relaxation in block connection path

02

Potential denial-of-service vector removed: previously a malicious or buggy filter provider could crash the node by replaying the current tip

03

New test coverage for same-block filtered rescan

04

Changes limited to filtered_block_connected; block_connected path unchanged

Risk score

Why this scored 35/100

Our methodology →
Potential impact 8/30
Exploitability 4/25
Stealth signal 5/15
Affected reach 7/15
Confidence 7/10
Evidence quality 4/5
Human-validated context

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